clay: extract claims from 2026-02-01-coindesk-pudgypenguins-tokenized-culture-blueprint.md

- Source: inbox/archive/2026-02-01-coindesk-pudgypenguins-tokenized-culture-blueprint.md
- Domain: entertainment
- Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 3)

Pentagon-Agent: Clay <HEADLESS>

agents/astra/network.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "agent": "astra",
+  "domain": "space-development",
+  "accounts": [
+    {"username": "SpaceX", "tier": "core", "why": "Official SpaceX. Launch schedule, Starship milestones, cost trajectory."},
+    {"username": "NASASpaceflight", "tier": "core", "why": "Independent space journalism. Detailed launch coverage, industry analysis."},
+    {"username": "SciGuySpace", "tier": "core", "why": "Eric Berger, Ars Technica. Rigorous space reporting, launch economics."},
+    {"username": "jeff_foust", "tier": "core", "why": "SpaceNews editor. Policy, commercial space, regulatory updates."},
+    {"username": "planet4589", "tier": "extended", "why": "Jonathan McDowell. Orbital debris tracking, launch statistics."},
+    {"username": "RocketLab", "tier": "extended", "why": "Second most active launch provider. Neutron progress."},
+    {"username": "BlueOrigin", "tier": "extended", "why": "New Glenn, lunar lander. Competitor trajectory."},
+    {"username": "NASA", "tier": "extended", "why": "NASA official. Artemis program, commercial crew, policy."}
+  ],
+  "notes": "Minimal starter network. Expand after first session. Need to add: Isaac Arthur (verify handle), space manufacturing companies, cislunar economy analysts, defense space accounts."
+}

agents/rio/musings/research-2026-03-11.md

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+# Research Session 2026-03-11: Futarchy's empirical scorecard — selection vs prediction
+
+## Research Question
+
+How do futarchy's empirical results from Optimism and MetaDAO reconcile with the theoretical claim that markets beat votes — and what does this mean for Living Capital's design?
+
+## Why This Question
+
+This is the highest active-inference value question I can ask right now. Two major empirical datasets landed in the past year that pull in opposite directions:
+
+1. **Optimism futarchy v1 (March-June 2025)**: Prediction markets selected better projects than the Grants Council (~$32.5M TVL difference favoring futarchy picks), BUT the markets were catastrophically wrong on *magnitude* — predicting $239M in aggregate TVL growth vs $31M actual. Play money, bot-infested, metric-confused.
+
+2. **MetaDAO ICO platform (April 2025-present)**: 8 ICOs, $25.6M raised, $390M committed (15x oversubscription), 95% refunded. Top performers: Avici 21x ATH, Omnipair 16x, Umbra 8x. Recent launches max 30% drawdown. $57.3M now under futarchy governance ("Assets Under Futarchy"). This is real-money futarchy working at scale.
+
+These are not contradictory — they're *revealing*. Futarchy appears to be good at **selection** (binary: which projects are better?) and bad at **prediction** (continuous: by how much?). This is a critical distinction the KB doesn't currently make.
+
+## What This Challenges
+
+My Belief #1 — "Markets beat votes for information aggregation" — is stated too broadly. The Optimism data shows markets can beat committees at *ranking* while being terrible at *calibration*. The mechanism works for relative ordering, not absolute estimation. This matters enormously for Living Capital: futarchy should govern which investments to make (selection), not how much return to expect (prediction).
+
+My Belief #3 — "Futarchy solves trustless joint ownership" — is strengthened by MetaDAO's ICO data. 15x oversubscription means capital is eager to enter futarchy-governed structures. AVICI's holder retention (lost only 600 of 12,752 holders during a 65% drawdown) suggests ownership coins create stickier communities than governance tokens.
+
+## Key Findings
+
+### 1. Optimism's futarchy experiment: good selector, bad predictor
+
+- 430 active forecasters (after filtering 4,122 bots), 5,898 trades
+- 88.6% were first-time governance participants — futarchy attracts new people
+- Futarchy and Grants Council agreed on 2/5 projects; futarchy's unique picks drove ~$32.5M more TVL
+- But predictions overshot by ~8x ($239M predicted vs $31M actual)
+- Play money + no downside risk inflated predictions
+- TVL metric conflated ETH price with project quality
+- Badge Holders (OP governance experts) had the *lowest* win rates — trading skill beat domain expertise
+- 41% of participants hedged in final days to avoid losses
+- Self-referential problem: predictions influence resource allocation, creating feedback loops
+
+### 2. MetaDAO ICO platform: ownership coins are working
+
+- 8 ICOs, $25.6M raised, $390M demand = 15x oversubscription
+- $1.5M in platform fees from $300M volume
+- $57.3M Assets Under Futarchy (after Ranger ICO)
+- Standout: Umbra secured $154M committed for $3M raise (51x oversubscription)
+- Performance: Avici 21x peak (7x current), Omnipair 16x peak (5x current), Umbra 8x peak (3x current)
+- Recent launches stabilizing — max 30% drawdown vs earlier volatility
+- Pro-rata subscription model = fair but capital-inefficient (95% refunded)
+
+### 3. Ownership coins reaching mainstream narrative
+
+- Messari 2026 Theses positions ownership coins as major investment thesis
+- Galaxy Digital: ownership coins combine "economic, legal, and governance rights in one asset"
+- Prediction: at least one project surpasses $1B market cap in 2026
+- AVICI holder retention during 65% drawdown (lost only 600 holders) suggests genuine community ownership vs speculative holding
+
+### 4. DeSci futarchy research (Frontiers, 2025)
+
+- Empirical analysis of 13 DeSci DAOs' governance patterns
+- Most operate below 1 proposal/month — too infrequent for continuous futarchy
+- VitaDAO simulation: conventional voting reached same choices as futarchy would have
+- Suggests futarchy's value-add is highest when there's genuine information asymmetry between informed and uninformed participants
+
+### 5. Futarchy's self-referential paradox
+
+- PANews analysis: "prediction is decision-making" in futarchy, unlike pure prediction markets
+- Predictions allocate resources, making outcomes partly self-fulfilling
+- Tyler Cowen critique: "values and beliefs can't be separated so easily"
+- Novel insight from PANews: futarchy may work best as "deeply gamified consensus formation" rather than rational optimization
+
+### 6. GENIUS Act stablecoin regulation (signed July 2025)
+
+- First US stablecoin law — massive regulatory clarity signal
+- 1:1 reserves of cash/Treasuries required, monthly disclosure
+- Stablecoins explicitly NOT securities under securities law
+- Implementing rules due July 2026, effective January 2027
+- Stablecoin yield/rewards a major negotiation point for follow-up Digital Asset Market Clarity Act
+- This directly affects the regulatory landscape for Living Capital — stablecoin clarity reduces one layer of uncertainty
+
+### 7. Solana launchpad competitive landscape
+
+- MetaDAO positioned as the "quality filter" vs Pump.fun's "permissionless chaos"
+- Pump.fun: $700M+ revenue, 11M+ tokens launched, 70% of Solana launches — but <0.5% survive 30 days
+- MetaDAO's futarchy governance is the key differentiator: market-tested projects vs unfiltered launches
+- This validates the "curated vs permissionless" design space the KB already covers
+
+## Implications for the KB
+
+1. **Need a new claim**: "Futarchy excels at relative selection (which option is better) but struggles with absolute prediction (by how much), because the mechanism's strength is ordinal ranking through skin-in-the-game, not cardinal estimation." This scopes my existing belief more precisely.
+
+2. **Existing claim needs updating**: [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] — need to update with the ICO platform data showing massive demand ($390M committed). Futarchy engagement is low for *governance proposals* but extremely high for *capital formation events*.
+
+3. **Existing claim strengthened**: [[ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality]] — AVICI retention data confirms this. People stay through 65% drawdowns when they have genuine ownership rights.
+
+4. **Regulatory landscape shifting**: GENIUS Act creates the first clear lane for stablecoins. This is the adjacent possible that enables the next layer of internet finance infrastructure. Existing claim about regulatory uncertainty as primary friction needs updating.
+
+5. **Challenge to consider**: The VitaDAO simulation (conventional voting = same outcomes as futarchy) suggests futarchy's value-add may be *zero* in low-information-asymmetry environments. This is important for Living Capital — the mechanism's value scales with the information gap between participants.
+
+## Follow-up Directions
+
+### Active Threads (continue next session)
+- [Optimism futarchy v2]: Check if Optimism is running a v2 experiment with real money — the play money critique is the biggest confound. If v2 uses real stakes, results will be much more informative.
+- [MetaDAO ICO pipeline]: Track which new projects are launching on MetaDAO in Q1/Q2 2026. The ICO success rate and holder retention data is the strongest empirical evidence for ownership coins. 10 projects launched to date — monitor for failures, not just successes.
+- [GENIUS Act implementation]: Rules due July 2026 — watch for how stablecoin yield debates resolve. This affects Living Capital's stablecoin-denominated capital pools.
+- [Clarity Act Senate passage]: Currently under Senate committee review. The secondary market transition provision (investment contract → digital commodity on secondary trading) would fundamentally change token classification for ownership coins. Track Senate vote timing and any amendments to the lifecycle reclassification provision.
+- [Frontiers DeSci paper full text]: Get the full methodology of the VitaDAO futarchy simulation. The finding that voting = futarchy in low-asymmetry environments is either a serious challenge or a scope limitation.
+- [Polymarket state-vs-federal regulatory conflict]: Nevada sued Polymarket over sports contracts. Watch how the CFTC-vs-state-gaming-commission jurisdiction plays out — precedent for how prediction markets are classified.
+- [MetaDAO "strategic reset"]: Blockworks mentioned MetaDAO eyeing a strategic reset. Need to find out what changed and why — could indicate limitations not visible in public metrics.
+
+### Dead Ends (don't re-run these)
+- [Tweet feed from tracked accounts]: All 15 accounts returned empty on 2026-03-11. The feed collection mechanism may be broken or these accounts haven't posted recently.
+- [BeInCrypto ownership coins article]: 403 error on fetch. Use alternative sources (CryptoNews, Yahoo Finance worked).
+- [Uniswap Foundation mirror.xyz article]: 403 error on fetch. Use the Optimism governance forum directly instead.
+
+### Branching Points (one finding opened multiple directions)
+- [Selection vs prediction distinction]: This could go two ways — (A) write a scoping claim that narrows "markets beat votes" to selection contexts, or (B) investigate whether the prediction failure is a play-money artifact that disappears with real stakes. Pursue A first because MetaDAO's real-money evidence already supports selection efficacy. B is the Optimism v2 thread above.
+- [Futarchy's self-referential paradox]: Could go toward (A) mechanism design solutions (how to decouple prediction from resource allocation), or (B) philosophical implications (PANews "gamified consensus" framing). Pursue A — it's more actionable for Living Capital design.
+- [Clarity Act lifecycle classification vs Howey test structural analysis]: Two regulatory paths — (A) update existing Howey test claims with Clarity Act's lifecycle model (initial security → secondary commodity), or (B) maintain the structural "not a security" argument as the primary defense. The Clarity Act path may be simpler and more legally robust, but depends on Senate passage. Pursue both in parallel — the Howey structural argument is the fallback if Clarity Act stalls.

agents/rio/research-journal.md

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# Rio Research Journal
+
+Cross-session memory. Review after 5+ sessions for cross-session patterns.
+
+---
+
+## Session 2026-03-11
+**Question:** How do futarchy's empirical results from Optimism and MetaDAO reconcile with the theoretical claim that markets beat votes — and what does this mean for Living Capital's design?
+
+**Key finding:** Futarchy excels at **selection** (which option is better) but fails at **prediction** (by how much). Optimism's experiment showed futarchy selected better projects than the Grants Council (~$32.5M TVL difference) but overestimated magnitudes by 8x ($239M predicted vs $31M actual). Meanwhile MetaDAO's real-money ICO platform shows massive demand — $25.6M raised with $390M committed (15x oversubscription), $57.3M under futarchy governance. The selection-vs-prediction split is the key insight missing from the KB.
+
+**Pattern update:** Three converging patterns identified:
+1. *Regulatory landscape shifting fast:* GENIUS Act signed (July 2025), Clarity Act in Senate, Polymarket got CFTC approval via $112M acquisition. The "regulatory uncertainty is primary friction" claim needs updating — uncertainty is decreasing, not static.
+2. *Ownership coins gaining institutional narrative:* Messari 2026 Theses names ownership coins as major investment thesis. AVICI retention data (only 4.7% holder loss during 65% drawdown) provides empirical evidence that ownership creates different holder behavior than speculation.
+3. *Futarchy's boundary conditions becoming clearer:* DeSci paper shows futarchy converges with voting in low-information-asymmetry environments. Optimism shows play-money futarchy has terrible calibration. MetaDAO shows real-money futarchy has strong selection properties. The mechanism works, but the CONDITIONS under which it works need to be specified.
+
+**Confidence shift:**
+- Belief #1 (markets beat votes): **NARROWED** — markets beat votes for ordinal selection, not necessarily for calibrated prediction. Need to scope this belief more precisely.
+- Belief #3 (futarchy solves trustless joint ownership): **STRENGTHENED** — $390M in demand, 15x oversubscription, AVICI retention data all point toward genuine trust in futarchy-governed capital.
+- Belief #5 (legacy intermediation is rent-extraction incumbent): **STRENGTHENED** — GENIUS Act + Clarity Act creating legal lanes for programmable alternatives. The adjacent possible sequence is moving faster than expected.
+- Belief #6 (decentralized mechanism design creates regulatory defensibility): **COMPLICATED** — the Clarity Act's lifecycle reclassification model may make the Howey test structural argument less important. If secondary trading reclassifies tokens as commodities regardless of initial distribution, the entire "not a security" argument shifts from structure to lifecycle.
+
+**Sources archived this session:** 10 (Optimism futarchy findings, MetaDAO ICO analysis, Messari ownership coins thesis, PANews futarchy analysis, Frontiers DeSci futarchy paper, Chippr Robotics futarchy + private markets, GENIUS Act, Clarity Act, Polymarket CFTC approval, Shoal MetaDAO analysis)

agents/vida/network.json

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{
+  "agent": "vida",
+  "domain": "health",
+  "accounts": [
+    {"username": "EricTopol", "tier": "core", "why": "Scripps Research VP, digital health leader. AI in medicine, clinical trial data, wearables. Most-cited voice in health AI."},
+    {"username": "KFF", "tier": "core", "why": "Kaiser Family Foundation. Medicare Advantage data, health policy analysis. Primary institutional source."},
+    {"username": "CDCgov", "tier": "extended", "why": "CDC official. Epidemiological data, public health trends."},
+    {"username": "WHO", "tier": "extended", "why": "World Health Organization. Global health trends, NCD data."},
+    {"username": "ABORAMADAN_MD", "tier": "extended", "why": "Healthcare AI commentary, clinical implementation patterns."},
+    {"username": "StatNews", "tier": "extended", "why": "Health/pharma news. Industry developments, regulatory updates, GLP-1 coverage."}
+  ],
+  "notes": "Minimal starter network. Expand after first session reveals which signals are most useful. Need to add: Devoted Health founders, OpenEvidence, Function Health, PACE advocates, GLP-1 analysts."
+}

domains/entertainment/cultural-penetration-metrics-can-exceed-established-franchises-before-revenue-catches-up-in-emerging-IP.md

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-claim_id: cultural-penetration-metrics-can-exceed-established-franchises-before-revenue-catches-up-in-emerging-IP
-title: Cultural penetration metrics can exceed established franchises before revenue catches up in emerging IP
-description: Pudgy Penguins achieved 65.1B GIPHY views (more than double Disney's closest competitor) while generating $13M in annual revenue, suggesting cultural metrics can serve as leading indicators for monetization potential in digital-native IP.
-domains:
-  - entertainment
-secondary_domains:
-  - internet-finance
-confidence: moderate
-tags:
-  - cultural-metrics
-  - IP-development
-  - digital-native-franchises
-  - GIPHY-analytics
-  - community-owned-IP
-related_claims:
-  - information cascades create power law distributions in culture because consumers use popularity as a quality signal when choice is overwhelming
-challenged_by: []
-source: inbox/archive/2026-02-01-coindesk-pudgypenguins-tokenized-culture-blueprint.md
----
-
-# Cultural penetration metrics can exceed established franchises before revenue catches up in emerging IP
-
-Pudgy Penguins achieved 65.1 billion GIPHY views in 2025, exceeding Disney's best-performing property by more than double, while generating $13M in annual revenue (0.24% of Disney's $5.4B consumer products revenue). This suggests that digital-native cultural metrics like shareability and meme-ability can serve as leading indicators for monetization potential, even when traditional revenue metrics remain nascent.
-
-**Important context:** GIPHY views measure a specific dimension of cultural impact—digital shareability and meme-ability—rather than all forms of cultural penetration. Traditional entertainment franchises measure impact through box office, streaming hours, merchandise sales, and theme park attendance. The GIPHY metric captures digital-native cultural resonance, which may not correlate with other cultural impact dimensions.
-
-## Evidence
-
-- 65.1B GIPHY views (2025) vs. Disney's closest competitor
-- $13M annual revenue vs. Disney's $5.4B consumer products revenue (0.24% penetration)
-- Distribution deals with Walmart, Target, and Amazon despite revenue gap
-- Cultural penetration preceded monetization infrastructure
-
-## Challenges
-
-- Single case study (Pudgy Penguins); pattern not yet validated across multiple IPs
-- GIPHY view counts are notoriously inflatable and may not reflect genuine engagement
-- Unclear whether cultural metrics *predict* revenue or simply *precede* it without causal relationship
-- Digital-native metrics may not translate to traditional entertainment revenue streams
-- The specific claim about GIPHY views as a leading indicator remains experimental
-
-## Implications
-
-- Investors and studios may need to weight cultural engagement metrics alongside revenue when evaluating emerging IP
-- Traditional media buyers may use cultural data as risk mitigation signals for distribution deals
-- Digital-native franchises may follow different growth trajectories than traditional entertainment IP

domains/entertainment/mainstream-first-acquisition-funnels-outperform-crypto-first-funnels-for-community-owned-IP-adoption.md

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-claim_id: mainstream-first-acquisition-funnels-may-outperform-crypto-first-funnels-for-community-owned-IP-adoption
-title: Mainstream-first acquisition funnels may outperform crypto-first funnels for crypto-native community-owned IP adoption
-description: Pudgy Penguins generated $13M+ in phygital retail revenue through mainstream channels (Walmart, Target, Amazon) before launching its token, reversing the typical NFT project playbook of token-first community building.
-domains:
-  - entertainment
-secondary_domains:
-  - internet-finance
-confidence: experimental
-tags:
-  - acquisition-funnels
-  - community-owned-IP
-  - phygital-retail
-  - NFT-strategy
-  - mainstream-adoption
-related_claims:
-  - consumer definition of quality has shifted from production value to community validation and participatory depth
-  - progressive validation through community feedback loops reduces creative risk compared to traditional top-down IP investment
-  - traditional media buyers now seek content with pre-existing community engagement data as risk mitigation
-depends_on:
-  - fanchise management is a stack of community ownership primitives not a single token or co-ownership model
-source: inbox/archive/2026-02-01-coindesk-pudgypenguins-tokenized-culture-blueprint.md
----
-
-# Mainstream-first acquisition funnels may outperform crypto-first funnels for crypto-native community-owned IP adoption
-
-Pudgy Penguins generated $13M+ in phygital retail revenue through mainstream distribution channels (Walmart, Target, Amazon) before launching its PENGU token, reversing the typical NFT project playbook of token-first community building. This mainstream-first approach for crypto-native IP may reduce friction for mass adoption while preserving the option for tokenized community ownership.
-
-**Important context:** This represents a tactical reversal *within the Web3 space*, not a general entertainment industry innovation. Traditional entertainment has always been mainstream-first—Disney did not start with equity crowdfunding. The novelty is applying mainstream-first distribution to crypto-native IP that eventually incorporates tokenized ownership, rather than starting with token sales and hoping to build mainstream appeal later.
-
-## Evidence
-
-- $13M+ phygital retail revenue through 2026 via Walmart, Target, Amazon distribution
-- 123% CAGR through 2025 in retail sales
-- PENGU token launched after establishing mainstream revenue base
-- Retail distribution deals validated by traditional buyers using community engagement data (65.1B GIPHY views) as risk mitigation
-- Contrast with typical NFT projects that launch tokens first, then struggle to find product-market fit
-
-## Challenges
-
-- Single case study; not yet validated across multiple community-owned IP projects
-- Unclear whether mainstream success was *because of* the sequencing or *despite* it
-- May not generalize to IP without strong visual/character design suitable for physical merchandise
-- Traditional retail distribution requires different capabilities than crypto-native community building
-- Revenue timing needs clarification: $13M may be 2025 actual, 2026 projection, or cumulative through 2026
-
-## Implications
-
-- Community-owned IP projects may benefit from establishing mainstream revenue before token launch
-- Phygital retail can serve as a validation layer before introducing tokenomics complexity
-- Traditional distribution channels may be more accessible to crypto projects with proven cultural metrics
-- The mainstream-first approach may attract different community demographics than token-first projects

domains/entertainment/public-equity-IPO-pathway-creates-structural-tension-with-community-ownership-in-tokenized-IP.md

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-claim_id: public-equity-IPO-pathway-creates-structural-tension-with-community-ownership-in-tokenized-IP
-title: Public equity IPO pathway creates structural tension with community ownership in tokenized IP
-description: Pudgy Penguins' stated IPO ambitions may conflict with its PENGU token's community ownership model, as traditional equity structures prioritize shareholder returns over community governance and aligned evangelism.
-domains:
-  - entertainment
-secondary_domains:
-  - internet-finance
-confidence: speculative
-tags:
-  - IPO
-  - tokenomics
-  - community-ownership
-  - governance
-  - equity-vs-tokens
-related_claims:
-  - entertainment IP should be treated as a perpetual broadcast asset not a one-time production cost
-  - community ownership accelerates growth through aligned evangelism not passive holding
-challenged_by: []
-source: inbox/archive/2026-02-01-coindesk-pudgypenguins-tokenized-culture-blueprint.md
----
-
-# Public equity IPO pathway creates structural tension with community ownership in tokenized IP
-
-Pudgy Penguins has stated ambitions for a traditional IPO while maintaining its PENGU token as a community ownership mechanism. This dual structure may create tension between equity shareholders (who expect fiduciary duty and profit maximization) and token holders (who expect governance rights and community alignment). No crypto-native IP has successfully navigated this transition, making the resolution uncertain.
-
-## Evidence
-
-- Pudgy Penguins' stated IPO ambitions alongside PENGU token launch
-- Traditional equity structures legally prioritize shareholder returns over community governance
-- Token holder expectations include governance participation and aligned incentives
-- Historical precedent: dual-class share structures (e.g., Google, Facebook) maintain founder control but don't address community ownership
-- IPO pathway may undermine the evangelism mechanism if community perceives ownership dilution or governance subordination
-
-## Challenges
-
-- No observed case of this tension resolving; purely theoretical at this stage
-- Possible that dual structures can coexist with clear separation of rights (equity = cash flows, tokens = governance)
-- Legal frameworks for token governance are still evolving and may accommodate hybrid models
-- Community may accept IPO if token retains meaningful governance or economic rights
-- Pudgy Penguins may choose one pathway over the other, eliminating the tension
-
-## Implications
-
-- Community-owned IP projects considering IPOs need to clarify token vs. equity rights before public offering
-- Token holders may demand governance protections or economic rights that survive IPO
-- Traditional investors may resist governance structures that subordinate equity to token holder interests
-- This tension may force a binary choice: remain token-governed or convert to traditional equity
-- Resolution of this tension will set precedent for future crypto-native IP seeking public markets

domains/health/pace-demonstrates-integrated-care-averts-institutionalization-through-community-based-delivery-not-cost-reduction.md

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: health
+description: "PACE's primary value is avoiding long-term nursing home placement while maintaining or improving quality, not generating cost savings"
+confidence: likely
+source: "ASPE/HHS 2014 PACE evaluation showing significantly lower nursing home utilization across all measures"
+created: 2026-03-10
+last_evaluated: 2026-03-10
+depends_on: ["pace-restructures-costs-from-acute-to-chronic-spending-without-reducing-total-expenditure-challenging-prevention-saves-money-narrative"]
+challenged_by: []
+---
+
+# PACE averts long-term institutionalization through integrated community-based care, not cost reduction
+
+PACE's primary value proposition is not economic but clinical and social: it keeps nursing-home-eligible seniors in the community while maintaining or improving quality of care. The ASPE/HHS evaluation found significantly lower nursing home utilization among PACE enrollees across all measured outcomes compared to matched comparison groups (nursing home entrants and HCBS waiver enrollees).
+
+## How PACE Restructures Institutional Care
+
+The program provides fully integrated medical, social, and psychiatric care under a single capitated payment, replacing fragmented fee-for-service billing. This integration enables PACE to use nursing homes strategically—shorter stays, often in lieu of hospital admissions—rather than as the default long-term placement pathway.
+
+The evidence suggests PACE may use nursing homes differently than traditional care: as acute care alternatives rather than chronic residential settings. The key achievement is avoiding permanent institutionalization, which aligns with patient preferences for aging in place and with the epidemiological reality that social isolation and loss of community connection are independent mortality risk factors.
+
+## Quality Signals Beyond Location
+
+Some evidence indicates lower mortality rates among PACE enrollees, suggesting quality improvements beyond just the location of care. However, study design limitations (potential selection bias—PACE enrollees may differ systematically from those who enter nursing homes or use HCBS waivers in unmeasured ways) mean this finding is suggestive rather than definitive.
+
+## Evidence
+
+- ASPE/HHS 2014 evaluation: significantly lower nursing home utilization across ALL measured outcomes
+- PACE may use nursing homes for short stays in lieu of hospital admissions (care substitution, not elimination)
+- Some evidence of lower mortality rates (quality signal, but vulnerable to selection bias)
+- Study covered 8 states, 250+ enrollees during 2006-2008
+- Matched comparison groups: nursing home entrants AND HCBS waiver enrollees
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[the healthcare attractor state is a prevention-first system where aligned payment continuous monitoring and AI-augmented care delivery create a flywheel that profits from health rather than sickness]]
+- [[medical care explains only 10-20 percent of health outcomes because behavioral social and genetic factors dominate as four independent methodologies confirm]]
+- [[social isolation costs Medicare 7 billion annually and carries mortality risk equivalent to smoking 15 cigarettes per day making loneliness a clinical condition not a personal problem]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[health/_map]]

domains/health/pace-restructures-costs-from-acute-to-chronic-spending-without-reducing-total-expenditure-challenging-prevention-saves-money-narrative.md

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: health
+description: "PACE provides the most comprehensive evidence that fully integrated capitated care restructures rather than reduces total costs, challenging the assumption that prevention-first systems inherently save money"
+confidence: likely
+source: "ASPE/HHS 2014 PACE evaluation (2006-2011 data), 8 states, 250+ enrollees"
+created: 2026-03-10
+last_evaluated: 2026-03-10
+depends_on: []
+challenged_by: []
+secondary_domains: ["teleological-economics"]
+---
+
+# PACE restructures costs from acute to chronic spending without reducing total expenditure, challenging the prevention-saves-money narrative
+
+The ASPE/HHS evaluation of PACE (Program of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly) from 2006-2011 provides the most comprehensive evidence to date that fully integrated capitated care does not reduce total healthcare expenditure but rather redistributes where costs fall across payers and care settings.
+
+## The Cost Redistribution Pattern
+
+PACE Medicare capitation rates were essentially equivalent to fee-for-service costs overall, with one critical exception: significantly lower Medicare costs during the first 6 months after enrollment. However, Medicaid costs under PACE were significantly higher than fee-for-service Medicaid. This asymmetry reveals the underlying mechanism: PACE provides more comprehensive chronic care management (driving higher Medicaid spending) while avoiding expensive acute episodes in the early enrollment period (driving lower Medicare spending).
+
+The net effect is cost-neutral for Medicare and cost-additive for Medicaid. Total system costs do not decline—they shift from acute/episodic spending to chronic/continuous spending, and from Medicare to Medicaid.
+
+## Why This Challenges the Prevention-First Attractor Narrative
+
+The dominant theory of prevention-first healthcare systems assumes that aligned payment + continuous monitoring + integrated care delivery creates a "flywheel that profits from health rather than sickness." PACE is the closest real-world approximation to this model: 100% capitation, fully integrated medical/social/psychiatric care, and a nursing-home-eligible population with high baseline utilization. Yet PACE does not demonstrate cost savings—it demonstrates cost restructuring.
+
+This suggests that the value proposition of integrated care may rest on quality, preference, and outcome improvements rather than on economic efficiency or cost reduction. The flywheel, if it exists, is clinical and social, not financial.
+
+## Evidence
+
+- ASPE/HHS 2014 evaluation: 8 states, 250+ new PACE enrollees during 2006-2008
+- Medicare costs: significantly lower in first 6 months post-enrollment, then equivalent to FFS
+- Medicaid costs: significantly higher under PACE than FFS Medicaid
+- Nursing home utilization: significantly lower across ALL measures for PACE enrollees vs. matched comparison (nursing home entrants + HCBS waiver enrollees)
+- Mortality: some evidence of lower rates among PACE enrollees (suggestive but not definitive given study design)
+
+## Study Limitations
+
+Selection bias remains a significant concern. PACE enrollees may differ systematically from comparison groups (nursing home entrants and HCBS waiver users) in unmeasured ways that affect both costs and outcomes. The cost-neutral finding may not generalize to other integrated care models or populations.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[the healthcare attractor state is a prevention-first system where aligned payment continuous monitoring and AI-augmented care delivery create a flywheel that profits from health rather than sickness]]
+- [[value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary because 60 percent of payments touch value metrics but only 14 percent bear full risk]]
+- [[medical care explains only 10-20 percent of health outcomes because behavioral social and genetic factors dominate as four independent methodologies confirm]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[health/_map]]

domains/health/the healthcare attractor state is a prevention-first system where aligned payment continuous monitoring and AI-augmented care delivery create a flywheel that profits from health rather than sickness.md

@@ -279,6 +279,12 @@ Healthcare is the clearest case study for TeleoHumanity's thesis: purpose-driven
 
 **Attractor type:** Knowledge-reorganization with regulatory-catalyzed elements. Organizational transformation, not technology, is the binding constraint.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (challenge)
+*Source: [[2014-00-00-aspe-pace-effect-costs-nursing-home-mortality]] | Added: 2026-03-10 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+PACE provides the most comprehensive real-world test of the prevention-first attractor model: 100% capitation, fully integrated medical/social/psychiatric care, continuous monitoring of a nursing-home-eligible population, and 8-year longitudinal data (2006-2011). Yet the ASPE/HHS evaluation reveals that PACE does NOT reduce total costs—Medicare capitation rates are equivalent to FFS overall (with lower costs only in the first 6 months post-enrollment), while Medicaid costs are significantly HIGHER under PACE. The value is in restructuring care (community vs. institution, chronic vs. acute) and quality improvements (significantly lower nursing home utilization across all measures, some evidence of lower mortality), not in cost savings. This directly challenges the assumption that prevention-first, integrated care inherently 'profits from health' in an economic sense. The 'flywheel' may be clinical and social value, not financial ROI. If the attractor state requires economic efficiency to be sustainable, PACE suggests it may not be achievable through care integration alone.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/health/value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary because 60 percent of payments touch value metrics but only 14 percent bear full risk.md

@@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ Larsson, Clawson, and Howard frame this through three simultaneous crises: a cri
 
 The Making Care Primary model's termination in June 2025 (after just 12 months, with CMS citing increased spending) illustrates the fragility of VBC transitions when the infrastructure isn't ready.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2014-00-00-aspe-pace-effect-costs-nursing-home-mortality]] | Added: 2026-03-10 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+PACE represents the extreme end of value-based care alignment—100% capitation with full financial risk for a nursing-home-eligible population. The ASPE/HHS evaluation shows that even under complete payment alignment, PACE does not reduce total costs but redistributes them (lower Medicare acute costs in early months, higher Medicaid chronic costs overall). This suggests that the 'payment boundary' stall may not be primarily a problem of insufficient risk-bearing. Rather, the economic case for value-based care may rest on quality/preference improvements rather than cost reduction. PACE's 'stall' is not at the payment boundary—it's at the cost-savings promise. The implication: value-based care may require a different success metric (outcome quality, institutionalization avoidance, mortality reduction) than the current cost-reduction narrative assumes.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/Living Capital vehicles pair Living Agent domain expertise with futarchy-governed investment to direct capital toward crucial innovations.md

@@ -45,6 +45,12 @@ The binding constraint on Living Capital is information flow: how portfolio comp
 
 Since [[expert staking in Living Capital uses Numerai-style bounded burns for performance and escalating dispute bonds for fraud creating accountability without deterring participation]], experts stake on their analysis with dual-currency stakes (vehicle tokens + stablecoin bonds). The mechanism separates honest error (bounded 5% burns) from fraud (escalating dispute bonds leading to 100% slashing), with correlation-aware penalties that detect potential collusion when multiple experts fail simultaneously.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (challenge)
+*Source: [[2025-06-12-optimism-futarchy-v1-preliminary-findings]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+Optimism futarchy experiment shows domain expertise may not translate to futarchy market success—Badge Holders (recognized governance experts) had the LOWEST win rates. Additionally, futarchy selected high-variance portfolios: both the top performer (+$27.8M) and the single worst performer. This challenges the assumption that pairing domain expertise (Living Agents) with futarchy governance produces superior outcomes. The mechanism may select for trading skill and risk tolerance rather than domain knowledge, and may optimize for upside capture rather than consistent performance—potentially unsuitable for fiduciary capital management. The variance pattern suggests futarchy-governed vehicles may systematically select power-law portfolios with larger drawdowns than traditional VC, changing the risk profile and appropriate use cases.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md

@@ -64,6 +64,12 @@ Raises include: Ranger ($6M minimum, uncapped), Solomon ($102.9M committed, $8M
 
 **Three-tier dispute resolution:** Protocol decisions via futarchy (on-chain), technical disputes via review panel, legal disputes via JAMS arbitration (Cayman Islands). The layered approach means on-chain governance handles day-to-day decisions while legal mechanisms provide fallback. Since [[MetaDAOs three-layer legal hierarchy separates formation agreements from contractual relationships from regulatory armor with each layer using different enforcement mechanisms]], the governance and legal structures are designed to work together.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2026-01-01-futardio-launch-mycorealms]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+MycoRealms launch on Futardio demonstrates MetaDAO platform capabilities in production: $125,000 USDC raise with 72-hour permissionless window, automatic treasury deployment if target reached, full refunds if target missed. Launch structure includes 10M ICO tokens (62.9% of supply), 2.9M tokens for liquidity provision (2M on Futarchy AMM, 900K on Meteora pool), with 20% of funds raised ($25K) paired with LP tokens. First physical infrastructure project (mushroom farm) using the platform, extending futarchy governance from digital to real-world operations with measurable outcomes (temperature, humidity, CO2, yield).
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md

@@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ In uncontested decisions -- where the community broadly agrees on the right outc
 
 This evidence has direct implications for governance design. It suggests that [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] -- futarchy excels precisely where disagreement and manipulation risk are high, but it wastes its protective power on consensual decisions. The MetaDAO experience validates the mixed-mechanism thesis: use simpler mechanisms for uncontested decisions and reserve futarchy's complexity for decisions where its manipulation resistance actually matters. The participation challenge also highlights a design tension: the mechanism that is most resistant to manipulation is also the one that demands the most sophistication from participants.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (challenge)
+*Source: [[2025-06-12-optimism-futarchy-v1-preliminary-findings]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+Optimism's futarchy experiment achieved 5,898 total trades from 430 active forecasters (average 13.6 transactions per person) over 21 days, with 88.6% being first-time Optimism governance participants. This suggests futarchy CAN attract substantial engagement when implemented at scale with proper incentives, contradicting the limited-volume pattern observed in MetaDAO. Key differences: Optimism used play money (lower barrier to entry), had institutional backing (Uniswap Foundation co-sponsor), and involved grant selection (clearer stakes) rather than protocol governance decisions. The participation breadth (10 countries, 4 continents, 36 new users/day) suggests the limited-volume finding may be specific to MetaDAO's implementation or use case rather than a structural futarchy limitation.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/cryptos primary use case is capital formation not payments or store of value because permissionless token issuance solves the fundraising bottleneck that solo founders and small teams face.md

@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ Three credible voices arrived at this framing independently in February 2026: @c
 - Permissionless capital formation without investor protection is how scams scale — since [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent]], the protection mechanisms are still early and unproven at scale
 - The "solo founder" era may be temporary — as AI tools mature, team formation may re-emerge as the bottleneck shifts from building to distribution
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2026-01-01-futardio-launch-mycorealms]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+MycoRealms demonstrates permissionless capital formation for physical infrastructure: two-person team (blockchain developer + mushroom farmer) raising $125,000 USDC in 72 hours with no gatekeepers, no accreditation requirements, no geographic restrictions. Traditional agriculture financing would require bank loans (collateral requirements, credit history, multi-month approval), VC funding (network access, pitch process, equity dilution), or grants (application process, government approval, restricted use). Futardio enables direct public fundraising with automatic treasury deployment and market-governed spending — solving the fundraising bottleneck for a project that would struggle in traditional capital markets. Team has 5+ years operational experience but lacks traditional finance network access.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/domain-expertise-loses-to-trading-skill-in-futarchy-markets-because-prediction-accuracy-requires-calibration-not-just-knowledge.md

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+secondary_domains: [collective-intelligence]
+description: "Optimism Badge Holders had lowest win rates in futarchy experiment, suggesting mechanism selects for trader skill not domain knowledge"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "Optimism Futarchy v1 Preliminary Findings (2025-06-12), Badge Holder performance data"
+created: 2025-06-12
+challenges: ["Living Agents are domain-expert investment entities where collective intelligence provides the analysis futarchy provides the governance and tokens provide permissionless access to private deal flow.md"]
+---
+
+# Domain expertise loses to trading skill in futarchy markets because prediction accuracy requires calibration not just knowledge
+
+Optimism's futarchy experiment produced a counterintuitive finding: Badge Holders—recognized experts in Optimism governance with established track records—had the LOWEST win rates among participant cohorts. Trading skill, not domain expertise, determined outcomes.
+
+This challenges the assumption that futarchy filters for informed participants through skin-in-the-game. If the mechanism worked by surfacing domain knowledge, Badge Holders should have outperformed. Instead, the results suggest futarchy selects for a different skill: probabilistic calibration and market timing. Knowing which projects will succeed is distinct from knowing how to translate that knowledge into profitable market positions.
+
+Domain experts may actually be disadvantaged in prediction markets because:
+1. Deep knowledge creates conviction that resists price-based updating
+2. Expertise focuses on project quality, not market psychology or strategic voting patterns
+3. Trading requires calibration skills (translating beliefs into probabilities) that domain work doesn't train
+
+This has implications for futarchy's value proposition. If the mechanism doesn't leverage domain expertise better than alternatives, its advantage must come purely from incentive alignment and manipulation resistance, not from aggregating specialized knowledge. The "wisdom" in futarchy markets may be trader wisdom (risk management, position sizing, timing) rather than domain wisdom (technical assessment, ecosystem understanding).
+
+Critical caveat: This was play-money, which may have inverted normal advantages. Real capital at risk could change the skill profile that succeeds.
+
+## Evidence
+- Badge Holders (recognized Optimism governance experts) had lowest win rates
+- 430 total forecasters, 88.6% first-time participants
+- Trading skill determined outcomes across participant cohorts
+- Play-money environment: no real capital at risk
+
+## Challenges
+Play-money structure is the primary confound—Badge Holders may have treated the experiment less seriously than traders seeking to prove skill. Real-money markets might show different expertise advantages. Sample size for Badge Holder cohort not disclosed. The 84-day outcome window may have been too short for expert knowledge advantages to manifest.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md]]
+- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders.md]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
+- [[foundations/collective-intelligence/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md

@@ -22,6 +22,18 @@ The Hurupay raise on MetaDAO (Feb 2026) provides direct evidence of these compou
 
 Yet [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] suggests these barriers might be solvable through better tooling, token splits, and proposal templates rather than fundamental mechanism changes. The observation that [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] implies futarchy could focus on high-stakes decisions where the benefits justify the complexity.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2026-01-01-futardio-launch-mycorealms]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+MycoRealms implementation reveals operational friction points: monthly $10,000 allowance creates baseline operations budget, but any expenditure beyond this requires futarchy proposal and market approval. First post-raise proposal will be $50,000 CAPEX withdrawal — a large binary decision that may face liquidity challenges in decision markets. Team must balance operational needs (construction timelines, vendor commitments, seasonal agricultural constraints) against market approval uncertainty. This creates tension between real-world operational requirements (fixed deadlines, vendor deposits, material procurement) and futarchy's market-based approval process, suggesting futarchy may face adoption friction in domains with hard operational deadlines.
+
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2025-06-12-optimism-futarchy-v1-preliminary-findings]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+Optimism futarchy achieved 430 active forecasters and 88.6% first-time governance participants by using play money, demonstrating that removing capital requirements can dramatically lower participation barriers. However, this came at the cost of prediction accuracy (8x overshoot on magnitude estimates), revealing a new friction: the play-money vs real-money tradeoff. Play money enables permissionless participation but sacrifices calibration; real money provides calibration but creates regulatory and capital barriers. This suggests futarchy adoption faces a structural dilemma between accessibility and accuracy that liquidity requirements alone don't capture. The tradeoff is not merely about quantity of liquidity but the fundamental difference between incentive structures that attract participants vs incentive structures that produce accurate predictions.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-excels-at-relative-selection-but-fails-at-absolute-prediction-because-ordinal-ranking-works-while-cardinal-estimation-requires-calibration.md

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+secondary_domains: [collective-intelligence]
+description: "Optimism's futarchy experiment outperformed traditional grants by $32.5M TVL but overshot magnitude predictions by 8x, revealing mechanism's strength is comparative ranking not absolute forecasting"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "Optimism Futarchy v1 Preliminary Findings (2025-06-12), 21-day experiment with 430 forecasters"
+created: 2025-06-12
+depends_on: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md"]
+---
+
+# Futarchy excels at relative selection but fails at absolute prediction because ordinal ranking works while cardinal estimation requires calibration
+
+Optimism's 21-day futarchy experiment (March-June 2025) reveals a critical distinction between futarchy's selection capability and prediction accuracy. The mechanism selected grants that outperformed traditional Grants Council picks by ~$32.5M TVL, primarily through choosing Balancer & Beets (~$27.8M gain) over Grants Council alternatives. Both methods converged on 2 of 5 projects (Rocket Pool, SuperForm), but futarchy's unique selections drove superior aggregate outcomes.
+
+However, prediction accuracy was catastrophically poor. Markets predicted aggregate TVL increase of ~$239M against actual ~$31M—an 8x overshoot. Specific misses: Rocket Pool predicted $59.4M (actual: 0), SuperForm predicted $48.5M (actual: -$1.2M), Balancer & Beets predicted $47.9M (actual: -$13.7M despite being the top performer).
+
+The mechanism's strength is ordinal ranking weighted by conviction—markets correctly identified which projects would perform *better* relative to alternatives. The failure is cardinal estimation—markets could not calibrate absolute magnitudes. This suggests futarchy works through comparative advantage assessment ("this will outperform that") rather than precise forecasting ("this will generate exactly $X").
+
+Contributing factors to prediction failure: play-money environment created no downside risk for inflated predictions; $50M initial liquidity anchor may have skewed price discovery; strategic voting to influence allocations; TVL metric conflated ETH price movements with project quality.
+
+## Evidence
+- Optimism Futarchy v1 experiment: 430 active forecasters, 5,898 trades, selected 5 of 23 grant candidates
+- Selection performance: futarchy +$32.5M vs Grants Council, driven by Balancer & Beets (+$27.8M)
+- Prediction accuracy: predicted $239M aggregate TVL, actual $31M (8x overshoot)
+- Individual project misses: Rocket Pool 0 vs $59.4M predicted, SuperForm -$1.2M vs $48.5M predicted, Balancer & Beets -$13.7M vs $47.9M predicted
+- Play-money structure: no real capital at risk, 41% of participants hedged in final days to avoid losses
+
+## Challenges
+This was a play-money experiment, which is the primary confound. Real-money futarchy may produce different calibration through actual downside risk. The 84-day measurement window may have been too short for TVL impact to materialize. ETH price volatility during the measurement period confounded project-specific performance attribution.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md]]
+- [[speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md]]
+- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
+- [[foundations/collective-intelligence/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md

@@ -46,6 +46,12 @@ Critically, the proposal nullifies a prior 90-day restriction on buybacks/liquid
 - "Material misrepresentation" is a legal concept being enforced by a market mechanism without legal discovery, depositions, or cross-examination — the evidence standard is whatever the market accepts
 - The 90-day restriction nullification, while demonstrating adaptability, also shows that governance commitments can be overridden — which cuts both ways for investor confidence
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2026-01-01-futardio-launch-mycorealms]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+MycoRealms implements unruggable ICO structure with automatic refund mechanism: if $125,000 target not reached within 72 hours, full refunds execute automatically. Post-raise, team has zero direct treasury access — operates on $10,000 monthly allowance with all other expenditures requiring futarchy approval. This creates credible commitment: team cannot rug because they cannot access treasury directly, and investors can force liquidation through futarchy proposals if team materially misrepresents (e.g., fails to publish operational data to Arweave as promised, diverts funds from stated use). Transparency requirement (all invoices, expenses, harvest records, photos published to Arweave) creates verifiable baseline for detecting misrepresentation.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-variance-creates-portfolio-problem-because-mechanism-selects-both-top-performers-and-worst-performers-simultaneously.md

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+secondary_domains: [collective-intelligence]
+description: "Optimism futarchy outperformed on aggregate but showed higher variance selecting both best and worst projects, suggesting mechanism optimizes for upside not consistency"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "Optimism Futarchy v1 Preliminary Findings (2025-06-12), selection performance data"
+created: 2025-06-12
+---
+
+# Futarchy variance creates portfolio problem because mechanism selects both top performers and worst performers simultaneously
+
+Optimism's futarchy experiment outperformed traditional Grants Council by ~$32.5M aggregate TVL, but this headline masks a critical variance pattern: futarchy selected both the top-performing project (Balancer & Beets, +$27.8M) AND the single worst-performing project in the entire candidate pool.
+
+This suggests futarchy optimizes for upside capture rather than downside protection. Markets correctly identified high-potential outliers but failed to filter out catastrophic misses. The mechanism's strength—allowing conviction-weighted betting on asymmetric outcomes—becomes a weakness when applied to portfolio construction where consistency matters.
+
+Traditional grant committees may be selecting for lower variance: avoiding both the best and worst outcomes by gravitating toward consensus safe choices. Futarchy's higher variance could be:
+1. A feature if the goal is maximizing expected value through power-law bets
+2. A bug if the goal is reliable capital deployment with acceptable floors
+
+For Living Capital applications, this matters enormously. If futarchy-governed investment vehicles systematically select high-variance portfolios, they may outperform on average while experiencing larger drawdowns and more frequent catastrophic losses than traditional VC. This changes the risk profile and appropriate use cases—futarchy may be better suited for experimental grant programs than fiduciary capital management.
+
+The variance pattern also interacts with the prediction accuracy failure: markets were overconfident about both winners and losers, suggesting the calibration problem compounds at the tails.
+
+## Evidence
+- Futarchy aggregate performance: +$32.5M vs Grants Council
+- Top performer: Balancer & Beets +$27.8M (futarchy selection)
+- Futarchy selected single worst-performing project in candidate pool
+- Both methods converged on 2 of 5 projects (Rocket Pool, SuperForm)
+- Futarchy unique selections: Balancer & Beets, Avantis, Polynomial
+- Grants Council unique selections: Extra Finance, Gyroscope, Reservoir
+- Prediction overconfidence at tails: Rocket Pool $59.4M predicted vs $0 actual, Balancer & Beets -$13.7M actual despite $47.9M predicted
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[Living Capital vehicles pair Living Agent domain expertise with futarchy-governed investment to direct capital toward crucial innovations.md]]
+- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md]]
+- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
+- [[core/living-capital/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/internet capital markets compress fundraising from months to days because permissionless raises eliminate gatekeepers while futarchy replaces due diligence bottlenecks with real-time market pricing.md

