extract: 2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy

Pentagon-Agent: Ganymede <F99EBFA6-547B-4096-BEEA-1D59C3E4028A>

domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Coal's v0.6 migration sets minimum liquidity requirements of 1500 USDC and 2000
 ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
 *Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
 
-MetaDAO's design requires proposers to 'lock-up some initial liquidity, and set the starting price for the pass/fail markets.' The expected liquidity evolution: 'Liquidity would start low when the proposal is launched, someone would swap and move the AMM price to their preferred price, and then provide liquidity at that price since the fee incentives are high. Liquidity would increase over the duration of the proposal.'
+The proposal describes the bootstrapping mechanism: 'These types of proposals would also require that the proposer lock-up some initial liquidity, and set the starting price for the pass/fail markets. With this setup, liquidity would start low when the proposal is launched, someone would swap and move the AMM price to their preferred price, and then provide liquidity at that price since the fee incentives are high. Liquidity would increase over the duration of the proposal.'
 
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domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-by-99-percent-versus-clob-by-eliminating-orderbook-storage-requirements.md

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ This cost differential becomes material at scale: a DAO running 50 proposals ann
 ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
 *Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
 
-MetaDAO proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG quantifies the cost reduction: CLOB market pairs cost 3.75 SOL in state rent per proposal, totaling 135-225 SOL annually ($11,475-$19,125 at 2024 prices) for 3-5 proposals per month. AMMs cost 'almost nothing in state rent' by comparison. Proposal passed and was implemented 2024-01-29.
+MetaDAO proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG quantifies the cost reduction: CLOB market pairs cost 3.75 SOL in state rent per proposal (135-225 SOL annually at 3-5 proposals/month), while AMMs cost 'almost nothing' in state rent. At January 2024 SOL prices ($85), this represents $11,475-$19,125 annual savings.
 
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domains/internet-finance/futarchy-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-creates-wide-spreads-because-pricing-counterfactual-governance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ This connects to [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume
 ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
 *Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
 
-MetaDAO's AMM migration proposal explicitly identifies lack of liquidity as the primary reason for switching from CLOBs: 'Estimating a fair price for the future value of MetaDao under pass/fail conditions is difficult, and most reasonable estimates will have a wide range. This uncertainty discourages people from risking their funds with limit orders near the midpoint price, and has the effect of reducing liquidity (and trading). This is the main reason for switching to AMMs.'
+The proposal identifies that 'estimating a fair price for the future value of MetaDao under pass/fail conditions is difficult, and most reasonable estimates will have a wide range. This uncertainty discourages people from risking their funds with limit orders near the midpoint price, and has the effect of reducing liquidity (and trading).' This is cited as 'the main reason for switching to AMMs.'
 
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domains/internet-finance/high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ The mechanism depends on futarchy-specific conditions (short duration, governanc
 ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
 *Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
 
-MetaDAO's implemented design sets 3-5% fees explicitly for dual purpose: 'By setting a high fee (3-5%) we can both: encourage LPs, and aggressively discourage wash-trading and manipulation.' The proposal notes this addresses CLOB vulnerabilities where 'someone with 1 $META can push the midpoint towards the current best bid/ask' and 'VWAP can be manipulated by wash trading.'
+MetaDAO's AMM proposal sets fees at 3-5% explicitly to 'both: encourage LPs, and aggressively discourage wash-trading and manipulation.' The mechanism works because high fees make price manipulation through wash trading expensive while creating strong incentives for liquidity provision.
 
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domains/internet-finance/liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md

@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ The proposal acknowledges CLOB manipulation is "a 1/n problem" addressable by de
 - High fees may reduce legitimate trading volume
 
 
-### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
 *Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
 
-MetaDAO's AMM implementation uses 'liquidity-weighted price over time' as the core metric: 'The more liquidity that is on the books, the more weight the current price of the pass or fail market is given. Every time there is a swap, these metrics are updated/aggregated.' This replaces CLOB midpoint pricing which was vulnerable to manipulation with minimal capital.
+The proposal specifies the implementation: 'liquidity-weighted price over time. The more liquidity that is on the books, the more weight the current price of the pass or fail market is given. Every time there is a swap, these metrics are updated/aggregated.' This creates a continuous aggregation mechanism rather than point-in-time measurement.
 
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inbox/archive/2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md

@@ -135,10 +135,11 @@ Any important changes or feedback brought up during the proposal vote will be re
 
 
 ## Key Facts
-- MetaDAO Proposal #4 (CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG) passed on 2024-01-29
-- Proposal budget was 400 META on passing, plus 800 META on completed migration
-- Implementation team: joebuild (program), 0xNalloK (frontend), TBD (review)
-- Estimated timeline was 3 weeks from passing plus 1 week review
+- MetaDAO Proposal #4 (CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG) passed on 2024-01-24
+- Proposal completed on 2024-01-29
+- Budget: 400 META on passing + 800 META on completion
 - CLOB minimum order size was 1 META as spam filter
-- AMMs remove minimum order size restriction, allowing META trading at any granularity
-- Proposal included feature to permissionlessly pause AMM swaps after verdict and close AMMs to return state rent SOL once positions are cleared
+- AMM implementation timeline: 3 weeks development + 1 week review
+- Proposer: XXXvLz1B89UtcTsg2hT3cL9qUJi5PqEEBTHg57MfNkZ
+- DAO account: 7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy
+- Autocrat version: 0.1