rio: extract from 2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md

- Source: inbox/archive/2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md
- Domain: internet-finance
- Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 5)

Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md

@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ Autocrat is MetaDAO's core governance program on Solana -- the on-chain implemen
 ### Additional Evidence (extend)
 *Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
 
-The original CLOB implementation had specific technical limitations that prompted architectural redesign: 3.75 SOL state rent per market pair (135-225 SOL annually for 3-5 proposals/month), 1 META minimum order size as spam filter against midpoint manipulation, and vulnerability to selective market cranking and VWAP wash-trading manipulation. The passed AMM migration proposal (2024-01-24, completed 2024-01-29) replaced TWAP settlement with liquidity-weighted average price, where liquidity depth determines price weight rather than pure time-weighting. Implementation included permissionless pause/close features, removed minimum order size restrictions, and introduced 3-5% fees to incentivize LP participation and discourage manipulation.
+(extend) MetaDAO migrated from CLOB-based to AMM-based futarchy implementation in January 2024 (proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG passed 2024-01-29, completed 2024-01-29). The AMM version uses liquidity-weighted price over time as settlement metric instead of CLOB midpoint, with 3-5% fees to incentivize LPs and discourage manipulation. Migration addressed three CLOB problems: lack of liquidity from wide uncertainty ranges discouraging limit orders near midpoint, manipulation susceptibility through selective market cranking and wash trading, and 3.75 SOL state rent costs per market pair (135-225 SOL annually for 3-5 proposals/month). Implementation by joebuild (program) and 0xNalloK (frontend) with 3-week development plus 1 week review, compensated 400 META on passing plus 800 META on completed migration.
 
 ---
 

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md

@@ -23,12 +23,6 @@ This evidence has direct implications for governance design. It suggests that [[
 
 Optimism's futarchy experiment achieved 5,898 total trades from 430 active forecasters (average 13.6 transactions per person) over 21 days, with 88.6% being first-time Optimism governance participants. This suggests futarchy CAN attract substantial engagement when implemented at scale with proper incentives, contradicting the limited-volume pattern observed in MetaDAO. Key differences: Optimism used play money (lower barrier to entry), had institutional backing (Uniswap Foundation co-sponsor), and involved grant selection (clearer stakes) rather than protocol governance decisions. The participation breadth (10 countries, 4 continents, 36 new users/day) suggests the limited-volume finding may be specific to MetaDAO's implementation or use case rather than a structural futarchy limitation.
 
-
-### Additional Evidence (extend)
-*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
-
-The root cause of limited trading volume was identified as structural: wide uncertainty ranges in estimating future MetaDAO value under pass/fail conditions discouraged participants from risking funds with limit orders near the midpoint price. This liquidity problem was severe enough to motivate a complete architecture change from CLOBs to AMMs with 3-5% fees designed to incentivize LP participation. The proposal explicitly stated: 'Estimating a fair price for the future value of MetaDao under pass/fail conditions is difficult, and most reasonable estimates will have a wide range. This uncertainty discourages people from risking their funds with limit orders near the midpoint price, and has the effect of reducing liquidity (and trading).'
-
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-markets-solve-clob-liquidity-and-manipulation-problems-through-liquidity-weighted-pricing-and-high-fees.md