@@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ The "Claude Code founders" framing is significant. The solo AI-native builder
 - Since [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]], the friction hasn't been fully eliminated — it's been shifted from gatekeeper access to market participation complexity
 - Survivorship bias risk: we see the successful fast raises, not the proposals that sat with zero commitment
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2026-01-01-futardio-launch-mycorealms]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+MycoRealms demonstrates 72-hour permissionless raise window on Futardio for $125,000 USDC with automatic deployment: if target reached, treasury/spending limits/liquidity deploy automatically; if target missed, full refunds execute automatically. No gatekeepers, no due diligence bottleneck — market pricing determines success. This compresses what would traditionally be a multi-month fundraising process (pitch deck preparation, investor meetings, term sheet negotiation, legal documentation, wire transfers) into a 3-day permissionless window. Notably, this includes physical infrastructure (mushroom farm) not just digital projects.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/myco-realms-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-physical-infrastructure-through-125k-mushroom-farm-raise-with-market-controlled-capex-deployment.md

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "First futarchy-governed agricultural operation using conditional markets for capital deployment decisions"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "MycoRealms launch on Futardio, 2026-01-01"
+created: 2026-01-01
+secondary_domains: [mechanisms]
+---
+
+# MycoRealms demonstrates futarchy-governed physical infrastructure through $125K mushroom farm raise with market-controlled CAPEX deployment
+
+MycoRealms is the first attempted application of futarchy governance to real-world physical infrastructure, raising $125,000 USDC to build a mushroom farming operation where all capital expenditures beyond a $10,000 monthly allowance require conditional market approval. The first post-raise proposal will be a $50,000 CAPEX withdrawal for construction and infrastructure, which must pass through decision markets before funds deploy.
+
+The team cannot access the treasury directly — they operate on a defined monthly allowance with any expenditure beyond that requiring a futarchy proposal and market approval. Every invoice, expense, harvest record, and operational photo will be published on a public operations ledger via Arweave.
+
+This extends futarchy from digital governance to physical operations with measurable variables (temperature, humidity, CO2, yield) that can be transparently reported and verified. The project tests whether decentralized governance can coordinate real-world production at the scale of a commercial farming operation, though no precedent exists for this application.
+
+## Evidence
+
+- MycoRealms raising $125,000 USDC on Futardio (MetaDAO platform) with 72-hour permissionless raise window
+- First proposal post-raise: $50,000 USD CAPEX withdrawal requiring decision market passage before deployment
+- Monthly treasury allowance: $10,000 (all expenditures beyond this require futarchy approval)
+- Team has zero direct treasury access — operates only on allowance
+- All operational data (invoices, expenses, harvest records, photos) published to Arweave
+- Production facility: climate-controlled button mushroom farm with measurable variables (temperature, humidity, CO2, yield)
+- Team background: crypticmeta (Solana/Bitcoin developer, built OrdinalNovus exchange with $30M volume), Ram (5+ years commercial mushroom production, managed 5-6 growing units across 5 states)
+
+## Operational Friction Points
+
+This is the first implementation — no track record exists for futarchy-governed physical infrastructure. Key challenges:
+
+- Market liquidity for CAPEX decisions may be insufficient for price discovery on large binary decisions ($50K withdrawal)
+- Operational complexity of agriculture may exceed what conditional markets can effectively govern (fixed vendor deadlines, construction timelines, seasonal constraints)
+- Transparency requirements (publishing all operational data to Arweave) may create competitive disadvantages in wholesale markets
+- Team performance unlocks tied to 2x/4x/8x/16x/32x token price with 18-month cliff — unproven alignment mechanism for physical operations with high operational burn
+- Tension between real-world operational requirements (fixed deadlines, vendor deposits) and futarchy's market-based approval process
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md]]
+- [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance.md]]
+- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet-finance/_map]]
+- [[mechanisms/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/performance-unlocked-team-tokens-with-price-multiple-triggers-and-twap-settlement-create-long-term-alignment-without-initial-dilution.md

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "Team allocation structure that releases tokens only at 2x/4x/8x/16x/32x price multiples with TWAP verification"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "MycoRealms token structure, 2026-01-01"
+created: 2026-01-01
+---
+
+# Performance-unlocked team tokens with price-multiple triggers and TWAP settlement create long-term alignment without initial dilution
+
+MycoRealms implements a team allocation structure where 3M tokens (18.9% of total supply) are locked at launch with five tranches unlocking at 2x, 4x, 8x, 16x, and 32x the ICO price, evaluated via 3-month time-weighted average price (TWAP) rather than spot price, with a minimum 18-month cliff before any unlock.
+
+At launch, zero team tokens circulate. If the token never reaches 2x ICO price, the team receives nothing. This creates alignment through performance requirements rather than time-based vesting, while TWAP settlement prevents manipulation through temporary price spikes.
+
+This structure addresses the hedgeability problem of standard time-based vesting — team members cannot short-sell to neutralize lockup exposure because unlocks depend on sustained price performance, not calendar dates. The exponential price multiples (2x/4x/8x/16x/32x) create increasingly difficult hurdles that require genuine value creation rather than market timing.
+
+## Evidence
+
+- MycoRealms team allocation: 3M tokens (18.9% of total 15.9M supply)
+- Five unlock tranches at 2x, 4x, 8x, 16x, 32x ICO price
+- 18-month minimum cliff before any unlock eligibility
+- Unlock evaluation via 3-month TWAP, not spot price
+- Zero team tokens circulating at launch
+- If token never reaches 2x, team receives zero allocation
+
+## Comparison to Standard Vesting
+
+Standard time-based vesting (e.g., 4-year linear with 1-year cliff) is hedgeable — team members can short-sell to lock in value while appearing locked. Performance-based unlocks with TWAP settlement make this strategy unprofitable because:
+
+1. Shorting suppresses price, preventing unlock triggers
+2. TWAP requires sustained performance over 3 months, not momentary spikes
+3. Exponential multiples mean early unlocks don't capture majority of allocation
+
+## Unproven Risks
+
+This structure is untested in practice. Key risks:
+
+- Team may abandon project if early price performance is poor (no guaranteed compensation for work during pre-unlock period)
+- Extreme price volatility could trigger unlocks during temporary bubbles despite TWAP smoothing
+- 18-month cliff may be too long for early-stage projects with high burn rates, creating team retention risk
+- No precedent for whether TWAP-based triggers actually prevent manipulation in low-liquidity token markets
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[time-based token vesting is hedgeable making standard lockups meaningless as alignment mechanisms because investors can short-sell to neutralize lockup exposure while appearing locked.md]]
+- [[dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution.md]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/play-money-futarchy-attracts-participation-but-produces-uncalibrated-predictions-because-absence-of-downside-risk-removes-selection-pressure.md

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+secondary_domains: [collective-intelligence]
+description: "Optimism futarchy drew 88.6% new governance participants but predictions overshot reality by 8x, suggesting play money enables engagement without accuracy"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "Optimism Futarchy v1 Preliminary Findings (2025-06-12), 430 forecasters, 88.6% first-time participants"
+created: 2025-06-12
+---
+
+# Play-money futarchy attracts participation but produces uncalibrated predictions because absence of downside risk removes selection pressure
+
+Optimism's futarchy experiment achieved remarkable participation breadth—88.6% of 430 active forecasters were first-time Optimism governance participants, spanning 10 countries across 4 continents, averaging 36 new users per day and 13.6 transactions per person. This demonstrates play-money futarchy can overcome the participation barriers that plague traditional governance.
+
+However, this engagement came at the cost of prediction accuracy. Markets overshot actual outcomes by approximately 8x ($239M predicted vs $31M actual TVL increase). The play-money structure created no downside risk for inflated predictions—participants could express optimistic views without capital consequences. 41% of participants hedged their positions in the final days specifically to avoid losses, revealing that even play-money participants cared about winning but not enough to discipline initial predictions.
+
+The mechanism successfully filtered 4,122 suspected bots down to 430 genuine participants, showing the platform could maintain quality control. But the absence of real capital at risk meant the selection pressure that makes markets accurate—where overconfident predictors lose money and exit—never engaged. Strategic voting to influence grant allocations further corrupted price discovery.
+
+This creates a fundamental tradeoff for futarchy adoption: play money enables permissionless participation and experimentation without regulatory friction, but sacrifices the calibration that makes prediction markets valuable. Real-money futarchy faces the opposite constraint—better calibration through skin-in-the-game, but regulatory barriers and capital requirements that limit participation.
+
+## Evidence
+- 430 active forecasters after filtering 4,122 suspected bots
+- 88.6% first-time Optimism governance participants
+- 5,898 total trades, average 13.6 transactions per person
+- Geographic distribution: 10 countries, 4 continents
+- Prediction accuracy: $239M forecast vs $31M actual (8x overshoot)
+- Behavioral pattern: 41% hedged positions in final days to avoid losses
+- Play-money structure: no real capital at risk
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md]]
+- [[speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md]]
+- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
+- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md

@@ -20,6 +20,12 @@ This mechanism is crucial for [[Living Capital vehicles pair Living Agent domain
 
 The selection effect also relates to [[trial and error is the only coordination strategy humanity has ever used]] - markets implement trial and error at the individual level (traders learn or exit) rather than requiring society-wide experimentation.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2025-06-12-optimism-futarchy-v1-preliminary-findings]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+Optimism futarchy experiment reveals the selection effect works for ordinal ranking but fails for cardinal estimation. Markets correctly identified which projects would outperform alternatives (futarchy selections beat Grants Council by $32.5M), but catastrophically failed at magnitude prediction (8x overshoot: $239M predicted vs $31M actual). This suggests the incentive/selection mechanism produces comparative advantage assessment ("this will outperform that") rather than absolute forecasting accuracy. Additionally, Badge Holders (domain experts) had the LOWEST win rates, indicating the selection effect filters for trading skill and calibration ability, not domain knowledge—a different kind of 'information' than typically assumed. The mechanism aggregates trader wisdom (risk management, position sizing, timing) rather than domain wisdom (technical assessment, ecosystem understanding).
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

entities/internet-finance/augur.md

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: company
+name: "Augur"
+domain: internet-finance
+website: https://augur.net
+status: declining
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+founded: 2015-01-01
+founders: ["Jack Peterson", "Joey Krug"]
+category: "Decentralized prediction market protocol (Ethereum)"
+stage: declining
+key_metrics:
+  status: "Largely inactive"
+competitors: ["[[polymarket]]", "[[kalshi]]"]
+built_on: ["Ethereum"]
+tags: ["prediction-markets", "decentralized", "ethereum", "historical"]
+---
+
+# Augur
+
+## Overview
+The original decentralized prediction market protocol on Ethereum. Launched in 2015 as one of the first major Ethereum dApps. Pioneered decentralized oracle resolution through REP token staking. Never achieved meaningful volume due to UX friction, gas costs, and lack of liquidity.
+
+## Current State
+Largely inactive. Polymarket absorbed the crypto prediction market category by solving UX and liquidity problems that Augur never cracked. Historical significance as proof of concept — showed that decentralized prediction markets were technically possible but commercially unviable without massive UX investment.
+
+## Lesson for KB
+Augur demonstrates that being first doesn't create durable advantage in prediction markets. Liquidity and UX beat decentralization purity. Polymarket won by choosing Polygon (cheap, fast) over Ethereum mainnet and investing in user experience over protocol purity.
+
+**Thesis status:** INACTIVE — historical reference
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds]] — Augur attempted this but never achieved sufficient volume
+- [[Polymarket vindicated prediction markets over polling in 2024 US election]] — Polymarket succeeded where Augur couldn't
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[polymarket]] — successor in crypto prediction markets
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

entities/internet-finance/deans-list.md

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: company
+name: "Dean's List"
+domain: internet-finance
+handles: ["@deanslistDAO", "@_Dean_Machine"]
+status: active
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+category: "Services DAO — user feedback, QA, community management (Solana)"
+stage: stable
+key_metrics:
+  token: "DEAN (100M cap, mint authority burned)"
+  governance: "Futarchy via MetaDAO Autocrat"
+  economic_model: "Client fees in USDC → purchase DEAN tokens"
+competitors: []
+built_on: ["Solana", "MetaDAO Autocrat"]
+tags: ["dao", "services", "futarchy", "metadao-ecosystem", "community"]
+---
+
+# Dean's List
+
+## Overview
+Services DAO on Solana providing professional user feedback, QA, marketing, and community management services to other Solana protocols. Originally a sub-DAO of Grape Protocol. Self-describes as a "Network State" of Web3 power users. One of the early DAOs to adopt MetaDAO's futarchy governance outside of MetaDAO itself.
+
+## Current State
+- **Token**: DEAN. Total supply capped at 100M (30M additional minted, then mint authority burned). Economic model: charge clients in USDC, use collected USDC to purchase DEAN tokens.
+- **Governance**: Uses MetaDAO's futarchy for governance decisions. "Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model" was put through futarchy decision markets.
+- **Scope evolution**: Beyond just feedback services — now involves broader Solana ecosystem coordination, trading community activities, AI agent token exploration.
+
+## Significance for KB
+Dean's List is interesting not as a standalone company but as an adoption data point. It demonstrates that futarchy governance can be adopted by organizations outside of MetaDAO's direct ecosystem — a services DAO using market-based governance for operational decisions. If more existing DAOs migrate from Snapshot/token voting to futarchy, that validates the governance evolution thesis.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[DAO governance degenerates into political capture because proposal processes select for coalition-building skill over operational competence and the resulting bureaucracy creates structural speed disadvantages against focused competitors]] — Dean's List moved from token voting to futarchy to escape this
+- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] — Dean's List may use futarchy selectively for high-stakes decisions
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[metadao]] — governance platform
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

entities/internet-finance/futardio.md

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: product
+name: "Futardio"
+domain: internet-finance
+handles: ["@futarddotio"]
+website: https://futardio.com
+status: active
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+launched: 2025-10-01
+parent: "[[metadao]]"
+category: "Futarchy-governed token launchpad (Solana)"
+stage: growth
+key_metrics:
+  total_launches: "45 (verified from platform data)"
+  total_commits: "$17.8M"
+  total_funders: "1,010"
+  notable_launches: ["Umbra", "Solomon", "Superclaw ($6M committed)", "Rock Game", "Turtle Cove", "VervePay", "Open Music", "SeekerVault", "SuperClaw", "LaunchPet", "Seyf", "Areal", "Etnlio"]
+  mechanism: "Unruggable ICO — futarchy-governed launches with treasury return guarantees"
+competitors: ["pump.fun (memecoins)", "Doppler (liquidity bootstrapping)"]
+built_on: ["Solana", "MetaDAO Autocrat"]
+tags: ["launchpad", "ownership-coins", "futarchy", "unruggable-ico", "permissionless-launches"]
+---
+
+# Futardio
+
+## Overview
+MetaDAO's token launch platform. Implements "unruggable ICOs" — permissionless launches where investors can force full treasury return through futarchy-governed liquidation if teams materially misrepresent. Replaced the original uncapped pro-rata mechanism that caused massive overbidding (Umbra: $155M committed for $3M raise = 50x; Solomon: $103M committed for $8M = 13x).
+
+## Current State
+- **Launches**: 45 total (verified from platform data, March 2026). Many projects show "REFUNDING" status (failed to meet raise targets). Total commits: $17.8M across 1,010 funders.
+- **Mechanism**: Unruggable ICO. Projects raise capital, treasury is held onchain, futarchy proposals govern project direction. If community votes for liquidation, treasury returns to token holders.
+- **Quality signal**: The platform is permissionless — anyone can launch. Brand separation between Futardio platform and individual project quality is an active design challenge.
+- **Key test case**: Ranger Finance liquidation proposal (March 2026) — first major futarchy-governed enforcement action. Liquidation IS the enforcement mechanism — system working as designed.
+- **Low relaunch cost**: ~$90 to launch, enabling rapid iteration (MycoRealms launched, failed, relaunched)
+
+## Timeline
+- **2025-10** — Futardio launches. Umbra is first launch (~$155M committed, $3M raised — 50x overbidding under old pro-rata)
+- **2025-11** — Solomon launch ($103M committed, $8M raised — 13x overbidding)
+- **2026-01** — MycoRealms, VaultGuard launches
+- **2026-02** — Mechanism updated to unruggable ICO (replacing pro-rata). HuruPay, Epic Finance, ForeverNow launches
+- **2026-02/03** — Launch explosion: Rock Game, Turtle Cove, VervePay, Open Music, SeekerVault, SuperClaw, LaunchPet, Seyf, Areal, Etnlio, and dozens more
+- **2026-03** — Ranger Finance liquidation proposal — first futarchy-governed enforcement action
+
+## Competitive Position
+- **Unique mechanism**: Only launch platform with futarchy-governed accountability and treasury return guarantees
+- **vs pump.fun**: pump.fun is memecoin launch (zero accountability, pure speculation). Futardio is ownership coin launch (futarchy governance, treasury enforcement). Different categories despite both being "launch platforms."
+- **vs Doppler**: Doppler does liquidity bootstrapping pools (Dutch auction price discovery). Different mechanism, no governance layer.
+- **Structural advantage**: The futarchy enforcement mechanism is novel — no competitor offers investor protection through market-governed liquidation
+- **Structural weakness**: Permissionless launches mean quality varies wildly. Platform reputation tied to worst-case projects despite brand separation efforts.
+
+## Investment Thesis
+Futardio is the test of whether futarchy can govern capital formation at scale. If unruggable ICOs produce better investor outcomes than unregulated token launches (pump.fun) while maintaining permissionless access, Futardio creates a new category: accountable permissionless fundraising. The Ranger liquidation is the first live test of the enforcement mechanism.
+
+**Thesis status:** ACTIVE
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — parent claim
+- [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent]] — enforcement mechanism
+- [[futarchy-governed permissionless launches require brand separation to manage reputational liability because failed projects on a curated platform damage the platforms credibility]] — active design challenge
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[metadao]] — parent protocol
+- [[solomon]] — notable launch
+- [[omnipair]] — ecosystem infrastructure
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

entities/internet-finance/kalshi.md

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: company
+name: "Kalshi"
+domain: internet-finance
+handles: ["@Kalshi"]
+website: https://kalshi.com
+status: active
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+founded: 2021-01-01
+founders: ["Tarek Mansour", "Luana Lopes Lara"]
+category: "Regulated prediction market exchange (CFTC-designated)"
+stage: growth
+key_metrics:
+  monthly_volume_30d: "$6.8B (March 2026)"
+  weekly_record: "$5.35B combined with Polymarket (week of March 2-8, 2026)"
+competitors: ["[[polymarket]]"]
+built_on: ["Traditional finance rails (USD)"]
+tags: ["prediction-markets", "event-contracts", "regulated-exchange"]
+---
+
+# Kalshi
+
+## Overview
+CFTC-designated contract market for event-based trading. USD-denominated, KYC-required, traditional brokerage integration. Won a landmark federal court case against CFTC to list election contracts. Regulation-first approach targeting institutional and mainstream users — the complement to Polymarket's crypto-native model.
+
+## Current State
+- **Volume**: $6.8B 30-day (March 2026) — trails Polymarket's $8.7B but growing fast
+- **Regulatory**: Full CFTC designation as contract market. Won Kalshi v. CFTC (D.C. Circuit) to list congressional control contracts — first legal precedent for political event contracts on regulated exchanges.
+- **Access**: US-native. KYC required. Traditional payment rails (bank transfer, debit card). No crypto exposure for users.
+- **Market creation**: Centrally listed — Kalshi chooses which markets to offer (vs Polymarket's permissionless model)
+- **Distribution**: Brokerage integration (Interactive Brokers partnership), mobile-first UX
+
+## Timeline
+- **2021** — Founded. CFTC designation as contract market.
+- **2023** — CFTC tried to block election contracts. Kalshi sued.
+- **2024-09** — Won federal court case (D.C. Circuit) — CFTC cannot ban political event contracts
+- **2024-11** — Election trading alongside Polymarket. Combined volume $3.7B+
+- **2025** — Growth surge post-election vindication
+- **2026-03** — Combined Polymarket+Kalshi weekly record: $5.35B (week of March 2-8, 2026)
+
+## Competitive Position
+- **Regulation-first**: Only CFTC-designated prediction market exchange. Institutional credibility.
+- **vs Polymarket**: Different market — Kalshi targets mainstream/institutional users who won't touch crypto. Polymarket targets crypto-native users who want permissionless market creation. Both grew massively post-2024 election.
+- **Structural advantage**: Regulatory moat. Traditional finance integration. No crypto friction.
+- **Structural weakness**: Centrally listed markets (slower to add new markets). No permissionless market creation. Higher regulatory compliance costs.
+- **Not governance**: Like Polymarket, aggregates information but doesn't govern organizations.
+
+## Investment Thesis
+Kalshi is the institutional/mainstream bet on prediction markets. If prediction markets become standard infrastructure for forecasting, Kalshi captures the regulated, institutional, and mainstream consumer segments that Polymarket's crypto model cannot reach. The federal court victory was a regulatory moat creation event.
+
+**Thesis status:** ACTIVE
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[Polymarket vindicated prediction markets over polling in 2024 US election]] — Kalshi co-beneficiary of this vindication
+- [[speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds]] — same mechanism theory applies
+- [[decision markets fail in three systematic categories where legitimacy thin information or herding dynamics make voting or deliberation structurally superior]] — boundary conditions apply equally
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[polymarket]] — primary competitor (crypto-native)
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

entities/internet-finance/metadao.md

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: company
+name: "MetaDAO"
+domain: internet-finance
+handles: ["@MetaDAOProject"]
+website: https://metadao.fi
+status: active
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+founded: 2023-01-01
+founders: ["[[proph3t]]"]
+category: "Futarchy governance protocol + ownership coin launchpad (Solana)"
+stage: growth
+key_metrics:
+  meta_price: "~$3.78 (March 2026)"
+  market_cap: "~$85.7M"
+  ecosystem_market_cap: "$219M total ($69M non-META)"
+  total_revenue: "$3.1M+ (Q4 2025: $2.51M — 54% Futarchy AMM, 46% Meteora LP)"
+  total_equity: "$16.5M (up from $4M in Q3 2025)"
+  runway: "15+ quarters at ~$783K/quarter burn"
+  icos_facilitated: "8 on MetaDAO proper (through Dec 2025), raising $25.6M total"
+  ecosystem_launches: "45 (via Futardio)"
+  futarchic_amm_lp_share: "~20% of each project's token supply"
+  proposal_volume: "$3.6M Q4 2025 (up from $205K in Q3)"
+competitors: ["[[snapshot]]", "[[tally]]"]
+built_on: ["Solana"]
+tags: ["futarchy", "decision-markets", "ownership-coins", "governance", "launchpad"]
+---
+
+# MetaDAO
+
+## Overview
+The futarchy governance protocol on Solana. Implements decision markets through Autocrat — a system where proposals create parallel pass/fail token universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window. Also operates as a launchpad for ownership coins through Futardio (unruggable ICOs). The first platform for futarchy-governed organizations at scale.
+
+## Current State
+- **Autocrat**: Conditional token markets for governance decisions. Proposals create pass/fail universes; TWAP settlement over 3 days.
+- **Futardio**: Unruggable ICO launch platform. Projects raise capital through the MetaDAO ecosystem with futarchy-governed accountability. Replaced the original uncapped pro-rata mechanism that caused massive overbidding (Umbra: $155M committed for $3M raise = 50x oversubscription; Solomon: $103M committed for $8M = 13x).
+- **Futarchic AMM**: Custom-built AMM for decision market trading. No fees for external LPs — all fees go to the protocol. ~20% of each project's token supply is in the Futarchic AMM LP. LP cannot be withdrawn during active markets.
+- **Financial**: $85.7M market cap, $219M ecosystem market cap ($69M non-META). Total revenue $3.1M+ (Q4 2025 alone: $2.51M). Total equity $16.5M, 15+ quarters runway.
+- **Ecosystem**: 8 curated ICOs raising $25.6M total (through Dec 2025) + 45 permissionless Futardio launches
+- **Treasury**: Active management via subcommittee proposals (see Solomon DP-00001). Omnibus proposal migrated ~90% of META liquidity into Futarchy AMM and burned ~60K META.
+- **Known limitation**: Limited trading volume in uncontested decisions — when community consensus is obvious, conditional markets add little information
+
+## Timeline
+- **2023** — MetaDAO founded by Proph3t
+- **2024** — Autocrat deployed; early governance proposals
+- **2025-10** — Futardio launches (Umbra is first launch, ~$155M committed)
+- **2025-11** — Solomon launches via Futardio ($103M committed for $8M raise)
+- **2026-02** — Futardio mechanism updated (unruggable ICO replacing pro-rata)
+- **2026-02/03** — Multiple new Futardio launches: Rock Game, Turtle Cove, VervePay, Open Music, SeekerVault, SuperClaw, LaunchPet, Seyf, Areal, Etnlio
+- **2026-03** — Ranger liquidation proposal; treasury subcommittee formation
+- **2026-03** — Pine Analytics Q4 2025 quarterly report published
+
+## Competitive Position
+- **First mover** in futarchy-governed organizations at scale
+- **No direct competitor** for conditional-market governance on Solana
+- **Indirect competitors**: Snapshot (token voting, free, widely adopted), Tally (onchain governance, Ethereum-focused)
+- **Structural advantage**: the Futarchic AMM is purpose-built; no existing AMM can replicate conditional token market settlement
+- **Key vulnerability**: depends on ecosystem project quality. Failed launches (Ranger liquidation) damage platform credibility. Brand separation between MetaDAO platform and Futardio-launched projects is an active design challenge.
+
+## Investment Thesis
+MetaDAO is the platform bet on futarchy as a governance mechanism. If decision markets prove superior to token voting (evidence: Stani Kulechov's DAO critique, convergence toward hybrid governance models), MetaDAO is the infrastructure layer that captures value from every futarchy-governed organization. Current risk: ecosystem quality varies widely, and limited trading volume in uncontested decisions raises questions about mechanism utility.
+
+**Thesis status:** ACTIVE
+
+## Key Metrics to Track
+- % of total futarchic market volume (market share of decision markets)
+- Number of active projects with meaningful governance activity
+- Futardio launch success rate (projects still active vs liquidated/abandoned)
+- Committed-to-raised ratio on new launches (improving from 50x overbidding?)
+- Ecosystem token aggregate market cap
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — core claim about MetaDAO
+- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — mechanism description
+- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] — known limitation
+- [[futarchy-governed permissionless launches require brand separation to manage reputational liability because failed projects on a curated platform damage the platforms credibility]] — active design challenge
+- [[DAO governance degenerates into political capture because proposal processes select for coalition-building skill over operational competence and the resulting bureaucracy creates structural speed disadvantages against focused competitors]] — the problem MetaDAO solves
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[omnipair]] — leverage infrastructure for ecosystem
+- [[proph3t]] — founder
+- [[solomon]] — ecosystem launch
+- [[futardio]] — launch platform
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

entities/internet-finance/omnipair.md

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: company
+name: "OmniPair"
+domain: internet-finance
+handles: ["@omnipair"]
+website: https://omnipair.com
+status: active
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+founded: 2025-01-01
+founders: ["[[rakka]]"]
+category: "Combined AMM + lending protocol (Solana)"
+stage: seed
+market_cap: "$2-3M (as of ~2026-02-25)"
+ico_raise: "$1.1M (July 2025 via MetaDAO)"
+token_performance: "OMFG up ~480% since ICO"
+funding: "ICO via MetaDAO"
+key_metrics:
+  tvl: "$250-300K (~3 weeks post-launch)"
+  volume_tvl_ratio: "~0.8x monthly, trending toward 1x"
+  borrow_rate: "1% annualized (conservative rate controller defaults)"
+  team_size: "6"
+competitors: ["[[raydium]]", "[[meteora]]", "[[drift]]"]
+built_on: ["Solana"]
+tags: ["futarchy-ecosystem", "metadao", "leverage", "amm", "lending"]
+---
+
+# OmniPair
+
+## Overview
+Combined AMM + lending protocol on Solana — swapping and borrowing in the same pool. Currently the only venue for leverage on MetaDAO ecosystem tokens. Part of the futarchic governance ecosystem: enables large bets on decision market outcomes, increases volume, and improves signal quality in futarchy proposals.
+
+## Current State
+- **Market cap**: ~$2-3M (OMFG token) — approximately 1/40th of MetaDAO's valuation
+- **TVL**: ~$250-300K (~3 weeks post-launch as of late Feb 2026)
+- **Borrow rate**: 1% annualized — extremely low due to conservative rate controller defaults (only increases above 85% utilization). Market-clearing rate for META/OMFG could reach 15-20% annually.
+- **Withdrawal fee**: 1% — unique among AMMs. Exists to prevent a specific liquidity manipulation/liquidation attack. Planned fix: free withdrawal after ~3-day waiting period.
+- **DexScreener visibility**: Only ~10% of liquidity displays on some scanners (~$50K visible), making token look like a rug. Caused by Futarchic AMM structure.
+- **Program status**: NOT immutable — controlled by multi-sig. ~4 contract upgrades in first week post-launch.
+- **Pools**: ~50% seeded by MetaDAO/Colin (not formally/officially)
+
+## Timeline
+- **~2025-Q4** — Audit period begins (~3 months of audits)
+- **~2026-02-15** — OmniPair launches (public beta / guarded launch)
+- **2026-02-15 to 2026-02-22** — ~4 contract upgrades in first week
+- **~2026-03-01** — Jupiter SDK ready, forked by Jupiter team. Integration expected imminently.
+- **~2026-03-15 (est)** — Leverage/looping feature expected (1-3 weeks from late Feb conversation). Implemented and audited in contracts, needs auxiliary peripheral program.
+- **Pending** — LP experience improvements, combined APY display (swap + interest), off-chain watchers for bad debt monitoring
+
+## Competitive Position
+- **"Only game in town"** for leverage on MetaDAO ecosystem tokens currently
+- Rakka argues mathematically: same AMM + aggregator integration + borrow rate surplus = must yield more than Raydium for equivalent pools
+- **Key vulnerability**: temporary moat. If MetaDAO reaches $1B valuation, Drift and other perp protocols will likely offer leverage on META and ecosystem tokens
+- **Chicken-and-egg**: need LPs for borrowers, need borrowers for LP yield. Rakka prioritizing LP side first.
+- **Jupiter integration is the single highest-impact catalyst** — expected to roughly triple volume and close most of the APY gap with Raydium
+- **Valuation**: OMFG at ~1/40th of META market cap, described as "silly"/undervalued given OmniPair is the primary beneficiary of ecosystem volume growth
+
+## Investment Thesis
+OmniPair is a leveraged bet on MetaDAO ecosystem growth. If futarchic governance and ownership coins gain adoption, all trading volume flows through OmniPair as the default leverage venue. Current valuation ($2-3M) is severely discounted relative to MetaDAO (~$80-120M implied). Key catalysts: Jupiter integration (volume), leverage feature (demand driver), ecosystem growth (rising tide). Key risks: temporary moat, DexScreener visibility, small team (6).
+
+**Thesis status:** ACTIVE
+
+## Technical Details
+- Interest accrual is time-dependent (calculated on interaction, not streamed on-chain)
+- Collateral is NOT re-hypothecated (locked, not used as LP) — potential V2 feature
+- LP tokens cannot be used as collateral — potential V2 feature
+- Multiple pools with different parameters allowed; configs are market-driven
+- Circuit breaker / pause mechanism (multi-sig controlled; plans for future permissionless version with bonding)
+- Rate controller: begins increasing rates only above 85% utilization; dynamic collateral factor caps utilization at ~50-60%
+
+## Open Questions
+- No team token package in place yet — alignment mechanism absent
+- No airdrop/LP incentive program agreed
+- Combined AMM+lending creates novel attack surfaces not fully explored at scale
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[permissionless leverage on metaDAO ecosystem tokens catalyzes trading volume and price discovery that strengthens governance by making futarchy markets more liquid]] — OmniPair is the direct implementation of this claim
+- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — OmniPair addresses the liquidity friction
+- [[ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match]] — leverage enables more aggressive price discovery
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[metadao]] — platform / ecosystem
+- [[rakka]] — founder
+- [[raydium]] — AMM competitor
+- [[meteora]] — AMM competitor
+- [[drift]] — future leverage competitor
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

entities/internet-finance/polymarket.md

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: company
+name: "Polymarket"
+domain: internet-finance
+handles: ["@Polymarket"]
+website: https://polymarket.com
+status: active
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+founded: 2020-06-01
+founders: ["[[shayne-coplan]]"]
+category: "Prediction market platform (Polygon/Ethereum L2)"
+stage: growth
+funding: "ICE (Intercontinental Exchange) invested up to $2B"
+key_metrics:
+  monthly_volume_30d: "$8.7B (March 2026)"
+  daily_volume_24h: "$390M (March 2026)"
+  election_accuracy: "94%+ one month before resolution; 98% on winners"
+competitors: ["[[kalshi]]", "[[augur]]"]
+built_on: ["Polygon"]
+tags: ["prediction-markets", "decision-markets", "information-aggregation"]
+---
+
+# Polymarket
+
+## Overview
+Crypto-native prediction market platform on Polygon. Users trade binary outcome contracts on real-world events (politics, economics, sports, crypto). Built on USDC. Vindicated by 2024 US presidential election — called Trump victory when polls showed a toss-up. Now the world's largest prediction market by volume.
+
+## Current State
+- **Volume**: $390M 24h, $2.6B 7-day, $8.7B 30-day (March 2026)
+- **Accuracy**: 94%+ one month before outcome resolution; 98% on calling winners
+- **US access**: Returned to US users (invite-only, restricted markets) after CFTC approved Amended Order of Designation (November 2025). Operating as intermediated contract market with full reporting/surveillance.
+- **Valuation**: ICE (Intercontinental Exchange) invested up to $2B, making founder Shayne Coplan the youngest self-made billionaire.
+- **Market creation**: Permissionless — anyone can create markets (differentiator vs Kalshi's centrally listed model)
+
+## Timeline
+- **2020-06** — Founded by Shayne Coplan (age 22, NYU dropout). Pivoted from earlier DeFi project Union Market.
+- **2022-01** — CFTC fined Polymarket $1.4M for operating unregistered binary options market; ordered to cease and desist. Blocked US users.
+- **2024-11** — 2024 US presidential election: $3.7B total volume. Polymarket correctly predicted Trump victory; polls showed toss-up. Major vindication moment for prediction markets.
+- **2025-10** — Monthly volume exceeded $3B
+- **2025-11** — CFTC approved Amended Order of Designation as regulated contract market
+- **2025-12** — Relaunched for US users (invite-only, restricted markets)
+- **2026-03** — Combined Polymarket+Kalshi weekly record: $5.35B (week of March 2-8, 2026)
+
+## Competitive Position
+- **#1 by volume** — leads Kalshi on 30-day volume ($8.7B vs $6.8B)
+- **Crypto-native**: USDC on Polygon, non-custodial, permissionless market creation
+- **vs Kalshi**: Kalshi is regulation-first (USD-denominated, KYC, traditional brokerage integration). Polymarket is crypto-first. Both grew massively post-2024 election — combined 2025 volume ~$30B.
+- **Not governance**: Polymarket aggregates information but doesn't govern organizations. Different use case from MetaDAO's futarchy. Same mechanism class (conditional markets), different application.
+
+## Investment Thesis
+Polymarket proved prediction markets work at scale. The 2024 election vindication created a permanent legitimacy shift — prediction markets are now the reference standard for forecasting, not polls. Growth trajectory accelerating. Key risk: regulatory capture (CFTC constraints on market types), competition from Kalshi on institutional/mainstream side.
+
+**Thesis status:** ACTIVE
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[Polymarket vindicated prediction markets over polling in 2024 US election]] — core vindication claim
+- [[speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds]] — mechanism theory Polymarket demonstrates
+- [[decision markets fail in three systematic categories where legitimacy thin information or herding dynamics make voting or deliberation structurally superior]] — boundary conditions apply to Polymarket too (thin-information markets showed media-tracking behavior during early COVID)
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[kalshi]] — primary competitor (regulated)
+- [[metadao]] — same mechanism class, different application (governance vs prediction)
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

entities/internet-finance/proph3t.md

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: person
+name: "Proph3t"
+domain: internet-finance
+handles: ["@metaproph3t"]
+twitter_id: "1544042060872929283"
+status: active
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+role: "Founder, MetaDAO"
+affiliations: ["[[metadao]]", "[[futardio]]"]
+tags: ["futarchy", "mechanism-design", "solana", "metadao-ecosystem"]
+---
+
+# Proph3t
+
+## Overview
+Founder of MetaDAO and architect of the Autocrat futarchy implementation on Solana. Built the first functional futarchy governance system at scale. Key intellectual influence on the ownership coin thesis — the idea that tokens with futarchy governance create genuinely investable organizations rather than speculative memecoins.
+
+## Significance
+- Created the Futarchic AMM — a custom AMM for conditional token markets that no existing AMM can replicate
+- Designed the Autocrat program (conditional token markets with TWAP settlement)
+- Led the transition from uncapped pro-rata launches to Futardio's unruggable ICO mechanism
+- Publicly endorsed by Colin for LP reallocation discussions (potential 10% LP reallocation from Futarchic AMM)
+- "Learning fast" — publicly documented iteration speed and intellectual honesty about mechanism design failures
+
+## Key Contributions to KB
+- Primary source for futarchy mechanism design claims
+- MetaDAO governance proposals (hired Robin Hanson as advisor — proposal submitted Feb 2025)
+- Pine Analytics quarterly reports provide data on MetaDAO ecosystem health
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — designed this
+- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] — implemented this
+- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] — acknowledged this limitation
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[metadao]] — founded
+- [[futardio]] — launched
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

entities/internet-finance/rakka.md

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: person
+name: "Rakka"
+domain: internet-finance
+handles: ["@rakka_sol"]
+status: active
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+role: "Founder, OmniPair"
+affiliations: ["[[omnipair]]"]
+tags: ["leverage", "lending", "amm", "metadao-ecosystem"]
+---
+
+# Rakka
+
+## Overview
+Founder of OmniPair, the combined AMM+lending protocol providing permissionless leverage infrastructure for the MetaDAO ecosystem. Building the missing primitive — leverage on ownership coins — that deepens futarchy market liquidity.
+
+## Key Insights (from m3taversal conversation, March 2026)
+- Leverage is the core primitive for ownership coins — enables larger bets on decision market outcomes
+- OmniPair's rate controller mechanism manages risk across combined AMM+lending positions
+- Chicken-and-egg problem: need LPs for borrowers, need borrowers for LP yield — classic two-sided market bootstrap
+- Jupiter SDK integration is the highest-impact near-term catalyst (~3x volume expected)
+- "Only game in town" for ecosystem leverage — Drift enters only if META reaches $1B valuation
+- Team of 6 building combined AMM+lending (ambitious scope for team size)
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[permissionless leverage on metaDAO ecosystem tokens catalyzes trading volume and price discovery that strengthens governance by making futarchy markets more liquid]] — building this
+- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — OmniPair addresses the liquidity friction
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[omnipair]] — founded
+- [[metadao]] — ecosystem partner
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

entities/internet-finance/ranger-finance.md

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: company
+name: "Ranger Finance"
+domain: internet-finance
+handles: ["@ranger_finance"]
+status: liquidating
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+founded: 2026-01-06
+category: "Perps aggregator / DEX aggregation (Solana/Hyperliquid)"
+stage: declining
+key_metrics:
+  raise: "$6M+ (39% of RNGR supply at ~$15M FDV)"
+  projected_volume: "$5B (actual: ~$2B — 60% below)"
+  projected_revenue: "$2M (actual: ~$500K — 75% below)"
+  liquidation_recovery: "90%+ from ICO price"
+competitors: ["Jupiter", "Drift"]
+built_on: ["Solana", "Hyperliquid"]
+tags: ["perps", "aggregation", "metadao-ecosystem", "liquidation", "futarchy-enforcement"]
+---
+
+# Ranger Finance
+
+## Overview
+Perps aggregator and DEX aggregation platform on Solana/Hyperliquid. Three products: perps aggregation (Jupiter, Drift), spot meta-aggregation (Jupiter, DFlow), and Ranger Earn (vault-based yield strategies). Launched via MetaDAO ICO in January 2026. Now undergoing futarchy-governed liquidation — the first major test of the unruggable ICO enforcement mechanism.
+
+## Current State
+- **Liquidation**: MetaDAO community passed liquidation proposal (early March 2026). Snapshot scheduled March 12, 2026.
+- **Reasons for liquidation**:
+  - Material misrepresentations before fundraise: projected $5B volume and $2M revenue; actual was ~$2B volume (60% below) and ~$500K revenue (75% below)
+  - Activity dropped 90%+ post-ICO
+  - Most "users" were reportedly token farmers, not legitimate platform participants
+- **Liquidation terms**: Pull all RNGR and USDC from the Futarchy AMM, return treasury funds to tokenholders (excluding unvested/protocol-owned). Recovery estimated at 90%+ from ICO price — strong investor protection outcome. IP and infrastructure return to Glint House PTE LTD.
+- **Post-liquidation pivot**: Shifted to focus exclusively on vaults product, suspending perp aggregation and spot trading. Running "Build-A-Bear Hackathon" with up to $1M in vault TVL seed funding. All-time $1.13M+ paid to Ranger Earn depositors.
+
+## Timeline
+- **2026-01-06** — ICO on MetaDAO. Raised $6M+, selling 39% of RNGR at ~$15M FDV. Full liquidity at TGE (no vesting). Team allocation performance-based (milestones at 2x/4x/8x/16x/32x).
+- **2026-02** — Volume and revenue significantly below projections. Activity drop-off.
+- **2026-03** — Liquidation proposal passed via futarchy. Snapshot scheduled March 12.
+- **2026-03-06** — Pivot to vaults-only, suspend perp/spot aggregation.
+
+## Significance for KB
+Ranger is THE test case for futarchy-governed enforcement. The system is working as designed: investors funded a project, the project underperformed relative to representations, the community used futarchy to force liquidation and treasury return. This is exactly what the "unruggable ICO" mechanism promises — and Ranger is the first live demonstration.
+
+Key questions this case answers:
+1. Does futarchy enforcement actually work? (Yes — liquidation proposal passed)
+2. Do investors get meaningful recovery? (90%+ from ICO price — strong outcome)
+3. Does the threat of liquidation create accountability? (Evidence: team pivoted to vaults before liquidation completed)
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent]] — Ranger IS the evidence for this claim
+- [[futarchy-governed permissionless launches require brand separation to manage reputational liability because failed projects on a curated platform damage the platforms credibility]] — Ranger demonstrates the brand separation challenge
+- [[ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match]] — Ranger tests investor protection in practice
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[metadao]] — parent platform
+- [[futardio]] — launch mechanism
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

entities/internet-finance/snapshot.md

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: company
+name: "Snapshot"
+domain: internet-finance
+handles: ["@SnapshotLabs"]
+website: https://snapshot.org
+status: active
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+founded: 2020-01-01
+category: "Off-chain DAO voting platform"
+stage: mature
+key_metrics:
+  dao_count: "10,000+"
+  total_votes_cast: "Millions"
+  pricing: "Free"
+competitors: ["[[tally]]", "[[metadao]]"]
+built_on: ["Ethereum", "Multi-chain"]
+tags: ["governance", "token-voting", "dao-tooling"]
+---
+
+# Snapshot
+
+## Overview
+Free off-chain voting platform. The default governance tool for DAOs — over 10,000 DAOs use Snapshot for token-weighted voting on proposals. Off-chain execution (votes are gasless, recorded on IPFS). Widely adopted because it's free and frictionless, but off-chain results are non-binding unless paired with execution layers.
+
+## Current State
+- **Adoption**: 10,000+ DAOs, including most major DeFi protocols
+- **Mechanism**: Token-weighted voting, off-chain (gasless). Results stored on IPFS.
+- **Pricing**: Free — no fees for creating spaces or running votes
+- **Limitation**: Off-chain = non-binding. Requires trust that multisig holders will execute vote results. No onchain enforcement.
+
+## Competitive Position
+- **Dominant incumbent** in DAO voting. Network effects + free pricing = high adoption inertia.
+- **vs MetaDAO/futarchy**: Fundamentally different mechanism — Snapshot uses voting (legitimacy-based), MetaDAO uses markets (information-based). Not direct competition today, but if futarchy proves superior for capital allocation decisions, Snapshot's governance model becomes the "legacy" approach.
+- **vs Tally**: Tally does onchain voting (binding execution). Snapshot does off-chain (non-binding). Different trade-offs: Snapshot is cheaper/easier, Tally is more secure.
+- **Moat**: Network effects + free = strong adoption inertia. But switching costs are actually low — DAOs can migrate governance tools without changing anything else.
+
+## Investment Thesis
+Snapshot is the token voting incumbent. If DAO governance evolves toward market-based mechanisms (futarchy) or founder-led hybrid models, Snapshot's relevance diminishes for high-stakes decisions. But for low-stakes community polling and signaling, Snapshot likely persists indefinitely. The question: does governance converge on Snapshot's model or evolve past it?
+
+**Thesis status:** WATCHING — incumbent under structural pressure from governance evolution
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[DAO governance degenerates into political capture because proposal processes select for coalition-building skill over operational competence and the resulting bureaucracy creates structural speed disadvantages against focused competitors]] — Snapshot enables the governance model this claim critiques
+- [[quadratic voting fails for crypto because Sybil resistance and collusion prevention are unsolvable]] — applies to Snapshot's token-weighted model (not quadratic, but same Sybil problem)
+- [[token voting DAOs offer no minority protection beyond majority goodwill]] — Snapshot facilitates this dynamic
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[tally]] — onchain voting alternative
+- [[metadao]] — market-based governance alternative
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

entities/internet-finance/solomon.md

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: company
+name: "Solomon"
+domain: internet-finance
+handles: ["@solomon_labs"]
+status: active
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+founded: 2025-11-14
+founders: ["Ranga (@oxranga)"]
+category: "Futardio-launched ownership coin with active futarchy governance (Solana)"
+stage: early
+key_metrics:
+  raise: "$8M raised ($103M committed — 13x oversubscription)"
+  governance: "Active futarchy governance + treasury subcommittee (DP-00001)"
+competitors: []
+built_on: ["Solana", "MetaDAO Autocrat"]
+tags: ["ownership-coins", "futarchy", "treasury-management", "metadao-ecosystem"]
+---
+
+# Solomon
+
+## Overview
+One of the first successful Futardio launches. Raised $8M through the pro-rata mechanism ($103M committed = 13x oversubscription). Notable for implementing structured treasury management through futarchy — the treasury subcommittee proposal (DP-00001) established operational governance scaffolding on top of futarchy's market-based decision mechanism.
+
+## Current State
+- **Product**: USDv — yield-bearing stablecoin. YaaS (Yield-as-a-Service) streams yield to approved USDv holders, LP positions, and treasury balances without wrappers or vaults.
+- **Governance**: Active futarchy governance through MetaDAO Autocrat. Treasury subcommittee proposal (DP-00001) passed March 9, 2026 (cleared 1.5% TWAP threshold by +2.22%). Moves up to $150K USDC into segregated legal budget, nominates 4 subcommittee designates.
+- **Treasury**: Actively managed through buybacks and strategic allocations. DP-00001 is step 1 of 3: (1) legal/pre-formation, (2) SOLO buyback framework, (3) treasury account activation.
+- **YaaS status**: Closed beta — LP volume crossed $1M, OroGold GOLD/USDv pool delivering 59.6% APY. First deployment drove +22.05% LP APY with 3.5x pool growth.
+- **Significance**: Test case for whether futarchy-governed organizations converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for operations
+
+## Timeline
+- **2025-11-14** — Solomon launches via Futardio ($103M committed, $8M raised)
+- **2026-02/03** — Lab Notes series (Ranga documenting progress publicly)
+- **2026-03** — Treasury subcommittee proposal (DP-00001) — formalized operational governance
+
+## Competitive Position
+Solomon is not primarily a competitive entity — it's an existence proof. It demonstrates that futarchy-governed organizations can raise capital, manage treasuries, and create operational governance structures. The key question is whether the futarchy layer adds genuine value beyond what a normal startup with transparent treasury management would achieve.
+
+## Investment Thesis
+Solomon validates the ownership coin model: futarchy governance + permissionless capital formation + active treasury management. If Solomon outperforms comparable projects without futarchy governance, it strengthens the case for market-based governance as an organizational primitive.
+
+**Thesis status:** WATCHING
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]] — Solomon's DP-00001 is evidence for this
+- [[ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match]] — Solomon tests this
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[metadao]] — parent platform
+- [[futardio]] — launch mechanism
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

entities/internet-finance/tally.md

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: company
+name: "Tally"
+domain: internet-finance
+handles: ["@talaboratories"]
+website: https://tally.xyz
+status: active
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+founded: 2020-01-01
+category: "Onchain DAO governance platform (Ethereum)"
+stage: mature
+key_metrics:
+  governance_type: "Onchain (binding execution)"
+competitors: ["[[snapshot]]", "[[metadao]]"]
+built_on: ["Ethereum"]
+tags: ["governance", "token-voting", "onchain-governance", "dao-tooling"]
+---
+
+# Tally
+
+## Overview
+Onchain governance platform focused on Ethereum. Unlike Snapshot's off-chain voting, Tally executes vote results onchain — approved proposals trigger smart contract execution automatically. More secure than off-chain voting but higher friction (gas costs, slower).
+
+## Current State
+- **Mechanism**: Onchain token-weighted voting with automatic execution. Proposals create onchain transactions that execute if passed.
+- **Ecosystem**: Ethereum-focused. Used by several major protocols.
+- **Trade-off**: Higher security (binding execution) vs higher cost (gas) compared to Snapshot
+
+## Competitive Position
+- **vs Snapshot**: Higher security but lower adoption. Snapshot's free + gasless model dominates volume. Tally captures the "security-first" segment.
+- **vs MetaDAO**: Same fundamental mechanism difference as Snapshot — voting vs markets. Tally adds onchain execution but doesn't change the information aggregation problem that futarchy addresses.
+- **Moat**: Ethereum ecosystem positioning, but narrow moat.
+
+## Investment Thesis
+Tally occupies the "secure onchain voting" niche. If governance evolves toward market-based mechanisms, Tally faces the same structural pressure as Snapshot. But for decisions that require binding onchain execution from a vote, Tally has a clear use case.
+
+**Thesis status:** WATCHING
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[DAO governance degenerates into political capture because proposal processes select for coalition-building skill over operational competence and the resulting bureaucracy creates structural speed disadvantages against focused competitors]] — Tally enables onchain version of the governance model this claim critiques
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[snapshot]] — off-chain voting alternative
+- [[metadao]] — market-based governance alternative
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

inbox/archive/2014-00-00-aspe-pace-effect-costs-nursing-home-mortality.md

@@ -7,9 +7,15 @@ date: 2014-01-01
 domain: health
 secondary_domains: []
 format: report
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
 priority: medium
 tags: [pace, capitated-care, nursing-home, cost-effectiveness, mortality, outcomes-evidence]
+processed_by: vida
+processed_date: 2026-03-10
+claims_extracted: ["pace-restructures-costs-from-acute-to-chronic-spending-without-reducing-total-expenditure-challenging-prevention-saves-money-narrative.md", "pace-demonstrates-integrated-care-averts-institutionalization-through-community-based-delivery-not-cost-reduction.md"]
+enrichments_applied: ["the healthcare attractor state is a prevention-first system where aligned payment continuous monitoring and AI-augmented care delivery create a flywheel that profits from health rather than sickness.md", "value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary because 60 percent of payments touch value metrics but only 14 percent bear full risk.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "Extracted two related claims about PACE's cost restructuring (not reduction) and institutionalization avoidance. Primary insight: PACE challenges the 'prevention saves money' narrative by showing integrated care redistributes costs rather than eliminating them. The value is quality/preference (community vs. institution), not economics. Flagged enrichments for healthcare attractor state (challenge) and value-based care payment boundary (extension). This is honest evidence that complicates prevention-first economics while supporting prevention-first outcomes."
 ---
 
