extract: 2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-test-proposal-based-on-metadao-content

Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links
that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md

@@ -103,6 +103,12 @@ MetaDAO Q3 2024 roadmap prioritized launching a market-based grants product as t
 
 Ranger Finance ICO completed in April 2025, adding ~$9.1M to total Assets Under Futarchy, bringing the total to $57.3M across 10 launched projects. This represents continued momentum in futarchy-governed capital formation, with Ranger being a leveraged trading platform on Solana. The article also notes MetaDAO was 'considering strategic changes to its platform model' around this time, though details were not specified.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2025-10-06-futardio-launch-umbra]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Umbra raised $3M through MetaDAO's futard.io platform (Oct 6-10, 2025) with $154.9M total committed against $750K target, demonstrating 206x oversubscription. This is concrete evidence of MetaDAO's operational capacity to facilitate large-scale futarchy-governed capital raises.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md

@@ -83,6 +83,12 @@ Proposal #3 on MetaDAO (account EXehk1u3qUJZSxJ4X3nHsiTocRhzwq3eQAa6WKxeJ8Xs) ra
 
 Production deployment data from futard.io shows Proposal #1 on DAO account De8YzDKudqgeJXqq6i7q82AgxxrQ1JXXfMgouQuPyhY using Autocrat version 0.3, with proposal created, ended, and completed all on 2025-03-05. This confirms operational use of the Autocrat v0.3 implementation in live governance.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Dean's List DAO treasury proposal required TWAP > 3% for passage, with the proposal arguing potential 5-20% FDV increase from de-risking would exceed this threshold. Proposal completed December 5, 2024 after 3-day duration.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-enables-conditional-ownership-coins.md

@@ -6,6 +6,12 @@ description: MetaDAO's Futardio platform demonstrates that futarchy governance c
 confidence: likely
 tags: [futarchy, token-design, governance, ownership, liquidation-rights]
 created: 2026-02-15
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+COAL's Meta-PoW demonstrates ownership coin mechanics applied to in-game economies: the proposal passed futarchy governance (proposal G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg, completed 2025-11-10) and establishes a treasury accumulation mechanism where ORE flows are proportional to active player engagement, creating a direct link between usage and treasury value.
+
 ---
 
 # Futarchy enables conditional ownership coins with liquidation rights

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed-memecoin-launchpads-face-reputational-risk-tradeoff-between-adoption-and-credibility.md

@@ -27,6 +27,12 @@ From the MetaDAO proposal:
 
 This claim extends futarchy-governed-permissionless-launches-require-brand-separation-to-manage-reputational-liability-because-failed-projects-on-a-curated-platform-damage-the-platforms-credibility by showing the reputational concern operates at the mechanism level, not just the platform level. The market's rejection of Futardio suggests futarchy stakeholders prioritize mechanism credibility over short-term adoption metrics.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-test-proposal-based-on-metadao-content]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
+
+Futardio proposal explicitly lists reputational risk as a potential pitfall: 'Makes futarchy look less serious' and 'May make it harder to sell DeFi DAOs / non-crypto organizations' and 'May make it harder to recruit contributors.' MetaDAO used futarchy to decide whether to launch the memecoin platform precisely because they recognized the credibility tradeoff.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md

@@ -26,6 +26,12 @@ The risk is that cultural proposals introduce systematic bias: participants who
 
 The single data point is limited. One passed proposal doesn't establish a reliable pattern. Cultural proposals that fail futarchy governance (and thus go unobserved in public records) would provide the necessary counter-evidence to calibrate how often futarchy actually validates cultural versus financial spending.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Dean's List DAO's fee increase proposal included switching quote token from mSOL back to SOL, a decision with no direct revenue impact but potential effects on user experience and composability. The futarchy market approved this alongside the fee changes, suggesting it priced the operational simplification and ecosystem alignment as net positive for token value despite being a 'cultural' rather than purely financial decision.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md

@@ -49,6 +49,18 @@ However, this case provides concrete evidence that [[futarchy adoption faces fri
 
 Drift's $8,250 creator competition proposal failed despite having clear upside potential (community engagement, content generation, B.E.T awareness) and minimal downside risk. The proposal offered a structured prize pool across multiple tracks (video, Twitter threads, trade ideas) with established evaluation criteria, yet still failed to generate sufficient market participation. This is a canonical example of participation friction killing an economically sensible proposal.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Dean's List treasury proposal passed despite requiring active market participation to price a 40 percentage point survival probability improvement. The proposal explicitly calculated that potential FDV increase (5-20%) exceeded the 3% TWAP threshold, suggesting the economics were clearly favorable yet still required formal market validation.
+
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Dean's List DAO fee structure proposal passed despite requiring traders to actively migrate to new pools and accept 20x higher fees (0.25% to 5%). The proposal explicitly acknowledged potential 20-30% volume decrease but passed anyway, suggesting the market priced the net treasury benefit (~$19k-25k annual growth) as worth the migration friction. This demonstrates that futarchy can approve proposals with significant user friction when the economic benefit is clear.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/internet capital markets compress fundraising from months to days because permissionless raises eliminate gatekeepers while futarchy replaces due diligence bottlenecks with real-time market pricing.md