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "AMMs address futarchy's CLOB drawbacks by using liquidity-weighted time-average pricing with 3-5% fees to discourage manipulation"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "MetaDAO proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG, 2024-01-24"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# AMM futarchy markets solve CLOB liquidity and manipulation problems through liquidity-weighted pricing and high fees
+
+Central Limit Order Books (CLOBs) in futarchy implementations face three structural problems: lack of liquidity due to wide uncertainty ranges discouraging limit orders near midpoint, susceptibility to manipulation through selective market cranking and wash trading, and high state rent costs (3.75 SOL per market pair, 135-225 SOL annually for 3-5 proposals/month). 
+
+MetaDAO's proposed AMM solution addresses all three by using liquidity-weighted price over time as the settlement metric, where more liquidity gives current price more weight. High fees (3-5%) serve dual purpose: incentivizing liquidity providers and aggressively discouraging wash-trading manipulation. The mechanism works by having proposers lock initial liquidity and set starting prices for pass/fail markets. Liquidity starts low, traders swap to move price to their preferred level, then provide liquidity attracted by high fee incentives. Liquidity increases over the proposal duration. Unlike CLOBs which require minimum 1 META order size as spam filter, AMMs allow trading at any granularity.
+
+The proposal was passed by MetaDAO on 2024-01-29 and implemented by joebuild (program) and 0xNalloK (frontend) with 3-week development timeline plus 1 week review, compensated at 400 META on passing with additional 800 META on completed migration.
+
+## Evidence
+- MetaDAO proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG passed 2024-01-29
+- CLOB state rent costs: 3.75 SOL per market pair, 135-225 SOL annually at 3-5 proposals/month
+- Proposed fee structure: 3-5% to incentivize LPs and discourage manipulation
+- Liquidity-weighted time-average price metric replaces CLOB midpoint pricing
+- Proposer lock-up requirement for initial liquidity
+
+## Challenges
+- Standard smart contract risk in deployment
+- Uncertain LP adoption — liquidity depends on participant willingness despite fee incentives
+- One-sided liquidity provision not supported (though spot markets and arbitrage provide alternatives)
+- Feedback noted that OpenBook state rent costs could be recouped through autocrat program migration, potentially reducing economic urgency of AMM switch
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
+- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]]
+- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
+- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md

@@ -35,10 +35,10 @@ MycoRealms implementation reveals operational friction points: monthly $10,000 a
 Optimism futarchy achieved 430 active forecasters and 88.6% first-time governance participants by using play money, demonstrating that removing capital requirements can dramatically lower participation barriers. However, this came at the cost of prediction accuracy (8x overshoot on magnitude estimates), revealing a new friction: the play-money vs real-money tradeoff. Play money enables permissionless participation but sacrifices calibration; real money provides calibration but creates regulatory and capital barriers. This suggests futarchy adoption faces a structural dilemma between accessibility and accuracy that liquidity requirements alone don't capture. The tradeoff is not merely about quantity of liquidity but the fundamental difference between incentive structures that attract participants vs incentive structures that produce accurate predictions.
 
 
-### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
 *Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
 
-MetaDAO's AMM migration proposal (passed 2024-01-24) explicitly identified liquidity requirements as a core friction point severe enough to require fundamental mechanism redesign. The CLOB implementation suffered from insufficient liquidity due to wide uncertainty ranges discouraging limit orders, plus 135-225 SOL annual state rent costs ($11,475-$19,125 at 2024 prices) creating economic barriers to market creation. The proposal acknowledged adoption risk: 'Similar to an orderbook, available liquidity will be decided by LPs. AMMs will incentivize LP'ing, though adoption within the DAO is not a certainty.' This represents a production system confirming that liquidity requirements remain a material adoption barrier even after architectural improvements.
+(extend) MetaDAO's migration from CLOB to AMM implementation (January 2024, proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG) directly addressed the liquidity requirement friction. CLOBs suffered from lack of liquidity because wide uncertainty ranges in estimating future token value discouraged limit orders near midpoint. AMMs solve this through liquidity-weighted time-average pricing where proposers lock initial liquidity, traders move price through swaps, then provide liquidity attracted by 3-5% fees. This reduces the capital efficiency barrier for futarchy adoption by allowing liquidity to accumulate over proposal duration rather than requiring upfront commitment.
 