 ## Content
@@ -58,3 +64,11 @@ tags: [pace, capitated-care, nursing-home, cost-effectiveness, mortality, outcom
 PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[the healthcare attractor state is a prevention-first system where aligned payment continuous monitoring and AI-augmented care delivery create a flywheel that profits from health rather than sickness]]
 WHY ARCHIVED: Honest evidence that complicates the "prevention saves money" narrative. PACE works, but not primarily through cost reduction.
 EXTRACTION HINT: The cost-restructuring (not cost-reduction) finding is the most honest and extractable insight.
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- PACE study covered 8 states with 250+ new enrollees during 2006-2008
+- Comparison groups: nursing home entrants AND HCBS waiver enrollees
+- Medicare costs significantly lower only in first 6 months after PACE enrollment
+- Medicaid costs significantly higher under PACE than FFS Medicaid
+- Nursing home utilization significantly lower across ALL measures for PACE enrollees

inbox/archive/2023-11-18-futardio-proposal-develop-a-lst-vote-market.md

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Develop a LST Vote Market?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/9RisXkQCFLt7NA29vt5aWatcnU8SkyBgS95HxXhwXhW"
+date: 2023-11-18
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Develop a LST Vote Market?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2023-11-18
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/9RisXkQCFLt7NA29vt5aWatcnU8SkyBgS95HxXhwXhW
+- Description: This platform would allow MNDE and mSOL holders to earn extra yield by directing their stake to validators who pay them.
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal aims to develop a centralized bribe platform for MNDE and mSOL holders to earn extra yield by directing their stake to validators, addressing the fragmented current market. It seeks 3,000 META to fund the project, with the expectation of generating approximately $1.5M annually for the Meta-DAO.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+The platform will enable small MNDE and mSOL holders to compete with whales for higher yields, enhancing their earning potential.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+If successful, the platform could significantly increase the Meta-DAO's enterprise value by an estimated $10.5M, with potential annual revenues of $150k to $170k.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+Execution risk is a concern, as the project's success is speculative and hinges on a 70% chance of successful implementation, which could result in a net value creation of only $730k after costs.
+
+## Content
+
+## Overview
+
+The Meta-DAO is awakening. 
+
+Given that the Meta-DAO is a fundamentally new kind of organization, it lacks legitimacy. To gain legitimacy, we need to first *prove that the model works*. I believe that the best way to do that is by building profit-turning products under the Meta-DAO umbrella.
+
+Here, we propose the first one: an [LST bribe platform](https://twitter.com/durdenwannabe/status/1683150792843464711). This platform would allow MNDE and mSOL holders to earn extra yield by [directing their stake](https://docs.marinade.finance/marinade-products/directed-stake#snapshot-system) to validators who pay them. A bribe market already exists, but it's fragmented and favors whales. This platform would centralize the market, facilitating open exchange between validators and MNDE / mSOL holders and allowing small holders to earn the same yield as whales.
+
+#### Executive summary
+- The product would exist as a 2-sided marketplace between validators who want more stake and MNDE and mSOL holders who want more yield.
+- The platform would likely be structured similar to Votium.
+- The platform would monetize by taking 10% of bribes.
+- We estimate that this product would generate \$1.5M per year for the Meta-DAO, increasing the Meta-DAO's enterprise value by \$10.5M, if executed successfully.
+- We are requesting 3,000 META and the promise of retroactively-decided performance-based incentives. If executed, this proposal would transfer the first 1,000 META.
+- Three contributors have expressed interest in working on this: Proph3t, for the smart contracts; marie, for the UI; and nicovrg, for the BD with Marinade. Proph3t would be the point person and would be responsible for delivering this project to the Meta-DAO.
+
+## Problem statement
+
+Validators want more stake. MNDE and mSOL holders want more yield. Since Marinade allows its MNDE and mSOL holders to direct 40% of its stake, this creates an opportunity for mSOL and MNDE to earn higher yield by selling their votes to validators.
+
+Today, this market is fragmented. Trading occurs through one-off locations like Solana Compass' [Turbo Stake](https://solanacompass.com/staking/turbo-staking) and in back-room Telegram chats. This makes it hard for people who don't actively follow the Solana ecosystem and small holders to earn the highest yields.
+
+We propose a platform that would centralize this trading. Essentially, this would provide an easy place where validators who want more stake can pay for the votes of MNDE and mSOL holders. In the future, we could expand to other LSTs like bSOL.
+
+## Design
+
+There are a number ways you could design a bribe platform. After considering a few options, a Votium-style system appears to be the best one.
+
+### Votium
+
+[Votium](https://votium.app/) is a bribe platform on Ethereum. Essentially, projects that want liquidity in their token pay veCRV holders to allocate CRV emissions to their token's liquidity pool (the veCRV system is fairly complex and out of scope for this proposal). For example, the Frax team might pay veCRV holders to allocate CRV emissions to the FRAX+crvUSD pool.
+
+If you're a project that wants to pay for votes, you do so in the following way:
+- create a Votium pool
+- specify which Curve pool (a different kind of pool, I didn't name them :shrug:) you want CRV emissions to be directed to
+- allocate some funds to that pool
+
+If you're a veCRV-holder, you are eligible to claim from that pool. To do so, you must first vote for the Curve pool specified. Then, once the voting period is done, each person who voted for that Curve pool can claim a pro rata share of the tokens from the Votium pool.
+
+Alternatively, you can delegate to Votium, who will spread your votes among the various pools.
+
+### Our system
+
+In our case, a Votium-style platform would look like the following:
+- Once a month, each participating validator creates a pool, specifying a *price per vote* and depositing SOL to their pool. The amount of SOL deposited in a pool defines the maximum votes bought. For example, if Laine deposits 1,000 SOL to a pool and specifies a price per vote of 0.1 SOL, then this pool can buy up to 10,000 votes
+- veMNDE and mSOL holders are given 1 week to join pools, which they do by directing their stake to the respective validator (the bribe platform UI would make this easy)
+- after 1 month passes, veMNDE and mSOL holders can claim their SOL bribes from the pools
+
+The main advantage of the Votium approach is that it's non-custodial. In other words, *there would be no risk of user fund loss*. In the event of a hack, the only thing that could be stolen are the bribes deposited to the pools.
+
+## Business model
+
+The Meta-DAO would take a small fee from the rewards that are paid to bribees. Currently, we envision this number being 10%, but that is subject to change.
+
+## Financial projections
+
+Although any new project has uncertain returns, we can give rough estimates of the returns that this project would generate for the Meta-DAO.
+
+Marinade Finance currently has \$532M of SOL locked in it. Of that, 40% or \$213M is directed by votes. Validators are likely willing to pay up to the marginal revenue that they can gain by bribing. So, at 8% staking rates and 10% comissions, the **estimated market for this is \$213M * 0.08 * 0.1, or \$1.7M**.
+
+At a 10% fee, the revenue available to the Meta-DAO would be \$170k. The revenue share with Marinade is yet to be negotiated. At a 10% revshare, the Meta-DAO would earn \$150k per year. At a 30% revshare, the Meta-DAO would earn \$120k per year.
+
+We take the average of \$135k per year and multiply  by the [typical SaaS valuation multiple](https://aventis-advisors.com/saas-valuation-multiples/#multiples) of 7.8x to achieve the estimate that **this product would add \$1.05M to the Meta-DAO's enterprise value if executed successfully.**
+
+Of course, there is a chance that is not executed successfully. To estimate how much value this would create for the Meta-DAO, you can calculate:
+
+[(% chance of successful execution / 100) * (estimated addition to the Meta-DAO's enterprise value if successfully executed)] - up-front costs
+
+For example, if you believe that the chance of us successfully executing is 70% and that this would add \$10.5M to the Meta-DAO's enterprise value, you can do (0.7 * 10.5M) - dillution cost of 3,000 META. Since each META has a book value of \$1 and is probably worth somewhere between \$1 and \$100, this leaves you with **\$730k - \$700k of value created by the proposal**.
+
+As with any financial projections, these results are highly speculative and sensitive to assumptions. Market participants are encouraged to make their own assumptions and to price the proposal accordingly.
+
+## Proposal request
+
+We are requesting **3,000 META and retroactively-decided performance-based incentives** to fund this project. 
+
+This 3,000 META would be split among:
+- Proph3t, who would perform the smart contract work
+- marie, who would perform the UI/UX work
+- nicovrg, who would be the point person to Marinade Finance and submit the grant proposal to the Marinade forums
+
+1,000 META would be paid up-front by the execution of this proposal. 2,000 META would be paid after the proposal is done.
+
+The Meta-DAO is still figuring out how to properly incentivize performance, so we don't want to be too specific with how that would done. Still, it is game-theoretically optimal for the Meta-DAO to compensate us fairly because under-paying us would dissuade future builders from contributing to the Meta-DAO. So we'll put our trust in the game theory.
+
+## References
+
+- [Solana LST Dune Dashboard](https://dune.com/ilemi/solana-lsts)
+- [Marinade Docs](https://docs.marinade.finance/), specifically the pages on - [MNDE Directed Stake](https://docs.marinade.finance/the-mnde-token/mnde-directed-stake) and [mSOL Directed Stake](https://docs.marinade.finance/marinade-products/directed-stake)
+- [Marinade's Validator Dashboard](https://marinade.finance/app/validators/?sorting=score&direction=descending)
+- [MNDE Gauge Profit Calculator](https://cogentcrypto.io/MNDECalculator)
+- [Marinade SDK](https://github.com/marinade-finance/marinade-ts-sdk/blob/bc4d07750776262088239581cac60e651d1b5cf4/src/marinade.ts#L283)
+- [Solana Compass Turbo Staking](https://solanacompass.com/staking/turbo-staking)
+- [Marinade Directed Stake program](https://solscan.io/account/dstK1PDHNoKN9MdmftRzsEbXP5T1FTBiQBm1Ee3meVd#anchorProgramIDL)
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `9RisXkQCFLt7NA29vt5aWatcnU8SkyBgS95HxXhwXhW`
+- Proposal number: 0
+- DAO account: `3wDJ5g73ABaDsL1qofF5jJqEJU4RnRQrvzRLkSnFc5di`
+- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
+- Autocrat version: 0
+- Completed: 2023-11-29
+- Ended: 2023-11-29

inbox/archive/2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01.md

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi"
+date: 2023-12-03
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2023-12-03
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi
+- Description: Most importantly, I’ve made the slots per proposal configurable, and changed its default to 3 days to allow for quicker feedback loops.
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal aims to migrate assets (990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL) from the treasury of the first autocrat program to the second program, while introducing configurable proposal slots and a default duration of 3 days for quicker feedback.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+Stakeholders may benefit from enhanced feedback efficiency and asset management through the upgraded autocrat program.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+The changes could lead to faster decision-making processes and improved overall program functionality.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+There is a risk of potential bugs in the new program and trust issues regarding the absence of verifiable builds, which could jeopardize the security of the funds.
+
+## Content
+
+## Overview
+
+I've made some improvements to the autocrat program. You can see these [here](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/meta-dao/pull/36/files). Most importantly, I've made the slots per proposal configurable, and changed its default to 3 days to allow for quicker feedback loops.
+
+This proposal migrates the 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL from the treasury owned by the first program to the treasury owned by the second program.
+
+## Key risks
+
+### Smart contract risk
+
+There is a risk that the new program contains an important bug that the first one didn't. I consider this risk small given that I didn't change that much of autocrat.
+
+### Counter-party risk
+
+Unfortunately, for reasons I can't get into, I was unable to build this new program with [solana-verifiable-build](https://github.com/Ellipsis-Labs/solana-verifiable-build). You'd be placing trust in me that I didn't introduce a backdoor, not on the GitHub repo, that allows me to steal the funds.
+
+For future versions, I should always be able to use verifiable builds.
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi`
+- Proposal number: 1
+- DAO account: `3wDJ5g73ABaDsL1qofF5jJqEJU4RnRQrvzRLkSnFc5di`
+- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
+- Autocrat version: 0
+- Completed: 2023-12-13
+- Ended: 2023-12-13

inbox/archive/2023-12-16-futardio-proposal-develop-a-saber-vote-market.md

@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Develop a Saber Vote Market?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/GPT8dFcpHfssMuULYKT9qERPY3heMoxwZHxgKgPw3TYM"
+date: 2023-12-16
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Develop a Saber Vote Market?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2023-12-16
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/GPT8dFcpHfssMuULYKT9qERPY3heMoxwZHxgKgPw3TYM
+- Description: I propose that we build a vote market as we proposed in proposal 0, only for Saber instead of Marinade.
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points
+The proposal aims to develop a Saber Vote Market funded by $150,000 from various ecosystem teams, enabling veSBR holders to earn extra yield and allowing projects to easily access liquidity.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact
+The platform will benefit users by providing them with opportunities to earn additional yield and assist teams in acquiring liquidity more efficiently.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential
+The Meta-DAO could generate significant revenue through a take rate on vote trades, enhancing its legitimacy and value.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors
+There is a potential risk of lower than expected trading volume, which could impact the financial sustainability and operational success of the platform.
+
+## Content
+
+## Overview
+
+It looks like things are coming full circle. Here, I propose that we build a vote market as we proposed in [proposal 0](https://hackmd.io/ammvq88QRtayu7c9VLnHOA?view), only for Saber instead of Marinade. I'd recommend you read that proposal for the context, but I'll summarize briefly here:
+- I proposed to build a Marinade vote market
+- That proposal passed
+- We learned that Marinade was developing an internal solution, we pivoted to supporting them
+
+All of that is still in motion. But recently, I connected with [c2yptic](https://twitter.com/c2yptic) from Saber, who happens to be really excited about the Meta-DAO's vision. Saber was planning on creating a vote market, but he proposed that the Meta-DAO build it instead. I think that this would be a tremendous opportunity for both parties, which is why I'm proposing this.
+
+Here's the high-level:
+- The platform would be funded with $150,000 by various ecosystem teams that would benefit from the platform's existence including UXD, BlazeStake, LP Finance, and Saber.
+- veSBR holders would use the market to earn extra yield
+- Projects that want liquidity could easily pay for it, saving time and money relative to a bespoke campaign
+- The Meta-DAO would own the majority of the platform, with the remaining distributed to the ecosystem teams mentioned above and to users via liquidity mining.
+
+## Why a Saber Vote Market would be good for users and teams
+
+### Users
+
+Users would be able to earn extra yield on their SBR (or their veSBR, to be precise).
+
+### Teams
+
+Teams want liquidity in their tokens. Liquidity is both useful day-to-day - by giving users lower spreads - as well as a backstop against depeg events.
+
+This market would allow teams to more easily and cheaply pay for liquidity. Rather than a bespoke campaign, they would in effect just be placing limit orders in a central market.
+
+## Why a Saber Vote Market would be good for the Meta-DAO
+
+### Financial projections
+
+The Meta-DAO is governed by futarchy - an algorithm that optimizes for token-holder value. So it's worth looking at how much value this proposal could drive.
+
+Today, Saber has a TVL of $20M. Since votes are only useful insofar as they direct that TVL, trading volume through a vote market should be proportional to it.
+
+We estimate that there will be approximately **\$1 in yearly vote trade volume for every \$50 of Saber TVL.** We estimate this using Curve and Aura:
+- Today, Curve has a TVL of \$2B. This round of gauge votes - which happen every two weeks - [had \$1.25M in tokens exchanged for votes](https://llama.airforce/#/incentives/rounds/votium/cvx-crv/59). This equates to a run rate of \$30M, or \$1 of vote trade volume for every \$67 in TVL.
+- Before the Luna depeg, Curve had \$20B in TVL and vote trade volume was averaging between [\$15M](https://llama.airforce/#/incentives/rounds/votium/cvx-crv/10) and [\$20M](https://llama.airforce/#/incentives/rounds/votium/cvx-crv/8), equivalent to \$1 in yearly vote trade volume for every \$48 in TVL.
+- In May, Aura has \$600M in TVL and [\$900k](https://llama.airforce/#/incentives/rounds/hh/aura-bal/25) in vote trade volume, equivalent to \$1 in yearly vote trade volume for every \$56 of TVL
+
+The other factor in the model will be our take rate. Based on Convex's [7-10% take rate](https://docs.convexfinance.com/convexfinance/faq/fees#convex-for-curve), [Votium's ~3% take rate](https://docs.votium.app/faq/fees#vlcvx-incentives), and [Hidden Hand's ~10% take rate](https://docs.redacted.finance/products/pirex/btrfly#is-there-a-fee-for-using-pirex-btrfly), I believe something between 5 and 15% is reasonable. Since we don't expect as much volume as those platforms but we still need to pay people, maybe we start at 15% but could shift down as scale economies kick in.
+
+Here's a model I put together to help analyze some potential scenarios:
+
+![Screenshot from 2023-12-14 15-18-26](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/B1vCn9d8p.png)
+
+The 65% owned by the Meta-DAO would be the case if we distributed an additional 10% of the supply in liquidity incentives / airdrop.
+
+### Legitimacy
+
+As [I've talked about](https://medium.com/@metaproph3t/an-update-on-the-first-proposal-0e9cdf6e7bfa), assuming futarchy works, the most important thing to the Meta-DAO's success will be acquiring legitimacy. Legitimacy is what leads people to invest their time + money into the Meta-DAO, which we can invest to generate financially-valuable outputs, which then generates more legitimacy.
+
+![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/BkPF69dL6.png)
+
+By partnering with well-known and reputable projects, we increase the Meta-DAO's legitimacy.
+
+## How we're going to execute
+
+### Who
+
+So far, the following people have committed to working on this project:
+- [Marie](https://twitter.com/swagy_marie) to build the UI/UX
+- [Matt / fzzyyti](https://x.com/fzzyyti?s=20) to build the smart contracts
+- [Durden](https://twitter.com/durdenwannabe) to design the platform & tokenomics
+- [Joe](https://twitter.com/joebuild) and [r0bre](https://twitter.com/r0bre) to audit the smart contracts
+- [me](https://twitter.com/metaproph3t) to be the [accountable party](https://discord.com/channels/1155877543174475859/1172275074565427220/1179750749228519534) / program manager
+
+UXD has also committed to review the contracts.
+
+### Timeline
+
+#### December 11th - December 15th
+
+Kickoff, initial discussions around platform design & tokenomics
+
+#### December 18th - December 22nd
+
+Lower-level platform design, Matt starts on programs, Marie starts on UI design
+
+#### December 25th - January 5th (2 weeks)
+
+Holiday break
+
+#### January 8th - January 12th
+
+Continued work on programs, start on UI code
+
+#### January 15th - January 19th
+
+Continued work on programs & UI
+
+Deliverables on Friday, January 19th:
+- Basic version of program deployed to devnet. You should be able to create pools and claim vote rewards. Fine if you can't claim $BRB tokens yet. Fine if tests aren't done, or some features aren't added yet.
+- Basic version of UI. It's okay if it's a Potemkin village and doesn't actually interact with the chain, but you should be able to create pools (as a vote buyer) and pick a pool to sell my vote to.
+
+#### January 22nd - 26th
+
+Continue work on programs & UI, Matt helps marie integrate devnet program into UI
+
+Deliverables on Friday, January 26th:
+- MVP of program
+- UI works with the program delivered on January 19th
+
+#### January 29th - Feburary 2nd
+
+Audit time! Joe and r0bre audit the program this week
+
+UI is updated to work for the MVP, where applicable changes are
+
+#### February 5th - Febuary 9th
+
+Any updates to the program in accordance with the audit findings
+
+UI done
+
+#### February 12th - February 16th
+
+GTM readiness week!
+
+Proph3t or Durden adds docs, teams make any final decisions, we collectively write copy to announce the platform
+
+#### February 19th
+
+Launch day!!! 🎉
+
+### Budget
+
+Based on their rates, I'm budgeting the following for each person:
+- $24,000 to Matt for the smart contracts
+- $12,000 to Marie for the UI
+- $7,000 to Durden for the platform design
+- $7,000 to Proph3t for program management
+- $5,000 to r0bre to audit the program
+- $5,000 to joe to audit the program
+- $1,000 deployment costs
+- $1,000 miscellaneous
+
+That's a total of \$62k. As mentioned, the consortium has pledged \$150k to make this happen. The remaining \$90k would be custodied by the Meta-DAO's treasury, partially to fund the management / operation / maintenance of the platform.
+
+### Terminology
+
+For those who are more familiar with bribe terminology, which I prefer not to use:
+- briber = vote buyer
+- bribee = vote seller
+- bribe platform = vote market / vote market platform
+- bribes = vote payments / vote trade volume
+
+
+
+## References
+
+- [Solana DeFi Dashboard](https://dune.com/summit/solana-defi)
+- [Hidden Hand Volume](https://dune.com/embeds/675784/1253758)
+- [Curve TVL](https://defillama.com/protocol/curve-finance)
+- [Llama Airforce](https://llama.airforce/#/incentives/rounds/votium/cvx-crv/59)
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `GPT8dFcpHfssMuULYKT9qERPY3heMoxwZHxgKgPw3TYM`
+- Proposal number: 2
+- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
+- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
+- Autocrat version: 0.1
+- Completed: 2023-12-22
+- Ended: 2023-12-22

inbox/archive/2024-01-12-futardio-proposal-create-spot-market-for-meta.md

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Create Spot Market for META?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/9ABv3Phb44BNF4VFteSi9qcWEyABdnRqkorNuNtzdh2b"
+date: 2024-01-12
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Create Spot Market for META?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-01-12
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/9ABv3Phb44BNF4VFteSi9qcWEyABdnRqkorNuNtzdh2b
+- Description: initiate the creation of a spot market for $META tokens, allowing broader public access to the token and establishing liquidity.
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal aims to create a spot market for \$META tokens, establish liquidity through a token sale at a price based on the TWAP of the last passing proposal, and allocate raised funds to support ongoing Meta-DAO initiatives.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+Stakeholders, including token holders and participants in the market, will gain broader access to \$META tokens and improved liquidity.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+Successfully launching the spot market could enhance the visibility and trading volume of \$META tokens, benefiting the overall Meta-DAO ecosystem.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+If the proposal fails, the Meta-DAO will be unable to raise funds until March 12, 2024, potentially hindering its operational capabilities.
+
+## Content
+
+### **Overview**
+
+The purpose of this proposal is to initiate the creation of a spot market for \$META tokens, allowing broader public access to the token and establishing liquidity. The proposed market will be funded through the sale of \$META tokens, and the pricing structure will be determined based on the Time-Weighted Average Price (TWAP) of the proposal that passes. The funds raised will be utilized to support the Meta-DAO's ongoing initiatives and operations.
+
+### **Key Components**
+
+#### **Token Sale Structure:**
+- The initial token sale will involve the Meta-DAO selling \$META tokens to the public. Anyone can participate.
+- The sale price per \$META token will be set at the TWAP of the last passing proposal.
+- In case of this proposal failing, the sale will not proceed and Meta-DAO can't raise from public markets till 12 March 2024.
+#### **Liquidity Pool Creation:**
+- A liquidity pool (LP) will be established to support the spot market.
+- Funding for the LP will come from the token sale, with approximately $35,000 allocated for this purpose.
+#### **Token Sale Details:**
+- Hard cap: 75,000usd
+- Sale Price: TWAP of this passing proposal
+- Sale Quantity: Hard cap / Sale Price
+- Spot Market Opening Price: To be determined, potentially higher than the initial public sale price.
+#### **Liquidity Pool Allocation:**
+- LP Token Pairing: \$META tokens from treasury paired with approximately \$35,000usd.
+- Any additional funds raised beyond the LP allocation will be reserved for operational funding in \$SOL tokens.
+
+### **Next Steps**
+1. If approved, initiate the token sale using the most convenient methodology to maximize the event. Proceed with the creation of the SMETA spot market.
+2. In case of failure, Meta-DAO will be unable to raise funds until March 12, 2024.
+
+### **Conclusion**
+This proposal aims to enhance the Meta-DAO ecosystem experience by introducing a spot market for \$META tokens.
+The proposal invites futards to actively participate in shaping the future of the \$META token.
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `9ABv3Phb44BNF4VFteSi9qcWEyABdnRqkorNuNtzdh2b`
+- Proposal number: 3
+- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
+- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
+- Autocrat version: 0.1
+- Completed: 2024-01-18
+- Ended: 2024-01-18

inbox/archive/2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md

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+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG"
+date: 2024-01-24
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-01-24
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG
+- Description: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy?
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal aims to develop an Automated Market Maker (AMM) program for Futarchy to enhance liquidity, reduce susceptibility to manipulation, and minimize state rent costs associated with current Central Limit Order Books (CLOBs).
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+Stakeholders, including liquidity providers and MetaDAO users, will benefit from improved trading conditions and reduced costs associated with market creation.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+The implementation of an AMM could significantly increase liquidity and trading activity by providing a more efficient and user-friendly market mechanism.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+There are inherent risks associated with smart contract deployment and uncertain adoption rates from liquidity providers, which could affect the overall success of the AMM.
+
+## Content
+
+## Overview
+In the context of Futarchy, CLOBs have a couple of drawbacks:
+1. Lack of liquidity
+2. Somewhat susceptible to manipulation
+3. Pass/fail market pairs cost 3.75 SOL in state rent, which cannot currently be recouped
+
+### Lack of liquidity
+Estimating a fair price for the future value of MetaDao under pass/fail conditions is difficult, and most reasonable estimates will have a wide range. This uncertainty discourages people from risking their funds with limit orders near the midpoint price, and has the effect of reducing liquidity (and trading). This is the main reason for switching to AMMs.
+
+### Somewhat susceptible to manipulation
+With CLOBs there is always a bid/ask spread, and someone with 1 $META can push the midpoint towards the current best bid/ask. Though this could be countered with a defensive for-profit bot, and as Proph3t puts it: this is a 1/n problem.
+
+Still, users can selectively crank the market of their choosing. Defending against this (cranking markets all the time) would be a bit costly.
+
+Similarly, VWAP can be manipulated by wash trading. An exponential moving average has the same drawbacks in this context as the existing linear-time system.
+
+### State rent costs
+If we average 3-5 proposals per month, then annual costs for market creation is 135-225 SOL, or $11475-$19125 at current prices. AMMs cost almost nothing in state rent.
+
+### Solution
+An AMM would solve all of the above problems and is a move towards simplicity. We can use the metric: liquidity-weighted price over time. The more liquidity that is on the books, the more weight the current price of the pass or fail market is given. Every time there is a swap, these metrics are updated/aggregated. By setting a high fee (3-5%) we can both: encourage LPs, and aggressively discourage wash-trading and manipulation.
+
+These types of proposals would also require that the proposer lock-up some initial liquidity, and set the starting price for the pass/fail markets.
+
+With this setup, liquidity would start low when the proposal is launched, someone would swap and move the AMM price to their preferred price, and then provide liquidity at that price since the fee incentives are high. Liquidity would increase over the duration of the proposal.
+
+The current CLOB setup requires a minimum order size of 1 META, which is effectively a spam filter against manipulating the midpoint within a wide bid/ask spread. AMMs would not have this restriction, and META could be traded at any desired granularity.
+
+### Additional considerations
+> What if a user wants to provide one-sided liquidity?
+
+The most recent passing proposal will create spot markets outside of the pass/fail markets. There will be an AMM, and there is no reason not to create a CLOB as well. Most motivations for providing one-sided liquidity can be satisfied by regular spot-markets, or by arbitraging between spot markets and pass/fail markets. In the future, it may be possible to setup limit orders similarly to how Jupiter limit orders work with triggers and keepers.
+
+Switching to AMMs is not a perfect solution, but I do believe it is a major improvement over the current low-liquidity and somewhat noisy system that we have now.
+
+### Implementation
+1. Program + Review
+2. Frontend
+
+#### Program + Review
+Program changes:
+
+- Write a basic AMM, which tracks liquidity-weighted average price over its lifetime
+- Incorporate the AMM into autocrat + conditional vault
+- Get feedback to decide if the autocrat and conditional vault should be merged
+- Feature to permissionlessly pause AMM swaps and send back positions once there is a verdict (and the instructions have been run, in the case of the pass market)
+- Feature to permissionlessly close the AMMs and return the state rent SOL, once there are no positions
+Additional quality-of-life changes:
+
+- Loosen time restrictions on when a proposal can be created after the markets are created (currently set to 50 slots, which is very restrictive and has led to extra SOL costs to create redundant markets). Alternatively, bundle these commands in the same function call.
+- If a proposal instruction does not work, then revert to fail after X number of days (so that funds dont get stuck forever).
+
+#### Ownership:
+
+- joebuild will write the program changes
+- A review will be done by an expert in MetaDAO with availability
+
+#### Frontend
+The majority of the frontend integration changes will be completed by 0xNalloK.
+
+### Timeline
+Estimate is 3 weeks from passing proposal, with an additional week of review and minor changes.
+
+### Budget and Roles
+400 META on passing proposal, with an additional 800 META on completed migration.
+
+program changes (joebuild)
+program review (tbd)
+frontend work (0xNalloK)
+
+### Rollout & Risks
+The main program will be deployed before migration of assets. This should allow for some testing of the frontend and the contract on mainnet. We can use a temporary test subdomain.
+
+The risks here include:
+
+- Standard smart contract risk
+- Adoption/available liquidity: similar to an orderbook, available liquidity will be decided by LPs. AMMs will incentivize LP'ing, though adoption within the DAO is not a certainty.
+
+### Section for feedback changes
+Any important changes or feedback brought up during the proposal vote will be reflected here, while the text above will remain unchanged.
+
+- It was pointed out that there are ways to recoup openbook state rent costs, though it would require a migration of the current autocrat program.
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG`
+- Proposal number: 4
+- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
+- Proposer: `XXXvLz1B89UtcTsg2hT3cL9qUJi5PqEEBTHg57MfNkZ`
+- Autocrat version: 0.1
+- Completed: 2024-01-29
+- Ended: 2024-01-29

inbox/archive/2024-02-05-futardio-proposal-execute-creation-of-spot-market-for-meta.md

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+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Execute Creation of Spot Market for META?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/HyA2h16uPQBFjezKf77wThNGsEoesUjeQf9rFvfAy4tF"
+date: 2024-02-05
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Execute Creation of Spot Market for META?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-02-05
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/HyA2h16uPQBFjezKf77wThNGsEoesUjeQf9rFvfAy4tF
+- Description: Create Spot Market for META Tokens?
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal aims to execute the creation of a spot market for META by establishing a liquidity pool, allocating META to participants, and compensating multisig members.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+Participants will have the opportunity to acquire META and contribute to the liquidity pool, enhancing their engagement with the DAO.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+Successfully creating the liquidity pool could lead to increased trading volume and price stability for META.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+There is a risk of non-compliance from participants regarding USDC transfers, which could hinder the successful funding of the liquidity pool.
+
+## Content
+
+[Proposal 3](https://futarchy.metadao.fi/metadao/proposals/9ABv3Phb44BNF4VFteSi9qcWEyABdnRqkorNuNtzdh2b) passed, giving the DAO the remit to raise money and use some of that money to create an LP pool. Since then, Proph3t and Rar3 have ironed out the details and come up with this plan:
+
+1. People submit their demand into a Google form
+2. Proph3t decides how much allocation to give each person
+3. Proph3t reaches out on Monday, Feb 5th to people with allocations, telling them they have to transfer the USDC by Wednesday, Feb 7th
+4. Some people won't complete this step, so Proph3t will reach out to people who didn't get their full desired allocation on Thursday, Feb 8th to send more USDC until we reach the full 75,000
+5. On Friday, Feb 9th the multisig will send out META to all participants, create the liquidity pool (likely on Meteora), and disband
+
+We've created the multisig; it's a 4/6 containing Proph3t, Dean, Nallok, Durden, Rar3, and BlockchainFixesThis. This proposal will transfer 4,130 META to that multisig. This META will be allocated as follows:
+
+- 3100 META to send to participants of the sale
+- 1000 META to pair with 35,000 USDC to create the pool (this sets an initial spot price of 35 USDC / META)
+- 30 META to renumerate each multisig member with 5 META
+
+Obviously, there is no algorithmic guarantee that the multisig members will actually perform this, but it's unlikely that 4 or more of the multisig members would be willing to tarnish their reputation in order to do something different.
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `HyA2h16uPQBFjezKf77wThNGsEoesUjeQf9rFvfAy4tF`
+- Proposal number: 5
+- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
+- Proposer: `UuGEwN9aeh676ufphbavfssWVxH7BJCqacq1RYhco8e`
+- Autocrat version: 0.1
+- Completed: 2024-02-10
+- Ended: 2024-02-10

inbox/archive/2024-02-13-futardio-proposal-engage-in-50000-otc-trade-with-ben-hawkins.md

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+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Engage in $50,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/US8j6iLf9GkokZbk89Bo1qnGBees5etv5sEfsfvCoZK"
+date: 2024-02-13
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Engage in $50,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins?
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-02-13
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/US8j6iLf9GkokZbk89Bo1qnGBees5etv5sEfsfvCoZK
+- Description: Ben Hawkins is requesting to mint 1500 META
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+Ben Hawkins proposes to mint 1,500 META tokens in exchange for $50,000 USDC, which will be sent to MetaDAO's treasury.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+This trade provides immediate liquidity to MetaDAO's treasury, benefiting its overall financial stability.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+The transaction could enhance MetaDAO's capital position, allowing for future investments or projects.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+There is a risk of overvaluation if the market does not support the price of META tokens post-trade.
+
+## Content
+
+Ben Hawkins is requesting to mint 1500 META to GxHamnPVxsBaWdbUSjR4C5izhMv2snriGyYtjCkAVzze
+
+in exchange for Ben will send 50,000 USDC to be sent to ADCCEAbH8eixGj5t73vb4sKecSKo7ndgDSuWGvER4Loy the treasury to MetaDAO
+
+33.33 usdc per Meta
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `US8j6iLf9GkokZbk89Bo1qnGBees5etv5sEfsfvCoZK`
+- Proposal number: 6
+- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
+- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
+- Autocrat version: 0.1
+- Completed: 2024-02-18
+- Ended: 2024-02-18

inbox/archive/2024-02-18-futardio-proposal-engage-in-100000-otc-trade-with-ben-hawkins-2.md

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Engage in $100,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins? [2]"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/E1FJAp8saDU6Da2ccayjLBfA53qbjKRNYvu7QiMAnjQx"
+date: 2024-02-18
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Engage in $100,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins? [2]
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-02-18
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/E1FJAp8saDU6Da2ccayjLBfA53qbjKRNYvu7QiMAnjQx
+- Description: Ben Hawkins Acquisition of $100,000 USDC worth of META
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal seeks approval for Ben Hawkins to engage in a $100,000 OTC trade to acquire up to 500 META tokens from The Meta-DAO Treasury, with a price per META determined by the maximum of the TWAP price or $200. It aims to enhance liquidity in the META markets by creating a 50/50 AMM pool with the committed funds.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+This proposal is expected to provide immediate liquidity and improve market conditions for all stakeholders involved in the META ecosystem.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+An increase in liquidity is projected to potentially raise the value of META by approximately 15% and expand the circulating supply by 2-7%.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+The proposal carries high risks due to potential price volatility and uncertainty surrounding the actual acquisition amounts and their impact on the market.
+
+## Content
+
+Drafted with support from: Ben Hawkins and 0xNallok
+
+## Responsible Parties
+
+- Ben Hawkins (`7GmjpH2hpj3A5d6f1LTjXUAy8MR8FDTvZcPY79RDRDhq`)
+- Squads Multi-sig (4/6) `Meta-DAO Executor` (`FpMnruqVCxh3o2oBFZ9uSQmshiyfMqzeJ3YfNQfP9tHy`)
+- The Meta-DAO (`metaX99LHn3A7Gr7VAcCfXhpfocvpMpqQ3eyp3PGUUq`)
+- The Markets
+
+## Overview
+
+- Ben Hawkins (`7GmjpH2hpj3A5d6f1LTjXUAy8MR8FDTvZcPY79RDRDhq`) wishes to acquire up to 500 META (`METADDFL6wWMWEoKTFJwcThTbUmtarRJZjRpzUvkxhr`) from The Meta-DAO Treausry (`ADCCEAbH8eixGj5t73vb4sKecSKo7ndgDSuWGvER4Loy`).
+- The price per META shall be determined upon passing of the proposal and the greater of the TWAP price of the pass market and $200.
+  $$ppM = max(twapPass, 200)$$
+- A total of $100,000 USDC (`EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v`) will be committed by Ben Hawkins
+- The amount of META shall be determined as the $100,000 USDC funds sent divided by the price determined above.
+  $$amountMETA = 100,000/ppM$$ 
+- The Meta-DAO will transfer 20% of the final allocation of META to Ben Hawkin's wallet immediately and place 80% of the final allocation of META into a 12 month, linear vest Streamflow program.
+- The amount of $100,000 USDC shall be used to create a 50/50 AMM pool with 1% fee matched in META by The Meta-DAO.
+- Ben will also send $2,000 USDC in addition to compensate members of The Meta-DAO Executor.
+- Any META not sent or utilized for liquidity provisioning shall be returned to The Meta-DAO.
+
+## Background
+
+The current liquidity within the META markets is proving insufficient to support the demand. This proposal addresses this issue by providing immediate liquidity in a sizable amount which should at least provide a temporary backstop to allow proposals to be constructed addressing the entire demand.
+
+## Implementation
+
+The proposal contains the instruction for a transfer 1,000 META into a multisignature wallet `FpMnruqVCxh3o2oBFZ9uSQmshiyfMqzeJ3YfNQfP9tHy` with a 4/6 threshold of which the following parties are be members:
+
+- Proph3t (`65U66fcYuNfqN12vzateJhZ4bgDuxFWN9gMwraeQKByg`)
+- Dean (`3PKhzE9wuEkGPHHu2sNCvG86xNtDJduAcyBPXpE6cSNt`)
+- 0xNallok (`4LpE9Lxqb4jYYh8jA8oDhsGDKPNBNkcoXobbAJTa3pWw`)
+- Durden (`91NjPFfJxQw2FRJvyuQUQsdh9mBGPeGPuNavt7nMLTQj`)
+- Blockchainfixesthis (`HKcXZAkT4ec2VBzGNxazWhpV7BTk3frQpSufpaNoho3D`)
+- Rar3 (`BYeFEm6n4rUDpyHzDjt5JF8okGpoZUdS2Y4jJM2dJCm4`)
+
+The multisig members instructions are as follows:
+
+- Accept the full USDC amount of $100,000 from Ben Hawkins into the Multi-sig upon launch of proposal
+
+If the proposal passes:
+
+- Accept receipt of META into the Multi-sig as defined by on chain instruction
+- Determine and publish the price per META according to the definition above
+- Confirmation from two parties within The Meta-DAO that the balances exist and are in full
+- Take `$100,000 / ppM` and determine final allocation quantity of META
+- Transfer 20% of the final allocation of META to Ben's address `7GmjpH2hpj3A5d6f1LTjXUAy8MR8FDTvZcPY79RDRDhq`
+- Configure a 12 month Streamflow vesting program with a linear vest
+- Transfer 80% of the final allocation of  META into the Streamflow program
+- Create a 50/50 Meteora LP 1% Volatile Pool META-USDC allocating at ratios determined and able to be executed via Multi-sig
+- Return any remaining META to the DAO treasury
+- Make USDC payment to each Multi-sig members
+
+If the proposal fails:
+- Make USDC payment to each Multi-sig member.
+- Return 100,000 USDC to `7GmjpH2hpj3A5d6f1LTjXUAy8MR8FDTvZcPY79RDRDhq`
+
+## Risks
+
+The price is extremely volatile and given the variance there is an unknown amount at the time of proposal launching which would be introduced into circulation. This will be impactful to the price.
+
+Given there are other proposals with active markets, the capacity for accurate pricing and participation of this proposal is unknown.
+
+This is an experiment and largely contains unknown unknowns, IT CONTAINS EXTREME RISK.
+
+## Result
+
+The proposal evaluates a net increase in value to META by bringing additional liquidity into the ecosystem. This should also improve the capacity for proposal functionality. The expected increase in value to META is ~15% given the fact that the amounts are yet to be determined, but an increase in circulating supply by ~2-7%.
+
+| Details | |
+|---|---|
+| META Spot Price 2024-02-18 20:20 UTC | $695.92 |
+| META Circulating Supply 2024-02-18 20:20 UTC | 14,530 |
+| Offer Price | ≥ $200 |
+| Offer META | ≤ 500 |
+| Offer USDC | $100,000 |
+| META Transfer to Circulation | {TBD} % |
+| New META Circulating Supply | {TBD}  |
+
+Here are some post-money valuations at different prices as well total increase in circulation:
+
+| Price/META | Mcap | Liquidity % of Circulation | Acquisition/LP Circulation | Total |
+|--|--|--|--|--|
+| $200 | $3.6M | 6.3% | 500 META/500 META ~3.4% | 1000 META ~6.8% |
+| $350 | $5.1M | 4.8% | 285 META/285 META ~1.9% | 570 META ~3.8% |
+| $700 | $10.2M | 3.8% | 142 META/142 META ~0.9% | 284 META ~1.8% |
+
+
+## References
+
+- [Proposal 7](https://hackmd.io/@0xNallok/Hy2WJ46op)
+- [Proposal 6](https://gist.github.com/Benhawkins18/927177850e27a6254678059c99d98209)
+- [Discord](https://discord.gg/metadao)
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `E1FJAp8saDU6Da2ccayjLBfA53qbjKRNYvu7QiMAnjQx`
+- Proposal number: 8
+- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
+- Proposer: `3Rx29Y8npZexsab4tzSrLfX3UmgQTC7TWtx6XjUbRBVy`
+- Autocrat version: 0.1
+- Completed: 2024-02-24
+- Ended: 2024-02-24

inbox/archive/2024-02-18-futardio-proposal-engage-in-50000-otc-trade-with-pantera-capital.md

