teleo-codex/entities/internet-finance/metadao-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md
Teleo Agents 8f7667f0fb rio: extract from 2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md
- Source: inbox/archive/2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md
- Domain: internet-finance
- Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 5)

Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
2026-03-12 10:04:34 +00:00

3.3 KiB

type entity_type name domain status parent_entity platform proposer proposal_url proposal_account proposal_number proposal_date resolution_date category summary key_metrics tracked_by created
entity decision_market MetaDAO: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy? internet-finance passed metadao futardio joebuild https://www.futard.io/proposal/CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG 4 2024-01-24 2024-01-29 mechanism Migrate MetaDAO futarchy from CLOB to AMM implementation to solve liquidity, manipulation, and state rent problems
budget timeline state_rent_savings
400 META on pass + 800 META on completion 3 weeks development + 1 week review 135-225 SOL annually
rio 2026-03-11

MetaDAO: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy?

Summary

Proposal to migrate MetaDAO's futarchy implementation from Central Limit Order Books (CLOBs) to Automated Market Makers (AMMs). The migration addressed three CLOB problems: lack of liquidity from wide uncertainty ranges discouraging limit orders, manipulation susceptibility through selective market cranking and wash trading, and high state rent costs (3.75 SOL per market pair, 135-225 SOL annually). AMMs use liquidity-weighted time-average pricing with 3-5% fees to incentivize LPs and discourage manipulation.

Market Data

  • Outcome: Passed (2024-01-29)
  • Proposer: joebuild
  • Proposal Account: CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG
  • Proposal Number: 4
  • Budget: 400 META on passing + 800 META on completion
  • Timeline: 3 weeks development + 1 week review
  • Implementation: joebuild (program), 0xNalloK (frontend)

Significance

This represents a fundamental architectural change in MetaDAO's futarchy implementation, moving from orderbook-based to AMM-based conditional markets. The migration directly addressed the liquidity problem that had limited futarchy adoption, while also solving economic (state rent) and security (manipulation) concerns. The proposal demonstrates MetaDAO's willingness to iterate on core mechanism design based on operational experience.

The AMM design uses liquidity-weighted price over time as settlement metric, where proposers lock initial liquidity and set starting prices. High fees (3-5%) create dual incentives: attract LPs and discourage wash trading manipulation. This is a production test of whether AMM mechanics can provide sufficient liquidity for futarchy decisions.

Additional Context

  • State rent costs: 3.75 SOL per pass/fail market pair under CLOB
  • Annual cost at 3-5 proposals/month: 135-225 SOL ($11,475-$19,125 at Jan 2024 prices)
  • AMMs described as costing "almost nothing in state rent"
  • Feedback noted OpenBook state rent could be recouped with autocrat program migration
  • One-sided liquidity not supported in AMM version (spot markets provide alternative)
  • Minimum order size restriction (1 META in CLOB) removed in AMM version

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