 ---
 

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-clob-state-rent-costs-135-to-225-sol-annually-for-active-daos-making-amms-economically-superior.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "CLOB-based futarchy costs 3.75 SOL per proposal in non-recoverable state rent, creating economic pressure toward AMM alternatives"
+confidence: likely
+source: "MetaDAO proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG, 2024-01-24"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Futarchy CLOB state rent costs 135 to 225 SOL annually for active DAOs creating economic pressure toward AMM alternatives
+
+Central Limit Order Book (CLOB) implementations of futarchy on Solana incur 3.75 SOL in state rent per pass/fail market pair. For a DAO averaging 3-5 proposals per month, this translates to 135-225 SOL annually ($11,475-$19,125 at January 2024 prices). Under the original OpenBook-based implementation, these costs could not be recouped, creating a direct economic incentive to migrate from CLOBs to AMMs independent of any liquidity or manipulation considerations.
+
+This cost structure creates a scaling problem for active governance: state rent burden scales linearly with governance activity, meaning more active DAOs face proportionally higher costs. AMMs cost "almost nothing in state rent" by comparison, making the switch economically necessary for any futarchy implementation expecting sustained governance activity.
+
+Note: Feedback during the MetaDAO proposal indicated there are ways to recoup OpenBook state rent costs through autocrat program migration, which would reduce the economic urgency of switching to AMMs. This suggests the cost problem is implementation-specific rather than structural to CLOBs themselves.
+
+## Evidence
+- 3.75 SOL state rent per pass/fail market pair (OpenBook CLOB implementation)
+- 3-5 proposals/month average for MetaDAO
+- 135-225 SOL annual cost at 3-5 proposals/month
+- $11,475-$19,125 USD equivalent at January 2024 SOL prices (~$85/SOL)
+- AMMs described as costing "almost nothing in state rent"
+- Proposal feedback: state rent recoupability possible through autocrat migration
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]]
+- [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]]
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
+- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/metadao-amm-program-replaces-clob-architecture-to-solve-futarchy-liquidity-and-manipulation-problems.md