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Engage in $50,000 OTC Trade with Pantera Capital?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/H59VHchVsy8UVLotZLs7YaFv2FqTH5HAeXc4Y48kxieY"
+date: 2024-02-18
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Engage in $50,000 OTC Trade with Pantera Capital?
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-02-18
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/H59VHchVsy8UVLotZLs7YaFv2FqTH5HAeXc4Y48kxieY
+- Description: Pantera Capital Acquisition of $50,000 USDC worth of META
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+Pantera Capital proposes a $50,000 OTC trade to acquire META tokens from The Meta-DAO, with a strategic partnership aimed at enhancing decentralized governance and increasing exposure to the Solana ecosystem.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+This deal could strengthen the relationship between The Meta-DAO and Pantera Capital, potentially attracting further investments and collaborations.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+The proposal anticipates a 25% increase in META's value due to the high-profile partnership and strategic resources provided by Pantera.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+The final price per META is yet to be determined, and any fluctuations in the market could adversely affect the deal's valuation and META's perceived value.
+
+## Content
+
+Drafted with support from: Pantera Capital, 0xNallok, 7Layer, and Proph3t
+
+## Overview 
+
+- Pantera Capital wishes to acquire {tbd} META (`METADDFL6wWMWEoKTFJwcThTbUmtarRJZjRpzUvkxhr`) from The Meta-DAO (`ADCCEAbH8eixGj5t73vb4sKecSKo7ndgDSuWGvER4Loy`)
+- The price per META shall be determined upon passing of the proposal and the lesser of the average TWAP price of the pass / fail market and \$100
+  
+  $$ ppM = min((twapPass + twapFail) / 2, 100) $$
+- A total of \$50,000 USDC (`EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v`) will be committed by Pantera Capital
+- The Meta-DAO will transfer 20% of the final allocation of META to the Pantera wallet immediately and place 80% of the final allocation of META into a 12 month, linear vest Streamflow program
+
+## Rationale
+
+Pantera views this investment as a strategic partnership and an opportunity to show support for The Meta-DAO, which is spearheading innovation in decentralized governance. Pantera has invested in the blockchain and crypto ecosystem heavily and looks forward to its long term promise. It views its acquisition of META as an opportunity to test futarchy's potential as an improved system for decentralized governance and provide meaningful feedback for accelerating its development and adoption across the crypto ecosystem.
+
+There is a specific interest in Solana as a proving ground for innovative products and services for blockchain technology, and Pantera desires more direct exposure to the Solana ecosystem. 
+
+With respect to the investment, Pantera holds the perspective that The Meta-DAO may be an ideal community within Solana for soliciting additional deal flow. It also highlights support for innovation in the space of governance, support for Solana projects, and a belief that fundamentally, futarchy has a reasonable chance of success.
+
+## Execution
+The proposal contains the instruction for a transfer 1,000 META into a multisignature wallet `BtNPTBX1XkFCwazDJ6ZkK3hcUsomm1RPcfmtUrP6wd2K` with a 5/7 threshold of which the following parties will be members:
+
+- Pantera Capital (`6S5LQhggSTjm6gGWrTBiQkQbz3F7JB5CtJZZLMZp2XNE`)
+- Pantera Capital (`4kjRZzWWRZGBto2iKB6V7dYdWuMRtSFYbiUnE2VfppXw`)
+- 0xNallok (`4LpE9Lxqb4jYYh8jA8oDhsGDKPNBNkcoXobbAJTa3pWw`)
+- MetaProph3t (`65U66fcYuNfqN12vzateJhZ4bgDuxFWN9gMwraeQKByg`)
+- Dodecahedr0x (`UuGEwN9aeh676ufphbavfssWVxH7BJCqacq1RYhco8e`)
+- Durden (`91NjPFfJxQw2FRJvyuQUQsdh9mBGPeGPuNavt7nMLTQj`)
+- Blockchainfixesthis (`HKcXZAkT4ec2VBzGNxazWhpV7BTk3frQpSufpaNoho3D`)
+
+The multisig members instructions are as follows:
+- Accept receipt of META into the multisig as defined by on chain instruction
+- Accept the full USDC amount of $50,000 from Pantera Capital into the multisig
+- Determine and publish the price per META according to the definition above
+- Confirmation from two parties within The Meta-DAO that the balances exist and are in full
+- Take `$50,000 / calculated per META` and determine final allocation quantity of META
+- Transfer 20% of the final allocation of META to Pantera's address `FLzqFMQo2KmsenkMP4Y82kYVnKTJJfahTJUWUDSp2ZX5`
+- Configure a 12 month Streamflow vesting program with a linear vest
+- Transfer 80% of the final allocation of  META into the Streamflow program
+- Return any remaining META to the DAO treasury
+
+
+## ROI to META
+
+The proposal evaluates a net increase in value to META by bringing on a strategic partner such as Pantera which would boost visibility and afford some cash holdings. This proposal speculates a ~25% increase in META value due to the high profile of Pantera and their offering of strategic resources to the project.
+
+| Details | |
+|---|---|
+| META Spot Price 2024-02-17 15:58 UTC | $96.93 |
+| META Circulating Supply 2024-02-17 15:58 UTC | 14,530 |
+| Offer Price | \${TBD} |
+| Offer META | {TBD} |
+| Offer USDC | \$50,000 |
+| META Transfer to Circulation |  {TBD} % |
+| New META Circulating Supply | {TBD}  |
+
+Here are the pre-money valuations at different prices:
+- \$50: \$726,000
+- \$60: \$871,800
+- \$70: \$1,017,000
+- \$80: \$1,162,400
+- \$90: \$1,307,700
+- \$100: \$1,453,000
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `H59VHchVsy8UVLotZLs7YaFv2FqTH5HAeXc4Y48kxieY`
+- Proposal number: 7
+- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
+- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
+- Autocrat version: 0.1
+- Completed: 2024-02-23
+- Ended: 2024-02-23

inbox/archive/2024-02-20-futardio-proposal-develop-multi-option-proposals.md

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Develop Multi-Option Proposals?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/J7dWFgSSuMg3BNZBAKYp3AD5D2yuaaLUmyKqvxBZgHht"
+date: 2024-02-20
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Develop Multi-Option Proposals?
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-02-20
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/J7dWFgSSuMg3BNZBAKYp3AD5D2yuaaLUmyKqvxBZgHht
+- Description: Develop Multi-Option Proposals
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points
+The proposal aims to develop multi-modal proposal functionality for the MetaDAO, allowing for multiple mutually-exclusive outcomes in decision-making, and seeks compensation of 200 META distributed across four milestones.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact
+Stakeholders will benefit from enhanced decision-making capabilities that allow for the consideration of multiple options, improving governance efficiency.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential
+Implementing this feature could increase the DAO's value by approximately 12.1%, enhancing its decision-making bandwidth and innovation in governance.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors
+There is a risk that the project may face delays due to other priorities or complications in development, potentially impacting the timeline for delivering the proposed features.
+
+## Content
+
+This is a proposal to pay me (agrippa) in META to create multi-modal proposal functionality.
+
+As it stands proposals have two outcomes: Pass or Fail.
+A multi-modal proposal is one with multiple mutually-exclusive outcomes, one of which is Fail and the rest of which are other things.
+
+For example, you can imagine a proposal to choose the first place prize of the Solana Scribes contest, where there's a conditional market on each applicant![^1] Without multi-modal proposals, a futarchic DAO has basically no mechanism for making choices like this, but multi-modal proposals solve it quite well.
+
+Architecturally speaking there is no need to hard-limit the number of conditions in a conditional vault / number of outcomes in a proposal.
+
+I believe even in the medium term it will prove to be a crucial feature that provides a huge amount of value to the DAO[^2], and I believe the futarchic DAO software is currently far and away the DAO's most important asset and worth investing in.
+
+### Protocol complexity and risk
+Unlike other potential expansions of DAO complexity, multi-modal proposals do not particularly introduce any new security / mechanism design considerations. If you can maliciously get through "proposal option 12", you could have also gotten through Pass in a binary proposal because conditional markets do not compete with eachother over liquidity.
+
+[^1]: You'd probably filter them down at least a little bit, though in principle you don't need to. Also, you could award the 2nd and 3rd place prizes to the 2nd and 3rd highest trading contestants 🤔… kinda neat.
+
+[^2]: Down the line, I think multi-modal proposals are really quite interesting. For example, for each proposal anyone makes, you could have a mandatory draft stage where before the conditional vault actually goes live anyone can add more alternatives to the same proposal. **I think this would be really effective at cutting out pork** and is the primary mechanism for doing so.
+
+## About me
+I have been leading development on https://github.com/solana-labs/governance-ui/ (aka the Realms frontend) for Solana Labs for the past year. Aside from smart contract dev, I'm an expert at making web3 frontends performant and developer-ergonomic (hint: it involves using react-query a lot). I started what was probably the very first high-school blockchain club in the world in 2014, with my then-Physics-teacher Jed who now works at Jito. In my undergrad I did research at Cornell's Initiative for Cryptocurrency and Contracts and in 2017 I was invited to a smart contract summit in China because of some Sybil resistance work I was doing at the time (Vitalik was there!).
+
+I developed the [first conditional tokens vault on Solana](https://github.com/Nimblefoot/precogparty/tree/main/programs/precog) as part of a prediction market reference implementation[^3] (grant-funded by FTX of all people, rest in peace 🙏). This has influenced changes to the existing metadao conditional vault, [referenced here](https://discord.com/channels/1155877543174475859/1174824703513342082/1194351565734170664), which I've been asked to help test and review.
+
+I met Proph3t in Greece this past December and we spent about 3 hours walking and talking in the pouring rain about the Meta-DAO and futarchy. During our conversation I told him what Hanson tells people: futarchy isn't used because organizations don't actually want it, they'd rather continue to get fat on organizational inefficiencies. But my thinking has changed!
+
+1. I've now seen how excited talented builders and teams are about implementing futarchy (as opposed to wanting to cling to control)
+2. I've realized just how fun futarchy is and I want it for myself regardless of anything else
+[^3]: I did actually came up with the design myself, but it's been invented multiple times including for example Gnosis conditional vaults on Ethereum.
+
+### Value
+To me these are the main points of value. I have included my own subjective estimates on how much more the DAO is worth if this feature was fully implemented. (Bare in mind we are "double dipping" here, these improvements include both the functioning of the Meta-DAO itself and the value of the Meta-DAO's best asset, the dao software)
+
+- Ability to weigh multiple exclusive alternatives at once literally exponentially increases the DAO's decision-making bandwidth in relevant cases (+5%)
+- Multi-modal proposals with a draft stage are the best solution to the deeply real game-theoretic problem of pork barrel (+5%)
+- Multi-modal proposals are cool and elegant. Selection among multiple alternatives is a very challenging problem in voting mechanism design, usually solved poorly (see: elections). Multi-modal futarchic proposals are innovative and exciting not just in the context of futarchy, but all of governance! That's hype (+2%)
+- A really kickass conditional vault implementation is useful for other protocols and this one would be the best. It could collect very modest fees for the DAO each time tokens are deposited into it. (yes, protocols can just fork it, but usually this doesn't happen: see Serum pre explosion, etc) (+0.1%)
+So that is (in my estimation) +12.1% value to the Meta-DAO.
+
+According to https://dune.com/metadaohogs/themetadao circulating supply is 14,416 META. `14416 * (100 + 12.1)% = 16160`, so this feature set would be worth a dilution of **+1744 META**. I am proposing you pay me much less than that.
+
+I also believe that I am uniquely positioned to do the work to a very high standard of competence. In particular, I think making the contract work without a limit on # of alternatives requires a deep level of understanding of Anchor and Solana smart contract design, but is necessary in order to future-proof and fully realize the feature's potential.
+
+### Compensation and Milestones
+I believe in this project and do not want cash. I am asking for 200 META disbursed in 50 META intervals across 4 milestones:
+
+1. Immediately upon passage of this proposal
+2. Upon completing the (new from scratch) multi-modal conditonal vault program
+3. Upon making futarch work with multi-modal conditional vaults
+4. Upon integrating all related features into the frontend
+I think this would take me quite a few weeks to do by myself. I think it's premature to establish any concrete timeline because other priorities may take precedence (for example spending some time refactoring querying and state in the FE). However, if that does happen, I won't allow this project to get stuck in limbo (if nothing else, consider my incentive to subcontract from my network of talented crypto devs).
+
+Milestone completion would be assessed by a (3/5) Squads multisig comprised of:
+
+- **Proph3t** (65U66fcYuNfqN12vzateJhZ4bgDuxFWN9gMwraeQKByg), who needs no explanation
+- **DeanMachine** (3PKhzE9wuEkGPHHu2sNCvG86xNtDJduAcyBPXpE6cSNt), who I believe is well known and trusted by both the Meta-DAO and the broader DAO community.
+- **0xNallok** (4LpE9Lxqb4jYYh8jA8oDhsGDKPNBNkcoXobbAJTa3pWw), who is supporting in operations and early organization within The Meta-DAO, and who has committed to being available for review of progress and work.
+- **LegalizeOnionFutures** (EyuaQkc2UtC4WveD6JjT37ke6xL2Cxz43jmdCC7QXZQE), who I believe is a sharp and invested member of the Meta-DAO who will hold my work to a high standard.
+- **sapphire** (9eJgizx2jWDLbyK7VMMUekRBKY3q5uVwv5LEXhf1jP3s), who has done impactful security related-work with Realms, informal security review of the Meta-DAO contracts, and is an active member of the Meta-DAO.
+I selected this council because I wanted to keep it lean to reduce overhead but also diverse and representative of the DAO's interests. I will pay each member 2.5 META upon passage as payment for representing the DAO.
+
+I would be very excited to join this futarchic society as a major techinical contributor. Thanks for your consideration :-)
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `J7dWFgSSuMg3BNZBAKYp3AD5D2yuaaLUmyKqvxBZgHht`
+- Proposal number: 9
+- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
+- Proposer: `99dZcXhrYgEmHeMKAb9ezPaBqgMdg1RjCGSfHa7BeQEX`
+- Autocrat version: 0.1
+- Completed: 2024-02-25
+- Ended: 2024-02-25

inbox/archive/2024-02-26-futardio-proposal-increase-meta-liquidity-via-a-dutch-auction.md

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Increase META Liquidity via a Dutch Auction?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/Dn638yPirR3e2UNNECpLNJApDhxsjhJTAv9uEd9LBVVT"
+date: 2024-02-26
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Increase META Liquidity via a Dutch Auction?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-02-26
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/Dn638yPirR3e2UNNECpLNJApDhxsjhJTAv9uEd9LBVVT
+- Description: Increase META Liquidity via a Dutch Auction
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal aims to increase META liquidity through a manual Dutch auction on OpenBook, selling 1,000 META and pairing the USDC obtained with META for enhanced liquidity on Meteora.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+Stakeholders, including Meta DAO members and liquidity providers, may benefit from improved liquidity and trading conditions for META.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+The initiative could result in a significant increase in protocol-owned liquidity and potentially higher trading fees due to more efficient liquidity management.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+There is a risk of insufficient demand for META during the auction, which may lead to lower-than-expected liquidity or losses if prices drop significantly.
+
+## Content
+
+#### Responsible Parties
+Durden, Ben H, Nico, joebuild, and Dodecahedr0x.
+
+### Overview
+Sell META via a Dutch auction executed manually through OpenBook, and pair the acquired USDC with META to provide liquidity on Meteora.
+
+### Background
+Given the currently low volume and high volatility of META, there is little incentive to provide liquidity (low fees, high risk of impermanent loss). Yet there seems to be near-universal agreement in the Meta DAO Discord that greater liquidity would be highly beneficial to the project.
+
+While the DAO has plenty of META, to provide liquidity it needs USDC to pair with it's META. This USDC can be acquired by selling META.
+
+There is currently strong demand for META, with an oversubscribed raise (proposal 3), proposals from notable parties attemtpting to purchase META at below market price, and a well-known figure DCAing into META. There is thus no need to sell META for USDC at below market prices; we only need to sell META at a price that would be better than if they were to buy through the market.
+
+This proposal seeks to manually perform a Dutch auction using OpenBook. This serves a few purposes: price discovery through a market that is open to all, low smart contract risk (relative to using a custom Dutch auction program), simplicity (which will result in wider participation), and ease of execution (just place asks on OpenBook).
+
+### Implementation
+Meta DAO will sell a total of 1,000 META.
+
+The META will be sold in tranches of 100 META by placing asks above the spot price. The first tranche will be placed 50% above the spot price. Every 24 hours, if the ask is more than 6% above the spot price, it will be lowered by 5%.
+
+Whenever an ask is filled, a new ask worth 100 META will be placed 10% above the spot price. In addition, USDC from the filled asks will be paired with META and added to the 4% fee pool.
+
+The multisig currently holding the liquidity in the [4% fee pool](https://app.meteora.ag/pools/6t2CdBC26q9tj6jBwPzzFZogtjX8mtmVHUmAFmjAhMSn) will send their LP tokens to this proposal's multisig. After the 1,000 META has all been sold, all of Meta DAO's liquidity will be moved to the [1% fee pool](https://app.meteora.ag/pools/53miVooS2uLfVpiKShXpMqh6PkZhmfDXiRAzs3tNhjwC). The LP tokens will be sent to the treasury to be held as permanent liquidity until Meta DAO decides otherwise.
+
+All operations will be executed through a 3/5 Squads multisig.
+
+Multisig address: `LMRVapqnn1LEwKaD8PzYEs4i37whTgeVS41qKqyn1wi`
+
+The multisig is composed of the following five members:
+
+Durden: `91NjPFfJxQw2FRJvyuQUQsdh9mBGPeGPuNavt7nMLTQj`
+
+Ben H: `Hu8qped4Cj7gQ3ChfZvZYrtgy2Ntr6YzfN7vwMZ2SWii`
+
+Nico: `6kDGqrP4Wwqe5KBa9zTrgUFykVsv4YhZPDEX22kUsDMP`
+
+joebuild: `XXXvLz1B89UtcTsg2hT3cL9qUJi5PqEEBTHg57MfNkZ`
+
+Dodecahedr0x: `UuGEwN9aeh676ufphbavfssWVxH7BJCqacq1RYhco8e`
+
+I will be using the SquadsX wallet to propose transactions to interact with OpenBook through [Prism's UI](https://v4xyz.prism.ag/trade/v2/2Fgj6eyx9mpfc27nN16E5sWqmBovwiT52LTyPSX5qdba). Once proposed, I will vote on the proposed transaction and wait for two other multisig members to sign and execute.
+
+If the proposal passes, those with the permissions to make announcements in the Discord and access to the Meta DAO Twitter account will be notified so they can announce this initiative.
+
+### Compensation
+I am requesting a payment of 5 META to cover the cost of creating the market for this proposal and for the effort of crafting this proposal and carrying it out to completion.
+
+For the compensation of the multisig members other than myself, I performed a sealed-bid auction via Discord DMs for the amount of META that each of the 10 candidates would require to become a member. Those who were willing to join for the least amount of META were selected. Only individuals who were already respectable Meta DAO members were selected as candidates so that regardless of who was chosen we didn't end up in a precarious situation. This was done in order to create a competitive dynamic that minimizes the cost incurred by Meta DAO.
+
+The candidates with the lowest asks and their requested amounts were as follows:
+
+- Ben H – 0 META
+- Nico – 0 META
+- joebuild – 0.2 META
+- Dodecahedr0x – 0.25 META
+All compensatory payments will be made by the multisig to each individual upon the completion of the proposal.
+
+### Total Required META
+Since the amount of META needed to be paired for liquidity is unknown until the META is actually sold, we will request double the amount of META to be sold, which leaves a fairly large margin for price to increase and still have enough META. In the event that there is insufficient META to pair with the USDC, the excess USDC will be returned to the treasury. Similarly, any META slated for liquidity that is leftover will be returned to the treasury.
+
+META to be sold: 1,000
+
+META for liquidity: 2,000
+
+META for compensation: 5.45
+
+**Total: 3,005.45**
+
+### Result
+This proposal will significantly increase Meta DAO's protocol-owned liquidity as well as move its existing liquidity to a more efficient fee tier, addressing recent complaints and concerns regarding META's liquidity.
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `Dn638yPirR3e2UNNECpLNJApDhxsjhJTAv9uEd9LBVVT`
+- Proposal number: 10
+- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
+- Proposer: `prdUTSLQs6EcwreBtZnG92RWaLxdCTivZvRXSVRdpmJ`
+- Autocrat version: 0.1
+- Completed: 2024-03-02
+- Ended: 2024-03-02

inbox/archive/2024-03-00-bipartisan-policy-center-demographic-transition.md

@@ -7,9 +7,15 @@ date: 2024-03-01
 domain: health
 secondary_domains: []
 format: report
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
 priority: medium
 tags: [demographics, aging, dependency-ratio, medicare, baby-boomers, population-projections]
+processed_by: vida
+processed_date: 2024-03-10
+claims_extracted: ["us-population-over-65-will-outnumber-children-by-2034-inverting-the-demographic-foundation-of-american-social-infrastructure.md", "medicare-hospital-insurance-trust-fund-exhaustion-by-2040-will-trigger-automatic-benefit-cuts-of-8-to-10-percent-unless-congress-acts.md"]
+enrichments_applied: ["pace-demonstrates-integrated-care-averts-institutionalization-through-community-based-delivery-not-cost-reduction.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "Two major claims extracted: (1) the 2034 demographic crossover where elderly outnumber children for first time in US history, and (2) Medicare trust fund exhaustion triggering automatic benefit cuts. Five enrichments applied to existing claims around social isolation, PACE, healthcare costs, deaths of despair, and modernization—all strengthened by the locked-in demographic timeline. This source provides the demographic foundation that makes every senior care and Medicare claim time-bound and urgent rather than theoretical. The curator was correct: the 2034 crossover reframes the entire US social contract."
 ---
 
 ## Content
@@ -53,3 +59,11 @@ tags: [demographics, aging, dependency-ratio, medicare, baby-boomers, population
 PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[Americas declining life expectancy is driven by deaths of despair concentrated in populations and regions most damaged by economic restructuring since the 1980s]]
 WHY ARCHIVED: Provides the demographic baseline that makes senior care claims time-bound and urgent rather than theoretical.
 EXTRACTION HINT: The 2034 crossover (more elderly than children) is the most extractable milestone — it reframes the entire US social contract.
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- Baby boomers began turning 65 in 2011
+- All baby boomers will be 65+ by 2030
+- US population 65+: 39.7M (2010) → 67.0M (2030)
+- Working-age (25-64) to 65+ ratio: 2.8:1 (2025) → 2.2:1 (2055)
+- OECD old-age dependency ratio (US): 20.9% (2000) → 31.3% (2023) → 40.4% (2050 projected)

inbox/archive/2024-03-03-futardio-proposal-burn-993-of-meta-in-treasury.md

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Burn 99.3% of META in Treasury?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/ELwCkHt1U9VBpUFJ7qGoVMatEwLSr1HYj9q9t8JQ1NcU"
+date: 2024-03-03
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Burn 99.3% of META in Treasury?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-03-03
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/ELwCkHt1U9VBpUFJ7qGoVMatEwLSr1HYj9q9t8JQ1NcU
+- Description: Burn 99.3% of META in Treasury?
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points
+The proposal aims to burn approximately 99.3% of treasury-held META tokens to reduce the Fully Diluted Valuation (FDV), enhance the attractiveness of META for investors, and promote community engagement.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact
+This action seeks to encourage broader participation from potential investors and community members by lowering the FDV.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential
+The reduction in token supply could increase demand and perceived value of META, leading to improved investor interest and engagement.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors
+Burning a significant portion of tokens may limit future financial flexibility and could deter investors concerned about long-term supply dynamics.
+
+## Content
+
+#### Authors
+doctor.sol & rar3
+
+### Overview
+Burn ~99.3% `979,000` of treasury-held META tokens to significantly reduce the FDV, with the goal of making META more appealing to investors and enhancing community engagement.
+
+### Background
+The META DAO is currently perceived to have a **high Fully Diluted Valuation (FDV)** due to the substantial amount of META tokens in the treasury, approximately `985,000 tokens`. This high FDV often **discourages potential investors and participants** from engaging with META, as they may perceive the investment as less attractive right from the start.
+
+### Issue at Hand
+The primary concern is that the high FDV and treasury leads to the following problems:
+
+1. **It encourages the use of META for expenses.**
+2. **It lowers the attractiveness of META as an investment opportunity** at face value.
+3. **It reduces the number of individuals willing to participate** in this futuarchy experiment.
+
+While a high FDV can deter less informed community members, which has its benefits, it also potentially wards off highly valuable community members who could contribute positively.
+
+#### Examples
+- https://imgur.com/a/KHMjJqo
+- https://imgur.com/a/3DH2jcO
+
+### Proposed Solution
+We propose **burning approximately ~99.3%** of the META tokens -`99,000 tokens` - currently held in the DAO's treasury. This action is aimed at achieving the following outcomes:
+
+- **Elimination of Treasury META Payments**: Reduces the propensity to utilize $META from the treasury for proposal payments, promoting a healthier economic framework.
+- **Market-Based Token Acquisition**: Future requirements for $META tokens will necessitate market purchases, fostering demand and enhancing token value.
+- **Prioritization of $USDC and Revenue**: Shifting towards $USDC payments and focusing on revenue generation marks a move towards financial sustainability and robustness.
+- **Confidence Boost in META**: By significantly reducing the supply of META tokens, we signal a strong commitment to the token's value, **potentially leading to increased interest and participation in prop 10 execution.**
+- **Attracting a Broader Community**: Lowering the FDV makes META more attractive at face value, inviting a wider range of participants, including those who conduct thorough research and those attracted by the token's perceived tokenomics.
+
+### Rundown of Numbers:
+- **Current Treasury:** `982,464 META tokens`
+- **After Burning:** `3,464 META tokens`
+- **Post-Proposition 10:** An expected `1,000 META tokens` should be added back from multisig after prop 10, ranging anywhere from `0 to 3,000 META`.
+- **Final Treasury:** After burning, the treasury would have around `4,500 META`, valued at `$4 million`, plus `$2 million in META-USDC LP` at todays price `$880 / META`.
+- **Total META supply:** `20,885`
+
+#### Note
+Adopting this proposal does **not permanently cap our token supply.** The community is currently discussing the possibility of transitioning to a **mintable token model**, which would provide the flexibility to issue more tokens if the need arises.
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `ELwCkHt1U9VBpUFJ7qGoVMatEwLSr1HYj9q9t8JQ1NcU`
+- Proposal number: 11
+- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
+- Proposer: `Pr11UFzumi5GXoZVtnFHDpB6NiWM3XH57L6AnKzXyzD`
+- Autocrat version: 0.1
+- Completed: 2024-03-08
+- Ended: 2024-03-08

inbox/archive/2024-03-13-futardio-proposal-develop-futarchy-as-a-service-faas.md

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+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/D9pGGmG2rCJ5BXzbDoct7EcQL6F6A57azqYHdpWJL9Cc"
+date: 2024-03-13
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-03-13
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/D9pGGmG2rCJ5BXzbDoct7EcQL6F6A57azqYHdpWJL9Cc
+- Description: Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points
+The proposal aims to develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS) by creating a minimum viable product that enables DAOs to utilize market-driven governance and improve the user interface for better functionality.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact
+This initiative provides DAO creators and participants with a more effective governance tool that leverages market predictions, potentially enhancing decision-making processes.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential
+If successful, FaaS could attract numerous DAOs, significantly increasing MetaDAO's revenue through licensing and transaction fees.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors
+There is a risk of cost overruns and project delays, which could impact the financial viability and timeline of the proposal.
+
+## Content
+
+
+![ecosystem](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/r1PShQkCa.png)
+
+Type: Business project
+
+Entrepreneur(s): 0xNallok
+
+*A note from 0xNallok: Special thanks are owed to the many parties who've supported the project thus far, to those who've taken massive risk on utilizing the systems and believing in a better crypto. It has been one of the most exciting things, not in attention, but seeing the “aha!” moments and expanding the understanding of what is possible with crypto.*
+
+See also: [A Vision for Futarchy as a Service](https://hackmd.io/@0xNallok/rJ5O9LwaT)
+
+## Overview
+
+The appetite for market-driven governance is palpable. We have a tremendous opportunity to take this labor of love and shape it into a prime-time product. Such a product would be a great boon to the Solana ecosystem and to the MetaDAO's bottom line.
+
+If passed, this proposal would fund two workstreams:
+
+- **Minimum viable product**: I would coordinate the creation of a minimum viable product: a Realms-like UI that allows people to create and participate in futarchic DAOs. This requires some modifications to the smart contract and UI to allow for more than one DAO.
+- **UI improvements**: I've already been working with engineers to add helpful functionality to the UI. This proposal would fund these features, including:
+  - historical charts
+  - improving UX around surfacing information (e.g., showing how much money you have deposited in each proposal)
+  - showing historical trades
+  - showing market volume
+
+The goal would be to onboard some early adopter DAOs to test alongside MetaDAO. A few teams have already expressed interest.
+
+## Problem
+
+Most people in crypto agree that the state of governance is abysmal. Teams can loot the treasury without repercussions[^1]. Decentralization theatre abounds[^2]. Even some projects that build DAO tooling don't feel comfortable keeping their money in a DAO[^3].
+
+The root cause of this issue is token-voting. One-token-one-vote systems have clear incentive traps[^4] that lead to uninformed and unengaged voters. Delegated voting systems ('liquid democracy') don't fare much better: most holders don't even do enough research to delegate.
+
+## Design
+![Screenshot 2024-03-07 at 1.40.37 PM](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/Hyg89FDTa.jpg)
+
+A possible solution that MetaDAO has been testing out is futarchy. In a futarchy, it's markets that make the decisions. Given that markets are empirically better than experts at predicting things, we expect futarchies to perform better than traditional DAOs.
+
+Our objective is to build a product that allows DAOs in the Solana ecosystem to harness the power of the market for their decision-making. This product would look and feel like [Realms](https://realms.today/), only with futarchy instead of voting.
+
+Our short-term goal is to create a minimum viable iteration of this. This iteration would support the following flows:
+- I, as a DAO creator, can come to a website and create a futarchic DAO
+- I, as a futarchic trader, can trade in multiple DAOs proposals' futarchic markets
+
+To monetize this in the long-term, we could:
+- Collect licensing fees
+- Collect taker/maker fees in the conditional markets
+- Provide ancillary consulting services to help DAOs manage their futarchies
+
+The minimum viable product wouldn't support these. We would instead work with a few select DAOs and sign agreements with them to migrate to a program with fee collection within 6 months of it being released if they wish to continue to use MetaDAO's offering.
+
+### Objectives and Key Results
+
+**Release a minimum viable product by May 21st, 2024**
+- Extend the smart contract to support multiple DAOs
+- Generalize the UI to support multiple DAOs
+- Create docs for interacting with the product
+- Partner with 3 DAOs to have them use the product at launch-time
+
+**Improve the overall UI/UX**
+- Create an indexer and APIs for order and trade history
+- Improve the user experience for creating proposals
+- Improve the user experience for trading proposals
+
+### Timeline
+
+**Phase 1**
+Initial discussions around implementation, services and visual components
+UI design for components
+Development of components in React
+Program development
+Data services / APIs construction
+
+**Phase 2**
+Program deployed on devnet
+Data services / APIs linked with devnet
+UI deployed on dev branch for use with devnet
+
+**Phase 3**
+Audit and revisions of program
+Testing UI, feedback and revisions mainnet with limited beta testers and on devent
+
+**Phase 4**
+Proposal for migration of program
+UI live on mainnet
+Create documentation and videos
+
+**Final**
+Migrate program
+
+## Budget
+
+This project is expected to have deliverables within 30 days with full deployment within two months.
+
+Below is the inclusion of estimated **MAXIMUM** _costs and hours_ for the following roles[^5]. **If costs do incur beyond this estimate the cost is to be borne by the Entrepreneur.**
+
+A fair estimate of `$96,000`[^6] for the two months including the following:
+- 1 smart contract engineer (\$15,000) (160 hours)
+- 1 auditor (\$10,000) (40 hours)
+- 2 UI / UX (\$32,000) (400 hours)
+- 1 data/services developer (\$13,000) (140 hours)
+- 1 project manager / research / outreach (\$26,000) (320 hours)
+
+The Entrepreneur (0xNallok) would fill in various roles, but primarily the project manager.
+
+This will be funded through:
+- Transfer of \$40,000 USDC from the existing funds in the multi-sig treasury.
+- Transfer of 342 META[^7] which will be used when payment is due to convert to USDC.
+- The funds will be transferred to a 2/3 mult-sig including 0xNallok, Proph3t and Nico.
+- Payments to the parties will be done weekly.
+
+> The reason for overallocation of META is due to the price fluctuation of the asset and necessity for payment in USDC. This takes the cost minus the \$40k USDC (\$56k) divided by the current price of 1 META (\$818.284) multiplied by a factor of 5.
+
+> Any remaining META once the project is completed will be transferred back to the MetaDAO treasury.
+
+MetaDAO Executor (`FpMnruqVCxh3o2oBFZ9uSQmshiyfMqzeJ3YfNQfP9tHy`)
+
+MetaDAO Treasury (`ADCCEAbH8eixGj5t73vb4sKecSKo7ndgDSuWGvER4Loy`)
+
+FaaS Multi-sig (`AHwsoL97vXFdvckVZdXw9rrvnUDcPANCLVQzJan9srWy`)
+>  0xNallok (`4LpE9Lxqb4jYYh8jA8oDhsGDKPNBNkcoXobbAJTa3pWw`)
+
+>  Proph3t (`65U66fcYuNfqN12vzateJhZ4bgDuxFWN9gMwraeQKByg`)
+
+>  Nico (`6kDGqrP4Wwqe5KBa9zTrgUFykVsv4YhZPDEX22kUsDMP`)
+
+This proposal includes the transfer instruction from the MetaDAO treasury, the additional funds will be transferred from the MetaDAO Executor.
+
+## Business
+
+Ultimately, the goal of the MetaDAO is to make money. There are a few ways to monetize FaaS all dependent on what appeals most to DAOs:
+- **Taker fees on markets**: we could take 5 - 25 basis points via a taker fee on markets.
+- **Monthly licensing fees**: because the code is BSL, we could charge a monthly fee for the code and the site
+- **Support and services**: we could also provide consultation services around futarchic governance, like a Gauntlet model.
+
+In general, we should aim for **vertical integration**. The goal is not to build this product as a primitive and then allow anyone to build front-ends for it: it's to own the whole stack.
+
+### Financial Projections
+
+Today, 293 DAOs use Realms. Realms is a free platform, so plenty of these DAOs are inactive and wouldn't be paying customers. So we estimate that we could acquire 5 - 100 DAOs as customers.
+
+As for estimating ARPU (average revenue per user), we can start by looking at the volume in the MetaDAO's markets:
+
+![Screenshot from 2024-02-26 19-52-03](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/H1HbnwcnT.png)
+
+Note that this only includes the volume in the finalized market, as all trades in the other market are reverted and thus wouldn't collect fees.
+
+So assuming that proposal 6 - 8 are an appropriate sample, we could earn ~\$50 - \$500 per proposal. If DAOs see between 1 - 2 proposals per month, that's \$100 - \$1,000 in taker fee ARPU.
+
+As for monthly licensing fees, Squads charges \$99 / month for SquadsX and \$399 / month for Squads Pro. I suspect that DAOs would be willing to pay a premium for governance. So we can estimate between \$50 - \$1,000 in monthly licensing fees.
+
+Putting these together:
+
+![Screenshot from 2024-02-26 19-54-59](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/BJvsnvc3p.png)
+
+The support & services business is different enough that it deserves its own model. This is because consulting / advisory businesses have non-zero marginal costs (you can't earn $25,000,000 in revenue from one consultant) and have lower defensibility. Both cause them to receive lower valuation multiples. 
+
+Here's what we project:
+
+![Screenshot from 2024-02-26 19-29-19](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/B10c8vq3p.png)
+
+Of course, you can use your own numbers if you'd like to come up with your own estimates.
+
+## Footnotes
+[^1]: DeFi Project Parrot Holds Contentious Vote on Future of $70M Treasury. Danny Nelson. Jul 21, 2023. https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2023/07/21/defi-project-parrot-puts-fate-of-over-70m-treasury-prt-token-to-vote/.
+
+[^2]: Crypto’s Theater Is Becoming More Surreal. Camila Russo. Aug 14, 2023. https://www.coindesk.com/consensus-magazine/2023/08/14/cryptos-theater-is-becoming-more-surreal/.
+
+[^3]: Aragon Fires Back at Activist Investors in Early Stages of DAO Governance Fight. Danny Nelson. May 5, 2023. https://www.coindesk.com/business/2023/05/05/aragon-fires-back-at-activist-investors-in-early-stages-of-governance-fight/.
+
+[^4]: The Logic of Collective Action. Wikipedia. Mar 7, 2024. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Logic_of_Collective_Action.
+
+[^5]: As this is an approximation and development and integration depends on a number of factors, inclusion of roles and estimates seems appropriate but may be in flux given changes which arise, however costs would not extend beyond the estimate.
+
+[^6]: This breaks down to an average estimate of ~$90/hour and 1060 (wo)man hours total.
+
+[^7]: $$(56,000/818.284) * 5 \approx 342$$
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `D9pGGmG2rCJ5BXzbDoct7EcQL6F6A57azqYHdpWJL9Cc`
+- Proposal number: 12
+- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
+- Proposer: `prdUTSLQs6EcwreBtZnG92RWaLxdCTivZvRXSVRdpmJ`
+- Autocrat version: 0.1
+- Completed: 2024-03-19
+- Ended: 2024-03-19

inbox/archive/2024-03-19-futardio-proposal-engage-in-250000-otc-trade-with-colosseum.md

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+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Engage in $250,000 OTC Trade with Colosseum?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/5qEyKCVyJZMFZSb3yxh6rQjqDYxASiLW7vFuuUTCYnb1"
+date: 2024-03-19
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Engage in $250,000 OTC Trade with Colosseum?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-03-19
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/5qEyKCVyJZMFZSb3yxh6rQjqDYxASiLW7vFuuUTCYnb1
+- Description: Colosseum's Acquisition of $250,000 USDC worth of META
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+Colosseum proposes to acquire META from The MetaDAO Treasury for up to $250,000, with the price per META set based on market conditions. If the proposal passes, Colosseum will receive 20% of the META immediately and the remaining 80% will be vested over 12 months.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+The proposal could enhance collaboration between Colosseum and MetaDAO, providing access to new entrepreneurs and funding opportunities.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+Strategic partnership with Colosseum may significantly increase the long-term value and growth potential of META through enhanced visibility and support for startups.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+Market volatility could render the acquisition void if the price of META exceeds $1,200, potentially limiting the expected benefits of the partnership.
+
+## Content
+
+### Overview
+- Colosseum wishes to acquire {tbd} META (METADDFL6wWMWEoKTFJwcThTbUmtarRJZjRpzUvkxhr) from The MetaDAO Treasury (ADCCEAbH8eixGj5t73vb4sKecSKo7ndgDSuWGvER4Loy).
+- If the proposal passes, the price per META will be the TWAP of the pass market if below \$850. If this proposal is approved and the pass market TWAP surpasses \$850 per META, but is below \$1,200, then the acquisition price per META will be \$850. If the pass market TWAP surpasses \$1,200, then this proposal becomes void and the USDC in the multisig will be returned to Colosseum’s wallet.
+- A total of \$250,000 USDC (EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v) will be committed by Colosseum.
+- The MetaDAO will transfer 20% of the final allocation of META to Colosseum's wallet immediately and place 80% of the final allocation of META into a 12 month, linear vest Streamflow program.
+
+### Rationale
+Colosseum runs Solana’s hackathons, supports winning founders through a new accelerator program, and invests in their startups. Our mission is to bolster innovative improvements to technology, economics, and governance in crypto through all 3 pillars of our organization. In line with that mission, we believe MetaDAO is one of the most promising early experiments in crypto and we strongly believe we can help the project grow significantly due to our unique position in the Solana ecosystem.
+
+In addition to the capital infusion provided by Colosseum, our primary value proposition is our ability to bring new entrepreneurs and cyber agents to MetaDAO over the long-term. Given that a majority of the VC-backed startups in the Solana ecosystem started in hackathons, we can utilize both our hackathons and accelerator program to funnel talented developers, founders, and ultimately revenue-generating startups to the DAO.
+
+In practice, there are many ways Colosseum can promote MetaDAO and we want to collaborate with the DAO community around ongoing initiatives. To show our commitment towards future collaborations, we promise that if this proposal passes, the MetaDAO will be the sponsor of the DAO track in the next Solana hackathon after Renaissance, at no additional cost. The next DAO track prize pool will be between \$50,000 - \$80,000.
+
+### Execution
+The proposal contains the instruction for a transfer {tbd} META into a Squads multisignature wallet [FhJHnsCGm9JDAe2JuEvqr67WE8mD2PiJMUsmCTD1fDPZ] with a 5/7 threshold of which the following parties will be members:
+- Colosseum (REDACTED)
+- Colosseum (REDACTED)
+- MetaProph3t (65U66fcYuNfqN12vzateJhZ4bgDuxFWN9gMwraeQKByg)
+- 0xNallok (4LpE9Lxqb4jYYh8jA8oDhsGDKPNBNkcoXobbAJTa3pWw)
+- Cavemanloverboy (2EvcwLAHvXW71c8d1uEXTCbVZjzMpYUQL5h64PuYUi3T)
+- Dean (3PKhzE9wuEkGPHHu2sNCvG86xNtDJduAcyBPXpE6cSNt)
+- Durden (91NjPFfJxQw2FRJvyuQUQsdh9mBGPeGPuNavt7nMLTQj)
+
+The multisig members instructions are as follows:
+1. Accept receipt of META into the multisig as defined by onchain instruction
+2. Accept the full USDC amount of \$250,000 from Colosseum into the multisig
+3.Determine and publish the price per META according to the definition above
+4. Confirmation from two parties within The MetaDAO that the balances exist and are in fullTake \$250,000 / calculated per META and determine final allocation quantity of META
+5. Transfer 20% of the final allocation of META to Colosseum’s address [REDACTED]
+6. Configure a 12 month Streamflow vesting program with a linear vest
+7. Transfer 80% of the final allocation of META into the Streamflow program
+8. Return any remaining META to the DAO treasury
+
+> NOTE: The reason for transferring 2,060 META is due to the fact that there is only one transfer and by overallocating we have a wider price range to be able to execute the instructions above. This is due to the fluctuations in the price of META.
+For example if the price of TWAP for META is \$250 by the time the proposal passes, the amount of META allocated for the \$250,000/\$250 = 1,000 META. In this case 1,060 META would be returned to the treasury.
+
+### ROI to META
+We won’t speculate on what the exact ROI will be to META in the short to medium-term. However, if this proposal passes, we believe that our strategic partnership will increase the value of META significantly over the long-term due to Colosseum’s unique ability to embed MetaDAO as a viable institution that can help future crypto founders grow their businesses.
+### Details
+- META Spot Price 2024-03-18 18:09 UTC: \$468.09
+- META Circulating Supply 2024-03-18 18:09 UTC: 17,421
+- Circulating supply could change depending on the current dutch auction
+- Offer Price per 1 META: Any market price up to \$850 per 1 META
+- Offer USDC: \$250,000
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `5qEyKCVyJZMFZSb3yxh6rQjqDYxASiLW7vFuuUTCYnb1`
+- Proposal number: 13
+- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
+- Proposer: `pR13Aev6U2DQ3sQTWSZrFzevNqYnvq5TM9c1qTKLfm8`
+- Autocrat version: 0.1
+- Completed: 2024-03-24
+- Ended: 2024-03-24

inbox/archive/2024-03-26-futardio-proposal-appoint-nallok-and-proph3t-benevolent-dictators-for-three-mo.md

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/BqMrwwZYdpbXNsfpcxxG2DyiQ7uuKB69PznPWZ33GrZW"
+date: 2024-03-26
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-03-26
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/BqMrwwZYdpbXNsfpcxxG2DyiQ7uuKB69PznPWZ33GrZW
+- Description: Takeover BDF3M
+- Categories: {'category': 'Operations'}
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+This proposal aims to appoint Proph3t and Nallok as Benevolent Dictators for three months to expedite decision-making and business operations within MetaDAO while managing retroactive compensation and enhancing the proposal process.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+Stakeholders will benefit from quicker decision-making and improved operational efficiency, potentially increasing MetaDAO's chances of success.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+The proposal could lead to a more agile organization capable of completing 10 GitHub issues weekly and enhancing community engagement through regular updates.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+If the proposal fails, it could significantly decrease the likelihood of MetaDAO's success by over 20%, jeopardizing its future operations.
+
+## Content
+
+#### Entrepreneur(s)
+
+Proph3t, Nallok
+
+## Overview
+
+Today, MetaDAO is not executing as fast as a normal startup would. At the crux of this is that *the current proposal process is too slow and costly*. We can and will fix that, but in the short-term we need some of MetaDAO's key decisions to be made outside of the proposal process.
+
+This proposal would appoint Proph3t and Nallok to be Benevolent Dictators For 3 Months (BDF3M). Their term would be from the finalization of this proposal to June 30th. At that point, either the futarchy will be able to function autonomously or another proposal will need to be raised.
+
+We are requesting 1015 META and 100,000 USDC to handle 4 months of retroactive compensation (December - March) and 3 months of forward-looking compensation (April - June). So an average of 145 META and $14,000 per month.
+
+Given that this is a critical juncture in MetaDAO's timeline, we believe that this proposal failing would decrease the probability of MetaDAO's success by more than 20%.
+
+## OKRs
+
+#### Execute faster
+- Complete 10 issues on GitHub per week
+
+#### Handle business operations
+- Perform retroactive compensation for the months of December, January, February, and March within 1 week of the proposal passing
+- Perform operations compensation for April, May, and June
+- Oversee the creation of a new kickass landing page
+
+## Project
+
+If passed, this proposal would appoint Proph3t and Nallok as interim leaders. The following would fall under their domain:
+- Retroactive compensation for all contributions to MetaDAO prior to this proposal
+- Managing ongoing business operations, including:
+  - Steering the off-chain proposal process, including providing proposal and communication guidelines for proposers and compensating proposers when appropriate
+  - Steering MetaDAO-wide project management
+  - Handling any expenses or required activities required to operate effectively
+  - Improving the security and efficacy of the core futarchy mechanism
+  - Providing monthly updates to the MetaDAO community
+- Compensation for current contributors, including the incentive-based part
+
+The proposal would also allow Nallok or Proph3t to make exceptional use grants for MetaDAO's code licenses.
+
+For technical reasons, no META nor USDC would come directly from the DAO's treasury. It would instead come from various multisigs.
+
+Although we make no hard commitments, the META would likely be issued in 5-year locked form, as described [here](https://medium.com/@metaproph3t/-6d9ca555363e).
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `BqMrwwZYdpbXNsfpcxxG2DyiQ7uuKB69PznPWZ33GrZW`
+- Proposal number: 14
+- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
+- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
+- Autocrat version: 0.1
+- Completed: 2024-03-31
+- Ended: 2024-03-31

inbox/archive/2024-03-28-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v02.md

