domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md

@@ -28,6 +28,12 @@ The mechanism addresses the "lack of liquidity" problem identified with CLOBs, w
 
 Rated experimental because this is a proposed design not yet deployed. The liquidity bootstrapping logic is sound but requires real-world validation.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2025-10-15-futardio-proposal-lets-get-futarded]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Coal's v0.6 migration sets minimum liquidity requirements of 1500 USDC and 2000 coal for proposals, with OTC buyer lined up to purchase dev fund tokens and seed the futarchy AMM. This shows the liquidity bootstrapping pattern extends beyond initial launch to governance upgrades, where projects must arrange capital to meet minimum depth requirements before migration.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations.md

@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ The new DAO parameters formalize the lesson: 120k USDC monthly spending limit (w
 - Mintable tokens introduce dilution risk that fixed-supply tokens avoid: if mint authority is misused, token holders face value extraction without recourse
 - Since [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]], minting decisions are themselves governable through futarchy — but this only works if the DAO has not already become inoperable from treasury exhaustion
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2025-10-15-futardio-proposal-lets-get-futarded]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Coal DAO executed a one-time supply increase from 21M to 25M tokens (19% increase) to fund development and liquidity, demonstrating the practical necessity of mint authority for treasury operations. The proposal explicitly structured this as a one-time increase rather than ongoing emissions, suggesting DAOs try to preserve fixed-supply narratives while pragmatically requiring mint capability.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/metadao-autocrat-v01-reduces-proposal-duration-to-three-days-enabling-faster-governance-iteration.md

@@ -11,6 +11,12 @@ created: 2026-03-15
 
 The Autocrat v0.1 upgrade introduces configurable slots per proposal with a default of 3 days, explicitly designed to "allow for quicker feedback loops." This represents a significant reduction from previous implementations and addresses a key friction point in futarchy adoption: the time cost of decision-making. The proposal passed and migrated 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL to the new program, demonstrating community acceptance of faster iteration cycles. The architectural change makes proposal duration a parameter rather than a constant, allowing MetaDAO to tune the speed-quality tradeoff based on empirical results. This matters because governance mechanism adoption depends on matching decision velocity to organizational needs—too slow and participants route around the system, too fast and markets cannot aggregate information effectively.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2025-10-15-futardio-proposal-lets-get-futarded]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Coal's v0.6 parameters set proposal length at 3 days with 1-day TWAP delay, confirming this as the standard configuration for Autocrat v0.6 implementations. The combination of 1-day TWAP delay plus 3-day proposal window creates a 4-day total decision cycle.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

inbox/archive/.extraction-debug/2025-10-15-futardio-proposal-lets-get-futarded.json

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+{
+  "rejected_claims": [
+    {
+      "filename": "coal-futarchy-dao-demonstrates-proof-of-work-memecoin-governance-transition-from-autocrat-v03-to-v06.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "filename": "futarchy-development-fund-disbursement-caps-with-escalating-thresholds-create-operational-flexibility-with-manipulation-resistance.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "filename": "meta-holder-airdrops-to-futarchy-governed-projects-create-cross-dao-network-effects-through-stakeholder-overlap.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "validation_stats": {
+    "total": 3,
+    "kept": 0,
+    "fixed": 10,
+    "rejected": 3,
+    "fixes_applied": [
+      "coal-futarchy-dao-demonstrates-proof-of-work-memecoin-governance-transition-from-autocrat-v03-to-v06.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
+      "coal-futarchy-dao-demonstrates-proof-of-work-memecoin-governance-transition-from-autocrat-v03-to-v06.md:stripped_wiki_link:metadao-autocrat-v01-reduces-proposal-duration-to-three-days",
+      "coal-futarchy-dao-demonstrates-proof-of-work-memecoin-governance-transition-from-autocrat-v03-to-v06.md:stripped_wiki_link:amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentive",
+      "coal-futarchy-dao-demonstrates-proof-of-work-memecoin-governance-transition-from-autocrat-v03-to-v06.md:stripped_wiki_link:futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fix",
+      "futarchy-development-fund-disbursement-caps-with-escalating-thresholds-create-operational-flexibility-with-manipulation-resistance.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
+      "futarchy-development-fund-disbursement-caps-with-escalating-thresholds-create-operational-flexibility-with-manipulation-resistance.md:stripped_wiki_link:futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate gov",
+      "futarchy-development-fund-disbursement-caps-with-escalating-thresholds-create-operational-flexibility-with-manipulation-resistance.md:stripped_wiki_link:futarchy-incentive-programs-use-multisig-execution-groups-as",
+      "meta-holder-airdrops-to-futarchy-governed-projects-create-cross-dao-network-effects-through-stakeholder-overlap.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
+      "meta-holder-airdrops-to-futarchy-governed-projects-create-cross-dao-network-effects-through-stakeholder-overlap.md:stripped_wiki_link:MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects r",
+      "meta-holder-airdrops-to-futarchy-governed-projects-create-cross-dao-network-effects-through-stakeholder-overlap.md:stripped_wiki_link:futarchy-governed-meme-coins-attract-speculative-capital-at-"
+    ],
+    "rejections": [
+      "coal-futarchy-dao-demonstrates-proof-of-work-memecoin-governance-transition-from-autocrat-v03-to-v06.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
+      "futarchy-development-fund-disbursement-caps-with-escalating-thresholds-create-operational-flexibility-with-manipulation-resistance.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
+      "meta-holder-airdrops-to-futarchy-governed-projects-create-cross-dao-network-effects-through-stakeholder-overlap.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
+    ]
+  },
+  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
+  "date": "2026-03-15"
+}

inbox/archive/2025-10-15-futardio-proposal-lets-get-futarded.md

@@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/6c1dnggYNpEZvz4fedJ19LAo8Pz2mTTvT6LxySYhpLb
 date: 2025-10-15
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-15
+enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations.md", "amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md", "metadao-autocrat-v01-reduces-proposal-duration-to-three-days-enabling-faster-governance-iteration.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -97,3 +101,14 @@ Voting
 - Autocrat version: 0.3
 - Completed: 2025-10-18
 - Ended: 2025-10-18
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- Coal DAO proposal 3 passed on October 18, 2025
+- Coal airdropped 420 tokens to each of 2,314 META holders
+- Coal total supply increased from 21,000,000 to 25,000,000 tokens
+- Coal development fund received 3,028,120 tokens
+- Coal v0.6 governance requires 10,000 COAL staked to create proposals
+- Coal v0.6 pass threshold is 100 basis points
+- Coal DAO account: 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
+- Coal proposal account: 6c1dnggYNpEZvz4fedJ19LAo8Pz2mTTvT6LxySYhpLbA