@@ -54,6 +54,12 @@ Futardio cult raised $11.4M in under 24 hours through MetaDAO's futarchy platfor
 
 MetaDAO ICO platform processed 8 project launches between April 2025 and January 2026, raising $25.6M total. Each ICO operated through defined subscription windows with pro-rata allocation, compressing capital formation to single-day events. $390M in committed demand across 8 launches demonstrates that permissionless futarchy-governed raises can aggregate capital at scale without traditional due diligence bottlenecks. Platform generated $300M in trading volume, indicating liquid secondary markets formed immediately post-launch.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2025-10-06-futardio-launch-umbra]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Umbra completed its raise in 4 days (Oct 6-10, 2025) through MetaDAO's futarchy platform, raising $3M final allocation from $154.9M committed. This provides empirical confirmation of sub-week fundraising timelines for futarchy-governed raises.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/internet-capital-markets-compress-fundraising-timelines.md

@@ -6,6 +6,12 @@ description: Platforms like Futardio demonstrate that internet-native capital ma
 confidence: likely
 tags: [capital-markets, fundraising, speed, internet-finance]
 created: 2026-02-20
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2025-10-18-futardio-launch-loyal]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Loyal completed a $2.5M raise in 4 days (October 18-22, 2025) through Futardio's futarchy-governed ICO platform, demonstrating the compression of fundraising from traditional months-long processes to sub-week execution.
+
 ---
 
 # Internet capital markets compress fundraising timelines to hours

domains/internet-finance/memecoin-governance-is-ideal-futarchy-use-case-because-single-objective-function-eliminates-long-term-tradeoff-ambiguity.md

@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ This claim complements [[coin price is the fairest objective function for asset
 
 MetaDAO's Futardio proposal explicitly states: 'One of the ideal use-cases for futarchy is memecoin governance. This is because memecoin holders only want the price of the token to increase. There's no question of "maybe the market knows what's the best short-term action, but not the best long-term action."' This provides direct confirmation from MetaDAO itself that memecoins eliminate the temporal tradeoff problem that complicates futarchy in other contexts.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-test-proposal-based-on-metadao-content]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
+
+MetaDAO proposal explicitly identifies memecoins as ideal futarchy use case: 'memecoin holders only want the price of the token to increase. There's no question of maybe the market knows what's the best short-term action, but not the best long-term action.' This confirms the single-objective-function thesis with direct practitioner reasoning.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/metadao-ico-platform-demonstrates-15x-oversubscription-validating-futarchy-governed-capital-formation.md

@@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ The source presents no failure cases despite eight ICOs, which suggests either s
 
 Avici achieved 17x oversubscription ($34.2M committed vs $2M target), exceeding the previously documented 15x benchmark and demonstrating continued strong market demand for futarchy-governed raises.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2025-10-18-futardio-launch-loyal]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Loyal's fundraise achieved 151x oversubscription ($75.9M committed vs $500K target), far exceeding the previously documented 15x pattern. The final raise settled at $2.5M, suggesting the platform's conditional market mechanisms successfully filtered commitment from actual capital deployment.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

inbox/archive/.extraction-debug/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.json