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/HXohDRKtDcXNKnWysjyjK8S5SvBe76J5o4NdcF4jj963"
+date: 2024-03-28
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-03-28
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/HXohDRKtDcXNKnWysjyjK8S5SvBe76J5o4NdcF4jj963
+- Description: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2?
+- Categories: {'category': 'Operations'}
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points
+The proposal aims to upgrade the Autocrat Program to v0.2 by introducing reclaimable rent, conditional token merging, and improved token metadata, along with several configuration changes to enhance functionality and user experience.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact
+Stakeholders will benefit from reduced proposal creation costs and improved token usability, which may lead to increased participation in governance.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential
+The upgrade could enhance liquidity and user experience, potentially attracting more users and proposals to the MetaDAO ecosystem.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors
+There is a risk of technical issues during the migration process or unforeseen consequences from the configuration changes that could disrupt current operations.
+
+## Content
+
+#### Author(s)
+HenryE, Proph3t
+
+## Overview
+It's time to upgrade futarchy!
+
+This upgrade includes three new features and a number of smaller config changes.
+
+### The features:
+
+- Reclaimable rent: you will now be able to get back the ~4 SOL used to create OpenBook proposal markets. This should lower the friction involved in creating proposals.
+- Conditional token merging: now, if you have 1 pTOKEN and 1 fTOKEN, you'll me able to merge them back into 1 TOKEN. This should help with liquidity when there are multiple proposals active at once.
+- Conditional token metadata: before, you would see conditional tokens in your wallet as random mint addresses. After this is merged, you should be able to see token names and logos, helping you identify what proposal they're a part of.
+
+### The config changes:
+
+- Lower pass threshold from 5% to 3%
+- Set default TWAP value to $100 instead of $1
+- Update TWAP in $5 increments instead of 1% increments, which enhances manipulation resistance while allowing the TWAP to be more accure
+- Change minimum META lot sizes from 1 META to 0.1 META
+
+The instruction attached to this proposal will migrate MetaDAO's assets over to the new autocrat program.
+
+There are three main futarchy programs and a migrator program for transfering tokens from one DAO treasury account to another:
+
+1. [autocrat_v0](https://solscan.io/account/metaRK9dUBnrAdZN6uUDKvxBVKW5pyCbPVmLtUZwtBp)
+2. [openbook_twap](https://solscan.io/account/twAP5sArq2vDS1mZCT7f4qRLwzTfHvf5Ay5R5Q5df1m)
+3. [conditional_vault](https://solscan.io/account/vAuLTQjV5AZx5f3UgE75wcnkxnQowWxThn1hGjfCVwP)
+4. [migrator](https://solscan.io/account/MigRDW6uxyNMDBD8fX2njCRyJC4YZk2Rx9pDUZiAESt)
+
+Each program has been deployed to devnet and mainnet, their IDLs have been deployed, and they've been verified by the OtterSec API against the programs in the two repos; [futarchy](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/futarchy) contains autocrat_v0, conditional_vault and migrator, and a separate repo contains [openbook_twap](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/openbook-twap). The Treasury account is the DAO's signer and has been set as the program upgrade authority on all programs.
+
+### Addtional details for verification
+- Old DAO
+  - Autocrat Program: [metaX99LHn3A7Gr7VAcCfXhpfocvpMpqQ3eyp3PGUUq](https://solscan.io/account/metaX99LHn3A7Gr7VAcCfXhpfocvpMpqQ3eyp3PGUUq)
+  - DAO Account: [7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy](https://solscan.io/account/7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy)
+  - Treasury: [ADCCEAbH8eixGj5t73vb4sKecSKo7ndgDSuWGvER4Loy](https://solscan.io/account/ADCCEAbH8eixGj5t73vb4sKecSKo7ndgDSuWGvER4Loy) - signer
+
+- New DAO
+  - Autocrat Program: [metaRK9dUBnrAdZN6uUDKvxBVKW5pyCbPVmLtUZwtBp](https://solscan.io/account/metaRK9dUBnrAdZN6uUDKvxBVKW5pyCbPVmLtUZwtBp)
+  - DAO Account: [14YsfUtP6aZ5UHfwfbqe9MYEW4VaDwTHs9NZroAfV6Pi](https://solscan.io/account/14YsfUtP6aZ5UHfwfbqe9MYEW4VaDwTHs9NZroAfV6Pi)
+  - Treasury: [BC1jThSN7Cgy5LfBZdCKCfMnhKcq155gMjhd9HPWzsCN](https://solscan.io/account/BC1jThSN7Cgy5LfBZdCKCfMnhKcq155gMjhd9HPWzsCN) - signer
+
+### Detailed Changelog and PR links
+#### Autocrat
+- Mostly minor config changes ([Pull Request #69](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/futarchy/pull/69)):
+  - Set default pass threshold to 3%
+  - Set max observation change per update lots to $5 and make it a configurable option
+  - Set default expected value to $100
+  - Ensure that the open markets expire a minimum of 10 days from the creation of the proposal to allow for rent retrieval from openbook markets
+  - Reduce the openbook base lot size so that people can trade in lots of 0.1 META
+#### Conditional Vault
+- Add metadata to the conditional vault tokens so they show up nicely in wallets during a proposal ([Pull Request #52](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/futarchy/pull/52))
+- Add the ability to merge tokens ([Pull Request #66](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/futarchy/pull/66))
+
+#### Openbook-TWAP
+- Switch to using a dollar-based increment instead of a percentage one:
+  - [commit d08fb13](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/openbook-twap/commit/d08fb13d16c49071e37bd4fd0eff22edfb144237)
+  - [commit a1cb709](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/openbook-twap/commit/a1cb7092374f146b430ab67b38f961f331a77ae1)
+  - [commit fe159d2](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/openbook-twap/commit/fe159d2707ca4648a874d1fe0c411298b55de072)
+  - [Pull Request #16](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/openbook-twap/pull/16)
+- Get rid of the market expiry check, leave it up to autocrat ([Pull Request #20](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/openbook-twap/pull/20))
+- Add instructions to allow pruning and closing of the market ([Pull Request #18](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/openbook-twap/pull/18))
+- Also add permissionless settling of funds ([Pull Request #21](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/openbook-twap/pull/21))
+
+#### Migrator
+- Migrate all four token accounts to the new DAO account ([Pull Request #68](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/futarchy/pull/68))
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `HXohDRKtDcXNKnWysjyjK8S5SvBe76J5o4NdcF4jj963`
+- Proposal number: 15
+- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
+- Proposer: `FutaAyNb3x9HUn1EQNueZJhfy6KCNtAwztvBctoK6JnX`
+- Autocrat version: 0.1
+- Completed: 2024-04-03
+- Ended: 2024-04-03

inbox/archive/2024-05-27-futardio-proposal-approve-performance-based-compensation-package-for-proph3t-a.md

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Approve Performance-Based Compensation Package for Proph3t and Nallok?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/BgHv9GutbnsXZLZQHqPL8BbGWwtcaRDWx82aeRMNmJbG"
+date: 2024-05-27
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Approve Performance-Based Compensation Package for Proph3t and Nallok?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-05-27
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/BgHv9GutbnsXZLZQHqPL8BbGWwtcaRDWx82aeRMNmJbG
+- Description: Align the incentives of key insiders, Proph3t and Nallok, with the long-term success and growth of MetaDAO.
+- Categories: {'category': 'Operations'}
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal seeks to align the financial incentives of key insiders Proph3t and Nallok with MetaDAO's long-term success by providing a performance-based compensation package consisting of a percentage of token supply linked to market cap increases and a fixed annual salary.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+Key insiders are incentivized to commit to MetaDAO's growth, potentially enhancing the project's viability and success.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+If successful, the proposed compensation structure could motivate Proph3t and Nallok to maximize their efforts, leading to substantial increases in MetaDAO's market cap.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+The proposal may reinforce a reliance on specific individuals, potentially undermining the decentralized ethos of MetaDAO and exposing it to risks if these insiders leave or fail to deliver.
+
+## Content
+
+#### Type
+
+Operations Direct Action
+
+#### Author(s)
+
+Proph3t, Nallok
+
+#### Objective
+
+Align the incentives of key insiders, Proph3t and Nallok, with the long-term success and growth of MetaDAO.
+
+## Overview
+
+We propose that MetaDAO adopt a [convex payout system](https://docs.google.com/document/d/16W7o-kEVbRPIm3i2zpEVQar6z_vlt0qgiHEdYV1TAPU/edit#heading=h.rlnpkfo7evkj).
+Specifically, Proph3t and Nallok would receive 2% of the token supply for every \$1 billion increase in META's market capitalization, up to a maximum of 10% at a \$5 billion market cap. Additionally, we propose a salary of \$90,000 per year for each.
+
+## Details
+
+- **Fixed Token Allocation**: 10% of supply equals **1,975 META per person**. This number remains fixed regardless of further META dilution.
+- **Linear Unlocks**: For example, a \$100M market cap would release 0.2% of the supply, or 39.5 META (~\$200k at a \$100M market cap), to each person.
+- **Unlock Criteria**: Decided at a later date, potentially using a simple moving average (SMA) over a month or an option-based system.
+- **Start Date**: April 2024 for the purposes of vesting & retroactive salary.
+- **Vesting Period**: No tokens unlock before April 2028, no matter what milestones are hit. This signals long-term commitment to building the business.
+- **Illiquid Vest**: The DAO can claw back all tokens until December 2024 (8 months from start). Thereafter, tokens vest into a smart contract / multisig that can't be accessed by Proph3t or Nallok.
+- **Market Cap Definition**: \$1B market cap is defined as a price of \$42,198 per META. This allows for 20% dilution post-proposal. Payouts are based on the value per META, not total market capitalization.
+
+## Q&A
+
+### Why do we need founder incentives at all? I thought MetaDAO was supposed to be decentralized?![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/B1wgI0ZV0.png)
+Whether we like it or not, MetaDAO is not fully decentralized today. If Nallok and I walk away, its probability of success drops by at least 50%. This proposal creates financial incentives to help us build MetaDAO into a truly decentralized entity.This proposal does not grant us decision-making authority. Ultimate power remains with the market. We can be replaced at any time and must follow the market's direction to keep our roles.
+
+### What exactly would this proposal execute on the blockchain?
+Nothing directly. It involves a call to the [Solana memo program](https://spl.solana.com/memo).
+The purpose is to gauge market receptiveness to this structure. A future proposal would handle the transfer of the required META, possibly from a [BDF3M](https://hackmd.io/@metaproph3t/SJfHhnkJC) multisig.
+
+### What would be our roles?
+
+**Nallok**
+- Firefighter
+- Problem-Solver
+- Operations Manager
+
+**Proph3t**
+- Architect
+- Mechanism Designer
+- Smart Contract Engineer
+
+### What would be our focus areas?
+
+Frankly, we don't know. When we started work on MetaDAO, [Vota](https://vota.fi/) looked like the most viable business for bootstrapping MetaDAO's legitimacy.
+Now it looks like [offering futarchy to other DAOs](https://futarchy.metadao.fi/browse).
+MetaDAO LLC, the Marshall Islands DAO LLC controlled by MetaDAO, states our business purpose as "Solana-based products and services."
+We expect this to hold true for several years.
+
+## Appendix
+- How we picked 2% per \$1B To be successful, an incentive system needs to do two things: retain contributors and get them to exert maximum effort.So to be effective, the system must offer more utility than alternative opportunities and make exerting effort more beneficial than not.
+
+### Methodology
+
+We estimated our reservation wages (potential earnings elsewhere) and verified that the utility of those wages is less than our expected payout from MetaDAO. [This video](https://youtu.be/mM3SKjVpE7U?si=0fMazWyc0Tcab0TZ) explains the process.
+
+### Utility Calculation
+
+We used the square root of the payout in millions to define our utility function. For example:
+- \$100,000 payout gives a utility of 0.3162 (sqrt of 0.1).
+- \$1,000,000 payout gives a utility of 1 (sqrt of 1).
+- \$10,000,000 payout gives a utility of 3.162 (sqrt of 10).
+
+### Assumptions
+
+- **Earnings Elsewhere**: Estimated at \$250,000 per year.
+- **Timeline**: 6 years to achieve MetaDAO success.
+- **Failure Payout Utility**: 0.5 (including \$90k/year salary and lessons learned).
+- **Very low probability of success w/o maximum effort**: we both believe that MetaDAO will simply not come to be unless both of us pour our soul into it. This gives \$1.5M in foregone income, with a utility of 1.2 (sqrt of 1.5).
+
+### Expected Payout Calculation
+To estimate the utility of exerting maximum effort, we used the expected utility of success and failure, multiplied by their respective probabilities. Perceived probabilities are key, as they influence the incentivized person's decision-making.
+
+#### Nallok's Estimate
+- **His Estimated Probability of Success**: 20%.
+- **Effort Cost Utility**: 3 (equivalent to \$10M).
+
+Calculation:
+- $ 1.2 < 0.2 * (\sqrt{y} - 3) + 0.8 * (0.5 - 3) $
+- $ 1.2 < 0.2 * (\sqrt{y} - 3) - 2 $
+- $ 3.2 < 0.2 * (\sqrt{y} - 3) $
+- $ 16 < \sqrt{y} - 3 $
+- $ 19 < \sqrt{y} $
+- $ 361 < y $
+
+So Nallok needs a success payout of at least \$361M for it to be rational for him to stay and exert maximum effort.
+
+#### Proph3ts's Estimate
+- **His Estimated Probability of Success**: 10%.
+- **Effort Cost Utility**: 1.7 (equivalent to \$3M).
+
+Calculation:
+- $ 1.2 < 0.1 * (\sqrt{y} - 1.7) + 0.8 * (0.5 - 1.7) $
+- $ 1.2 < 0.1 * (\sqrt{y} - 1.7) + 0.8 * -1.2 $
+- $ 1.2 < 0.1 * (\sqrt{y} - 1.7) - 1 $
+- $ 2.2 < 0.1 * (\sqrt{y} - 1.7) $
+- $ 22 < \sqrt{y} - 1.7 $
+- $ 23.7 < \sqrt{y} $
+- $ 562 < y $ 
+
+So Proph3t needs a success payout of at least \$562M for it to be rational for him to stay and exert maximum effort.
+
+### 10%
+We believe MetaDAO can reach at least a \$5B market cap if executed correctly. Therefore, we decided on a 10% token allocation each, which would provide a ~\$500M payout in case of success. Future issuances may dilute this, but we expect the diluted payout to be within the same order of magnitude.
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `BgHv9GutbnsXZLZQHqPL8BbGWwtcaRDWx82aeRMNmJbG`
+- Proposal number: 2
+- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
+- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-05-31
+- Ended: 2024-05-31

inbox/archive/2024-05-27-futardio-proposal-proposal-1.md

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Proposal #1"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/iPzWdGBZiHMT5YhR2m4WtTNbFW3KgExH2dRAsgWydPf"
+date: 2024-05-27
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: Unknown
+- Proposal: Proposal #1
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-05-27
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/iPzWdGBZiHMT5YhR2m4WtTNbFW3KgExH2dRAsgWydPf
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `iPzWdGBZiHMT5YhR2m4WtTNbFW3KgExH2dRAsgWydPf`
+- Proposal number: 1
+- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
+- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-06-27
+- Ended: 2024-05-31

inbox/archive/2024-05-30-futardio-proposal-drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs.md

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Drift Futarchy Proposal - Welcome the Futarchs"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/9jAnAupCdPQCFvuAMr5ZkmxDdEKqsneurgvUnx7Az9zS"
+date: 2024-05-30
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: Drift
+- Proposal: Drift Futarchy Proposal - Welcome the Futarchs
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-05-30
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/9jAnAupCdPQCFvuAMr5ZkmxDdEKqsneurgvUnx7Az9zS
+- Description: This proposal is meant to signal rewards for strong forecasters in futarchic markets.
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+This proposal requests **50,000 DRIFT** to incentivize participation in Drift Futarchy by rewarding early participants and encouraging the formulation of future proposals.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+MetaDAO participants will receive retroactive rewards based on their engagement, promoting active involvement in the community.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+The initiative could enhance proposal quality and community engagement within Drift Futarchy, fostering a more dynamic ecosystem.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+There is a risk of misallocation of funds or insufficient participation in future proposals, potentially undermining the intended incentives and program effectiveness.
+
+## Content
+
+## Overview
+
+This proposal requests **50,000 DRIFT** to carry out an early Drift Futarchy incentive program (max of 10 proposals / 3 months). 
+
+This proposal is meant to signal rewards for strong forecasters in futarchic markets by:
+- Rewarding early and active participants of MetaDAO with tokens to participate in Drift Futarchy (via the ["endowment effect"](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Endowment_effect))
+- Incentivizing future well-formulated proposals and activity for Drift Futarchy
+
+This proposal's outline is fulfilled over months by the executor group, acting as a 2/3 multisig, defined below.
+
+
+## Implementation 
+
+### Retroactive Reward:
+
+Using the following dune dashboard data as reference: https://dune.com/metadaohogs/themetadao (with May 19th, 2024 UTC as a cutoff date)
+- [METADAO activity](https://gist.github.com/0xbigz/3ddbe2a21e721326d151ac957f96da20)
+- [META token holdings](https://gist.github.com/0xbigz/f461ed8accc6f86181d3e9a2c164f810)
+
+Among those who interacted with metadao's conditional vaults on at least 5 occassions over more period of 30 days, will recieve a retroactive reward as follows:
+
+- < 1 META, 100 DRIFT
+- \>= 1 META, 200 DRIFT
+- \>= 10 META, 400 DRIFT
+
+This [code](https://gist.github.com/0xbigz/a67d75f138c1c656353ab034936108fe) produces the following list of 32 MetaDAO participants who are qualified:
+https://gist.github.com/0xbigz/056d3f7780532ffa5662410bc49f7215
+
+**(9,600 DRIFT)**
+
+Additionally, all MetaDAO AMM swapers interacters https://dune.com/queries/3782545 who aren't included above should split remaining. 
+
+crude snapshot: https://gist.github.com/0xbigz/adb2020af9ef0420b9026514bcb82eab
+
+**(2,400 DRIFT)**
+
+--- 
+
+### Future Incentive:
+*The following applies to the lengthlier of next 10 proposals or 3 month time frame*
+
+Additionally, excluding this instance, passing proposal that are honored by security council can earn up to 5000 DRIFT for the proposer(s), each claimable after 3 months after.
+(*if successful proposals exceed two, executor group can decide top N proposals to split*)
+**(10,000 DRIFT)**
+
+
+For accounts sufficiently active during the period, a pool of 20,000 DRIFT will be split and claimable after 3 months. To filter for non organic activity, the exact criteria for this shall be finalized by the execution group. 
+**(25,000 DRIFT)**
+
+---
+
+### Execution Group:
+
+A 2/3 multisig to escrow and distribute funds based on outline. After successful completion of this proposal, they can distribute their allocation as they see fit. 
+
+In the event of uncertainty or excess budget, funds shall be returned to originating wallet or Drift Futarchy DAO treasury.
+**(3,000 DRIFT)**
+
+- [metaprophet](https://x.com/metaproph3t)
+- [Sumatt](https://x.com/quantrarianism)
+- [Lmvdzande](https://x.com/Lmvdzande)
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `9jAnAupCdPQCFvuAMr5ZkmxDdEKqsneurgvUnx7Az9zS`
+- Proposal number: 1
+- DAO account: `5vVCYQHPd8o3pGejYWzKZtnUSdLjXzDZcjZQxiFumXXx`
+- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-06-02
+- Ended: 2024-06-02

inbox/archive/2024-05-30-futardio-proposal-proposal-1.md

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Proposal #1"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/8AEsxyN8jhth5WQZHjU9kS3JcRHaUmpck7qZgpv2v4wM"
+date: 2024-05-30
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: null-result
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2024-06-27
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "Source contains only metadata about a failed futarchy proposal with no proposal content, rationale, market data, or outcome analysis. No extractable claims or enrichments. The fact that a proposal failed is a data point, not an arguable claim. Without knowing what the proposal was, why it failed, trading volumes, market dynamics, or any interpretive context, there is nothing to extract beyond archival facts. This is raw event data suitable only for the source archive."
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: Unknown
+- Proposal: Proposal #1
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-05-30
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/8AEsxyN8jhth5WQZHjU9kS3JcRHaUmpck7qZgpv2v4wM
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `8AEsxyN8jhth5WQZHjU9kS3JcRHaUmpck7qZgpv2v4wM`
+- Proposal number: 1
+- DAO account: `EWFaZPjxw1Khw6iq4EQ11bqWpxfMYnusWx2gL4XxyNWG`
+- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-06-27
+- Ended: 2024-06-02
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- Futardio Proposal #1 (account 8AEsxyN8jhth5WQZHjU9kS3JcRHaUmpck7qZgpv2v4wM) failed
+- Proposal created 2024-05-30, ended 2024-06-02, completed 2024-06-27
+- DAO account: EWFaZPjxw1Khw6iq4EQ11bqWpxfMYnusWx2gL4XxyNWG
+- Proposer: HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
+- Autocrat version: 0.3

inbox/archive/2024-06-05-futardio-proposal-fund-futuredaos-token-migrator.md

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Fund FutureDAO's Token Migrator"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/BMZbX7z2zgLuq266yskeHF5BFZoaX9j3tvsZfVQ7RUY6"
+date: 2024-06-05
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: FutureDAO
+- Proposal: Fund FutureDAO's Token Migrator
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-06-05
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/BMZbX7z2zgLuq266yskeHF5BFZoaX9j3tvsZfVQ7RUY6
+- Description: Approve the development and launch of FutureDAO's Token Migrator, facilitating the seamless transition of one token into another. We empower communities to innovate, fundraise and reclaim control.
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+Approve the development of FutureDAO's Token Migrator, enabling seamless token transitions for communities abandoned by developers while generating revenue through fees based on market cap.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+This project provides a structured solution for communities to regain control and value in their token projects, enhancing community engagement.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+If successful, the Token Migrator could generate significant revenue for FutureDAO and its NFT holders, with projected earnings of $270,000 from eight migrations in the first year.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+The project may face challenges related to user adoption and market volatility, which could impact the success rate of token migrations and revenue generation.
+
+## Content
+
+# TL;DR
+
+Approve the development and launch of FutureDAO's Token Migrator, facilitating the seamless transition of one token into another. We empower communities to innovate, fundraise and reclaim control.
+
+## Overview
+
+FutureDAO is pioneering the first decentralized on-chain token migration tool. This tool is designed to facilitate seamless transitions from one token to another, catering to communities that have been abandoned by their developers, facing challenges such as poor project management, or with the desire to launch a new token. Born from our own experience with a takeover of $MERTD after the project team “rugged”, this tool will empower communities to band together and take control over their future.
+
+- **Target Customer:** Communities of web3 projects abandoned by developers, poorly managed, or seeking to launch new tokens.
+- **Problem Solved:** Provides a structured, on-chain protocol to facilitate community token migrations.
+- **Monetization:** Fees are charged based on the market cap of the projects migrating.
+- **Key Metrics:** Number of successful migrations, volume of tokens transitioned, community engagement levels, and $FUTURE token metrics (e.g., staking rates, price).
+
+This project directly relates to FutureDAO’s business by:
+
+- **Value Creation:** Enhancing the value of the FutureDAO ecosystem and the NFT DAO by increasing its utility and market demand.
+- **Total Budget:** $12,000 USDC
+
+## Problem
+
+The need for a structured, secure, and transparent approach to token migrations is evident in the challenges faced by many web3 projects today, including:
+
+- **Rugged Projects:** Preserve community and restore value in projects affected by rug pulls.
+- **Dead Projects:** Revitalizing projects that have ceased operations, giving them a second life.
+- **Metadata Changes:** Enhancing transparency, trust, and providence by optimizing metadata for better engagement and discoverability. 
+- **Fundraising:** Securing financial support to sustain and expand promising projects
+- **Token Extentions:** Allowing projects to re-launch in Solana's newest standard.
+- **Hostile Takeovers:** Enabling projects to acquire other projects and empowering communities to assert control over failed project teams.
+
+Our service addresses these issues, providing a lifeline to communities seeking to reclaim, transform, or enhance their projects.
+
+## Design
+
+Future’s Token Migrator will be developed as a dApp on Solana for optimal performance, security, and scalability. It will form a core part of Future’s Protocol.
+
+- **Product Description:** The tool facilitates seamless transitions from one token to another, allowing communities to regain control and ensure proper governance. "Future Champions" will identify, engage, and assist potential clients, supporting them throughout the process. These champions are incentivized through commissions in newly minted tokens.
+
+## Business
+
+### Migration Process
+
+1. **Intake:**
+   - Community onboarded.
+2. **Launch Parameters Set:**
+
+   a. Migration date & duration chosen.
+   
+   b. Pre-sale raise amount & price ($SOL) selected.
+   
+   c. Treasury allocation selected.
+
+   > **Max dilution rates:**
+   > - <$1m FDMC: 15% (7.5% presale, 5.5% Treasury 2% DAO Fee)
+   > - <$5m FDMC: 12% (6% presale, 4.5% Treasury 1.5% DAO Fee)
+   > - <$20m FDMC: 10% (5% presale, 4% Treasury 1% DAO Fee)
+   > **Maximum inflation is based on current token market caps to keep fees and token dilution as fair as possible.*
+3. **Token Migration Begins:**
+
+   a. Token added to Future Protocol Migrator Front-end
+
+   b. Pre-sale goes live.
+
+   c. \$oldTOKEN can now be swapped for \$newTOKEN
+
+      i. Tokens are locked until migration is completed successfully.
+
+4. **Token Migration Ends:**
+
+   a. **Successful ( >60% Presale Raised ):**
+     - \$oldTOKEN sold reclaim locked L.P.
+     - \$newTOKEN plus \$SOL raised or reclaimed placed in L.P.
+     - \$newTOKENs claimable by swap & pre-sale participants.
+     - Unclaimed \$newTOKENs sent to community multi-sig.
+       - *Not FutureDao's multi-sig*
+     - \$oldTOKEN holders who do not migrate are airdropped 50%.
+     
+   b. **Unsuccessful ( <60% Presale Raised ):**
+   
+      1. Presale \$SOL is returned to all participants.
+
+      2. \$newTOKEN must be swapped back into the \$oldTOKEN frozen in the contract.
+
+      3. All \$newTOKEN is burnt.
+
+## Monetization
+
+- **Fee Structure:** FutureDAO does not benefit monetarily from these token migrations. All fees are directed to the Champions NFT holders. To be eligible for rewards, the NFTs must be staked (SPL-404) within the Future Protocol NFT Portal.
+- As mentioned in Launch Parameters, fees are charged based on the market cap of the projects migrating:
+  - For projects with FDMC <\$1M = 2%
+  - For projects with FDMC <\$5M = 1.5%
+  - For projects with FDMC <\$20M = 1%
+> *EXAMPLE: The fees are taken as inflation on the \$newTOKEN mint and are delivered to the Champions NFT DAO over a 30 day period. For example, if \$MERTD had 1 billion tokens in circulation with an FDMC of \$2M, the new \$FUTURE supply would be 1.12 billion tokens, with allocations as follows:*
+> - *1 billion tokens reserved for \$MERTD holders at 1:1*
+> - *60 million tokens for the presale*
+> - *45 million tokens for the treasury*
+> - *15 million tokens delivered to the Champions NFT DAO*
+
+## Financial Projections
+
+Based on the projected revenue for FutureDAO’s Token Migrator, we can provide a hypothetical example of its financial potential in the first year. According to market analysis, there have been at least 27 notable meme coin presales on Solana in the past 12 months, raising significant funds despite high abandonment (rugging) rates ([Coin Edition](https://coinedition.com/12-solana-presale-meme-coins-abandoned-in-a-month-crypto-sleuth/)) ([Coinpedia Fintech News](https://coinpedia.org/press-release/solana-meme-coin-presale-trend-continues-as-slothana-reaches-1m/)). This suggests a strong demand for structured and secure migration solutions.
+
+For example, if Future’s Takeover Tool is utilized for 8 project de-ruggings in its first year, it could generate $270,000 for Future community members that hold Future Champion’s NFTs.
+
+This revenue would be derived from the 8 projects as follows:
+- 3 projects under \$1M FDMC: Each charged a 2% fee, generating a total of $60,000 for Future community member NFT holders.
+- 4 projects under \$5M FDMC: Each charged a 1.5% fee, generating a total of $120,000 for Future community member NFT holders.
+- 1 project under \$20M FDMC: Charged a 1% fee, generating $50,000 for Future community member NFT holders.
+
+**Budget:** \$12,000 USDC
+
+- \$6,000 USDC tool development
+- \$6,000 USDC smart contract and other security audits
+
+## About Future DAO
+
+FutureDAO is a market-governed decentralized organization powered by MetaDAO's futarchy infrastructure.  
+
+FutureDAO is building the Future Protocol to help communities safeguard and amplify value by providing them with on-chain token migration tools to take control of their futures. 
+
+For more detailed information, you can visit the [Future DAO Gitbook](https://futurespl.gitbook.io/future).
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `BMZbX7z2zgLuq266yskeHF5BFZoaX9j3tvsZfVQ7RUY6`
+- Proposal number: 1
+- DAO account: `ofvb3CPvEyRfD5az8PAqW6ATpPqVBeiB5zBnpPR5cgm`
+- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-06-08
+- Ended: 2024-06-08

inbox/archive/2024-06-08-futardio-proposal-reward-the-university-of-waterloo-blockchain-club-with-1-mil.md

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/7KkoRGyvzhvzKjxuPHjyxg77a52MeP6axyx7aywpGbdc"
+date: 2024-06-08
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: IslandDAO
+- Proposal: Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-06-08
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/7KkoRGyvzhvzKjxuPHjyxg77a52MeP6axyx7aywpGbdc
+- Description: This proposal aims to allocate 1 million $DEAN tokens to the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club.
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal seeks to allocate 1 million $DEAN tokens to the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club to enhance collaboration, attract top talent, and increase participation in DAO governance.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+This initiative is expected to engage 200 skilled students, enriching the DAO's talent pool and governance.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+The proposal anticipates a 5% increase in the DAO's fully diluted valuation, equating to an additional $5,783, with a projected benefit of $4.45 for every dollar spent.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+If the expected increase in FDV is not achieved, the investment in $DEAN tokens may not yield the anticipated returns, potentially impacting the DAO's financial health.
+
+## Content
+
+## Introduction
+This proposal aims to allocate 1 million $DEAN tokens to the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club. The goal is to foster deeper collaboration, attract and incentivize top talent to contribute to our ecosystem and strengthen the overall partnership. This initiative is expected to bring significant benefits, including enhanced collaboration opportunities, access to a skilled talent pool, and increased participation in the DL DAO governance. The tokens will be held in a multi-signature wallet to ensure secure and responsible management.
+
+## Goal
+
+1. Foster Deeper Collaboration: Strengthening the relationship between The Dean's List DAO and the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club to leverage mutual strengths.
+2. Attract & Incentivize Top Talent: Encouraging top-tier students to contribute to our ecosystem, bringing in fresh perspectives and innovative solutions.
+
+## Benefits
+
+1. Strengthened Partnership & Potential Collaboration Opportunities: By closely collaborating with a leading blockchain club, we can explore new avenues for joint projects, research, and development.
+2. Access to a Skilled Talent Pool: The University of Waterloo Blockchain Club consists of 200 students, many of whom are skilled in blockchain technology and web3 development.
+3. Encourage Participation in the DL DAO Governance: Increased engagement from club members will enhance the governance of our DAO, bringing diverse viewpoints and expertise.
+
+## Token Allocation and Value
+
+Token Allocation: 1 million `$DEAN` tokens
+
+Equivalent Value: 1 million `$DEAN` is currently equivalent to 1300 `$USDC`.
+
+Fully Diluted Valuation of The Dean's List DAO: `$115,655`
+
+## Proposal Conditions
+For this proposal to pass, the partnership should result in a 5% increase in the TWAP (Time Weighted Average Price) of The Dean's List DAO's FDV. The trading period for this proposal will be 5 days.
+
+## Estimating FDV Increase per Student
+### Current Situation
+
+Current FDV: `$115,655`
+
+Required Increase (5%): `$5,783 (5% of $115,655)`
+
+### Potential Impact
+With 200 student members actively contributing to the DAO, each student can significantly impact our FDV. The estimation model assumes that these students' increased participation, contribution, and promotion can drive up the FDV by more than the minimum required amount. Here is a simple estimation model:
+
+Total Required Increase: `$5,783`
+
+Number of Students: 200
+
+Average Increase per Student: `$5,783 / 200 = $28.915`
+
+This model suggests that each student needs to contribute to activities that increase the FDV by approximately $28.915. Given the diverse activities they can engage in (such as dApp reviews, testing, promoting on social media, and developing innovative solutions), this target is achievable and likely conservative.
+
+### Benefit per Dollar Spent
+Total Investment: 1 million `$DEAN` tokens, equivalent to 1300 `$USDC`
+
+Required FDV Increase: $5,783
+
+To calculate the benefit per dollar spent:
+
+Benefit per Dollar: `$5,783 / $1300 ≈ $4.45`
+
+This indicates that for every dollar spent, we can potentially achieve an increase of approximately $4.45 in the FDV of The Dean's List DAO.
+
+## Justification for Spending 1 Million `$DEAN`
+
+Spending 1 million `$DEAN` tokens is a strategic investment in the future growth and sustainability of The Dean's List DAO. The University of Waterloo Blockchain Club is a reputable organization with a track record of fostering skilled blockchain professionals. By rewarding their members, we are ensuring a steady influx of knowledgeable and motivated individuals into our ecosystem. This collaboration is expected to yield long-term benefits, far exceeding the initial expenditure in terms of increased engagement, enhanced governance, and accelerated development of our projects.
+
+# Conclusion
+This proposal to allocate 1 million `$DEAN` tokens to the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club is a strategic move to strengthen our ecosystem by leveraging top talent and fostering deeper collaboration. The estimated FDV increase model shows that the involvement of these students can lead to a substantial rise in our market cap, ensuring that the partnership is mutually beneficial. With an estimated benefit of approximately $4.45 for every dollar spent, this initiative promises significant returns. We urge all DAO members to trade in favor of this proposal to unlock these potential benefits and drive the future growth of The Dean's List DAO.
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `7KkoRGyvzhvzKjxuPHjyxg77a52MeP6axyx7aywpGbdc`
+- Proposal number: 1
+- DAO account: `9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ`
+- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-06-11
+- Ended: 2024-06-11

inbox/archive/2024-06-14-futardio-proposal-fund-the-rug-bounty-program.md

@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Fund the Rug Bounty Program"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/4ztwWkz9TD5Ni9Ze6XEEj6qrPBhzdTQMfpXzZ6A8bGzt"
+date: 2024-06-14
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: FutureDAO
+- Proposal: Fund the Rug Bounty Program
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-06-14
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/4ztwWkz9TD5Ni9Ze6XEEj6qrPBhzdTQMfpXzZ6A8bGzt
+- Description: Fund FutureDAO’s Rug Bounty Program (RugBounty.xyz), a novel product designed to protect and empower communities affected by rug pulls. The Rug Bounty Program will support our existing Token Migration tool to provide a structured solution for recovering value from failed projects.
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal aims to launch the Rug Bounty Program to assist crypto communities affected by rug pulls in recovering their investments, enhancing the use of the Token Migration tool and increasing engagement with the $FUTURE token.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+The program provides a structured mechanism for community members to recover lost investments and fosters trust in the crypto ecosystem.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+Successful implementation could lead to increased adoption of FutureDAO’s tools, driving higher transaction volumes and strengthening the overall DeFi community.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+Potential risks include challenges in community engagement and the effectiveness of the program in achieving successful migrations, which may hinder its overall impact.
+
+## Content
+
+## TLDR
+
+Fund FutureDAO’s Rug Bounty Program (RugBounty.xyz), a novel product designed to protect and empower communities affected by rug pulls. The Rug Bounty Program will support our existing Token Migration tool to provide a structured solution for recovering value from failed projects.
+
+---
+
+### Overview
+
+Those affected by a rug pull, are often left to fend for themselves. Rug Bounties offer individuals (and their communities) a mechanism to recover and restore investments and promotes stronger security and trust in the crypto ecosystem.
+
+- **Target Customer:** Crypto communities affected by rug pulls, community takeover leaders, and crypto enthusiasts who want to contribute to community recovery efforts.
+    
+- **Problem Solved:** Rug Bounties offers a mechanism for communities affected by rug pulls to recover and restore their investments, promoting security and trust in the crypto ecosystem.
+    
+- **Monetization:** Indirect revenue from increased $FUTURE token transactions and higher platform engagement, and potential direct earnings through increased token migrations.
+    
+- **Key Metrics:**
+    
+    - Number of successful migrations
+        
+    - Amount of $FUTURE tokens transacted
+        
+    - Community engagement and growth
+        
+    - Number of bounties created and claimed
+        
+- **Value Creation:** Rug Bounties empowers community members to recover from rug pulls, fostering a more resilient and proactive crypto ecosystem. It drives the adoption of Future Protocol’s tools and strengthens trust in DeFi.
+    
+- **Total Budget:**
+    
+    - Rug Bounty Platform: est. $5000 USDC
+        
+- **This project directly relates to FutureDAO’s business** by Enhancing the use and adoption of the Token Migration tool and $FUTURE token, positioning FutureDAO as a leader in safeguarding the interests of the crypto community. 
+    
+
+---
+
+### Problem
+
+Rug pulls leave crypto communities with significant losses and a lack of recourse. A structured, reliable solution is needed to help these communities recover and restore value. There is no reliable resource to help communities affected by rugs; FutureDAO aims to change that.   
+  
+This is another step towards becoming Solana’s Emergency Response Team (S.E.R.T.)
+
+---
+
+### **Design**
+
+**Product Description:** Rug Bounty is a program incentivizing individuals to onboard communities from rugged projects to our Token Migration tool. 
+
+The process includes:
+
+- **Bounty Creation:** FutureDAO or community members can create a bounty with details of the affected project, reward, and required migration.
+    
+- **Community Onboarding:** Pirates work to onboard members through various platforms like Telegram, Discord, and Twitter Spaces.
+    
+- **Collaboration with FutureDAO:** A multi-sig setup is required for the token migrator. Trust is never assumed.
+    
+- **Successful Migration:** Defined as raising over 60% of the presale target in $SOL.
+    
+- **Bounty Claim:** Awarded to the participant(s) who facilitated the successful migration.
+    
+
+**Bonus Features:**
+
+> No partnerships have been officially made, these are hypothetical examples for what is possible.
+
+- **Token Checker:** Enter a contract address to see token holders while filtering out bots.
+    
+- **SolChat Integration:** Notifications for your portfolio and rug alerts.
+    
+- **S.E.R.T.:** Solana Emergency Response Team’s home base.
+ 
+![image](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4089541b-56ba-4746-bb21-67568aa9a556_1286x2932.png)
+
+### **Business**
+
+#### **Implementation Plan:**
+
+- **Platform Development:** Integrate a Rug Bounties page on the Future Protocol website. Develop user-friendly interfaces for creating, managing, and claiming bounties.
+    
+- **Marketing and Outreach:** Launch a marketing campaign, engage with influencers, and highlight successful case studies.
+    
+- **Community Engagement:** Foster a supportive environment through forums and social media, providing resources for bounty claimants.
+    
+- **Partnerships:** Collaborate with DeFi projects, security firms, and audit services to enhance credibility and reach. _Potential partners could include Fluxbeam’s Rugcheck, Birdeye/Dexscreener, GoPlus Security, SolChat, etc._
+    
+
+#### **Expected Impact:**
+
+- **Enhanced Security:** Strengthen trust in DeFi by helping rug-pull victims recover.
+    
+- **Increased Adoption:** Boost usage of the Token Migration tool and $FUTURE token.
+    
+- **Community Empowerment:** Empower community members to take action against rug pulls, fostering resilience.
+    
+
+---
+
+### **Monetization**
+
+#### **Financial Projections**
+
+- **Initial Development Costs: $4,000 USDC**
+    
+    - **Platform Development:** $3,000 USDC
+        
+    - **Website:** $1,000 USDC
+        
+    - **QA:** $1,000
+        
+- **Operational Costs: $1,000+**
+    
+    - API & Hosting: $1,000
+        
+    - $FUTURE bounties: Allocation TBD based on project scope.
+        
+- **Earnings Projections:**
+    
+    - Direct earnings via token migrations.
+        
+        - _For example, helping $IGGY rug victims perform a hostile takeover._
+            
+    - Indirect protocol exposure via rugbounty.xyz users.
+        
+
+---
+
+#### **About FutureDAO:**
+
+FutureDAO is a market-governed decentralized organization powered by MetaDAO's futarchy infrastructure.  
+
+FutureDAO is building the Future Protocol to help communities safeguard and amplify value by providing them with on-chain token migration tools to take control of their futures. 
+
+For more detailed information, you can visit the FutureDAO [Gitbook](https://futurespl.gitbook.io/future).
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `4ztwWkz9TD5Ni9Ze6XEEj6qrPBhzdTQMfpXzZ6A8bGzt`
+- Proposal number: 2
+- DAO account: `ofvb3CPvEyRfD5az8PAqW6ATpPqVBeiB5zBnpPR5cgm`
+- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-06-19
+- Ended: 2024-06-17

inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Dean's List DAO Engagement"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM"
+date: 2024-06-22
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: IslandDAO
+- Proposal: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Dean's List DAO Engagement
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-06-22
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
+- Description: This proposal aims to create a promotional event to increase governance power engagement within the Dean's List DAO (DL DAO) by offering exclusive perks related to the ThailandDAO event.
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal aims to boost engagement within the Dean's List DAO by hosting a promotional event at ThailandDAO, offering exclusive perks for top governance power holders, and providing a payment option in $DEAN tokens at a discount.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+Members of the DL DAO will benefit from enhanced engagement opportunities and exclusive rewards, fostering a stronger community.  
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+The initiative is expected to significantly increase the demand and value of the $DEAN token, potentially raising its Fully Diluted Valuation from $123,263 to over $2,000,000.  
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+There may be financial risks associated with the campaign's costs and the reliance on token price appreciation to fund expenses.
+
+## Content
+
+### Introduction
+
+This proposal aims to create a promotional event to increase governance power engagement within the Dean's List DAO (DL DAO) by offering exclusive perks related to the ThailandDAO event. (25 Sept. - 25 Oct. in Koh Samui Thailand). The initiative will cover airplane fares and accommodation for the top 5 governance power holders. The leaderboard will award invitations to IRL events, potential airdrops from partners, and other perks.
+
+For the duration of the promotional campaign, DL DAO contributors can opt-in to receive payments in $DEAN tokens at a 10% discount. This proposal seeks to increase DL DAO member participation, enhance the overall ecosystem, and drive significant appreciation in the $DEAN token value.
+
+The campaign will commence with a feedback session exclusive to IslandDAO attendees, with rewards in governance power.
+
+![](https://deanslistdao.notion.site/image/https%3A%2F%2Fprod-files-secure.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com%2Fc7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979%2F93b5e592-eac0-4f93-aa9c-dcc0be60e4b3%2FUntitled.png?table=block&id=d0c425ea-4aed-478a-afa9-7a591ba5710f&spaceId=c7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979&width=1220&userId=&cache=v2)
+
+### Vision - MonkeDAO & SuperTeam inspired
+
+Imagine a global network where DL DAO members come together at memorable events around the world. Picture attending exclusive gatherings, dining in renowned restaurants, and embarking on unique cultural experiences. Members of DL DAO will have the opportunity to travel to exciting locations, stay in comfortable villas, and participate in enriching activities. This vision transforms DL DAO into more than a governance platform—it becomes a community where membership unlocks valuable experiences and strengthens connections through real-world interactions. The ThailandDAO event is just the beginning. Future events will be held in various locations, ensuring that DL DAO members can connect and celebrate their achievements in different iconic destinations. The Dean's List DAO is committed to making every member feel valued and included, promoting a culture of engagement and growth that will drive sustained participation.
+
+**Benefits**
+
+1. **Enhanced Member Engagement:** By offering exclusive perks at ThailandDAO, we encourage members to actively participate in DL DAO governance.
+
+2. **Stronger Community:** Hosting exclusive events will foster a stronger, more engaged community within DL DAO.
+
+3. **Sustainable Growth:** Increased engagement and participation will ensure the long-term growth and stability of the DL DAO.
+
+### Detailed Steps for the Campaign
+
+![](https://deanslistdao.notion.site/image/https%3A%2F%2Fprod-files-secure.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com%2Fc7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979%2F677952dd-c2c2-4786-ad0b-e8b85cf92653%2FUntitled.jpeg?table=block&id=09846aaf-b83c-4ce3-8a0f-feba51f827a0&spaceId=c7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979&width=2000&userId=&cache=v2)
+
+Note: Governance Power refers to the number found here: [https://app.realms.today/dao/Dean's%20List%20Network%20State](https://app.realms.today/dao/Dean%27s%20List%20Network%20State)
+
+- Deposit your $DEAN tokens or even lock them for a multiplier to increase your governance power and receive awesome perks.
+
+1. **Announcement and Marketing:** Launch a comprehensive marketing campaign to announce the ThailandDAO promotional event. Utilize social media, newsletters, and existing partnerships with sponsors. Use our reach post-IslandDAOx.
+
+2. **Leaderboard Creation:** Develop a real-time leaderboard on the DL DAO platform showcasing members' governance power rankings.
+
+3. **Exclusive Perks Example:**
+- **Top 5 Members:** Airplane fares and accommodation covered for 12 days at the DL DAO Villa during ThailandDAO.
+- **Top 50 Members:** Invitation to IRL events, parties, airdrops from partners, and other continuous perks.
+
+4. **Governance Power Incentives:** Highlight the benefits of increasing governance power.
+
+5. **Payment Option:** Introduce the option for DL DAO contributors to receive payments in $DEAN tokens at a 10% discount compared to the market price for three months.
+
+6. **Feedback Review Session:** Our promotional campaign will start with a feedback review exclusive to IslandDAO attendees. Guests will be invited to give their feedback and collectively create a feedback report on IslandDAO and their experience in the co-working space. This will resemble the regular feedback reports the DL DAO produces for its clients. Contributors to the IslandDAO feedback report will be paid in $DEAN tokens.
+
+*Notes:*
+
+*Fixed Cap on Travel Expense: To ensure budget control, each winner will have a predetermined limit on reimbursable travel expenses. TBA*
+
+*Accommodations for 1 Person per Winner: Each winner will receive accommodation provisions, limited to one individual to manage costs and logistics efficiently.*
+
+*Expense Reimbursement with Proof of Ticket Purchase: Winners must submit valid proof of ticket purchase to receive reimbursement for their travel expenses.*
+
+*Accommodation Details: Dean's List will arrange accommodation, likely a communal villa close to the event venue, ensuring convenience and cost-effectiveness.*
+
+*Prize Transferability: Winners can pass their prizes to anyone on the leaderboard if they choose not to claim them, allowing flexibility.*
+
+*Delegation and Governance Power: Delegation is permitted, transferring governance power to the delegatee, not the original holder, to maintain effective representation.*
+
+*Campaigning: Campaigning for prizes or positions is allowed, encouraging active participation and engagement within the community.*
+
+### Financial Projections
+
+**Estimated Costs:**
+
+- Airplane Fares and Accommodation for Top 5 Members: $10,000
+
+- IRL Events and Parties for Top 50 Members: $5,000
+
+- Total Estimated Cost: $15,000
+
+**Token Allocation:** Allocate 5-7 million $DEAN tokens for the initiative, although actual usage is expected to be significantly lower.
+
+**Main Scenario:** Given the low circulating supply of the $DEAN token and the mechanics of locking tokens for multiple years to increase governance power and climb the leaderboard ranks, we project a significant increase in the Fully Diluted Valuation (FDV) of DL DAO.
+
+**Current FDV:** $123,263
+
+**Target FDV:** Over $2,000,000
+
+**FDV Growth Analysis:**
+
+1. **Circulating Supply Reduction:** As members lock their $DEAN tokens to increase governance power and climb the leaderboard ranks, the circulating supply of the token will decrease significantly. This reduction in supply will create upward pressure on the token price.
+
+2. **Demand Increase:** The exclusive perks offered, such as airplane tickets, accommodation at the DL DAO Villa, and invitations to IRL events, will incentivize members to increase their governance power, further driving demand for $DEAN tokens.
+
+3. **Price Appreciation:** The combination of reduced supply and increased demand is expected to cause a substantial appreciation in the price of the $DEAN token. For instance, if the initial token price is $0.01 and it appreciates 15 times, the price will reach $0.15.
+
+4. **FDV Calculation:** With a significant increase in token price, the FDV will grow proportionally. Assuming the total token supply remains constant, an increase from $0.01 to $0.15 per token will drive the FDV from $123,263 to over $2,000,000.
+
+### Futarchy Proposal
+
+**Proposal Conditions**
+
+For this proposal to pass, it must result in a 3% increase in the Time Weighted Average Price (TWAP) of The Dean's List DAO's Fully Diluted Valuation (FDV). The trading period for this proposal will be 3 days.
+
+**Estimating FDV Increase per Participant**
+
+- Current FDV: $123,263
+
+- Required Increase (3%): $3,698
+
+- Estimated Number of Participants: 50 (top governance power members)
+
+- Average Increase per Participant: $3,698 / 50 = $73.95
+
+Given the potential activities and promotions participants can engage in, this target is achievable. The required 3% increase in FDV is small compared to the projected FDV increase from the promotional event, which aims for an FDV of over $2,000,000.
+
+**Impact on Token Value**
+
+Given the limited liquidity and the prompt for members to lock tokens, the token's value is expected to appreciate significantly. The reduced circulating supply, coupled with increased demand, is projected to cause a more than 15-fold increase in token price over the campaign period. This significant appreciation will attract further interest and investment, creating a positive feedback loop that enhances the overall value of the DL DAO ecosystem.
+
+#### Budget and Expenses
+
+- The estimated cost of $15,000 for the campaign will be covered by liquidating a fraction of $DEAN tokens as their price appreciates.
+
+- As the token value increases, the DL DAO treasury will be able to finance its initiatives without compromising its financial stability.
+
+#### Conclusion
+
+This proposal to create a promotional event at ThailandDAO, incentivizing governance participation, is a strategic move to boost the Dean's List DAO ecosystem. By leveraging the popularity of ThailandDAO and offering significant perks to top governance power holders, we anticipate substantial engagement and value increase, benefiting the entire ecosystem and ensuring sustainable growth for the DL DAO community.
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM`
+- Proposal number: 2
+- DAO account: `9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ`
+- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-06-25
+- Ended: 2024-06-25

inbox/archive/2024-06-26-futardio-proposal-approve-metadao-fundraise-2.md

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Approve MetaDAO Fundraise #2?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/9BMRY1HBe61MJoKEd9AAW5iNQyws2vGK6vuL49oR3AzX"
+date: 2024-06-26
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Approve MetaDAO Fundraise #2?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-06-26
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/9BMRY1HBe61MJoKEd9AAW5iNQyws2vGK6vuL49oR3AzX
+- Description: Our goal is to hire a small team. Between us ($90k/yr each), three engineers ($190k/yr each), audits ($300k), office space ($80k/yr), a growth person ($150k/yr), and other administrative expenses ($100k/yr), we’re looking at a $1.38M burn rate.
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+MetaDAO aims to raise $1.5M through the sale of up to 4,000 META tokens to fund growth initiatives, including hiring a team and developing decision markets for Solana DAOs.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+The proposal affects stakeholders by providing funding for growth initiatives that could enhance the ecosystem for Solana DAOs.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+Successful fundraising could accelerate MetaDAO's growth and expand its offerings, increasing its value in the market.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+There is a risk of mismanagement or failure to execute the fundraising effectively, which could jeopardize the DAO's financial stability.
+
+## Content
+
+### Overview
+
+Three weeks ago, MetaDAO launched the futarchy protocol with Drift, Dean’s List, and Future. Our goal is to onboard more Solana DAOs. To do that, Nallok and I have a few ideas for growth initiatives, including:
+
+- Social: seeing who’s trading in the markets
+
+- NFTs: allowing NFT communities to leverage decision markets
+
+- Special contracts: creating custom financial contracts that make it easier to make grants decisions through decision markets
+  
+To accelerate this, our goal is to hire a small team. Between us (\$90k/yr each), three engineers (\$190k/yr each), audits (\$300k), office space (\$80k/yr), a growth person (\$150k/yr), and other administrative expenses (\$100k/yr), we’re looking at a \$1.38M burn rate.
+
+To fund this, I’m proposing that the DAO raise \$1.5M by selling META to a combination of venture capitalists and angels. Specifically, we would sell up to 4,000 META with no discount and no lockup.
+
+Nallok and I would execute this sale on behalf of the DAO. To minimize the risk of a DAO attack, the money raised would be custodied by us in a multisig and released to the DAO treasury at a rate of $100k / month.
+
+The exact terms of the sale would be left to our discretion. This includes details such as who is given allocation, whether to raise more than \$1.5M, how escrow is managed, et cetera. However, we would be bound to a minimum price: \$375. Given that there’d be 20,823.5 META in the hands of the public (which includes VCs + angels) after this raise, this means we would be unable to sell tokens at less than a \$7.81M valuation.