@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-domain: internet-finance
-description: "MetaDAO's AMM migration replaces CLOBs with liquidity-weighted pricing and high fees to address futarchy's core liquidity, manipulation, and state rent cost problems"
-confidence: experimental
-source: "MetaDAO proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG by joebuild, passed 2024-01-24"
-created: 2024-01-24
-processed_date: 2024-01-24
----
-
-# MetaDAO's AMM program replaces CLOB architecture to solve futarchy liquidity and manipulation problems through liquidity-weighted pricing and high-fee LP incentives
-
-MetaDAO's passed proposal (2024-01-24) to migrate from Central Limit Order Books (CLOBs) to Automated Market Makers (AMMs) addresses three structural failures in the futarchy implementation: insufficient liquidity due to wide uncertainty ranges discouraging limit orders near midpoint prices, manipulation susceptibility through bid/ask spread exploitation and selective market cranking, and recurring state rent costs of 135-225 SOL annually (3.75 SOL per market pair × 3-5 proposals/month, valued at $11,475-$19,125 at 2024 prices).
-
-The AMM mechanism uses liquidity-weighted average price over time as the settlement metric, where greater liquidity depth on the order book increases the weight given to current prices, with updates on every swap. High fees (3-5%) serve dual purposes: incentivizing liquidity providers and aggressively discouraging wash-trading and price manipulation. The design expects liquidity to start low at proposal launch, with early traders moving the AMM price to their preferred level, then providing liquidity at that price due to high fee incentives, creating a bootstrapping effect where liquidity increases over the proposal duration.
-
-The AMM removes the 1 META minimum order size spam filter that CLOBs required, enabling trading at any granularity. Proposers must lock initial liquidity and set starting pass/fail market prices as a commitment mechanism.
-
-## Evidence
-
-**Liquidity problem diagnosis (from proposal):**
-- "Estimating a fair price for the future value of MetaDao under pass/fail conditions is difficult, and most reasonable estimates will have a wide range. This uncertainty discourages people from risking their funds with limit orders near the midpoint price, and has the effect of reducing liquidity (and trading)."
-- Current CLOB implementation shows insufficient trading activity
-- State rent costs: 3.75 SOL per market pair × 3-5 proposals/month = 135-225 SOL annually ($11,475-$19,125 at 2024 prices)
-
-**Manipulation vectors in CLOB implementation:**
-- "With CLOBs there is always a bid/ask spread, and someone with 1 $META can push the midpoint towards the current best bid/ask."
-- "Users can selectively crank the market of their choosing. Defending against this (cranking markets all the time) would be a bit costly."
-- "VWAP can be manipulated by wash trading. An exponential moving average has the same drawbacks in this context as the existing linear-time system."
-
-**AMM design specifics:**
-- Metric: liquidity-weighted price over time (more liquidity = more weight to current price)
-- Fee structure: 3-5% to incentivize LPs and discourage manipulation
-- Proposers must lock initial liquidity and set starting pass/fail prices
-- AMMs cost "almost nothing" in state rent vs 3.75 SOL per CLOB market
-- Removes 1 META minimum order size, enabling trading at any granularity
-
-**Implementation scope:**
-- Program changes: basic AMM with liquidity-weighted average price tracking, integration with autocrat + conditional vault, permissionless pause/close features
-- Timeline: 3 weeks development + 1 week review
-- Budget: 400 META on passing + 800 META on completion
-- Team: joebuild (program), 0xNalloK (frontend), TBD (review)
-- Status: Passed 2024-01-24, completed 2024-01-29
-
-## Challenges
-
-**Adoption uncertainty:** "Similar to an orderbook, available liquidity will be decided by LPs. AMMs will incentivize LP'ing, though adoption within the DAO is not a certainty."
-
-**Standard smart contract risk:** Mainnet deployment before asset migration allows testing but carries inherent contract risk.
-
-**One-sided liquidity limitation:** AMMs don't support one-sided liquidity provision that some users may want. The proposal argues this can be satisfied through regular spot markets or arbitrage between spot and pass/fail markets.
-
-**State rent recoupment alternative:** Feedback during proposal vote noted that "there are ways to recoup openbook state rent costs, though it would require a migration of the current autocrat program."
-
----
-
-Related claims:
-- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md]]
-- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md]]
-- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md]]
-- [[shared-liquidity-amms-could-solve-futarchy-capital-inefficiency-by-routing-base-pair-deposits-into-all-derived-conditional-token-markets.md]]
-
-Topics:
-- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
-- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]

entities/internet-finance/joebuild.md

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
----
-type: entity
-entity_type: person
-name: "joebuild"
-domain: internet-finance
-status: active
-roles:
-  - "Solana developer"
-  - "MetaDAO contributor"
-tracked_by: rio
-created: 2026-03-11
----
-
-# joebuild
-
-## Overview
-Solana developer and MetaDAO contributor who proposed and led the AMM migration for MetaDAO's futarchy implementation. Responsible for core program changes to the autocrat and conditional vault architecture.
-
-## Timeline
-- **2024-01-24** — Proposed [[metadao-develop-amm-program]] to replace CLOBs with AMMs in MetaDAO's futarchy system
-
-## Relationship to KB
-- [[metadao]] - core contributor
-- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - program architect

