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@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/7KkoRGyvzhvzKjxuPHjyxg77a52MeP6axy
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proposal_date: 2024-06-08
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resolution_date: 2024-06-11
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category: "grants"
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summary: "Allocate 1M $DEAN tokens ($1,300 USDC equivalent) to University of Waterloo Blockchain Club targeting 5% FDV increase through student engagement"
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summary: "Allocate 1M $DEAN tokens ($1,300 USDC equivalent) to University of Waterloo Blockchain Club to attract 200 students with target 5% FDV increase"
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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@ -19,22 +19,23 @@ created: 2026-03-11
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# IslandDAO: Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens
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## Summary
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Proposal to allocate 1 million $DEAN tokens (equivalent to $1,300 USDC at proposal time) to the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club's 200 members. The proposal set a success condition requiring a 5% increase in The Dean's List DAO's fully diluted valuation (from $115,655 to $121,438) measured over a 5-day trading period. The proposal passed, indicating market belief that student engagement would drive sufficient value creation.
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Proposal to allocate 1 million $DEAN tokens (equivalent to $1,300 USDC at time of proposal) to the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club's 200 members. The proposal targeted a 5% increase in The Dean's List DAO's fully diluted valuation ($5,783 increase from $115,655 baseline) over a 5-day trading period as the success condition. The proposal passed, completing on 2024-06-11.
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## Market Data
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- **Outcome:** Passed
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- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
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- **Trading Period:** 5 days
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- **Trading Period:** 5 days (2024-06-08 to 2024-06-11)
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- **Token Allocation:** 1,000,000 $DEAN (~$1,300 USDC)
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- **Target FDV Increase:** 5% ($5,783)
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- **Estimated ROI:** $4.45 per dollar spent
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- **Target FDV Impact:** 5% increase ($5,783)
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- **Projected ROI:** $4.45 benefit per dollar spent
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- **Target Participants:** 200 University of Waterloo Blockchain Club students
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## Significance
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This proposal demonstrates futarchy-governed grant allocation where the market prices the expected value of community partnerships. The proposal's economic model explicitly calculated per-student value contribution ($28.915 per student across 200 members) and required the partnership to generate measurable FDV growth. The passing outcome suggests market participants believed university blockchain club engagement could drive token value through increased participation, governance contribution, and ecosystem development.
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This proposal demonstrates futarchy-governed grant allocation with explicit ROI modeling. The proposal calculated that each of 200 students needed to contribute activities increasing FDV by $28.915 to meet the 5% threshold. The justification framed university partnership as talent pipeline investment rather than pure marketing spend, with tokens held in multi-signature wallet for "secure and responsible management."
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The proposal also illustrates how futarchy handles subjective value propositions (community building, talent pipeline) by requiring them to manifest as measurable token price impact.
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The proposal's economic model explicitly tied grant spending to measurable FDV impact, creating accountability through conditional market resolution. This represents an attempt to apply futarchy's market-based decision-making to community development and talent acquisition spending.
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[deans-list]] - parent organization governance decision
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- [[futardio]] - platform used for decision market
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - mechanism used (5-day window variant)
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- [[deans-list]] - parent DAO making the grant decision
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- [[futardio]] - platform hosting the decision market
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - governance mechanism used
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