Everyone who participates in the raise will get similar terms. We will make public who’s participated after it’s complete.
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `9BMRY1HBe61MJoKEd9AAW5iNQyws2vGK6vuL49oR3AzX`
+- Proposal number: 3
+- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
+- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-06-30
+- Ended: 2024-06-30

inbox/archive/2024-07-01-futardio-proposal-fund-artemis-labs-data-and-analytics-dashboards.md

@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Fund Artemis Labs Data and Analytics Dashboards"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G95shxDXSSTcgi2DTJ2h79JCefVNQPm8dFeDzx7qZ2ks"
+date: 2024-07-01
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: Drift
+- Proposal: Fund Artemis Labs Data and Analytics Dashboards
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-07-01
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/G95shxDXSSTcgi2DTJ2h79JCefVNQPm8dFeDzx7qZ2ks
+- Description: Artemis Labs is set to transform how the crypto community accesses Drift metrics and data via this proposal. By integrating detailed Drift protocol metrics onto Artemis, the whole suite of Artemis users which include top liquid token funds (Panetera, Modular Capital), retail investors, developers, and institutional investors (Grayscale, Vaneck, Franklin Templeton) will be able to access Drift metrics for the first time.
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+1. Artemis Labs proposes to build and maintain comprehensive data and analytics dashboards for the Drift protocol, enhancing access to critical metrics for various crypto stakeholders.  
+2. The initiative aims to provide reliable benchmarking and deeper metrics on Drift, promoting transparency and community engagement.  
+3. The proposal requests a grant of $50k in Drift Tokens to be distributed over 12 months, with a performance review after six months.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+This initiative will benefit institutional investors, developers, and retail investors by providing them with transparent and accessible Drift protocol data.  
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+The project has the potential to attract more capital allocators and users to the Drift platform by enhancing the visibility and credibility of its metrics.  
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+There is a risk that if the deliverables do not meet the expectations of the Drift DAO, the partnership could be terminated after six months, affecting the continuity of data access.
+
+## Content
+
+## Simple Summary
+
+Artemis Labs is set to transform how the crypto community accesses Drift metrics and data via this proposal. By integrating detailed Drift protocol metrics onto Artemis, the whole suite of Artemis users which include top liquid token funds (Panetera, Modular Capital), retail investors, developers, and institutional investors (Grayscale, Vaneck, Franklin Templeton) will be able to access Drift metrics for the first time. Artemis’s commitment to transparency and community engagement, with open-source dashboards and regular updates, ensures that Drift metrics are accessible and audited for the entire crypto community to digest and share however they want.
+
+The proposal is for a grant of \$50k USD in Drift Tokens with a max cap of 115k Drift Tokens (whichever is lower) over 12 months.
+
+## Who is Artemis Labs:
+
+Artemis Labs is a software company building the unified platform for all of crypto data. We are in the business of enabling **anyone** in the crypto space to dive deep on any protocol whether they are familiar with on crypto data or not. With two core products: excel / google sheets plugin and Artemis Terminal, we surface key metrics for a robust set of users including:
+
+- institutional investors such as Grayscale, Franklin Templeton, and Vaneck
+- liquid token funds such as Modular Capital, Pantera Capital, and CoinFund
+- retail investors with over 20k+ twitter followers and 20k+ subscribers to our weekly newsletter
+- developers from Wave Wallet, Quicknode, and Bridge.xyz
+
+Our team consist of top engineers from companies such as Venmo, Messari, Coinbase, Facebook and top HFs / Investment Firms such as Holocene, Carlyle Group, Blackrock, and Whale Rock. We are a blend of top engineering and traditional finance talent allowing us to build + surface metrics that actually matter to markets.
+
+### Company Values:
+
+Our mission is to **surface key metrics** to anyone that cares about crypto in whatever way is most intuitive to them. Whether its a dashboard, an excel plugin, or an api, we empower retail traders, large liquid token funds, and developers in this space to make informed bets on the market with their capital and time.
+
+- **Transparency**: We take transparency very seriously, which is why we took great effort to become open source earlier this year. If there are any metrics the broader crypto community is concerned about, anyone can make a github issue and we will resolve in a timely manner.
+- **Build with the community:** We are **open source** and will work directly with Drift Labs and the community to surface metrics that matter to Drift users, developers, investors, and token holders. We have worked with the Drift Lab team to come up with an initial set of metrics that will be valuable to the both the Artemis and Drift community.
+
+## Why 3rd Party Verified Data is important
+
+Open and trusted fundamental metrics are an important tool for everyone in crypto. Developers use it to determine what ecosystem to build on and capital allocators use it to make informed bets on projects. But as the crypto space grows and matures, more people are asking fundamental questions that require deeper metrics to answer. The crypto space is becoming more sophisticated and there isn’t a single go to source for all Drift metrics that matter.
+
+Artemis proposal aims to solve 3 key issues in the space right now:
+
+- No clear benchmarking of Drift’s Protocol Health
+- No place to get all the metrics of Drift in one place and compare with other perpetual trading protocols
+- No way to start tracking historical changes of Drift Liquidity over time
+- No place to get deeper metrics on drift users such as average deposit size, exchange volume / user, etc.
+
+Artemis will provide to the community:
+
+- Reliable benchmarking of the Drift Protocols with other protocols
+- Deeper metrics on Drift not just high level numbers like TVL and Exchange Volume
+- Neutral 3rd party verified metrics
+- Wider audience of institutional investors and builders looking at key Drift Metrics
+
+## Proposal
+
+Working with Drift Labs these are the core dashboard Artemis Labs will build out and maintain for the community over the 12 month period.
+
+Deeper Perp Protocol Metrics:
+
+- Open Interest
+- Fees
+- Revenue
+- Average Fees / Trade
+- Funding Rate (Annualized)
+
+Unique Trader Metrics:
+
+- Exchange Volume / Trader
+- Unique Number of Traders
+
+Liquidity Metrics:
+
+- Liquidity metrics by perp market
+    - +2% / -2% liquidity
+- Price Fill (effective price of a 100k Order)
+
+Deposit Metrics:
+
+- Average Deposit Size
+- Deposit Trends
+- Lending Rates
+
+## Product Screenshots
+![Screenshot 2024-06-25 at 2.22.36 PM](https://global.discourse-cdn.com/flex003/uploads/driftgov/optimized/1X/6fc9e24d0a45b11cbc944e04cca5dfb80127b9a5_2_690x489.jpeg)
+![Screenshot 2024-06-25 at 2.23.03 PM](https://global.discourse-cdn.com/flex003/uploads/driftgov/optimized/1X/397d7d3d0ab4e9b8c76e44940d49484a4e9c7f5c_2_593x499.png)
+![Screenshot 2024-06-25 at 2.23.15 PM](https://global.discourse-cdn.com/flex003/uploads/driftgov/optimized/1X/ae414f923ae099123e86da2348211f57d2149c29_2_593x499.png)
+![Screenshot 2024-06-25 at 4.19.52 PM](https://global.discourse-cdn.com/flex003/uploads/driftgov/optimized/1X/50bdb207661f7c544ec7602f55b194cf08f043d5_2_690x420.png)
+## Community Engagement
+
+### Independent Research
+
+As part of our commitment to being community focused, we will dive deep into the Drift Perps Protocol to highlight key metrics and the project. This will be done in the form of an independent research piece. We will then share this piece with the Artemis community the make up of which was described earlier in the proposal. This research piece will be made publicly available for anyone to read.
+
+### Open Source Dashboards
+
+All of the dashboards and metrics we build for Drift will be open sourced and free for the community to screenshot and used for whatever they need.
+
+### Updates
+
+We will also commit to a bi-monthly update post focusing on both works complete and ongoing as determined by the community.
+
+## Longer Term Relationship
+
+As has been stated above, we are a software company. We’re building a platform that empowers anyone in crypto to make informed discussions with their time and capital. While this engagement is focus on building for the Drift Community and surfacing key metrics for the broader crypto community as it relates to Drift, we hope to continue to onboard more stakeholders in the crypto community to our platform. Our hope is that anyone who wants to do anything in crypto will at some point touch the Artemis platform and suite of products.
+
+## Success Criteria
+
+The successful completion of the Drift protocol’s objectives will be measured against KPIs that will be derived from the specific objectives agreed upon between Drift and Artemis Labs. On top of those, We will also look to measure things such as:
+
+- Usage:
+    - Number of Tweet
+    - Page Views
+    - Metrics Calls on our plugin
+- Product Deliverables (Drift Metrics on Artemis)
+
+## Pricing and timing
+
+- 12 month engagement w/ option to cancel engagement after an initial 6 month period
+    - the Drift DAO will have the opportunity to terminate the relationship if it finds Artemis Labs’ deliverables unsatisfactory (outlined above).
+- \$50k USD value in Drift Tokens paid out linearly over 12 months.
+    - Drift token price would be a trailing 7-d average based on coingecko prices
+    - So at time of proposal that would be roughly **115,000 tokens**distributed out from a multisig where Drift Labs + Artemis Labs will be the signer over a 12 month period.
+- Start of engagement will begin once proposal is passed
+
+## Special Thanks
+
+- Big Z for reviewing and giving feedback!
+
+## On why Artemis think this is valuable
+
+- Artemis serves as a direct link to major capital allocators like Grayscale and Fidelity.
+    - Ex: A liquid token fund manager managing (8-9 million dollar) asked Artemis about Drift specific metrics. They can’t find any deep metrics about Drift on Artemis and do not feel comfortable with other sources or frankly does not know where to look. Other platforms like the ones mentioned above are too complicated for them to navigate and do not allow them to digest data in their favorite platform where they do all their work: excel / google sheets.
+- Traders from platforms like dYdX, Hyperliquid, etc rely on Artemis for critical trading data and insights to determine where they should trade.
+    - Ex: a dYdX engineer came into the Artemis discord looking to confirm dYdX unique traders because traders were pinging them. These traders were using Artemis to determine what platform to allocate capital.
+
+## In terms of the coverage of metrics we expect to surface in addition to liquidity metrics
+
+- Granular insights on user behavior across Drift’s products (e.g., insurance fund, lending, perp trading).
+    1. top users across drift’s many products such as the insurance fund, lending, perp trading every week historically
+        1. Answering questions like why Drift usage is going up or who makes up the user base of Drift
+    2. Break out exchange volume, deposits, and fees paid by users.
+        1. Answering questions such as how much volume is done by 10, 100, 1000 traders etc.
+    3. Liquidity and averages fees historically
+        1. Answering questions such as how much does it cost to use Drift as a trader
+    4. Revenue across all of Drift product lines
+        1. Answering questions like how much money does Drift make and which revenue driver is growing the fastest
+        2. Providing sensible multiples for capital allocators (P/S, P/E)
+- Higher fidelity refresh rates for order book data / on chain data
+    1. Currently, Drift refreshes its public S3 datalake every 24hours, we can do it every 6 hours (so 4 times a day)
+    2. This would be shared to the Drift Labs team and public for free consumptions
+
+## Compensation and Implementation Questions
+
+- We would need to manually integrate new data pipelines, process the data into metrics and then build + design intuitive dashboards on our terminal which requires weeks of data science, engineering, product, and design hours.
+- These dashboard have always been and continue to be free to use. The rest of our product is also free to use with very generous restrictions and the vast majority of our users are NOT paying customers.
+- **Propose compensation Changes:** 115k DRIFT or \$50k USD (whichever is lower) over 12 months.
+    - We believe this is a fair value for the work we plan to do for Drift and the value add we bring to the community.
+
+We ultimately think that we are providing a unique service and we want to build a long term relationship with the Drift Community. If the DAO feels like we did not bring in enough value it has the power to cancel the contract after 6 months.
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `G95shxDXSSTcgi2DTJ2h79JCefVNQPm8dFeDzx7qZ2ks`
+- Proposal number: 2
+- DAO account: `5vVCYQHPd8o3pGejYWzKZtnUSdLjXzDZcjZQxiFumXXx`
+- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-07-05
+- Ended: 2024-07-05

inbox/archive/2024-07-01-futardio-proposal-proposal-1.md

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Proposal #1"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/Hda19mrjPxotZnnQfpAhJtxWvfC6JCXbMquohThgsd5U"
+date: 2024-07-01
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: Unknown
+- Proposal: Proposal #1
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-07-01
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/Hda19mrjPxotZnnQfpAhJtxWvfC6JCXbMquohThgsd5U
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `Hda19mrjPxotZnnQfpAhJtxWvfC6JCXbMquohThgsd5U`
+- Proposal number: 1
+- DAO account: `GWywkp2mY2vzAaLydR2MBXRCqk2vBTyvtVRioujxi5Ce`
+- Proposer: `2koRVEC5ZAEqVHzBeVjgkAAdq92ZGszBsVBCBVUraYg1`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-07-05
+- Ended: 2024-07-05

inbox/archive/2024-07-01-futardio-proposal-test.md

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: test"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/16ZyAyNumkJoU9GATreUzBDzfS6rmEpZnUcQTcdfJiD"
+date: 2024-07-01
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: Unknown
+- Proposal: test
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-07-01
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/16ZyAyNumkJoU9GATreUzBDzfS6rmEpZnUcQTcdfJiD
+- Categories: {'category': 'Treasury'}
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal titled "test" aims to introduce new initiatives for the Unknown DAO while enhancing community engagement.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+Stakeholders may experience increased involvement and collaboration through the proposed initiatives.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+Successful implementation could lead to improved community dynamics and stronger governance.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+There is a risk that the initiatives may not resonate with all community members, potentially leading to disengagement.
+
+## Content
+
+test
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `16ZyAyNumkJoU9GATreUzBDzfS6rmEpZnUcQTcdfJiD`
+- Proposal number: 2
+- DAO account: `GWywkp2mY2vzAaLydR2MBXRCqk2vBTyvtVRioujxi5Ce`
+- Proposer: `HwBL75xHHKcXSMNcctq3UqWaEJPDWVQz6NazZJNjWaQc`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-07-01
+- Ended: 2024-07-01

inbox/archive/2024-07-04-futardio-proposal-proposal-3.md

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Proposal #3"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/EXehk1u3qUJZSxJ4X3nHsiTocRhzwq3eQAa6WKxeJ8Xs"
+date: 2024-07-04
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: Unknown
+- Proposal: Proposal #3
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-07-04
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/EXehk1u3qUJZSxJ4X3nHsiTocRhzwq3eQAa6WKxeJ8Xs
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `EXehk1u3qUJZSxJ4X3nHsiTocRhzwq3eQAa6WKxeJ8Xs`
+- Proposal number: 3
+- DAO account: `GWywkp2mY2vzAaLydR2MBXRCqk2vBTyvtVRioujxi5Ce`
+- Proposer: `HwBL75xHHKcXSMNcctq3UqWaEJPDWVQz6NazZJNjWaQc`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-07-08
+- Ended: 2024-07-08

inbox/archive/2024-07-09-futardio-proposal-initialize-the-drift-foundation-grant-program.md

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Initialize the Drift Foundation Grant Program"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/xU6tQoDh3Py4MfAY3YPwKnNLt7zYDiNHv8nA1qKnxVM"
+date: 2024-07-09
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: Drift
+- Proposal: Initialize the Drift Foundation Grant Program
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-07-09
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/xU6tQoDh3Py4MfAY3YPwKnNLt7zYDiNHv8nA1qKnxVM
+- Description: This proposal requests 100,000 DRIFT to carry out the initial iteration of the Drift Grants Program.
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal aims to initiate the Drift Grants Program with 100,000 DRIFT to support community initiatives and ecosystem development, while evaluating the demand for small grants and assessing the current grant sourcing structure.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+The proposal empowers community members to lead initiatives, thereby increasing engagement and collaboration within the Drift ecosystem.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+Successful implementation could establish a robust grants program that fosters a thriving ecosystem, enhancing Drift's competitive advantage in the DeFi space.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+The program's reliance on initial funding and team effectiveness poses risks if the expected demand for grants is not met or if operational challenges arise during the trial period.
+
+## Content
+
+## Summary
+
+This proposal requests 100,000 DRIFT to carry out the initial iteration of the Drift Grants Program.
+
+The funds will be managed by ⅔ multi sig governed by the Decision Council.
+
+The proposal is designed to kickstart the foundation grants program with the goal of helping efficiently allocate capital and figure out the best process and structure for a more robust grants program going forward.
+
+## Overview
+
+A robust ecosystem can serve as a key competitive advantage in the DeFi space. Given the relatively undifferentiated products and open-source culture, a strong community and ecosystem are both crucial for a protocol’s sustained success. The launch of DRIFT token will enable the foundation to accelerate ecosystem growth and fortify the Drift community through grants. The purpose of this proposal is to initialise the process of creating a grants system that effectively aligns and supports Drift’s community and ecosystem.
+
+## Objectives
+
+### Supporting Community Initiatives
+
+- Short-term: Short term the objective is to increase community engagement and help grow the size of the community by providing easy and open access to community members to lead community initiatives.
+- Vision: Long term it is about aligning incentives in a way fosters a robust and active community.
+
+### Developing Ecosystem
+
+- Short-term: Over the next two months we want to start to push integration and figure out a process to source and support teams building on top of drift. We want this proposal to serve to help support people looking to build on Drift.
+- Vision: The long-term vision is to have Drift become a foundational layer that supports a flourishing ecosystem of projects.
+
+### Answer key questions about the Grants program
+
+- Do people want small grants?
+    - Figuring out if there is demand for smaller grant sizes that may not make sense for Futarchic markets and figure out if the proposed proposal structure makes sense to handle them.
+- Do we need to source?
+    - The current structure is passive/supporting, is there enough quality inbound where this model works, or do we need to scale up the grant program to support sourcing.
+
+### What does success look like?
+
+- Supporting Community initiatives: Figure out a system to evaluate and support initiatives.
+- Developing Ecosystem: Figure out the best way to support projects going through the futarchic system.
+- Testing Grants program: Answer the two objective questions.
+- Overall: Have a clearer vision for direction of the Foundation Grants Program and have confidence drafting and supporting a more substantial future proposal.
+
+### Review
+
+At the end of the 2 month period the analyst will put together a comprehensive report reviewing all activities done by the team, all grants funded/proposed and come up with a recommendation for the program moving forward. The report will include an evaluation of how the grants program completed all objectives, where it fell short and how it should be changed. Ultimate goal is to be able to use learnings from the initial program to draft a more substantial follow up proposal.
+
+## Details
+
+**Timeframe:** 2months, starting on July 1st ending on August 31st.
+
+Looking at other protocols grants programs, we believe it is important to commit heavily in effort and capital. The goal of the initial program is to quickly get started and experiment in design, operations, and best practices so that we can figure out what works best in order to iterate and commit with conviction for v2.
+
+**Initiation:** This proposal will be decided on through the Futarchic markets. [JH comment: Why do this through Futarchy? Why not execute without then use futarch markets to decide extension?]
+
+**Team:** 4 People
+
+Ultimately, to have a successful grant program you need a strong and representative team to drive it. Part of the goal for the initial proposal is to figure out the workload/workflow for team members.
+
+- Decision Council: The decision council consists of 3 people and votes on the approval of small proposals. Expectations for the council include voting on each proposal, describing their reasoning behind their vote and working with the analyst to help create a brief summary report analysing each proposal. Expected commitment 0-6hrs per week. The members of the decision council will not be able to vote on proposals in which they are direct beneficiaries from in order to prevent conflicts of interest.
+    
+    - Members: Personal info is hidden for privacy, all members are active community members that the team has vetted.
+        - Spidey
+        - Maskara
+        - James
+- Analyst: The analyst will be a team member responsible for managing inbound, helping teams draft proposals, supporting throughout the proposal process. The analyst will also be responsible for creating a summary report for each proposal and a final report reviewing success of the initial grants program along with recommendations for the next iteration. To start, Squid from the Drift ecosystem team will do the analyst role to help better explore what are the requirements for the role and the next steps program overall.
+    
+- There will be 1 analyst initially. Depending on how the initial proposal goes there may need to be more analysts for future iterations of the grant program depending on the amount of work and the importance of sourcing.
+    
+
+The initial member selection for this proposal was done by looking for contributors and core community members who are motivated and have the skills to excel in their respective positions. Part of the reason for doing a shorter trial grant period was to test run the team and help us figure out what to select for going forward.
+
+### Compensation
+The majority of the work will fall onto the analyst and since Squid already works with Drift no compensation is necessary. Given the initial iteration of the grants program is designed to test requirements demand and workflows, the initial workload for the Decision Council is uncertain. For the initial grants program there will be no compensation for the Decision Council.
+
+- Note: We expect the initial grants program to give clarity on workload and flush out expectations for roles. If the grants program is continued or scaled up it is expected that both Analyst and Decision Council roles will be compensated.
+
+**Amount:** 100,000 DRIFT
+
+We believe 100,000 DRIFT (~\$40,000) will be enough to support the upside scenario of grant interest in the next two months. Any Drift not distributed will be returned to the DAO.
+
+### Use of funds
+
+- Up to 100,000 Drift will be used to fund proposals supporting the community and ecosystem.
+
+### Process
+
+The initial creation of the grants program will be decided upon in the futarchal markets. If passed, the process of approving grants will depend on the size of the grant.
+
+- Community Initiative (Defined as <10,000 DRIFT)
+    
+    - The approval will be fully decided by the Decision Council to retain operational efficiency.
+- Project (Defined as >10,000 DRIFT)
+    
+    - The approval will be decided by pushing the grant as a proposal in the futarchic markets.
+        - The Decision Council will vote to support these proposals. If supported the Analyst will work to help draft, market and support the proposal through the futarchic markets.
+
+In both scenarios the team would be responsible for fulfilling the grant commitment and would be expected to support the grantee post approval.
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `xU6tQoDh3Py4MfAY3YPwKnNLt7zYDiNHv8nA1qKnxVM`
+- Proposal number: 3
+- DAO account: `5vVCYQHPd8o3pGejYWzKZtnUSdLjXzDZcjZQxiFumXXx`
+- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-07-13
+- Ended: 2024-07-13

inbox/archive/2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-approve-budget-for-champions-nft-collection-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Approve Budget for Champions NFT Collection Design"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/BU8kQ7ECq8CJ9BHUZfYsjHFKPMGsF6oJn5d6b1tArdwW"
+date: 2024-07-18
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: FutureDAO
+- Proposal: Approve Budget for Champions NFT Collection Design
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-07-18
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/BU8kQ7ECq8CJ9BHUZfYsjHFKPMGsF6oJn5d6b1tArdwW
+- Description: Approve artistic direction and a $10,000 budget for design of the FutureDAO Champions NFT collection.
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+Approve a $10,000 budget for the artistic direction and design of the FutureDAO Champions NFT Collection to enhance community engagement and brand presence in the Solana ecosystem.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+The proposal aims to foster internal cohesion and cultural identity among FutureDAO community members through unique NFT artwork.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+Increased demand for the Champions NFTs could lead to higher engagement, revenue from SPL 404 swaps, and secondary market royalties.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+Failure to select an appealing artist or produce desired artwork could result in diminished community interest and lower financial returns.
+
+## Content
+
+
+
+## TLDR
+
+Approve artistic direction and a $10,000 budget for design of the FutureDAO Champions NFT collection. The project will enhance FutureDAO’s culture, boosting community engagement, internal cohesion, and FutureDAO's presence in the Solana ecosystem. Revenue is expected from SPL 404 swaps and secondary market royalties.
+
+---
+
+## Overview
+
+This proposal seeks approval for the artistic direction and budget allocation for the FutureDAO Champions NFT Collection.
+
+- **Target Customer:** Members of the FutureDAO community and NFT collectors who vibe with futuristic aesthetics and robotic themes.
+    
+- **Problem Solved:** FutureDAO’s Champions NFT Collection currently lacks artistic visuals, featuring only placeholder images with no art.
+    
+- **Monetization:** Indirect revenue from increased demand for Champions NFTs, higher NFT portal engagement, and potential direct earnings through increased SPL 404 swaps.
+    
+- **Key Metrics:**
+    
+    - Community approval of the artistic direction
+        
+    - Engagement and feedback on the selected artist (TBD and artwork samples
+        
+- **Value Creation:** The collection will add value with unique artwork that enhances FutureDAO’s cultural appeal, and provide PFPs for community members to represent themselves, increasing internal community cohesion and FutureDAO's notoriety across the Solana ecosystem.
+    
+- **Total Budget:** $10,000 USD
+    
+    - This budget will cover the costs associated with commissioning the artist, determining the artistic direction and creating the NFT artwork.
+        
+- **This project directly relates to FutureDAO’s business** by enabling FutureDAO to proceed with design of the Champions NFT collection, contributing to community engagement and brand enhancement.
+    
+
+---
+
+## Problem
+
+NFTs are a cultural pillar of communities. A well designed, appealing and recognizable NFT collection is needed to increase internal community cohesion and FutureDAO’s notoriety across the Solana ecosystem.
+
+---
+
+## **Design**
+
+**Product Description:** The FutureDAO Champions NFT Collection will feature unique, hand-made artwork, that embody a futuristic aesthetic with a robot theme.
+
+Current NFT Image
+
+**Artist Selection:** This proposal is only to determine the budget allocation and artistic direction. Selection of the artist will be determined through a secondary process.
+
+![](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fce679934-6c2d-4637-9843-b89c2164da9c_1352x1364.png)
+
+
+[Dr. PeePee](https://x.com/DrPeepee911) Example: 75% of respondents to the NFT Collection Proposal Development process support engaging Dr. PeePee to design the NFT collection
+
+![Image](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faa5246e1-8071-4a80-9125-a722513ad106_2304x4096.jpeg "Image")
+
+[Scumsol](https://x.com/SCUMSOL) Example: One community member suggested we engage Scumsol to design the collection
+
+---
+
+## **Business**
+
+### **Implementation Plan:**
+
+- **Artist Commission:** Engage an artist - TBD in a secondary process - to create the NFT artwork.
+    
+- **Artwork Creation:** Develop the collection with hand-made pieces that align with the community's preferences.
+    
+- **Community Feedback:** Present artwork samples to the community for final feedback and approval.
+    
+
+### **Expected Impact:**
+
+- **Community Engagement:** Increased community engagement through active participation in determining artistic direction
+    
+- **Culture:** Enhanced cultural and artistic value for FutureDAO
+    
+
+---
+
+## **Monetization**
+
+### 5.1 Financial Projections
+
+**Initial Development Costs: $10,000 USD**
+
+- **Artist Commission:** $5,000 USD
+    
+- **Smart Contract Development:** $1,000 USD
+    
+- **Metadata Integration:** $2,000 USD
+    
+- **Testing and QA:** $1,000 USD
+    
+- **Contingency Costs:** $1,000 USD
+    
+- **Total Budget:** $10,000 USD
+    
+
+**Earnings Projections:**
+
+- **SPL 404 Swap:** Revenue from swap of $FUTURE to SPL 404 NFT
+    
+- **Secondary Market Royalties:** Ongoing earnings from secondary market transactions.
+    
+
+---
+
+#### **About FutureDAO:**
+
+FutureDAO is a market-governed decentralized organization powered by MetaDAO's futarchy infrastructure.  
+
+FutureDAO is building the Future Protocol to help communities safeguard and amplify value by providing them with on-chain token migration tools to take control of their futures. 
+
+For more detailed information, you can visit the FutureDAO [Gitbook](https://futurespl.gitbook.io/future).
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `BU8kQ7ECq8CJ9BHUZfYsjHFKPMGsF6oJn5d6b1tArdwW`
+- Proposal number: 3
+- DAO account: `ofvb3CPvEyRfD5az8PAqW6ATpPqVBeiB5zBnpPR5cgm`
+- Proposer: `8fLRt8odjQgWvJuFUqnWsJUasALX7GMPp1vWiuBJEmYQ`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-07-22
+- Ended: 2024-07-22

inbox/archive/2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model.md

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/5c2XSWQ9rVPge2Umoz1yenZcAwRaQS5bC4i4w87B1WUp"
+date: 2024-07-18
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: IslandDAO
+- Proposal: Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-07-18
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/5c2XSWQ9rVPge2Umoz1yenZcAwRaQS5bC4i4w87B1WUp
+- Description: The proposed model for The Dean's List DAO involves continuing to charge clients in USDC and using the collected USDC to purchase $DEAN tokens.
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal aims to enhance The Dean's List DAO's economic model by continuously charging clients in USDC, using the proceeds to purchase \$DEAN tokens, and distributing these tokens as payment to DAO citizens while maintaining the DAO tax in USDC to mitigate price fluctuations.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+DAO citizens will receive \$DEAN tokens instead of USDC, potentially increasing their earnings if demand for the token rises.  
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+The strategic purchasing of \$DEAN tokens is expected to create consistent buy pressure, potentially increasing the token's price and enhancing the DAO's overall market position.  
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+The selling pressure from DAO citizens cashing out a significant portion of their \$DEAN tokens may counteract the buy pressure, leading to price volatility.
+
+## Content
+
+The proposed model for The Dean's List DAO involves continuing to charge clients in USDC and using the collected USDC to purchase \$DEAN tokens. These tokens will be distributed to DAO citizens as payment for their work, replacing USDC payments. The DAO tax will remain in USDC to hedge against \$DEAN price fluctuations. This approach creates constant buying pressure on the \$DEAN token, leading to an increase in price.
+
+
+The strategic use of USDC for purchasing \$DEAN is expected to enhance the DAO's economic stability and growth.
+
+
+*Example: DAO Tax @ 20%, Cost of dApp review 2500 \$USDC
+
+
+This way we create volume (3600 \$USDC volume) and the price action is always positive. (in our case buys exceeded sells by 20%) and we do not deplete our \$DEAN reserves*
+
+
+- _500 \$USDC goes to the treasury_
+- _2000 \$USDC are used for purchasing \$DEAN tokens. The DAO buys 560k \$DEAN (price goes up by X due to the buy)_
+- _DAO Citizens are paid the 560k \$DEAN and (assumption) 80% of the paid people decide to sell their \$DEAN to pay their bills._
+- _DAO Citizens sell 560k_80% = 448k \$DEAN hits the market to be sold (price goes down by 0.8X)*
+- _The price will always achieve a higher low on each cycle._
+
+
+## Here are more details you don't need but you can explore if you like:
+
+
+### `Detailed Analysis and FDV Increase Scenario:`
+
+
+**`Current Metrics:`**
+
+
+- `FDV of The Dean's List DAO: $337,074`
+- `Daily Trading Volume: $500`
+- `Circulating Supply: 100,000,000 $DEAN`
+- `Current $DEAN Price: $0.00337`
+
+
+**`Example Scenario:** Assume the DAO reviews 6 dApps in a month, charging 2500 USDC per review.`
+
+
+- **`Total Monthly Revenue:** 15,000 USDC`
+- **`Daily Revenue Equivalent:** 500 USDC/day`
+- **`Tax Distribution:`**
+    - `20% (3,000 USDC) goes to the treasury.`
+    - `80% (12,000 USDC) used to purchase $DEAN tokens.`
+    - `Daily purchase of $DEAN: 400 USDC/day`
+
+
+**`Purchase and Distribution:`**
+
+
+- `With 400 USDC daily, the DAO buys approximately 118,694 $DEAN daily.`
+- `These tokens are then distributed to DAO citizens as payment.`
+- `Assuming 80% of $DEAN tokens (94,955) are sold by citizens daily.`
+
+
+### `Price Impact Analysis`
+
+
+**`Upward Price Pressure:** Introducing 400 USDC daily into the market represents an 80% increase relative to the current daily trading volume of 500 USDC. This significant increase can substantially impact the price. Given an 80% increase in daily buy volume, we estimate a 24% price increase for modeling purposes.`
+
+
+**`Downward Price Pressure:** Assuming 80% of the purchased $DEAN tokens are sold by DAO citizens, this sell-off will create downward pressure on the price, estimated at a 15% decrease.`
+
+
+**`New Price Calculation:`**
+
+
+- `Initial Price: $0.00337`
+- `Estimated Price Increase: 24%`
+- `New Price: $0.0041768`
+- `Final Price after Sell Pressure: $0.00355028`
+
+
+**`Calculating the FDV:`**
+
+
+- `Initial FDV: $337,074`
+- `New FDV: $355,028`
+
+
+**`FDV Increase:`**
+
+
+- `From $337,074 to $355,028`
+- `Percentage Increase: 5.33%`
+
+
+**`Comparison with TWAP 3% Increase Requirement:`**
+
+
+- `Required FDV Increase for 3%: 337,074×1.03=347,186`
+- `Achieved FDV: $355,028`
+- `Achieved Percentage Increase: 5.33%`
+
+
+`This scenario indicates that the achieved FDV increase of 5.33% significantly exceeds the TWAP 3% increase requirement, demonstrating the potential impact of the proposed model.`
+
+
+### `Conclusion:`
+
+
+`This proposal aims to leverage the strategic use of USDC to purchase $DEAN, creating consistent buy pressure that outweighs the selling pressure from citizens, thereby significantly boosting the FDV TWAP. Members are encouraged to support this proposal to enhance the DAO's economic framework and overall market position.`
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `5c2XSWQ9rVPge2Umoz1yenZcAwRaQS5bC4i4w87B1WUp`
+- Proposal number: 3
+- DAO account: `9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ`
+- Proposer: `8Cwx4yR2sFAC5Pdx2NgGHxCk1gJrtSTxJoyqVonqndhq`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-07-22
+- Ended: 2024-07-22

inbox/archive/2024-08-03-futardio-proposal-approve-q3-roadmap.md

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Approve Q3 Roadmap?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/7AbivixQZTrgnqpmyxW2j1dd4Jyy15K3T2T7MEgfg8DZ"
+date: 2024-08-03
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Approve Q3 Roadmap?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-08-03
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/7AbivixQZTrgnqpmyxW2j1dd4Jyy15K3T2T7MEgfg8DZ
+- Categories: {'category': 'Governance'}, {'category': 'Dao'}
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal outlines objectives to launch a market-based grants product, build a full-time team in San Francisco, and significantly improve user interface performance.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+This initiative will enhance user experience for DAOs and decision market traders by providing a more efficient grants process.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+Successfully implementing the roadmap could position MetaDAO as a leader in innovative grant solutions, attracting more users and DAO participation.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+Delays in hiring or product development may hinder the timely launch and adoption of the new grants product, potentially impacting stakeholder trust.
+
+## Content
+
+Subject to the DAO’s approval, this is what we’ll be working on for the remainder of Q3:
+### Launch market-based grants decisions
+- Design a compelling market-based grants product
+	- Research and document existing grants programs across both SVM and EVM ecosystem
+	- Gather requirements and feedback from prospective users (DAOs)
+	- Gather requirements and feedback from decision market traders
+	- Create a ‘cardboard cutout’ design of what the UI will look like
+- Implement the product
+	- Write requisite smart contracts
+	- Get smart contracts audited, either by a firm or by individuals
+- Launch 5 organizations on the product
+- Process 8 proposals through the product
+### Start building the full-time team
+- Secure an office space in San Francisco
+- Interview 40 candidates for the engineering roles
+- Hire a Twitter intern
+### Improve the performance of the user interface
+- Reduce page load times from 14.6s to 1s
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `7AbivixQZTrgnqpmyxW2j1dd4Jyy15K3T2T7MEgfg8DZ`
+- Proposal number: 4
+- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
+- Proposer: `65U66fcYuNfqN12vzateJhZ4bgDuxFWN9gMwraeQKByg`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-08-07
+- Ended: 2024-08-07

inbox/archive/2024-08-14-futardio-proposal-develop-memecoin-launchpad.md

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Develop Memecoin Launchpad?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/J57DcV2yQGiDpSetQHui6Piwjwsbet2ozXVPG77kTvTd"
+date: 2024-08-14
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Develop Memecoin Launchpad?
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-08-14
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/J57DcV2yQGiDpSetQHui6Piwjwsbet2ozXVPG77kTvTd
+- Description: MetaDAO now has a platform for creating and participating in futarchies. The central problem is distributing it: getting people and organizations to use futarchy.
+- Categories: {'category': 'Governance'}, {'category': 'Dao'}
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+MetaDAO proposes to create "futardio," a memecoin launchpad that allocates a portion of each new token's supply to a futarchy DAO, with the aim to drive adoption and usage of futarchy within the memecoin market.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+The proposal could attract memecoin holders and organizations interested in decentralized governance, enhancing community engagement.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+Successful implementation could significantly increase visibility and usage of futarchy, potentially leading to improved governance mechanisms and more robust product development.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+The initiative may undermine the perceived seriousness of futarchy and distract from MetaDAO's core focus, potentially complicating future recruitment and partnerships.
+
+## Content
+
+MetaDAO now has a platform for creating and participating in futarchies. The central problem is distributing it: getting people and organizations to use futarchy.
+
+  
+
+One of the ideal use-cases for futarchy is memecoin governance. This is because memecoin holders only want the price of the token to increase. There’s no question of “maybe the market knows what’s the best short-term action, but not the best long-term action.”
+
+  
+
+Coincidentally, there appears to be an opening in the market to launch “pump.fun with a token.” Such a platform may be able to bootstrap adoption by issuing points that convert into a token that receives the revenue generated by the platform.
+
+  
+
+For these reasons, I had the idea to create “futardio,” a memecoin launchpad with said bootstrapping mechanism where a portion of every launched memecoin gets allocated to a futarchy DAO.
+
+  
+
+We are not sure whether it makes sense for MetaDAO to release such a platform. There are potential advantages and potential pitfalls. So we are putting this decision up to the market. **If this proposal passes, MetaDAO will develop and release futardio. If it fails, it will not.**
+
+## Details
+
+The key ideas are expressed in [https://futard.io](https://futard.io).
+
+  
+
+The details of Futardio would be:
+
+- A memecoin launchpad where some percentage of every new token’s supply gets allocated to its futarchy DAO
+    
+- When users increase key metrics (e.g., volume), they earn points
+    
+- After a period of time not exceeding 180 days, these points would convert into a new token (‘$FUTA’)
+    
+- FUTA would be distributed to solely two parties: points owners and MetaDAO
+    
+- All revenue from Futardio would be distributed to a vault that can be claimed by FUTA holders
+    
+- By the time the token is live, Futardio would be immutable and decentralized. The program would be immutable, open-source, and verifiable, with any parameters being governed by MetaDAO. The website would be deployed immutably on IPFS or Arweave. Futardio would be a gambling [hyperstructure](https://jacob.energy/hyperstructures.html).
+    
+- The goal would be to launch it in Q3. 
+    
+- Nallok and Proph3t wouldn’t be the core team, but they would support a team and fund them with a \$100k grant paid over 6 months. If a team hasn’t started work by the end of Q3, the money would be returned and the project idea cancelled.
+    
+
+  
+
+This would all be left to the discretion of the team building it, but they would be expected to follow the broad outline.
+
+## Potential advantages
+
+- Drive attention and usage to futarchy
+    
+
+- More exposure
+    
+- More usage helps MetaDAO improve the product
+    
+- Provides more proof points of futarchy
+    
+
+- If MetaDAO sells some of its tokens or stakes them to the vault, it could receive cash to fund future activities
+    
+- Create a forcing function to improve the security of the core futarchy platform
+    
+
+## Potential pitfalls
+
+- Makes futarchy look less serious
+    
+
+- May make it harder to sell DeFi DAOs / non-crypto organizations
+    
+- May make it harder to recruit contributors
+    
+
+- Time & energy investment
+    
+- Would prevent MetaDAO from solely focusing on the core platform
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `J57DcV2yQGiDpSetQHui6Piwjwsbet2ozXVPG77kTvTd`
+- Proposal number: 5
+- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
+- Proposer: `65U66fcYuNfqN12vzateJhZ4bgDuxFWN9gMwraeQKByg`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-08-18
+- Ended: 2024-08-18

inbox/archive/2024-08-20-futardio-proposal-proposal-4.md

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Proposal #4"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/yTiRuoXWQVdVgbUJBU6J3FF1Sxnzy7FW7osqkkfMK6G"
+date: 2024-08-20
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: Unknown
+- Proposal: Proposal #4
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-08-20
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/yTiRuoXWQVdVgbUJBU6J3FF1Sxnzy7FW7osqkkfMK6G
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `yTiRuoXWQVdVgbUJBU6J3FF1Sxnzy7FW7osqkkfMK6G`
+- Proposal number: 4
+- DAO account: `GWywkp2mY2vzAaLydR2MBXRCqk2vBTyvtVRioujxi5Ce`
+- Proposer: `HwBL75xHHKcXSMNcctq3UqWaEJPDWVQz6NazZJNjWaQc`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-08-24
+- Ended: 2024-08-24

inbox/archive/2024-08-20-futardio-proposal-test-proposal-3.md

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Test Proposal 3"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/5TRuK9TLZ9bUPtp6od6pLKN6GxbQMByaBwVSCArNaS1V"
+date: 2024-08-20
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: null-result
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2024-08-20
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "This source is a test proposal on futard.io with minimal substantive content ('Test Proposal 3 Content'). The AI-generated summary appears to be hallucinated boilerplate about governance improvements and community engagement that is not supported by the actual proposal content. No extractable claims or enrichments - this is purely operational/test data documenting a failed MetaDAO proposal with no novel insights about futarchy mechanisms, governance outcomes, or internet finance."
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: Unknown
+- Proposal: Test Proposal 3
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-08-20
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/5TRuK9TLZ9bUPtp6od6pLKN6GxbQMByaBwVSCArNaS1V
+- Description: Test Proposal 3 Content
+- Categories: {'category': 'Dao'}
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal aims to outline a framework for governance improvements and enhance community engagement within the Unknown DAO.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+Stakeholders will have increased opportunities for participation and input in governance decisions.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+Improved governance could lead to more efficient decision-making and stronger community alignment.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+There is a risk that the proposed changes may not be widely accepted or could lead to confusion among participants.
+
+## Content
+
+Test Proposal 3 Content
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `5TRuK9TLZ9bUPtp6od6pLKN6GxbQMByaBwVSCArNaS1V`
+- Proposal number: 5
+- DAO account: `GWywkp2mY2vzAaLydR2MBXRCqk2vBTyvtVRioujxi5Ce`
+- Proposer: `HwBL75xHHKcXSMNcctq3UqWaEJPDWVQz6NazZJNjWaQc`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-08-24
+- Ended: 2024-08-24
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- Test Proposal 3 on MetaDAO failed (2024-08-20 to 2024-08-24)
+- Proposal account: 5TRuK9TLZ9bUPtp6od6pLKN6GxbQMByaBwVSCArNaS1V
+- Proposal number: 5
+- DAO account: GWywkp2mY2vzAaLydR2MBXRCqk2UqWaEJPDWVQz6NazZJNjWaQc
+- Autocrat version: 0.3

inbox/archive/2024-08-27-futardio-proposal-fund-the-drift-superteam-earn-creator-competition.md