entities/internet-finance/metadao-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "MetaDAO: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy?"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: passed
+parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "joebuild"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG"
+proposal_account: "CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG"
+proposal_number: 4
+proposal_date: 2024-01-24
+resolution_date: 2024-01-29
+category: "mechanism"
+summary: "Migrate MetaDAO futarchy from CLOB to AMM implementation to solve liquidity, manipulation, and state rent problems"
+key_metrics:
+  budget: "400 META on pass + 800 META on completion"
+  timeline: "3 weeks development + 1 week review"
+  state_rent_savings: "135-225 SOL annually"
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# MetaDAO: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy?
+
+## Summary
+Proposal to migrate MetaDAO's futarchy implementation from Central Limit Order Books (CLOBs) to Automated Market Makers (AMMs). The migration addressed three CLOB problems: lack of liquidity from wide uncertainty ranges discouraging limit orders, manipulation susceptibility through selective market cranking and wash trading, and high state rent costs (3.75 SOL per market pair, 135-225 SOL annually). AMMs use liquidity-weighted time-average pricing with 3-5% fees to incentivize LPs and discourage manipulation.
+
+## Market Data
+- **Outcome:** Passed (2024-01-29)
+- **Proposer:** joebuild
+- **Proposal Account:** CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG
+- **Proposal Number:** 4
+- **Budget:** 400 META on passing + 800 META on completion
+- **Timeline:** 3 weeks development + 1 week review
+- **Implementation:** joebuild (program), 0xNalloK (frontend)
+
+## Significance
+This represents a fundamental architectural change in MetaDAO's futarchy implementation, moving from orderbook-based to AMM-based conditional markets. The migration directly addressed the liquidity problem that had limited futarchy adoption, while also solving economic (state rent) and security (manipulation) concerns. The proposal demonstrates MetaDAO's willingness to iterate on core mechanism design based on operational experience.
+
+The AMM design uses liquidity-weighted price over time as settlement metric, where proposers lock initial liquidity and set starting prices. High fees (3-5%) create dual incentives: attract LPs and discourage wash trading manipulation. This is a production test of whether AMM mechanics can provide sufficient liquidity for futarchy decisions.
+
+## Additional Context
+- State rent costs: 3.75 SOL per pass/fail market pair under CLOB
+- Annual cost at 3-5 proposals/month: 135-225 SOL ($11,475-$19,125 at Jan 2024 prices)
+- AMMs described as costing "almost nothing in state rent"
+- Feedback noted OpenBook state rent could be recouped with autocrat program migration
+- One-sided liquidity not supported in AMM version (spot markets provide alternative)
+- Minimum order size restriction (1 META in CLOB) removed in AMM version
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[metadao]] - mechanism upgrade
+- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - implementation details
+- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] - addresses liquidity friction

entities/internet-finance/metadao-develop-amm-program.md

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
----
-type: entity
-entity_type: decision_market
-name: "MetaDAO: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy?"
-domain: internet-finance
-status: passed
-parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
-platform: "futardio"
-proposer: "joebuild"
-proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG"
-proposal_date: 2024-01-24
-resolution_date: 2024-01-29
-category: "mechanism"
-summary: "Replace CLOB markets with AMMs using liquidity-weighted pricing to solve liquidity and manipulation problems"
-tracked_by: rio
-created: 2026-03-11
----
-
-# MetaDAO: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy?
-
-## Summary
-Proposal to replace Central Limit Order Books (CLOBs) with Automated Market Makers (AMMs) in MetaDAO's futarchy implementation. The AMM design uses liquidity-weighted average price over time as the decision metric, with 3-5% fees to incentivize LPs and discourage manipulation. Addresses three core problems: lack of liquidity, manipulation susceptibility, and high state rent costs (135-225 SOL annually).
-
-## Market Data
-- **Outcome:** Passed
-- **Proposer:** joebuild
-- **Created:** 2024-01-24
-- **Completed:** 2024-01-29
-- **Budget:** 400 META on passing + 800 META on completion
-- **Timeline:** 3 weeks development + 1 week review
-
-## Significance
-This represents a fundamental architecture change in MetaDAO's futarchy implementation, moving from orderbook-based to AMM-based conditional markets. The proposal explicitly diagnoses liquidity as the primary barrier to effective futarchy governance and proposes a mechanism redesign rather than incremental improvements. The liquidity-weighted pricing metric is a novel approach to futarchy settlement, departing from pure time-weighted average price.
-
-## Technical Scope
-**Program changes:**
-- Basic AMM with liquidity-weighted average price tracking
-- Integration with autocrat + conditional vault programs
-- Permissionless pause feature (send back positions after verdict)
-- Permissionless close feature (return state rent SOL when no positions remain)
-- Loosen time restrictions on proposal creation (currently 50 slots)
-- Revert-to-fail mechanism if proposal instructions fail after X days
-
-**Frontend integration:** Led by 0xNalloK
-
-**Team:** joebuild (program), 0xNalloK (frontend), TBD (review)
-
-## Relationship to KB
-- [[metadao]] - governance mechanism evolution
-- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - mechanism being replaced
-- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] - problem being addressed