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+{
+  "rejected_claims": [
+    {
+      "filename": "meta-pow-creates-ore-treasury-accumulation-through-ingot-smelting-fees-that-scale-with-coal-mining-demand.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "filename": "dynamic-license-costs-using-price-ratios-create-self-throttling-token-emission-systems-without-governance-intervention.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "filename": "evergreen-tool-design-with-repair-cheaper-than-replacement-creates-stable-demand-patterns-in-token-economies.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "filename": "halving-band-emissions-with-5-percent-supply-increments-create-predictable-long-tail-token-distribution.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "validation_stats": {
+    "total": 4,
+    "kept": 0,
+    "fixed": 7,
+    "rejected": 4,
+    "fixes_applied": [
+      "meta-pow-creates-ore-treasury-accumulation-through-ingot-smelting-fees-that-scale-with-coal-mining-demand.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
+      "meta-pow-creates-ore-treasury-accumulation-through-ingot-smelting-fees-that-scale-with-coal-mining-demand.md:stripped_wiki_link:futarchy-enables-conditional-ownership-coins.md",
+      "meta-pow-creates-ore-treasury-accumulation-through-ingot-smelting-fees-that-scale-with-coal-mining-demand.md:stripped_wiki_link:MetaDAO-is-the-futarchy-launchpad-on-Solana-where-projects-r",
+      "dynamic-license-costs-using-price-ratios-create-self-throttling-token-emission-systems-without-governance-intervention.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
+      "dynamic-license-costs-using-price-ratios-create-self-throttling-token-emission-systems-without-governance-intervention.md:stripped_wiki_link:dynamic-performance-based-token-minting-replaces-fixed-emiss",
+      "evergreen-tool-design-with-repair-cheaper-than-replacement-creates-stable-demand-patterns-in-token-economies.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
+      "halving-band-emissions-with-5-percent-supply-increments-create-predictable-long-tail-token-distribution.md:set_created:2026-03-15"
+    ],
+    "rejections": [
+      "meta-pow-creates-ore-treasury-accumulation-through-ingot-smelting-fees-that-scale-with-coal-mining-demand.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
+      "dynamic-license-costs-using-price-ratios-create-self-throttling-token-emission-systems-without-governance-intervention.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
+      "evergreen-tool-design-with-repair-cheaper-than-replacement-creates-stable-demand-patterns-in-token-economies.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
+      "halving-band-emissions-with-5-percent-supply-increments-create-predictable-long-tail-token-distribution.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
+    ]
+  },
+  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
+  "date": "2026-03-15"
+}

inbox/archive/2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-test-proposal-based-on-metadao-content.md

@@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/EmPUGgv2Utzuu2vgSu6GcTRAtJMox5vJeZKi95cBgfJ
 date: 2024-08-28
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-16
+enrichments_applied: ["memecoin-governance-is-ideal-futarchy-use-case-because-single-objective-function-eliminates-long-term-tradeoff-ambiguity.md", "futarchy-governed-memecoin-launchpads-face-reputational-risk-tradeoff-between-adoption-and-credibility.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -352,3 +356,13 @@ This would all be left to the discretion of the team building it, but they would
 - Autocrat version: 0.3
 - Completed: 2024-09-01
 - Ended: 2024-09-01
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- Futardio proposal created 2024-08-28, failed 2024-09-01
+- Proposal offered $100k grant paid over 6 months
+- Target launch was Q3 2024
+- Points would convert to $FUTA token within 180 days
+- FUTA distribution only to points owners and MetaDAO
+- Revenue would go to vault claimable by FUTA holders
+- Nallok and Proph3t would support team but not be core team

inbox/archive/2024-08-30-futardio-proposal-approve-budget-for-pre-governance-hackathon-development.md

@@ -6,9 +6,12 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/2LKqzegdHrcrrRCHSuTS2fMjjJuZDfzuRKMnzPhzeD4
 date: 2024-08-30
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-16
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -161,3 +164,12 @@ Future is building a comprehensive pre-governance platform for DAOs and crypto p
 - Autocrat version: 0.3
 - Completed: 2024-09-02
 - Ended: 2024-09-02
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- FutureDAO proposal 2LKqzegdHrcrrRCHSuTS2fMjjJuZDfzuRKMnzPhzeD42 approved $25,000 for Pre-Governance Mandates tool
+- Pre-Governance Mandates tool targets Solana-based DAOs and professional proposal builders
+- Tool features include multi-criteria decision-making engine, customizable surveys, Web3 integration, AI-powered analysis, and mandates dashboard
+- Budget breakdown: Decision-Making Engine & API ($5k), Mandates Wizard ($3k), dApp Frontend ($7k), dApp Backend ($5k), Documentation & Graphics ($5k)
+- FutureDAO positions Pre-Governance Mandates as complementary to MetaDAO, Realms, Squads, and Align
+- Potential monetization models include $FUTURE staking, monthly payments, pay-as-you-go, and consultancy services

inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md

@@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuA
 date: 2025-11-07
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-15
+enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-enables-conditional-ownership-coins.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -265,3 +269,19 @@ Vote NO – keep the current model unchanged.
 - Autocrat version: 0.3
 - Completed: 2025-11-10
 - Ended: 2025-11-10
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- COAL Meta-PoW proposal account: G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
+- COAL proposal number: 4
+- COAL DAO account: 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
+- Meta-PoW proposal created 2025-11-07, completed 2025-11-10
+- COAL max supply: 25,000,000 tokens
+- COAL initial daily emissions: 11,250 tokens/day
+- COAL halving band size: 1,250,000 tokens (5% of max supply)
+- INGOT smelting cost: 100 COAL + ~12.10 ORE
+- Pickaxe crafting cost: 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license
+- Pickaxe daily repair cost: ~0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD
+- Tool power decay rate: 4% per day if not repaired
+- License cost formula: c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p, with c0=200, y_ref=50, p=3, c_min=1, c_max=300
+- GUI planned for minechain.gg