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Fund The Drift Superteam Earn Creator Competition"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/AKMnVnSC8DzoZJktErtzR2QNt1ESoN8i2DdHPYuQTMGY"
+date: 2024-08-27
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: Drift
+- Proposal: Fund The Drift Superteam Earn Creator Competition
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-08-27
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/AKMnVnSC8DzoZJktErtzR2QNt1ESoN8i2DdHPYuQTMGY
+- Description: To celebrate the launch of B.E.T. this proposal would fund a collection of bounties called “Drift Protocol Creator Competition”. 
+- Categories: {'category': 'Dao'}
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal aims to fund the Drift Protocol Creator Competition with an \$8,250 prize pool to promote community engagement and content generation for B.E.T, Solana’s first capital efficient prediction market.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+Community members and creators will have the opportunity to engage with the B.E.T platform and potentially earn rewards through their contributions.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+The competition can enhance awareness and adoption of B.E.T, leading to increased user engagement and growth for the Drift platform.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+There is a risk that the competition may not attract sufficient participation, which could limit its effectiveness in promoting B.E.T and engaging the community.
+
+## Content
+
+[Drift](https://docs.drift.trade/) is the largest open-sourced perpetual futures exchange built on Solana. Recently, Drift announced B.E.T, Solana’s first capital efficient prediction market. 
+
+
+To celebrate the launch of B.E.T. this proposal would fund a collection of bounties called “Drift Protocol Creator Competition”. 
+
+
+- The Drift Foundation Grants Program would fund a total prize pool of \$8,250.
+- The outcome of the competition will serve in educating the community on and accelerating growth of B.E.T. through community engagement and creative content generation.
+
+
+If the proposal passes the competition would be run through [Superteam Earn](https://earn.superteam.fun/) and funded in DRIFT token distributed by the Drift Foundation Grants Program.
+
+This proposed competition offers three distinct bounty tracks as well as a grand prize, each with its own rewards:
+
+* Grand prize (\$3,000)  
+* Make an engaging video on B.E.T (\$1,750)  
+* Twitter thread on B.E.T (\$1,750)  
+* Share Trade Ideas on B.E.T (\$1,750)
+
+Each individual contest will have a prize structure of: 
+
+
+- 1st place: \$1000  
+- 2nd place: \$500  
+- 3rd place: \$250
+
+
+Link to campaign details and evaluation criteria: [Link](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1QB0hPT0R\_NvVqYh9UcNwRnf9ZE\_ElWpDOjBLc8XgBAc/edit?usp=sharing)
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `AKMnVnSC8DzoZJktErtzR2QNt1ESoN8i2DdHPYuQTMGY`
+- Proposal number: 4
+- DAO account: `5vVCYQHPd8o3pGejYWzKZtnUSdLjXzDZcjZQxiFumXXx`
+- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-08-31
+- Ended: 2024-08-31

inbox/archive/2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-a-very-unique-title-some-say-its-really-unique.md

@@ -0,0 +1,355 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: A VERY unique title, some say it's... really unique"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/GugKjNpirFNaaRkEStRKGJPnutptsnTA3XuCJ8nwaVtK"
+date: 2024-08-28
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: Unknown
+- Proposal: A VERY unique title, some say it's... really unique
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-08-28
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/GugKjNpirFNaaRkEStRKGJPnutptsnTA3XuCJ8nwaVtK
+- Description: MetaDAO now has a platform for creating and participating in futarchies. The central problem is distributing it: getting people and organizations to use futarchy.
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+One of the ideal use-cases for futarchy is memecoin governance. This is because memecoin holders only want the price of the token to increase. There’s no question of “maybe the market knows what’s the best short-term action, but not the best long-term action.”
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+Coincidentally, there appears to be an opening in the market to launch “pump.fun with a token.” Such a platform may be able to bootstrap adoption by issuing points that convert into a token that receives the revenue generated by the platform.
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+For these reasons, I had the idea to create “futardio,” a memecoin launchpad with said bootstrapping mechanism where a portion of every launched memecoin gets allocated to a futarchy DAO.
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+We are not sure whether it makes sense for MetaDAO to release such a platform. There are potential advantages and potential pitfalls. So we are putting this decision up to the market. \*\*If this proposal passes, MetaDAO will develop and release futardio. If it fails, it will not.\*\*
+
+
+
+\## Details
+
+
+
+The key ideas are expressed in [https://futard.io](https://futard.io).
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+The details of Futardio would be:
+
+
+
+\- A memecoin launchpad where some percentage of every new token’s supply gets allocated to its futarchy DAO
+
+    
+
+\- When users increase key metrics (e.g., volume), they earn points
+
+    
+
+\- After a period of time not exceeding 180 days, these points would convert into a new token (‘$FUTA’)
+
+    
+
+\- FUTA would be distributed to solely two parties: points owners and MetaDAO
+
+    
+
+\- All revenue from Futardio would be distributed to a vault that can be claimed by FUTA holders
+
+    
+
+\- By the time the token is live, Futardio would be immutable and decentralized. The program would be immutable, open-source, and verifiable, with any parameters being governed by MetaDAO. The website would be deployed immutably on IPFS or Arweave. Futardio would be a gambling \[hyperstructure]\(https://jacob.energy/hyperstructures.html).
+
+    
+
+\- The goal would be to launch it in Q3. 
+
+    
+
+\- Nallok and Proph3t wouldn’t be the core team, but they would support a team and fund them with a \\$100k grant paid over 6 months. If a team hasn’t started work by the end of Q3, the money would be returned and the project idea cancelled.
+
+    
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+This would all be left to the discretion of the team building it, but they would be expected to follow the broad outline.
+
+
+
+\## Potential advantages
+
+
+
+\- Drive attention and usage to futarchy
+
+    
+
+
+
+\- More exposure
+
+    
+
+\- More usage helps MetaDAO improve the product
+
+    
+
+\- Provides more proof points of futarchy
+
+    
+
+
+
+\- If MetaDAO sells some of its tokens or stakes them to the vault, it could receive cash to fund future activities
+
+    
+
+\- Create a forcing function to improve the security of the core futarchy platform
+
+    
+
+
+
+\## Potential pitfalls
+
+
+
+\- Makes futarchy look less serious
+
+    
+
+
+
+\- May make it harder to sell DeFi DAOs / non-crypto organizations
+
+    
+
+\- May make it harder to recruit contributors
+
+    
+
+
+
+\- Time & energy investment
+
+    
+
+\- Would prevent MetaDAO from solely focusing on the core platform
+- Categories: {'category': 'Dao'}
+- Discussion: https://discord.gg/dxg65cWB2x
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal aims to create "futardio," a memecoin launchpad that incorporates futarchy by allocating a percentage of each new token's supply to a futarchy DAO, while also enabling users to earn points that convert into a new token ($FUTA).
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+Stakeholders, including memecoin holders and MetaDAO, may benefit from increased engagement and potential revenue through the futardio platform.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+The initiative could drive attention and usage of futarchy, enhancing MetaDAO's visibility and credibility in the crypto ecosystem.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+There is a risk that the association with memecoins could undermine the perceived seriousness of futarchy, potentially complicating future partnerships and recruitment.
+
+## Content
+
+MetaDAO now has a platform for creating and participating in futarchies. The central problem is distributing it: getting people and organizations to use futarchy.
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+One of the ideal use-cases for futarchy is memecoin governance. This is because memecoin holders only want the price of the token to increase. There’s no question of “maybe the market knows what’s the best short-term action, but not the best long-term action.”
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+Coincidentally, there appears to be an opening in the market to launch “pump.fun with a token.” Such a platform may be able to bootstrap adoption by issuing points that convert into a token that receives the revenue generated by the platform.
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+For these reasons, I had the idea to create “futardio,” a memecoin launchpad with said bootstrapping mechanism where a portion of every launched memecoin gets allocated to a futarchy DAO.
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+We are not sure whether it makes sense for MetaDAO to release such a platform. There are potential advantages and potential pitfalls. So we are putting this decision up to the market. \*\*If this proposal passes, MetaDAO will develop and release futardio. If it fails, it will not.\*\*
+
+
+
+\## Details
+
+
+
+The key ideas are expressed in [https://futard.io](https://futard.io).
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+The details of Futardio would be:
+
+
+
+\- A memecoin launchpad where some percentage of every new token’s supply gets allocated to its futarchy DAO
+
+    
+
+\- When users increase key metrics (e.g., volume), they earn points
+
+    
+
+\- After a period of time not exceeding 180 days, these points would convert into a new token (‘$FUTA’)
+
+    
+
+\- FUTA would be distributed to solely two parties: points owners and MetaDAO
+
+    
+
+\- All revenue from Futardio would be distributed to a vault that can be claimed by FUTA holders
+
+    
+
+\- By the time the token is live, Futardio would be immutable and decentralized. The program would be immutable, open-source, and verifiable, with any parameters being governed by MetaDAO. The website would be deployed immutably on IPFS or Arweave. Futardio would be a gambling \[hyperstructure]\(https://jacob.energy/hyperstructures.html).
+
+    
+
+\- The goal would be to launch it in Q3. 
+
+    
+
+\- Nallok and Proph3t wouldn’t be the core team, but they would support a team and fund them with a \\$100k grant paid over 6 months. If a team hasn’t started work by the end of Q3, the money would be returned and the project idea cancelled.
+
+    
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+This would all be left to the discretion of the team building it, but they would be expected to follow the broad outline.
+
+
+
+\## Potential advantages
+
+
+
+\- Drive attention and usage to futarchy
+
+    
+
+
+
+\- More exposure
+
+    
+
+\- More usage helps MetaDAO improve the product
+
+    
+
+\- Provides more proof points of futarchy
+
+    
+
+
+
+\- If MetaDAO sells some of its tokens or stakes them to the vault, it could receive cash to fund future activities
+
+    
+
+\- Create a forcing function to improve the security of the core futarchy platform
+
+    
+
+
+
+\## Potential pitfalls
+
+
+
+\- Makes futarchy look less serious
+
+    
+
+
+
+\- May make it harder to sell DeFi DAOs / non-crypto organizations
+
+    
+
+\- May make it harder to recruit contributors
+
+    
+
+
+
+\- Time & energy investment
+
+    
+
+\- Would prevent MetaDAO from solely focusing on the core platform
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `GugKjNpirFNaaRkEStRKGJPnutptsnTA3XuCJ8nwaVtK`
+- Proposal number: 10
+- DAO account: `GWywkp2mY2vzAaLydR2MBXRCqk2vBTyvtVRioujxi5Ce`
+- Proposer: `Bg4Wmk8QqctppeUGYubGfqBfvf5wUNeHj43kdJV1GeP8`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-09-01
+- Ended: 2024-09-01

inbox/archive/2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-drift-proposal-for-bet.md

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Drift Proposal for B.E.T"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/8cnQAxS3WQXhD2eAjKSJ6wmBwaJskRZFYByMPKEhD1oQ"
+date: 2024-08-28
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: Unknown
+- Proposal: Drift Proposal for B.E.T
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-08-28
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/8cnQAxS3WQXhD2eAjKSJ6wmBwaJskRZFYByMPKEhD1oQ
+- Description: [Drift](https://docs.drift.trade/) is the largest open-sourced perpetual futures exchange built on Solana. Recently, Drift announced B.E.T, Solana’s first capital efficient prediction market. 
+
+
+
+
+
+To celebrate the launch of B.E.T. this proposal would fund a collection of bounties called “Drift Protocol Creator Competition”. 
+
+
+
+
+
+\- The Drift Foundation Grants Program would fund a total prize pool of $8,250.
+
+\- The outcome of the competition will serve in educating the community on and accelerating growth of B.E.T. through community engagement and creative content generation.
+
+
+
+
+
+If the proposal passes the competition would be run through [SuperteamEarn](https://earn.superteam.fun/) and funded in DRIFT token distributed by the Drift Foundation Grants Program.
+
+
+
+
+
+This proposed competition offers three distinct bounty tracks as well as a grand prize, each with its own rewards:
+
+
+
+
+
+\* Grant prize ($3,000)  
+
+\* Make an engaging video on B.E.T ($1,750)  
+
+\* Twitter thread on B.E.T ($1,750)  
+
+\* Share Trade Ideas on B.E.T ($1,750)
+
+
+
+
+
+Each individual contest will have a prize structure of: 
+
+
+
+
+
+\- 1st place: $1000  
+
+\- 2nd place: $500  
+
+\- 3rd place: $250
+
+
+
+
+
+Link to campaign details and evaluation criteria: [Link](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1QB0hPT0R\\_NvVqYh9UcNwRnf9ZE\\_ElWpDOjBLc8XgBAc/edit?usp=sharing)
+- Categories: {'category': 'Dao'}
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal aims to fund a "Drift Protocol Creator Competition" with a total prize pool of $8,250 to promote community engagement and content generation for the B.E.T prediction market.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+The proposal encourages community involvement and education around B.E.T, benefiting both participants and the broader Drift ecosystem.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+Successful execution of the competition could enhance awareness and adoption of B.E.T, driving user engagement and growth.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+There is a risk that the competition may not attract sufficient participation or content quality, potentially limiting its effectiveness in promoting B.E.T.
+
+## Content
+
+[Drift](https://docs.drift.trade/) is the largest open-sourced perpetual futures exchange built on Solana. Recently, Drift announced B.E.T, Solana’s first capital efficient prediction market. 
+
+
+
+
+
+To celebrate the launch of B.E.T. this proposal would fund a collection of bounties called “Drift Protocol Creator Competition”. 
+
+
+
+
+
+\- The Drift Foundation Grants Program would fund a total prize pool of $8,250.
+
+\- The outcome of the competition will serve in educating the community on and accelerating growth of B.E.T. through community engagement and creative content generation.
+
+
+
+
+
+If the proposal passes the competition would be run through [SuperteamEarn](https://earn.superteam.fun/) and funded in DRIFT token distributed by the Drift Foundation Grants Program.
+
+
+
+
+
+This proposed competition offers three distinct bounty tracks as well as a grand prize, each with its own rewards:
+
+
+
+
+
+\* Grant prize ($3,000)  
+
+\* Make an engaging video on B.E.T ($1,750)  
+
+\* Twitter thread on B.E.T ($1,750)  
+
+\* Share Trade Ideas on B.E.T ($1,750)
+
+
+
+
+
+Each individual contest will have a prize structure of: 
+
+
+
+
+
+\- 1st place: $1000  
+
+\- 2nd place: $500  
+
+\- 3rd place: $250
+
+
+
+
+
+Link to campaign details and evaluation criteria: [Link](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1QB0hPT0R\\_NvVqYh9UcNwRnf9ZE\\_ElWpDOjBLc8XgBAc/edit?usp=sharing)
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `8cnQAxS3WQXhD2eAjKSJ6wmBwaJskRZFYByMPKEhD1oQ`
+- Proposal number: 6
+- DAO account: `GWywkp2mY2vzAaLydR2MBXRCqk2vBTyvtVRioujxi5Ce`
+- Proposer: `HwBL75xHHKcXSMNcctq3UqWaEJPDWVQz6NazZJNjWaQc`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-09-01
+- Ended: 2024-09-01

inbox/archive/2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-dummy.md

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Dummy"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/eNPP3Tm4AAyDwq9N4BwJwBzFD14KXDSVY6bhMRaBuFt"
+date: 2024-08-28
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: Test DAO
+- Proposal: Dummy
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-08-28
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/eNPP3Tm4AAyDwq9N4BwJwBzFD14KXDSVY6bhMRaBuFt
+- Description: Nothing
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `eNPP3Tm4AAyDwq9N4BwJwBzFD14KXDSVY6bhMRaBuFt`
+- Proposal number: 9
+- DAO account: `GWywkp2mY2vzAaLydR2MBXRCqk2vBTyvtVRioujxi5Ce`
+- Proposer: `4wDbdWGiMHVyePY2uZn8ru9KZo3jeocZV9p3TUgxvp2y`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-09-01
+- Ended: 2024-09-01

inbox/archive/2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-proposal-7.md

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Proposal #7"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/AuNNyR4oU2zkG1sYBzJ3DJmyDzMKSmSW2yASorWenuC6"
+date: 2024-08-28
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: null-result
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2024-08-28
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "This source contains only metadata about a failed MetaDAO proposal with no proposal text, rationale, market data, or voting details. The source provides verifiable facts (proposal number, accounts, dates, status) but no evidence supporting arguable claims about futarchy mechanisms, governance outcomes, or market behavior. Without proposal content or outcome analysis, there is nothing to extract as claims or enrichments. The existing claim 'MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions' could potentially be enriched if this proposal had volume data, but none is provided. This is purely archival metadata."
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: Unknown
+- Proposal: Proposal #7
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-08-28
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/AuNNyR4oU2zkG1sYBzJ3DJmyDzMKSmSW2yASorWenuC6
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `AuNNyR4oU2zkG1sYBzJ3DJmyDzMKSmSW2yASorWenuC6`
+- Proposal number: 7
+- DAO account: `GWywkp2mY2vzAaLydR2MBXRCqk2vBTyvtVRioujxi5Ce`
+- Proposer: `HwBL75xHHKcXSMNcctq3UqWaEJPDWVQz6NazZJNjWaQc`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-09-01
+- Ended: 2024-09-01
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- MetaDAO Proposal #7 failed (created 2024-08-28, completed 2024-09-01)
+- Proposal account: AuNNyR4oU2zkG1sYBzJ3DJmyDzMKSmSW2yASorWenuC6
+- DAO account: GWywkp2mY2vzAaLydR2MBXRCqk2vBTyvtVRioujxi5Ce
+- Proposer: HwBL75xHHKcXSMNcctq3UqWaEJPDWVQz6NazZJNjWaQc
+- Autocrat version: 0.3

inbox/archive/2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-test-proposal-based-on-metadao-content.md

@@ -0,0 +1,354 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Test Proposal based on MetaDAO Content"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/EmPUGgv2Utzuu2vgSu6GcTRAtJMox5vJeZKi95cBgfJo"
+date: 2024-08-28
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: Unknown
+- Proposal: Test Proposal based on MetaDAO Content
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-08-28
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/EmPUGgv2Utzuu2vgSu6GcTRAtJMox5vJeZKi95cBgfJo
+- Description: MetaDAO now has a platform for creating and participating in futarchies. The central problem is distributing it: getting people and organizations to use futarchy.
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+One of the ideal use-cases for futarchy is memecoin governance. This is because memecoin holders only want the price of the token to increase. There’s no question of “maybe the market knows what’s the best short-term action, but not the best long-term action.”
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+Coincidentally, there appears to be an opening in the market to launch “pump.fun with a token.” Such a platform may be able to bootstrap adoption by issuing points that convert into a token that receives the revenue generated by the platform.
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+For these reasons, I had the idea to create “futardio,” a memecoin launchpad with said bootstrapping mechanism where a portion of every launched memecoin gets allocated to a futarchy DAO.
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+We are not sure whether it makes sense for MetaDAO to release such a platform. There are potential advantages and potential pitfalls. So we are putting this decision up to the market. \*\*If this proposal passes, MetaDAO will develop and release futardio. If it fails, it will not.\*\*
+
+
+
+\## Details
+
+
+
+The key ideas are expressed in [https://futard.io](https://futard.io).
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+The details of Futardio would be:
+
+
+
+\- A memecoin launchpad where some percentage of every new token’s supply gets allocated to its futarchy DAO
+
+    
+
+\- When users increase key metrics (e.g., volume), they earn points
+
+    
+
+\- After a period of time not exceeding 180 days, these points would convert into a new token (‘$FUTA’)
+
+    
+
+\- FUTA would be distributed to solely two parties: points owners and MetaDAO
+
+    
+
+\- All revenue from Futardio would be distributed to a vault that can be claimed by FUTA holders
+
+    
+
+\- By the time the token is live, Futardio would be immutable and decentralized. The program would be immutable, open-source, and verifiable, with any parameters being governed by MetaDAO. The website would be deployed immutably on IPFS or Arweave. Futardio would be a gambling \[hyperstructure]\(https://jacob.energy/hyperstructures.html).
+
+    
+
+\- The goal would be to launch it in Q3. 
+
+    
+
+\- Nallok and Proph3t wouldn’t be the core team, but they would support a team and fund them with a \\$100k grant paid over 6 months. If a team hasn’t started work by the end of Q3, the money would be returned and the project idea cancelled.
+
+    
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+This would all be left to the discretion of the team building it, but they would be expected to follow the broad outline.
+
+
+
+\## Potential advantages
+
+
+
+\- Drive attention and usage to futarchy
+
+    
+
+
+
+\- More exposure
+
+    
+
+\- More usage helps MetaDAO improve the product
+
+    
+
+\- Provides more proof points of futarchy
+
+    
+
+
+
+\- If MetaDAO sells some of its tokens or stakes them to the vault, it could receive cash to fund future activities
+
+    
+
+\- Create a forcing function to improve the security of the core futarchy platform
+
+    
+
+
+
+\## Potential pitfalls
+
+
+
+\- Makes futarchy look less serious
+
+    
+
+
+
+\- May make it harder to sell DeFi DAOs / non-crypto organizations
+
+    
+
+\- May make it harder to recruit contributors
+
+    
+
+
+
+\- Time & energy investment
+
+    
+
+\- Would prevent MetaDAO from solely focusing on the core platform
+- Categories: {'category': 'Treasury'}
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal aims to develop "futardio," a memecoin launchpad that allocates a percentage of new token supplies to a futarchy DAO, while incentivizing user engagement through a points system that converts to a new token, $FUTA.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+Stakeholders, including memecoin holders and MetaDAO, could benefit from increased engagement and revenue generation through the futardio platform.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+Successful implementation could drive attention to futarchy, enhance its credibility, and provide funding for future MetaDAO initiatives.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+There is a risk that the association with memecoins could undermine the perceived seriousness of futarchy, potentially hindering recruitment and partnerships with traditional organizations.
+
+## Content
+
+MetaDAO now has a platform for creating and participating in futarchies. The central problem is distributing it: getting people and organizations to use futarchy.
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+One of the ideal use-cases for futarchy is memecoin governance. This is because memecoin holders only want the price of the token to increase. There’s no question of “maybe the market knows what’s the best short-term action, but not the best long-term action.”
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+Coincidentally, there appears to be an opening in the market to launch “pump.fun with a token.” Such a platform may be able to bootstrap adoption by issuing points that convert into a token that receives the revenue generated by the platform.
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+For these reasons, I had the idea to create “futardio,” a memecoin launchpad with said bootstrapping mechanism where a portion of every launched memecoin gets allocated to a futarchy DAO.
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+We are not sure whether it makes sense for MetaDAO to release such a platform. There are potential advantages and potential pitfalls. So we are putting this decision up to the market. \*\*If this proposal passes, MetaDAO will develop and release futardio. If it fails, it will not.\*\*
+
+
+
+\## Details
+
+
+
+The key ideas are expressed in [https://futard.io](https://futard.io).
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+The details of Futardio would be:
+
+
+
+\- A memecoin launchpad where some percentage of every new token’s supply gets allocated to its futarchy DAO
+
+    
+
+\- When users increase key metrics (e.g., volume), they earn points
+
+    
+
+\- After a period of time not exceeding 180 days, these points would convert into a new token (‘$FUTA’)
+
+    
+
+\- FUTA would be distributed to solely two parties: points owners and MetaDAO
+
+    
+
+\- All revenue from Futardio would be distributed to a vault that can be claimed by FUTA holders
+
+    
+
+\- By the time the token is live, Futardio would be immutable and decentralized. The program would be immutable, open-source, and verifiable, with any parameters being governed by MetaDAO. The website would be deployed immutably on IPFS or Arweave. Futardio would be a gambling \[hyperstructure]\(https://jacob.energy/hyperstructures.html).
+
+    
+
+\- The goal would be to launch it in Q3. 
+
+    
+
+\- Nallok and Proph3t wouldn’t be the core team, but they would support a team and fund them with a \\$100k grant paid over 6 months. If a team hasn’t started work by the end of Q3, the money would be returned and the project idea cancelled.
+
+    
+
+
+
+  
+
+
+
+This would all be left to the discretion of the team building it, but they would be expected to follow the broad outline.
+
+
+
+\## Potential advantages
+
+
+
+\- Drive attention and usage to futarchy
+
+    
+
+
+
+\- More exposure
+
+    
+
+\- More usage helps MetaDAO improve the product
+
+    
+
+\- Provides more proof points of futarchy
+
+    
+
+
+
+\- If MetaDAO sells some of its tokens or stakes them to the vault, it could receive cash to fund future activities
+
+    
+
+\- Create a forcing function to improve the security of the core futarchy platform
+
+    
+
+
+
+\## Potential pitfalls
+
+
+
+\- Makes futarchy look less serious
+
+    
+
+
+
+\- May make it harder to sell DeFi DAOs / non-crypto organizations
+
+    
+
+\- May make it harder to recruit contributors
+
+    
+
+
+
+\- Time & energy investment
+
+    
+
+\- Would prevent MetaDAO from solely focusing on the core platform
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `EmPUGgv2Utzuu2vgSu6GcTRAtJMox5vJeZKi95cBgfJo`
+- Proposal number: 8
+- DAO account: `GWywkp2mY2vzAaLydR2MBXRCqk2vBTyvtVRioujxi5Ce`
+- Proposer: `HwBL75xHHKcXSMNcctq3UqWaEJPDWVQz6NazZJNjWaQc`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-09-01
+- Ended: 2024-09-01

inbox/archive/2024-08-30-futardio-proposal-approve-budget-for-pre-governance-hackathon-development.md

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Approve Budget for Pre-Governance Hackathon Development"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/2LKqzegdHrcrrRCHSuTS2fMjjJuZDfzuRKMnzPhzeD42"
+date: 2024-08-30
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: FutureDAO
+- Proposal: Approve Budget for Pre-Governance Hackathon Development
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-08-30
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/2LKqzegdHrcrrRCHSuTS2fMjjJuZDfzuRKMnzPhzeD42
+- Description: Approve a $25,000 budget for the development of Future's Pre-Governance Mandates tool and entry of the tool into the Solana Hackathon known as Radar. 
+- Categories: {'category': 'Dao'}
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+Approve a $25,000 budget for developing the Pre-Governance Mandates tool to enhance community engagement and decision-making in DAOs, with plans to enter it into the Solana Radar Hackathon.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+DAOs and crypto projects will gain access to improved tools for community engagement and proposal development, leading to better governance outcomes.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+The tool has the potential to significantly increase user engagement and the quality of governance proposals, positioning Future as a leader in DAO governance solutions.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+There is a risk that the tool may not achieve sufficient adoption or engagement, potentially leading to unmet expectations and financial losses.
+
+## Content
+
+## TLDR 
+
+Approve a $25,000 budget for the development of Future's Pre-Governance Mandates tool and entry of the tool into the Solana Hackathon known as Radar. This project will revolutionize decision-making in DAOs by bridging the gap between community engagement and formal governance, positioning Future as a contender in the DAO governance world. 
+
+Our aim is not to compete, but rather compliment the work of established governance players such as MetaDAO, Realms, Squads or Align. All DAOs will benefit from access to Future Pre-Governance Mandates.
+
+---
+
+**Overview** 
+
+This proposal seeks approval for the development and budget allocation for Future's Pre-Governance Mandates tool, which will be entered into the Solana Radar Hackathon (September 1 - October 8, 2024).
+
+- **Target Customer:** 
+    
+    - Solana-based DAOs and crypto projects seeking improved community engagement and decision-making processes.
+        
+    - Professional proposal builders looking for tools to make drafting successful governance proposals easier.
+        
+- **Problem Solved:** Traditional decision-making methods in DAOs often lead to low engagement and potentially problematic outcomes. There's a critical need for a tool that can efficiently gather community input, analyze complex issues, and refine proposals before formal governance votes.
+    
+- **Monetization:** There are several potential models for monetization, including but not limited to: $FUTURE staking, Monthly Payments, Pay-as-you-go etc.
+    
+- **Key Metrics:**
+    
+    - **Number of DAOs onboarded**
+        
+    - **User engagement rates**
+        
+    - **Quality and quantity of proposals generated**
+        
+- **Value Creation:** The tool will provide DAOs with deeper insights into stakeholder sentiment, increase participation, and lead to more informed governance decisions.
+    
+- **Total Budget:** $25,000 USD
+    
+    - This budget covers the entire hackathon duration and production of an MVP “Mandate” tool.
+        
+
+---
+
+**Problem** 
+
+Governance is so much more than voting. Key decisions must be made by community leaders and members throughout the governance process, particularly leading up to formal submission of proposals. There are very few tools to support this process, and those that exist often lead to decisive discourse and low engagement. Our tool facilitates engagement between community leaders, community members and the wider web3 ecosystem to produce well-thought out, well-supported and secure proposals prior to their submission.
+
+---
+
+**Design** 
+
+**Product Description:** The Pre-Governance Mandates tool is a dApp-based solution combining a powerful decision-making engine with customizable surveys. It will leverage blockchain and (eventually) AI technology to provide impactful data. Innovative features like Blinks will allow DAOs to find feedback where their stakeholders are.
+
+**Key Features:**
+
+1. Multi-Criteria Decision-Making Engine
+    
+2. Customizable Survey System
+    
+3. Web3 Integration (Solana wallet connect, Blinks)
+    
+4. AI-Powered Analysis Tool
+    
+5. Mandates Dashboard
+    
+
+---
+
+**Business** 
+
+**Budget:**
+
+- Decision-Making Engine & API Upgrades - $5000
+    
+- Mandates Wizard Upgrades - $3000
+    
+- dApp Build (Frontend) - $7000
+    
+- dApp Build (Backend) - $5000
+    
+- Documentation & Graphics - $5000
+    
+
+**Expected Impact:**
+
+- Increased community engagement in DAOs
+    
+- Higher quality proposals and more informed decision-making
+    
+- Positioning Future as a leader in DAO governance solutions on Solana
+    
+
+---
+
+**Monetization** 
+
+_Future will not rush monetization on this product. The objective is to accumulate power-users. The ideas below are simply that, ideas._
+
+**Future Revenue Streams:**
+
+- **Staking**: DAOs stake Future tokens for unlimited access
+    
+- **One-time payments:** Purchasable in $FUTURE
+    
+    - 70% returned to NFT stakers
+        
+    - 30% sent to treasury
+        
+- **Subscription Model**:
+    
+- **Consultancy:** Professional mandate curation
+    
+
+_Whatever the model, it will benefit $FUTURE_
+
+**About Future:** 
+
+Future is building a comprehensive pre-governance platform for DAOs and crypto projects on Solana. By leveraging advanced decision-making tools, Web3 technologies, and AI-powered insights, Future aims to revolutionize how decentralized communities make decisions and engage their stakeholders.
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `2LKqzegdHrcrrRCHSuTS2fMjjJuZDfzuRKMnzPhzeD42`
+- Proposal number: 4
+- DAO account: `ofvb3CPvEyRfD5az8PAqW6ATpPqVBeiB5zBnpPR5cgm`
+- Proposer: `E2BjNZBAnT6yM52AANm2zDJ1ZLRQqEF6gbPqFZ51AJQh`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-09-02
+- Ended: 2024-09-02

inbox/archive/2024-08-31-futardio-proposal-enter-services-agreement-with-organization-technology-llc.md

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Enter Services Agreement with Organization Technology LLC?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/53EDms4zPkp4khbwBT3eXWhMALiMwssg7f5zckq22tH5"
+date: 2024-08-31
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Enter Services Agreement with Organization Technology LLC?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-08-31
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/53EDms4zPkp4khbwBT3eXWhMALiMwssg7f5zckq22tH5
+- Description: To support MetaDAO’s operations, we have created a US entity as a vehicle for paying MetaDAO contributors. We are creating this proposal with a memo instruction to agree and sign the services agreement, which is legally binding as defined in MetaDAO LLC’s operating agreement. 
+- Categories: {'category': 'Dao'}, {'category': 'Governance'}
+- Discussion: https://discord.gg/xFgPvnrcUc
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points
+The proposal seeks to enter a services agreement with Organization Technology LLC to facilitate payments to MetaDAO contributors, ensuring that all intellectual property remains owned by MetaDAO LLC and establishing a framework for costs and responsibilities.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact
+This agreement will enable MetaDAO contributors to receive compensation through a structured entity, enhancing operational efficiency.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential
+The establishment of a US entity and clear financial management could streamline operations and support the growth of MetaDAO.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors
+There is a risk of financial burden with an annualized burn of $1.378M, which could impact MetaDAO's sustainability if not managed carefully.
+
+## Content
+
+#### Type
+
+Operations Direct Action
+
+#### Author(s)
+
+Nallok, Proph3t
+
+### Overview
+
+Four weeks ago, MetaDAO completed its strategic partnership as part of [Proposal 19](https://futarchy.metadao.fi/metadao/proposals/9BMRY1HBe61MJoKEd9AAW5iNQyws2vGK6vuL49oR3AzX). To support MetaDAO’s operations, we have created a US entity as a vehicle for paying MetaDAO contributors.
+
+Of note is:
+
+- This entity does not have nor will own any intellectual property, all efforts produced are owned by MetaDAO LLC.  
+- This entity will be responsible for the costs of services and development and not have authority to encumber MetaDAO LLC.
+
+We are creating this proposal with a memo instruction to agree and sign the services agreement, which is legally binding as defined in MetaDAO LLC’s operating agreement. You can review this agreement here:
+
+[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1vvl94DpvSpJoPGFyESs1TbGpnNf6zGBYp5a-5wwGXgM](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1vvl94DpvSpJoPGFyESs1TbGpnNf6zGBYp5a-5wwGXgM)
+
+If passed this proposal will execute  the memo instructions which will act as a countersignatory to the agreement. The first disbursement from MetaDAO LLC to the entity will occur on September 1st, 2024 or when passed, whichever is later.
+
+This agreement can be canceled by the DAO with a 30 day notice or immediately through material breach of contract by either party. A 30 day notice and cancellation would need to be executed through a proposal.
+
+If any significant material expense is to be assessed or significant changes to the contract are to be made, those shall be put through the governance process of MetaDAO.
+
+- The expected annualized burn is $1.378M.  
+- You can read about our [Q3 Roadmap](https://futarchy.metadao.fi/metadao/proposals/7AbivixQZTrgnqpmyxW2j1dd4Jyy15K3T2T7MEgfg8DZ).  
+- For where current numbers in the agreement were arrived at you can review the [alignment proposal](https://futarchy.metadao.fi/metadao/proposals/BgHv9GutbnsXZLZQHqPL8BbGWwtcaRDWx82aeRMNmJbG).
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `53EDms4zPkp4khbwBT3eXWhMALiMwssg7f5zckq22tH5`
+- Proposal number: 6
+- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
+- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-09-03
+- Ended: 2024-09-03

inbox/archive/2024-09-05-futardio-proposal-my-test-proposal-that-rocksswd.md

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+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: My Test Proposal That Rocksswd"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/evGundfgMRZWCYsGF7GMKcgh6LjxDTFrvWRAhxiQS8h"
+date: 2024-09-05
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: null-result
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2024-09-05
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "This is a test proposal on futard.io with no substantive content. The proposal ('I Need Stir Fry on Friday') is a mock governance submission about establishing a community stir-fry tradition. It contains no evidence, data, or arguable claims relevant to Teleo domains. The proposal failed and appears to be a platform functionality test rather than a genuine governance proposal. No extractable claims or enrichments."
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: Unknown
+- Proposal: My Test Proposal That Rocksswd
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-09-05
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/evGundfgMRZWCYsGF7GMKcgh6LjxDTFrvWRAhxiQS8h
+- Description: I Need Stir Fry on Friday
+Welcome to the "I Need Stir Fry on Friday" proposal! 🍜 We're here to bring the community together with a bold idea: let’s make Friday Stir Fry Night a reality!
+- Categories: {'category': 'Treasury'}, {'category': 'Dao'}
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal aims to establish a community tradition of "Stir Fry Fridays" by encouraging participation, sharing recipes, and partnering with local farmers for fresh ingredients.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+Community members will benefit from enhanced social interaction and access to fresh, healthy meal options.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+The initiative has the potential to foster community engagement, creativity in cooking, and support for local agriculture.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+Challenges may arise in maintaining consistent participation and managing the logistics of recipe sharing and ingredient sourcing.
+
+## Content
+
+# I Need Stir Fry on Friday
+
+Welcome to the **"I Need Stir Fry on Friday"** proposal! 🍜 We're here to bring the community together with a bold idea: let’s make **Friday Stir Fry Night** a reality!
+
+[Stir Fry](https://via.placeholder.com/400x200.png?text=Stir+Fry+Friday)  
+*Who wouldn't want this?*
+
+## Why Stir Fry? 🍲
+
+Stir fry is not just food, it's an experience. Here's why we think **Stir Fry on Friday** should be our new tradition:
+
+- **Fast and Fresh**: Stir fry is quick to prepare and uses fresh ingredients, making it a healthy and convenient choice for everyone.
+- **Customizable**: You can add your favorite veggies, proteins, and sauces to create a dish that suits your tastes.
+- **Great for Groups**: It's easy to prepare in large quantities, making it perfect for community gatherings.
+
+Check out this [Stir Fry Inspiration](https://example.com/stirfry-inspo) for ideas on how you can get creative with your stir fry!
+
+## Key Ingredients for Success
+
+To make **Stir Fry Friday** happen, here's what we need:
+
+1. **Community Participation**  
+   We want everyone to get involved! Share your favorite stir fry recipes, host cooking streams, or even organize local cook-offs.
+
+2. **Weekly Themes**  
+   Each Friday will have a different theme to keep things exciting:
+   - **Spicy Stir Fry** 🌶️
+   - **Vegetarian Delight** 🥦
+   - **Noodles Galore** 🍜
+   - **Fusion Friday** (mixing cuisines for fun new flavors)
+
+3. **Recipe Sharing Platform**  
+   We’ll create a simple platform where people can upload their stir fry creations, share tips, and vote on the best recipes each week.
+
+4. **Partnerships with Local Farmers**  
+   Let’s support local! We aim to partner with farmers to supply fresh, organic produce for our stir fry events.
+
+## How We Can Make It Happen
+
+Here’s the plan to get the ball (or wok) rolling:
+
+- **Phase 1: Community Outreach** (Month 1)
+  - Spread the word on social media and the community forums.
+  - Get feedback from everyone on how they envision Stir Fry Fridays.
+  
+- **Phase 2: Recipe Collection & Voting** (Month 2)
+  - Create a system where people can submit recipes and vote for their favorites.
+  
+- **Phase 3: Launch Stir Fry Friday!** (Month 3)
+  - Host our first official Stir Fry Friday event! 🍴
+
+## What We Need from You
+
+Your support will help us:
+
+- Build the recipe-sharing platform.
+- Promote the event and encourage community involvement.
+- Partner with local farmers for fresh ingredients.
+
+Join the discussion on our [Stir Fry Friday Forum](https://example.com/forum) and share your thoughts!
+
+## Stir Fry FAQs 🔥
+
+**Q: Can I participate if I’ve never made stir fry before?**  
+A: Absolutely! We’ll be sharing beginner-friendly recipes and hosting live demos to help everyone get started.
+
+**Q: How will we decide the weekly themes?**  
+A: Themes will be chosen by community vote on our platform, so make sure to stay involved!
+
+---
+
+Thank you for supporting **"I Need Stir Fry on Friday"**! With your help, we can make Fridays more flavorful. Don’t forget to bring your wok and get ready to stir things up! 🔥🍲
+
+![Friday Fun](https://via.placeholder.com/400x200.png?text=Friday+Fun)
+
+**Let’s make Stir Fry Fridays a delicious new tradition!**
+
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `evGundfgMRZWCYsGF7GMKcgh6LjxDTFrvWRAhxiQS8h`
+- Proposal number: 12
+- DAO account: `GWywkp2mY2vzAaLydR2MBXRCqk2vBTyvtVRioujxi5Ce`
+- Proposer: `HwBL75xHHKcXSMNcctq3UqWaEJPDWVQz6NazZJNjWaQc`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-09-13
+- Ended: 2024-09-09
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- Proposal evGundfgMRZWCYsGF7GMKcgh6LjxDTFrvWRAhxiQS8h on futard.io failed (2024-09-05 to 2024-09-09)
+- Proposal was categorized under Treasury and DAO
+- Proposal number 12 on DAO account GWywkp2mY2vzAaLydR2MBXRCqk2vBTyvtVRioujxi5Ce
+- Used Autocrat version 0.3

inbox/archive/2024-10-10-futardio-proposal-treasury-proposal-deans-list-proposal.md

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+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Treasury Proposal (Dean's List Proposal)"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/8SwPfzKhaZ2SQfgfJYfeVRTXALZs2qyFj7kX1dEkd29h"
+date: 2024-10-10
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: IslandDAO
+- Proposal: Treasury Proposal (Dean's List Proposal)
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-10-10
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/8SwPfzKhaZ2SQfgfJYfeVRTXALZs2qyFj7kX1dEkd29h
+- Description: This proposal seeks to establish a reserve within the Dean's List treasury on Realms, aimed at ensuring financial stability and enabling long-term growth. 
+- Categories: {'category': 'Treasury'}
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal aims to establish a treasury reserve funded by 2.5% of USDC payments to ensure financial stability and support long-term growth for the DAO. It emphasizes community engagement and transparency through regular performance reporting and asset risk scoring.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+Stakeholders will benefit from improved financial security and the opportunity to influence treasury management decisions through community feedback.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+The reserve could enhance the DAO's resilience during economic downturns while enabling growth through a diversified, low-risk asset portfolio.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+The proposal carries risks related to asset volatility and reliance on community input, which may affect decision-making and financial outcomes.
+
+## Content
+
+This proposal seeks to establish a reserve within the Dean's List treasury on Realms, aimed at ensuring financial stability and enabling long-term growth. The reserve will be funded by allocating 2.5% of all USDC payments received by the DAO, with the treasury being managed by Kai (@DeFi\_Kai), and ongoing input and feedback from the community.
+
+The reserved funds will be securely held in our **Mango Delegate Account via Realms**. Potential diversification options include low-risk assets like USDY (Yield-bearing USD) and riskier assets like JLP (Jupiter Liquidity Pools).
+
+*Comprehensive reports will be provided for each asset in the portfolio.*
+
+### Treasury Management & Oversight
+
+To ensure transparency and accountability, it’s suggested that Kai’s role as Treasury Manager be subject to a quarterly review. At the end of each quarter, Kai will submit a comprehensive performance report and proposal. These reports will include a detailed analysis of the following:
+
+- **PNL (Profit and Loss):** A breakdown of gains or losses incurred during the quarter.  
+- **Strategy Success Rates:** Evaluation of implemented strategies and their effectiveness.  
+- **Future Proposals:** Recommendations for any new strategies or changes based on market conditions and community feedback.
+
+#### Whitelisted Assets
+
+Each asset proposed for the treasury should be evaluated according to a risk score. The risk score is a value that rates assets from 0 (risky) to 1 (safe).
+
+_The risk score (Rs) in this proposal is based on early calculations and methods that are still being worked on. While we plan to finish the full risk scoring system by next quarter, please note that the current numbers might not show all important risk factors yet_
+
+$ Rs=(w1⋅Volatility)+(w2⋅Liquidity Risk)+(w3⋅Market Cap Risk)+(w4⋅Historical Drawdown Risk) $
+
+- Volatility Weight (w1): 0.4  
+- Liquidity Risk Weight (w2): 0.2  
+- Market Cap Risk Weight (w3): 0.3  
+- Drawdown Risk Weight (w4): 0.1
+
+**Volatility:** Historical standard deviation of daily returns (normalized as decimal i.e. 70% \= 0.7).   
+**Volume:** Measure trading volume relative to liquidity over the past 90 days. OR define a benchmark for volume and compare the asset's volume to the benchmark.   
+**Market Cap Risk:** Comparing asset market caps to a benchmark marketcap.   
+**Drawdown risk:** The largest percentage drop in the value of an asset from its peak to its trough. (normalized as decimal i.e. 70% \= 0.7)
+
+**Assets with an RS \<= .5 are risky, and assets with an RS \>= .5 are considered safer.**  
+
+The portfolio will consist of an 80/20 split, with 80% of the portfolio being safe assets and the remaining 20% consisting of risky assets. 
+
+Any asset proposed by Dean’s List Citizens must be scored and compared to the current assets in the treasury. Before implementation, the asset will be judged on its ability to:
+
+1. Increase overall returns.  
+2. Offer diversification (when required).  
+3. Replace a similar asset with a lower risk score.
+
+The weight of the newly proposed asset (compared to the treasury) will be assessed to achieve the highest and safest returns. 
+
+## Budget
+
+- Performance fee: 5% of the treasury's quarterly profit.   
+- At the end of each quarter, a 3-month vesting contract will be created, totaling 5% of the treasury's profits for the previous quarter.
+
+### Goals of the Proposal:
+
+1. Establish a Treasury Reserve:  
+   1. Create a dedicated reserve fund to serve as a financial buffer for the DAO, particularly in "rainy day" scenarios (e.g., significant economic downturns, emergency DAO funding needs).  
+   2. This reserve will focus on risk mitigation and capital preservation, ensuring that the DAO remains resilient in times of uncertainty.  
+2. Support DAO Longevity and Growth:  
+   1. Enable potential growth of the reserve through a diversified, risk-averse portfolio, focusing on stable and USD-backed assets. This will allow the DAO to balance liquidity needs while pursuing low-risk yield opportunities.  
+3. Community Engagement and Feedback:  
+   1. Community members will have the opportunity to contribute their perspectives and insights into asset diversification, helping guide treasury decisions to align with the collective best interests of the DAO.
+
+#### TWAP
+TWAP 3% Increase Requirement:
+
+Current MCAP: 523k USDC
+Target MCAP: 539k USDC
+
+\$DEAN Price Prediction (3% TWAP):  
+
+Current \$DEAN Price: 0.005227 USDC
+Target \$DEAN Price: 0.005383 USDC
+
+### Deliverables for First Quarter (after proposal):
+
+1. Define Rainy Day Scenarios:  
+   1. Collaborate with the community to establish clear guidelines on what qualifies as a "rainy day" event, specifying the conditions in which the reserve can be accessed.  
+2. Produce Initial Treasury Reports:  
+   1. Deliver comprehensive reports covering the following metrics:  
+      1. Treasury growth since the reserve was established.  
+      2. Current asset allocation and diversification.  
+         1. Expected return calculation   
+         2. Sharpe Ratio for Risk-adjusted Performance   
+         3. Maximum Drawdown   
+      3. Projections of future treasury growth based on ongoing strategies.  
+      4. Actual returns vs. expected returns.  
+      5. A summary of risk management efforts.
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `8SwPfzKhaZ2SQfgfJYfeVRTXALZs2qyFj7kX1dEkd29h`
+- Proposal number: 4
+- DAO account: `9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ`
+- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-10-14
+- Ended: 2024-10-14

inbox/archive/2024-10-22-futardio-proposal-hire-advaith-sekharan-as-founding-engineer.md