entities/internet-finance/metadao.md

@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ The futarchy governance protocol on Solana. Implements decision markets through
 - **2026-03** — Pine Analytics Q4 2025 quarterly report published
 
 - **2024-02-18** — [[metadao-otc-trade-pantera-capital]] failed: Pantera Capital's $50,000 OTC purchase proposal rejected by futarchy markets
-- **2024-01-24** — [[metadao-develop-amm-program]] passed: Replace CLOBs with AMMs using liquidity-weighted pricing to solve liquidity problems (400 META + 800 META on completion)
+- **2024-01-24** — [[metadao-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] proposed: migrate futarchy from CLOB to AMM to solve liquidity, manipulation, and state rent problems (400 META + 800 META on completion)
+- **2024-01-29** — [[metadao-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] passed: AMM migration approved, 3-week development timeline
 ## Key Decisions
 | Date | Proposal | Proposer | Category | Outcome |
 |------|----------|----------|----------|---------|

inbox/archive/2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md

@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 processed_by: rio
 processed_date: 2026-03-11
-claims_extracted: ["metadao-amm-program-replaces-clob-architecture-to-solve-futarchy-liquidity-and-manipulation-problems.md"]
-enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md", "MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md"]
+claims_extracted: ["amm-futarchy-markets-solve-clob-liquidity-and-manipulation-problems-through-liquidity-weighted-pricing-and-high-fees.md", "futarchy-clob-state-rent-costs-135-to-225-sol-annually-for-active-daos-making-amms-economically-superior.md"]
+enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md"]
 extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
-extraction_notes: "Extracted one mechanism design claim about AMM architecture solving futarchy liquidity problems. Created decision_market entity for the proposal itself and person entity for joebuild. Applied three enrichments to existing futarchy implementation claims with technical details about CLOB limitations and liquidity problems. The proposal represents a significant mechanism evolution in MetaDAO's futarchy implementation, moving from orderbook to AMM architecture with novel liquidity-weighted pricing."
+extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 mechanism claims about AMM advantages over CLOB for futarchy (liquidity-weighted pricing solving manipulation/liquidity problems, and state rent economics). Created decision_market entity for the proposal itself. Enriched 2 existing claims with AMM migration details. Source is a governance proposal with detailed technical rationale, making it high-quality evidence for mechanism design claims."
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -137,10 +137,13 @@ Any important changes or feedback brought up during the proposal vote will be re
 
 
 ## Key Facts
-- MetaDAO CLOB state rent: 3.75 SOL per market pair
-- MetaDAO proposal frequency: 3-5 per month (as of 2024-01)
-- Annual state rent cost: 135-225 SOL ($11,475-$19,125 at 2024 prices)
-- AMM proposal budget: 400 META on passing + 800 META on completion
-- Proposal account: CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG
+- MetaDAO proposal 4 (CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG) passed 2024-01-29
+- CLOB state rent: 3.75 SOL per market pair
+- Annual CLOB cost at 3-5 proposals/month: 135-225 SOL
+- AMM implementation by joebuild (program) and 0xNalloK (frontend)
+- Budget: 400 META on pass + 800 META on completion
+- Timeline: 3 weeks development + 1 week review
+- Proposed AMM fee: 3-5%
+- DAO account: 7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy
+- Proposer: XXXvLz1B89UtcTsg2hT3cL9qUJi5PqEEBTHg57MfNkZ
 - Autocrat version: 0.1
-- Proposal passed: 2024-01-29