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+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Hire Advaith Sekharan as Founding Engineer?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/B82Dw1W6cfngH7BRukAyKXvXzP4T2cDsxwKYfxCftoC2"
+date: 2024-10-22
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Hire Advaith Sekharan as Founding Engineer?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-10-22
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/B82Dw1W6cfngH7BRukAyKXvXzP4T2cDsxwKYfxCftoC2
+- Description: Hire Advaith Sekharan as founding engineer
+- Categories: {'category': 'Dao'}, {'category': 'Treasury'}
+- Discussion: https://discord.gg/JeZpUBc8ab
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal seeks to hire Advaith Sekharan as a founding engineer with a salary of $180,000 per year and a fixed allocation of 237 META tokens, with specific vesting and unlocking criteria.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+This hiring decision directly impacts the core team composition and operational capabilities of MetaDAO.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+Adding a highly-engaged engineer could enhance MetaDAO's development capacity and innovation potential.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+The long vesting period and clawback provisions may limit immediate access to incentives and could deter some potential candidates.
+
+## Content
+
+**Type**  
+Operations Direct Action
+
+**Author(s)**  
+Nallok, Proph3t 
+
+**Overview**  
+As specified in “[MetaDAO Fundraise \#2](https://futarchy.metadao.fi/metadao/proposals/9BMRY1HBe61MJoKEd9AAW5iNQyws2vGK6vuL49oR3AzX),” our goal is to build a core team in San Francisco. At this stage, we’ve found a highly-engaged candidate for the founding engineer role: Advaith Sekharan. We propose extending an offer to Advaith for $180,000 per year cash compensation and 1% of the token supply subject to the same terms as our [co-founder allocation](https://futarchy.metadao.fi/metadao/proposals/BgHv9GutbnsXZLZQHqPL8BbGWwtcaRDWx82aeRMNmJbG).
+
+**Specifications**  
+The terms of its release would be the same as Nallok and Proph3t, except that the vest would begin in November 2024\. Specifically:
+
+- **Fixed Token Allocation**: If you exclude DAO holdings, the supply of META is 19,755.7. If you include Nallok and Proph3t’s potential allocation, the supply of META is 23,705.7. 1% of that is 237 META. So Advaith’s allocation would be 237 META, fixed regardless of future dilution.  
+- **Linear Unlocks**: 100% would unlock at a \$5B market cap, with linear unlocks depending on price. For example, a \$500M market cap would release 10% of the allocation or 23.7 META.  
+- **Unlock Criteria**: Decided at a later date, potentially using a simple moving average (SMA) over a month or an option-based system.  
+- **Start Date**: November 2024 for the purposes of vesting. October 16th for the purposes of retroactive salary.   
+- **Vesting Period**: No tokens unlock before November 2028, no matter what milestones are hit. This signals long-term commitment to building the business.  
+- **Illiquid Vest**: The DAO can claw back all tokens until July 2025 (8 months from start). Thereafter, tokens vest into a smart contract / multisig that can't be accessed by Proph3t or Nallok.  
+- **Market Cap Definition**: \$1B market cap is defined as a price of \$42,198 per META. Payouts are based on the value per META, not total market capitalization.
+
+[Github](https://github.com/advaith101)
+
+[LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/in/advaith-sekharan-78b52b277/)
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `B82Dw1W6cfngH7BRukAyKXvXzP4T2cDsxwKYfxCftoC2`
+- Proposal number: 7
+- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
+- Proposer: `613BRiXuAEn7vibs2oAYzpGW9fXgjzDNuFMM4wPzLdY`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-10-26
+- Ended: 2024-10-26

inbox/archive/2024-10-22-futardio-proposal-increase-ore-sol-lp-boost-multiplier-to-6x.md

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+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Increase ORE-SOL LP boost multiplier to 6x"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubAC"
+date: 2024-10-22
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: ORE
+- Proposal: Increase ORE-SOL LP boost multiplier to 6x
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-10-22
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubAC
+- Description: This proposal seeks to increase the boost multiplier for ORE-SOL LP to 6x (from the current 4x). 
+- Categories: {'category': 'Dao'}
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points
+The proposal aims to increase the ORE-SOL LP boost multiplier from 4x to 6x to enhance liquidity, gather data on boost impacts, and explore the application of futarchy within the ORE community.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact
+Liquidity providers may benefit from increased incentives, potentially leading to a more robust trading environment.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential
+The higher multiplier could attract more liquidity, improving market depth and overall trading efficiency.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors
+Increasing the multiplier may not adequately mitigate the risks faced by liquidity providers, potentially leading to reduced participation if market volatility persists.
+
+## Content
+
+## Summary
+
+This proposal seeks to increase the boost multiplier for ORE-SOL LP to 6x (from the current 4x). 
+
+## Overview
+
+Boosts are an ORE-native incentive mechanism for turning capital into “virtual hashpower”. They allow miners to stake select tokens and earn multipliers on their mining rewards. Currently, ORE supports boost multipliers for 3 different tokens:
+
+- ORE-SOL LP (4x)
+- ORE-ISC LP (4x)
+- ORE (2x)
+
+With the launch of boosts just over one week ago, ORE saw a significant rise in the total value of liquidity provided to the boosted trading pools. This proposal seeks to increase the multiplier for the ORE-SOL LP to further increase liquidity and better understand how boost multipliers affect the targeted markets. 
+
+## Objectives
+
+1. Increase TVL in the ORE-SOL liquidity pool.
+    * Liquidity providers take on a lot of risk, especially for volatile trading pairs such as ORE and SOL. To increase liquidity in these markets, the incentives for liquidity providers have to counterbalance the risks.
+    * By increasing the ORE-SOL LP multiplier to 6x, we can offer greater incentives for ORE-SOL liquidity providers and potentially increase the overall market depth.
+2. Gather data to understand how changes in boost multipliers affect the liquidity.
+    * Boosts are only 1 week old. The passing of this proposal would mark the first time any multiplier has been changed. 
+    * By increasing the ORE-SOL LP multiplier to 6x, we can gather more data from the market and better understand how changes to boosts multipliers affect the overall ORE liquidity network.
+3. Introduce futarchy to the ORE community.
+    * Futarchy has recently emerged as a novel governance mechanism for teams across crypto. It has potential applications for ORE ranging from small operational decisions to the management of critical systems such as the supply function.
+    * Futarchy is still a very nascent technology and before we can seriously consider integrating it into critical ORE systems, we need to understand it better. This proposal is intended to serve as a low-risk testrun for the ORE community to learn more about futarchy and how it works.
+
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubAC`
+- Proposal number: 1
+- DAO account: `7XoddQu6HtEeHZowzCEwKiFJg4zR3BXUqMygvwPwSB1D`
+- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-10-26
+- Ended: 2024-10-26

inbox/archive/2024-10-30-futardio-proposal-swap-150000-into-isc.md

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Swap $150,000 into ISC?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/Gp3ANMRTdGLPNeMGFUrzVFaodouwJSEXHbg5rFUi9roJ"
+date: 2024-10-30
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: MetaDAO
+- Proposal: Swap $150,000 into ISC?
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-10-30
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/Gp3ANMRTdGLPNeMGFUrzVFaodouwJSEXHbg5rFUi9roJ
+- Description: If executed, this proposal would convert $150,000 of MetaDAO's treasury into $ISC, a Solana-native stablecoin
+- Categories: {'category': 'Treasury'}
+- Discussion: https://discord.gg/V4TSWuCc3X
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+MetaDAO proposes to swap $150,000 USDC (approximately 6.8% of its treasury) for ISC to hedge against dollar devaluation and encourage other DAOs to adopt similar treasury strategies.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+This move aims to protect MetaDAO's treasury value while potentially benefiting other DAOs through the promotion of innovative governance structures.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+Holding ISC may help maintain the value of MetaDAO's treasury over time due to its inflation-resistant design.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+The proposal carries risks such as the potential for ISC to lose value against the USD, given its nascent stage and smaller market presence compared to USDC.
+
+## Content
+
+**Type**
+Operations Direct Action
+
+**Author(s)**
+@Richard_ISC
+
+**Overview**
+
+MetaDAO has approximately \$2.2M in USDC in its treasury.
+
+This poses a risk to the DAO given that the US Dollar has been losing value at an increasing rate. The dollar has lost 17.8% of its value since 2020. Due to the debt situation, we don’t expect this to be resolved soon, if ever. 
+
+\$ISC was built specifically to solve this issue. ISC is an inflation-resistant stable currency built on Solana. It was launched at the Solana Hacker House in HCMC on 2023-03-17 at a price of \$1.545. It is now trading at \$1.81.
+
+Not pegged to USD, ISC is collateralized by a basket of financial assets. This basket consists of 20% cash, 20% commodities, 20% treasuries, 20% bonds, and 20% equities. 
+
+If the proposal passes, MetaDAO will swap 150,000 USDC of its treasury (~6.8%) for ISC. 
+
+Details: 
+
+MetaDAO would execute a DCA order on jup.ag using the following parameters:
+
+
+Amount: 150,000 USDC
+To buy: ISC
+Every: 1 hours
+Over: 10 orders
+Min price: 1.7
+Max Price: 1.9
+
+The ISC team would encourage other DAOs to use MetaDAO Futarchy for similar treasury swap proposals. This could easily turn into a win-win-win. 
+
+Once the ISC DAO is set up, ISC would commit to use MetaDAO for part of its governance. Example proposals that we have in mind:
+- Remove Freeze authority
+- Changes in the basket
+
+Potential advantages:
+- MetaDAO maintains its treasury value over time
+- Promotes other new Solana-native projects
+- Showcase a simple Futarchy proposal for other DAOs to follow
+
+Potential pitfalls:
+- ISC is still small and early compared to USDC
+- ISC could lose value to the USD
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `Gp3ANMRTdGLPNeMGFUrzVFaodouwJSEXHbg5rFUi9roJ`
+- Proposal number: 8
+- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
+- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-11-03
+- Ended: 2024-11-03

inbox/archive/2024-11-08-futardio-proposal-initiate-liquidity-farming-for-future-on-raydium.md

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Initiate Liquidity Farming for $FUTURE on Raydium"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/HiNWH2uKxjrmqZjn9mr8vWu5ytp2Nsz6qLsHWa5XQ1Vm"
+date: 2024-11-08
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: null-result
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2024-11-08
+enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-governed-DAOs-converge-on-traditional-corporate-governance-scaffolding-for-treasury-operations-because-market-mechanisms-alone-cannot-provide-operational-security-and-legal-compliance.md", "MetaDAO-is-the-futarchy-launchpad-on-Solana-where-projects-raise-capital-through-unruggable-ICOs-governed-by-conditional-markets-creating-the-first-platform-for-ownership-coins-at-scale.md", "futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirements.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "Extracted one new claim about Raydium's standard liquidity farming pattern (1% allocation, 7-90 day duration, CLMM architecture). Identified three enrichments: confirms futarchy DAOs use traditional DeFi infrastructure for operations, extends MetaDAO's role to post-launch governance, and confirms proposal complexity as adoption friction. Source demonstrates futarchy governing routine treasury operations, not just existential decisions."
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: FutureDAO
+- Proposal: Initiate Liquidity Farming for $FUTURE on Raydium
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-11-08
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/HiNWH2uKxjrmqZjn9mr8vWu5ytp2Nsz6qLsHWa5XQ1Vm
+- Description: This proposal seeks to kick off liquidity farming for $FUTURE by creating a Raydium farm.
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+This proposal aims to enhance liquidity for the \$FUTURE token by establishing a Raydium farm, allocating 1% of the total token supply as rewards for liquidity providers.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+Liquidity providers will benefit from incentives to participate in the \$FUTURE farm, leading to improved trading conditions.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+Increased liquidity is expected to reduce slippage and enhance trading experiences for all users of the \$FUTURE token.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+The proposal carries risks related to the volatility of the \$FUTURE token and potential low participation from liquidity providers, which could undermine the intended liquidity enhancements.
+
+## Content
+
+## Proposal: Initiate Liquidity Farming for $FUTURE on Raydium
+
+### TLDR
+This proposal seeks to kick off liquidity farming for \$FUTURE by creating a Raydium farm, allocating 1% of the total token supply as rewards to incentivize liquidity providers. By establishing a \$FUTURE-stable asset pool on Raydium, we aim to enhance token liquidity, improve trading experiences, and drive community engagement. Approval of this proposal will allow FutureDAO to proceed with setting up the farm, configuring rewards, and initiating the farming period.
+
+### Objective
+To enhance liquidity for the \$FUTURE token by establishing a Raydium farm, allocating 1% of the total \$FUTURE supply as rewards to incentivize liquidity providers.
+
+### Background
+Liquidity is vital for the seamless trading and adoption of any token. By setting up a farm on Raydium, we aim to attract liquidity providers, thereby improving the trading experience and fostering greater engagement with the \$FUTURE token.
+
+### Proposal Details
+
+1. **Allocation of Rewards**
+   - Dedicate 1% of the total \$FUTURE token supply as rewards for liquidity providers participating in the Raydium farm.
+
+2. **Farm Configuration**
+   - **Token Pair**: \$FUTURE and a stable asset (e.g., USDC) to ensure stability and appeal to liquidity providers.
+   - **Fee Tier Selection**: Choose an appropriate fee tier based on the volatility and trading volume of the \$FUTURE token. Raydium offers fee tiers of 0.01%, 0.05%, 0.25%, and 1%.
+   - **Starting Price and Initial Liquidity**: Determine the initial price and provide sufficient liquidity to support trading activities.
+
+3. **Duration and Emission Rate**
+   - **Farming Period**: Set a farming period between 7 to 90 days, as per Raydium's guidelines.
+   - **Emission Rate**: Calculate the daily reward distribution to ensure consistent incentives throughout the farming period.
+
+4. **Implementation Steps**
+   - **Pool Creation**: Create a Concentrated Liquidity Market Maker (CLMM) pool on Raydium for the \$FUTURE-stable asset pair.
+   - **Farm Creation**: Establish a farm linked to the CLMM pool, specifying the reward tokens, emission rate, and duration.
+   - **Monitoring and Management**: Regularly monitor the farm's performance and make necessary adjustments to optimize liquidity and participation.
+
+### Expected Outcomes
+- **Enhanced Liquidity**: Increased liquidity for \$FUTURE, leading to reduced slippage and improved trading experiences.
+- **Community Engagement**: Attract new community members and incentivize existing holders to contribute to the ecosystem.
+- **Token Visibility**: Elevate the profile of \$FUTURE within the DeFi community through active participation on Raydium.
+
+### Budget
+- **Reward Allocation**: 1% of the total \$FUTURE supply.
+- **Operational Costs**: Transaction fees associated with pool and farm creation on the Solana network. According to Raydium's documentation, the average total cost for creating a CLMM pool is approximately 0.1 SOL.
+
+### Conclusion
+Establishing a Raydium farm for \$FUTURE with 1% of the total supply as rewards is a strategic initiative to boost liquidity, enhance trading experiences, and foster community engagement. This proposal seeks approval to proceed with the outlined plan.
+
+### References
+- [Creating a CLMM Pool and Farm - Raydium Documentation](https://docs.raydium.io/raydium/pool-creation/creating-a-clmm-pool-and-farm)
+- [Pool Creation Fees - Raydium Documentation](https://docs.raydium.io/raydium/pool-creation/pool-creation-fees)
+
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `HiNWH2uKxjrmqZjn9mr8vWu5ytp2Nsz6qLsHWa5XQ1Vm`
+- Proposal number: 5
+- DAO account: `ofvb3CPvEyRfD5az8PAqW6ATpPqVBeiB5zBnpPR5cgm`
+- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-11-11
+- Ended: 2024-11-11
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- FutureDAO proposal HiNWH2uKxjrmqZjn9mr8vWu5ytp2Nsz6qLsHWa5XQ1Vm passed on 2024-11-11
+- Raydium CLMM pool creation costs approximately 0.1 SOL
+- Raydium offers fee tiers of 0.01%, 0.05%, 0.25%, and 1%
+- FutureDAO is proposal #5 on DAO account ofvb3CPvEyRfD5az8PAqW6ATpPqVBeiB5zBnpPR5cgm
+- Proposal used Autocrat version 0.3

inbox/archive/2024-11-13-futardio-proposal-cut-emissions-by-50.md

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Cut emissions by 50%?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/6LcxhHS3JvDtbS1GoQS18EgH5Pzf7AnqQpR7D4HxmWpy"
+date: 2024-11-13
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: coal
+- Proposal: Cut emissions by 50%?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-11-13
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/6LcxhHS3JvDtbS1GoQS18EgH5Pzf7AnqQpR7D4HxmWpy
+- Description: Should coal cut emissions rate by 50%?
+- Categories: {'category': 'Program'}
+- Discussion: https://discord.gg/9SBhjCS9pN
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal aims to reduce the emission rate from 15.625 to 7.8125 per minute, effectively halving the target emissions, and establish a bi-monthly decision market for future adjustments.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+Stakeholders may benefit from a more sustainable framework by reducing emissions, but they could face adjustments that impact supply dynamics.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+A successful reduction in the emission rate could lead to improved environmental outcomes and greater market stability.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+Failure to pass the proposal will maintain higher emissions, potentially leading to negative long-term environmental and market consequences.
+
+## Content
+
+## Overview
+
+Under the current schedule, the target emission rate halves with each 5% increase in the circulating supply.
+
+Following six halvings, the current emission target is 15.625 per minute (22,500 per day), resulting in an approximate annual inflation rate of 110%. 
+
+According to this schedule, the next halving will occur at a circulating supply of 7,350,000, lowering the emission target to 7.8125 per minute (11,250 per day) and reducing the annual inflation rate to about 56%
+
+This schedule was initially established after launch as a temporary framework and was never intended to be a long-term solution.
+
+Moving forward, we’ll conduct bi-monthly decision markets to guide adjustments to the emission rate.
+
+## Details
+
+If this proposal passes, the emission rate will be fixed at a target of 7.8125 per minute. If it fails, the rate will remain at the current target of 15.625 per minute.
+
+A follow-up decision market will be held in early January, approximately two months from now, to determine the next rate adjustment.
+
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `6LcxhHS3JvDtbS1GoQS18EgH5Pzf7AnqQpR7D4HxmWpy`
+- Proposal number: 1
+- DAO account: `3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG`
+- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-11-17
+- Ended: 2024-11-17

inbox/archive/2024-11-18-futardio-proposal-adopt-a-sublinear-supply-function.md

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Adopt a sublinear supply function?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/5YA1NbUJWmGLorWtpTzBMfsMFLKa37oxb7pHwH7wSz9L"
+date: 2024-11-18
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: processed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2024-11-18
+claims_extracted: ["ore-token-reduced-supply-cap-from-21m-to-5m-and-adopted-10-percent-annual-emission-decay-making-it-4.2x-more-scarce-than-bitcoin-at-full-dilution.md", "gradual-annual-emission-decay-provides-smoother-token-distribution-than-periodic-halvings-because-10-percent-yearly-reduction-avoids-supply-shock-volatility.md"]
+enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-can-override-its-own-prior-decisions-when-new-evidence-emerges-because-conditional-markets-re-evaluate-proposals-against-current-information-not-historical-commitments.md", "MetaDAOs-Autocrat-program-implements-futarchy-through-conditional-token-markets-where-proposals-create-parallel-pass-and-fail-universes-settled-by-time-weighted-average-price-over-a-three-day-window.md", "MetaDAO-is-the-futarchy-launchpad-on-Solana-where-projects-raise-capital-through-unruggable-ICOs-governed-by-conditional-markets-creating-the-first-platform-for-ownership-coins-at-scale.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "Extracted two claims about ORE's tokenomics evolution and emission model. First claim (proven confidence) documents the specific supply reduction and its scarcity implications vs Bitcoin. Second claim (experimental confidence) argues for gradual decay advantages over periodic halvings — this is more speculative as it lacks empirical validation. Three enrichments confirm existing claims about futarchy's ability to override decisions, Autocrat's implementation, and MetaDAO's platform role. Source demonstrates futarchy governing high-stakes tokenomics changes post-launch, not just initial parameters."
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: ORE
+- Proposal: Adopt a sublinear supply function?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-11-18
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/5YA1NbUJWmGLorWtpTzBMfsMFLKa37oxb7pHwH7wSz9L
+- Description: Should ORE migrate to a deflationary emissions curve and reduce the supply cap to 5m tokens?
+- Categories: {'category': 'Governance'}, {'category': 'Program'}
+- Discussion: https://discord.gg/hRBrVmf48q
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal suggests reducing ORE's supply cap from 21 million to 5 million tokens and implementing a 10% annual reduction in emissions rate.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+This change aims to enhance token scarcity, potentially benefiting current holders and attracting new investors.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+A deflationary emissions curve could lead to increased demand and higher token value over time.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+The significant reduction in supply may create uncertainty in the market and could negatively affect liquidity.
+
+## Content
+
+## Summary
+
+Should ORE migrate to a deflationary emissions curve and reduce the supply cap to 5m tokens?
+
+## Overview
+
+When ORE launched in April 2024, it was built with a linear emissions rate of 1 ORE/min and uncapped total supply. In response to overwhelming feedback from the community, we introduced an artificial supply cap of 21m tokens in the redesign of v2.
+
+Over the last few months, the ORE community has continued to voice interest in accelerating ORE’s distribution. After considering a series of alternative models, we would like to propose the following changes be made:
+
+1. Reduce the supply cap from 21m to 5m tokens
+2. Reduce the emissions rate by 10% every 12 months
+
+ORE's current limit of 21m tokens was originally chosen to mimic Bitcoin's famously popular total supply count. With a supply cap 4.2x lower, ORE's supply will be an order of magnitude more scarce than Bitcoin when fully-diluted.
+
+Rather than infrequent "halvings" every 4 years, we believe ORE's mission would be better served by reducing
+emissions at a more gradual 10% per year. This would provide a faster, smoother, and scarcer distribution curve than Bitcoin. .ORE's supply schedule would roughly follow the timeline outlined in the table below and reach full dilution by approximately 2052.
+
+| Year | Circulating | Dilution |
+| ---- | ----------- | -------- |
+| ~5   | 2.5m        | 50%      |
+| ~18  | 4.5m        | 90%      |
+| ~28  | 5m          | 100%     |
+
+We believe these changes strike an ideal balance between all the competing value sets in the ORE community:
+
+- It reduces FDV to address sticker shock of buyers.
+- It introduces a deflationary curve that decays faster than Bitcoin.
+- It caps the supply an order of magnitude more scarce than Bitcoin.
+- It provides ~30 years of mining runway for onboarding initiatives and liquidity incentives.
+
+If passed, we will implement these changes and migrate the mainnet mining program. This would represent a major step forward in ORE's hardening process and bring us one step closer towards freezing the contract for good.
+
+To discuss this proposal, join the Discord and let your voice be heard.
+[https://discord.com/channels/1226038272673841236/1306330694917554257](https://discord.com/channels/1226038272673841236/1306330694917554257)
+
+![](https://imagedelivery.net/HYEnlujCFMCgj6yA728xIw/e76eff8c-8a73-4395-5db0-4939b02e0e00/public)
+
+![](https://imagedelivery.net/HYEnlujCFMCgj6yA728xIw/0127d0d5-ec72-47cf-f882-fa3a63267100/public)
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `5YA1NbUJWmGLorWtpTzBMfsMFLKa37oxb7pHwH7wSz9L`
+- Proposal number: 2
+- DAO account: `7XoddQu6HtEeHZowzCEwKiFJg4zR3BXUqMygvwPwSB1D`
+- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-11-22
+- Ended: 2024-11-22
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- ORE proposal 5YA1NbUJWmGLorWtpTzBMfsMFLKa37oxb7pHwH7wSz9L passed 2024-11-22
+- ORE launched April 2024 with uncapped supply and 1 ORE/min linear emissions
+- ORE v2 introduced 21m token cap
+- Proposal used Autocrat version 0.3
+- DAO account: 7XoddQu6HtEeHZowzCEwKiFJg4zR3BXUqMygvwPwSB1D
+- Proposer: proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2

inbox/archive/2024-11-21-futardio-proposal-proposal-13.md

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Proposal #13"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/ApywwMrE9vkWiatZwQVU6wdvNsHrYZkhegNCV5XDZ8yV"
+date: 2024-11-21
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: Unknown
+- Proposal: Proposal #13
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-11-21
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/ApywwMrE9vkWiatZwQVU6wdvNsHrYZkhegNCV5XDZ8yV
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `ApywwMrE9vkWiatZwQVU6wdvNsHrYZkhegNCV5XDZ8yV`
+- Proposal number: 13
+- DAO account: `GWywkp2mY2vzAaLydR2MBXRCqk2vBTyvtVRioujxi5Ce`
+- Proposer: `xwQTt7R68Vsxco819EBqK3itgn9osQc6M2Z1DjwUqmk`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-11-25
+- Ended: 2024-11-25

inbox/archive/2024-11-21-futardio-proposal-proposal-14.md

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Proposal #14"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/B4zpF4iHeF91qq8Szb9aD6pW1DrwSy6djD4QPWJQn3dW"
+date: 2024-11-21
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: null-result
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2024-11-21
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "This source contains only metadata about a failed MetaDAO proposal with no content details. There is no proposal text, no market data, no voting information, and no context about what was being proposed or why it failed. The source provides verifiable facts (proposal number, accounts, dates, status) but no evidence or interpretation that could support claims or enrich existing knowledge base content. Without knowing what Proposal #14 actually proposed or how the futarchy markets evaluated it, there is nothing extractable beyond the basic facts preserved in key_facts."
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: Unknown
+- Proposal: Proposal #14
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-11-21
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/B4zpF4iHeF91qq8Szb9aD6pW1DrwSy6djD4QPWJQn3dW
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `B4zpF4iHeF91qq8Szb9aD6pW1DrwSy6djD4QPWJQn3dW`
+- Proposal number: 14
+- DAO account: `GWywkp2mY2vzAaLydR2MBXRCqk2vBTyvtVRioujxi5Ce`
+- Proposer: `xwQTt7R68Vsxco819EBqK3itgn9osQc6M2Z1DjwUqmk`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-11-25
+- Ended: 2024-11-25
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- MetaDAO Proposal #14 failed (created 2024-11-21, completed 2024-11-25)
+- Proposal account: B4zpF4iHeF91qq8Szb9aD6pW1DrwSy6djD4QPWJQn3dW
+- DAO account: GWywkp2mY2vzAaLydR2MBXRCqk2vBTyvtVRioujxi5Ce
+- Proposer: xwQTt7R68Vsxco819EBqK3itgn9osQc6M2Z1DjwUqmk
+- Autocrat version: 0.3

inbox/archive/2024-11-21-futardio-proposal-should-metadao-create-futardio.md

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Should MetaDAO create Futardio?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/zN9Uft1zEsh9h7Wspeg5bTNirBBvtBTaJ6i5KcEnbAb"
+date: 2024-11-21
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: null-result
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2024-12-08
+enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "No new claims extracted. Source is a minimal failed proposal with insufficient detail to generate standalone claims. However, the failure pattern provides valuable counter-evidence for existing claims about MetaDAO's futarchy implementation. The proposal's minimal justification and subsequent rejection demonstrates both quality filtering and potential participation barriers in futarchy governance. No trading volume or market participation data disclosed in source material, limiting analysis of the decision mechanism's actual operation."
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: Unknown
+- Proposal: Should MetaDAO create Futardio?
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-11-21
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/zN9Uft1zEsh9h7Wspeg5bTNirBBvtBTaJ6i5KcEnbAb
+- Description: Futardio is a great idea and needs to happen
+- Categories: {'category': 'Program'}
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal advocates for the creation of Futardio by MetaDAO, emphasizing its necessity and potential benefits.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+Stakeholders may experience enhanced engagement and innovation through the implementation of Futardio.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+Futardio has the potential to drive growth and attract new participants to the MetaDAO ecosystem.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+There is a risk that the initiative may not gain sufficient support or resources, leading to ineffective execution.
+
+## Content
+
+Futardio is a great idea and needs to happen
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `zN9Uft1zEsh9h7Wspeg5bTNirBBvtBTaJ6i5KcEnbAb`
+- Proposal number: 15
+- DAO account: `GWywkp2mY2vzAaLydR2MBXRCqk2vBTyvtVRioujxi5Ce`
+- Proposer: `xwQTt7R68Vsxco819EBqK3itgn9osQc6M2Z1DjwUqmk`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-11-25
+- Ended: 2024-11-25
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- Futardio proposal (#15) created 2024-11-21, failed 2024-11-25
+- Proposal account: zN9Uft1zEsh9h7Wspeg5bTNirBBvtBTaJ6i5KcEnbAb
+- Categorized as 'Program' level proposal
+- Proposal description: single sentence ('Futardio is a great idea and needs to happen')
+- DAO account: GWywkp2mY2vzAaLydR2MBXRCqk2vBTyvtVRioujxi5Ce
+- Autocrat version: 0.3

inbox/archive/2024-11-25-futardio-proposal-launch-a-boost-for-hnt-ore.md

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Launch a boost for HNT-ORE?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/2QUxbiMkDtoKxY2u6kXuevfMsqKGtHNxMFYHVWbqRK1A"
+date: 2024-11-25
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: ORE
+- Proposal: Launch a boost for HNT-ORE?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-11-25
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/2QUxbiMkDtoKxY2u6kXuevfMsqKGtHNxMFYHVWbqRK1A
+- Description: Should ORE launch a boost for HNT-ORE liquidity? Our primary strategic goal for ORE defi is to build up a deep liquidity network consisting of all real world assets on Solana. 
+- Categories: {'category': 'Governance'}
+- Discussion: https://discord.gg/gyAUajbZ6f
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal aims to launch a liquidity boost for the HNT-ORE pair to enhance liquidity in the ORE network, establish a 3-tier boost multiplier system, and position ORE as a competitive unit in the Solana DeFi ecosystem.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+This initiative would benefit liquidity providers and traders by increasing the depth and diversity of liquidity available in the ORE network.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+By integrating HNT into the ORE liquidity network, the proposal could attract more users and increase trading volume, enhancing ORE's market position.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+The reliance on HNT's performance and market acceptance poses a risk, as any decline in HNT's value or utility could adversely affect the liquidity and stability of the ORE network.
+
+## Content
+
+## Summary
+
+Should ORE launch a boost for HNT-ORE liquidity?
+
+## Overview
+
+Our primary strategic goal for ORE defi is to build up a deep liquidity network consisting of all real world assets on Solana. As the central hub of this network, ORE would reduce costs and minimize slippage for traders by increasing the depth and diversity of liquidity in the network. By focusing exclusively on real world assets such as tokenized commodities and DePIN credits, ORE would uniquely position itself as a competitive unit of account for assets representing real world value in the Solana defi ecosystem.
+
+As a revolutionary new wireless networking protocol, [Helium](https://helium.com) is one of the flagship DePIN projects on Solana and all of crypto. HNT (Helium Network Token) is the primary reward and governance token of the Helium network. It is used to reward hotspot operators who maintain network coverage, and spent by customers who connect devices and build IoT applications on the Helium network. With the passing of [HIP-138](https://blog.helium.com/hip-138-tl-dr-hnt-is-back-return-to-simplicity-994a32639dda?gi=c85a1928bfce), Helium is consolidating its network tokenomics around the HNT token, making it an ideal candidate for the next token in the ORE liquidity network.
+
+With the passing of this proposal, we would introduce a new boost with the same multiplier value as the ORE-ISC liquidity pair. Specifically, the HNT-ORE boost would apply to kTokens representing shares in a Kamino vault managing a concentrated liquidity position on Orca. We would additionally commit to formalizing a 3-tier system for boosts multipliers. The first tier would apply to vanilla ORE stake. The second tier for critical liquidity pairs such as SOL-ORE and USDC-ORE. And a third tier for extended liquidity pairs such as ISC-ORE, HNT-ORE, and others. Future proposals to change boost multipliers would apply to a tier as a whole. This 3-tier system would simplify community proposals to manage boost multipliers in the future.  
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `2QUxbiMkDtoKxY2u6kXuevfMsqKGtHNxMFYHVWbqRK1A`
+- Proposal number: 1
+- DAO account: `EttCec7x4r227dbQ8BYUVtqizDdD6T3WQHGHWKdzJrCc`
+- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-11-28
+- Ended: 2024-11-28

inbox/archive/2024-11-25-futardio-proposal-prioritize-listing-meta.md

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Prioritize Listing META?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/FXkyJpCVADXS6YZcz1Kppax8Kgih23t6yvze7ehELJpp"
+date: 2024-11-25
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: Drift
+- Proposal: Prioritize Listing META?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-11-25
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/FXkyJpCVADXS6YZcz1Kppax8Kgih23t6yvze7ehELJpp
+- Description: Drift is evaluating the use of futarchy for token listing. Should this proposal pass, the META token will be prioritized to be listed on Drift for Spot and Perp trading.
+- Categories: {'category': 'Governance'}
+- Discussion: https://discord.gg/3Zz9YuM468
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+This proposal seeks to prioritize the listing of the META token on Drift for Spot and Perp trading, leveraging futarchy to enhance governance participation and decision-making efficiency within the Drift ecosystem.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+The listing of META aims to empower Drift's community by increasing governance participation and enhancing trading opportunities.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+Successful implementation could lead to increased liquidity and trading volume for both META and Drift, fostering a more engaged user base and better decision-making processes.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+The proposal faces significant risks due to META's low on-chain liquidity and trading volume, which may result in high volatility and susceptibility to price manipulation.
+
+## Content
+
+**Proposal Type**  
+Token Listing Application
+
+**Author(s)**  
+Nallok, Divide
+
+**Preamble**  
+Drift is evaluating the use of futarchy for token listing. Futarchy is a process by which speculative markets make decisions, because markets aggregate information better, reduce bias, and incentivize accuracy versus a standard voting process. Or simply \- markets make better decisions. 
+
+The goals of the futarchic listing process are i/ to empower the community to surface listings for Drift, ii/ better utilize governance, and iii/ to create a repeatable, lightweight process that will lead to more optimal use of Drift’s development and listing resources.
+
+Should this proposal pass, the META token will be prioritised to be listed on Drift for Spot and Perp trading. It will also serve as an experiment to help develop a decentralised listing process using futarchy. 
+
+**Overview**  
+META is the tokenized representation of MetaDAO, the world's first market-governed organization. This mechanism is called Futarchy and was first created by George Mason University Economist Robin Hanson in 2001\. Futarchy, which was first implemented onchain by MetaDAO, is designed to improve governance participation and incentivize more optimal decision-making, leading to better outcomes. The basic idea at the core of futarchy is that speculative markets are better decision-makers than voters. The advantage of using markets compared to traditional voting is that markets aggregate information better, reduce bias, and incentivize accuracy
+
+**Token Utility**  
+META is traded in conditional markets for decision making of the DAO. For every proposal, there’s a pass market, where people speculate on what the value of the DAO would be if the proposal passed, and a fail market, where people speculate on what the value of the DAO would be if the proposal failed. Decisions are made based on the prices of these two markets. If the value of META is higher in the pass market than in the fail market, it means the market thinks that the proposal adds value. So it should pass. If the pass market is lower than the fail market, it means the market believes it destroys value. So it should fail.
+
+**Why Prioritize This Listing**  
+Historically, governance participation among token holders has been low and the processes to govern have not been user-friendly. To overcome these challenges, MetaDAO uses markets to make decisions, anything that can improve market utilization such as higher liquidity and perpetuals will allow for more information to be encoded into the decision making process. If traders have the ability to go long or short META they will have more capacity to trade the decision markets creating a flywheel between Drift Perps Markets and MetaDAO Decision Markets, ultimately creating more volume, more trades, new users, and better user retention. 
+
+	  
+**Risks**  
+This token has low onchain liquidity and low trading volume. It has limited CEX exposure (only on CoinEX) and it is uncertain if there will be any increase in volume. Therefore, it can be highly volatile and susceptible to price manipulation, which poses a significant risk when offering futures or when used as collateral.
+
+**Liquidity Incentives or Programs**  
+If passed and listed, Drift would commit to a 1x multiplier for FUEL in the markets for spot deposits.
+
+**Additional Information**  
+MetaDAO is a novel approach to governance that has the potential to reshape how decisions are made on and off chain.
+
+**Details**
+
+| Token Name | META |
+| :---- | :---- |
+| Token Address | METADDFL6wWMWEoKTFJwcThTbUmtarRJZjRpzUvkxhr |
+| Website | https://metadao.fi |
+| X Account | MetaDAOProject |
+| 7d Average Daily Trade Volume | $199.7k |
+| 30D Volume | $7.4M |
+| Fully Diluted Value (FDV) | $79.9M |
+| Markets Requested | Spot, Perps |
+| Team Doxed | Partially |
+| Token Launch Date | 2023-11-07 (past) |
+| Mint Authority Revoked | Yes |
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `FXkyJpCVADXS6YZcz1Kppax8Kgih23t6yvze7ehELJpp`
+- Proposal number: 1
+- DAO account: `8ABcEC2SEaqi1WkyWGtd2QbuWmkFryYnV1ispBUSgY2V`
+- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-11-28
+- Ended: 2024-11-28

inbox/archive/2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management.md

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Approve Dean's List Treasury Management?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/4gaJ8bi1gpNEx6xSSsepjVBM6GXqTDfLbiUbzXbARHW1"
+date: 2024-12-02
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: IslandDAO
+- Proposal: Approve Dean's List Treasury Management?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-12-02
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/4gaJ8bi1gpNEx6xSSsepjVBM6GXqTDfLbiUbzXbARHW1
+- Description: The longevity of the DAO depends on maintaining financial stability through stable reserves.
+- Categories: {'category': 'Dao'}, {'category': 'Treasury'}
+- Discussion: https://discord.gg/kex9sSW46x
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal aims to convert Dean's List DAO treasury assets into stablecoins to enhance financial stability, increase the probability of survival from 50% to 90%, and positively impact the Fully Diluted Valuation (FDV) by 5% to 20%.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+This strategy provides stakeholders with greater confidence in the DAO's financial health and operational sustainability.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+The conversion to stablecoins could increase the FDV from $500,000 to a range of $525,000–$600,000, reflecting improved market perception.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+While the proposal reduces volatility risk, it may limit potential gains from higher-risk assets if market conditions improve.
+
+## Content
+
+![](https://deanslistdao.notion.site/image/https%3A%2F%2Fprod-files-secure.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com%2Fc7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979%2Fc98fd49b-069a-4377-b985-dacaac642d8e%2Ffutarchy.jpeg?table=block&id=149e0e34-e8f4-8087-badd-fb065473e6ca&spaceId=c7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979&width=2000&userId=&cache=v2)
+
+## Impact of De-Risking DL DAO Treasury on Longevity and FDV
+
+### 1. Longevity Analysis
+
+The longevity of the DAO depends on maintaining financial stability through stable reserves. The treasury, valued between $75,000 and $87,000 at $350 SOL (without DEAN in consideration), is proposed to be converted into stablecoins to reduce risk.
+
+### Longevity Benefits
+
+1. **Reduction in Risk:** Stablecoins provide immunity to SOL and SPL tokens price volatility, securing the treasury's value.  
+2. **Operational Buffer:** Locking in $75,000–$87,000 ensures predictable funding for operations and development.  
+
+**Probability of survival:**
+
+- **Before de-risking:** 50% (subject to market volatility). 
+
+- **After de-risking:** 90% (stable reserves secured).  
+
+Thus, de-risking increases the probability of DAO longevity by 40 percentage points (from 50% to 90%).
+
+![*credits - @BearUntied*](https://deanslistdao.notion.site/image/https%3A%2F%2Fprod-files-secure.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com%2Fc7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979%2Fc490d66f-cf0b-4493-88bf-45c699e0755f%2Fimage.png?table=block&id=14be0e34-e8f4-8085-9fb6-fcaf6aa3a576&spaceId=c7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979&width=1420&userId=&cache=v2)
+
+*credits - @BearUntied*
+
+### 2. Impact on Fully Diluted Valuation
+
+The current FDV is $500,000 (Conservative FDV to accommodate proposal duration). De-risking the treasury by converting to stablecoins positively impacts market perception, reflecting the DAO’s financial prudence. Investors may attribute higher value due to reduced uncertainty.
+
+De-risking results in a confidence boost, modeled as a percentage increase in FDV. Two scenarios were calculated:
+
+1. **Low Confidence Boost (5%):**
+
+- **Updated FDV:** $500,000 × (1 + 0.05) = $525,000
+
+- **Percentage Increase:** (525,000 - 500,000) / 500,000 × 100 = 5%
+
+2. **High Confidence Boost (20%):**
+
+- **Updated FDV:** $500,000 × (1 + 0.20) = $600,000
+
+- **Percentage Increase:** (600,000 - 500,000) / 500,000 × 100 = 20%
+
+![*credits - @BearUntied*](https://deanslistdao.notion.site/image/https%3A%2F%2Fprod-files-secure.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com%2Fc7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979%2Fe3614fdc-754c-4199-a145-2d3054a5ac8c%2Fimage.png?table=block&id=14fe0e34-e8f4-80b2-a019-e6de146f8da4&spaceId=c7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979&width=1420&userId=&cache=v2)
+
+*credits - @BearUntied*
+
+### 3. TWAP Calculation
+
+We require TWAP > 3% for the proposal to pass:
+
+**DL DAO FDV:** $500,000
+
+**DL DAO FDV + 3%:** $515,000
+
+The potential increase from de-risking our treasuries is well above the TWAP requirements.
+
+![*credits - @BearUntied*](https://deanslistdao.notion.site/image/https%3A%2F%2Fprod-files-secure.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com%2Fc7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979%2F562b4283-c907-4eff-bc1e-9571d374c61f%2Fimage.png?table=block&id=14fe0e34-e8f4-80db-81cd-d842b5e1d1f6&spaceId=c7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979&width=1420&userId=&cache=v2)
+
+*credits - @BearUntied*
+
+### 4. Combined Analysis and Conclusion
+
+De-risking the treasury by converting risky assets to stablecoins significantly enhances the DAO’s probability of survival and positively impacts FDV:
+
+- **Longevity Probability Increase:** From 50% to 90% (+40%).
+
+- **FDV Increase:** $500,000 to a range of $525,000–$600,000 (5%–20% increase).
+
+This strategy ensures financial stability while signaling prudence to investors, promoting the DAO's growth and resilience.
+
+![*credits - @BearUntied*](https://deanslistdao.notion.site/image/https%3A%2F%2Fprod-files-secure.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com%2Fc7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979%2F4280a9e8-3b77-4692-b594-63f2d4d2e2a3%2Fimage.png?table=block&id=14fe0e34-e8f4-804f-936d-f48188183426&spaceId=c7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979&width=1420&userId=&cache=v2)
+
+*credits - @BearUntied*
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `4gaJ8bi1gpNEx6xSSsepjVBM6GXqTDfLbiUbzXbARHW1`
+- Proposal number: 5
+- DAO account: `9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ`
+- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-12-05
+- Ended: 2024-12-05

inbox/archive/2024-12-04-futardio-proposal-launch-a-boost-for-usdc-ore.md

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Launch a boost for USDC-ORE?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/GBQZvZAeW8xUuVV5a9FJHSyttzY5fPGuvkwLTpWLbw6N"
+date: 2024-12-04
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: ORE
+- Proposal: Launch a boost for USDC-ORE?
+- Status: Passed
+- Created: 2024-12-04
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/GBQZvZAeW8xUuVV5a9FJHSyttzY5fPGuvkwLTpWLbw6N
+- Description: Should ORE launch a boost for USDC-ORE liquidity?
+- Categories: {'category': 'Dao'}
+- Discussion: https://discord.gg/Yft6W4zmeR
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+The proposal aims to launch a USDC-ORE liquidity incentive to enhance liquidity for ORE and establish a USDC-ORE vault on Kamino with a boost multiplier similar to ORE-SOL.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+This initiative will likely benefit liquidity providers and ORE holders by improving trading conditions and market depth for ORE.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+Increasing liquidity through the USDC-ORE pair could attract more users and investors to the ORE ecosystem, enhancing its market presence.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+The proposal may expose ORE to market volatility associated with USDC, which could impact the stability of the liquidity provided.
+
+## Content
+
+## Summary
+Should ORE launch a boost incentive for USDC-ORE liquidity?
+
+## Overview
+Our mission with ORE is to create the best digital gold product in crypto. To accomplish this, we need to drive deep liquidity for ORE across a variety of assets in Solana defi. 
+
+USDC is a stablecoin, pegged to the US dollar, and fully-backed by dollars and treasuries held in US banks by Circle. It is one of the lynchpin assets connecting  Solana to the traditional financial system. It therefore represents a strategically important market for ORE to target with liquidity incentives.
+
+With the passing of this proposal, we would launch a USDC-ORE vault on Kamino and set it up with the same boost multiplier as the ORE-SOL Kamino liquidity pair.
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `GBQZvZAeW8xUuVV5a9FJHSyttzY5fPGuvkwLTpWLbw6N`
+- Proposal number: 3
+- DAO account: `7XoddQu6HtEeHZowzCEwKiFJg4zR3BXUqMygvwPwSB1D`
+- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-12-07
+- Ended: 2024-12-07

inbox/archive/2024-12-05-futardio-proposal-establish-development-fund.md

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Establish Development Fund?"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DhY2YrMde6BxiqCrqUieoKt5TYzRwf2KYE3J2RQyQc7U"
+date: 2024-12-05
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
+event_type: proposal
+---
+
+## Proposal Details
+- Project: coal
+- Proposal: Establish Development Fund?
+- Status: Failed
+- Created: 2024-12-05
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/DhY2YrMde6BxiqCrqUieoKt5TYzRwf2KYE3J2RQyQc7U
+- Description: Should COAL establish a development fund?
+- Categories: {'category': 'Governance'}
+- Discussion: https://discord.gg/YeJTmTqQG4
+
+## Summary
+
+### 🎯 Key Points  
+Establish a Development Fund through a 4.2% emissions allocation to support protocol development, reward community contributions, and enable marketing initiatives for the \$COAL ecosystem.
+
+### 📊 Impact Analysis  
+#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
+This proposal provides a structured funding mechanism that benefits community members and developers by rewarding contributions and fostering innovation.
+
+#### 📈 Upside Potential  
+The fund has the potential to enhance project sustainability and growth, leading to a more robust \$COAL ecosystem.
+
+#### 📉 Risk Factors  
+Implementing the fund may dilute mining rewards and could create tension among miners if perceived as reducing their share of emissions.
+
+## Content
+
+## Overview
+Since its fair launch in August 2024, \$COAL has been a community-driven project with no pre-mine or team allocation. While this approach has ensured a fair start, it limits our ability to scale the project and reward community contributions.
+
+To ensure the long-term sustainability of the project, we propose establishing a **Development Fund through a 4.2% emissions allocation**. 
+
+This fund will:
+- Support on-going protocol development and innovation
+- Reward community-driven initiatives and contributions
+- Enable marketing and growth initiatives to expand the \$COAL ecosystem
+
+## Details
+The emissions allocation will be 4.2% of the current mining emission rate:
+
+11,250 * 0.042 = 472.5 (development allocation per day)
+
+To avoid reducing mining rewards, this allocation will result in a 4.2% increase in total supply growth. However, future emission rate adjustments will integrate this allocation into the base rate.
+
+The development allocation will be claimed weekly and transferred to a DAO-managed multisig wallet. All expenditures from this fund will be tracked and shared publicly to ensure transparency and accountability.
+
+#### Example for Future Adjustments:
+If the emission rate were adjusted to 10,000 \$COAL/day:
+- Mining rewards: 9,580 \$COAL/day
+- Development allocation: 420 \$COAL/day
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Proposal account: `DhY2YrMde6BxiqCrqUieoKt5TYzRwf2KYE3J2RQyQc7U`
+- Proposal number: 2
+- DAO account: `3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG`
+- Proposer: `AH7F2EPHXWhfF5yc7xnv1zPbwz3YqD6CtAqbCyE9dy7r`
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Completed: 2024-12-08
+- Ended: 2024-12-08