extract: 2025-11-00-operationalizing-pluralistic-values-llm-alignment #1010
20 changed files with 254 additions and 9 deletions
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@ -19,6 +19,12 @@ Since [[democratic alignment assemblies produce constitutions as effective as ex
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Since [[collective intelligence requires diversity as a structural precondition not a moral preference]], community-centred norm elicitation is a concrete mechanism for ensuring the structural diversity that collective alignment requires. Without it, alignment defaults to the values of whichever demographic builds the systems.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2025-11-00-operationalizing-pluralistic-values-llm-alignment]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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Empirical study with 27,375 ratings from 1,095 participants shows that demographic composition of training data produces 3-5 percentage point differences in model behavior across emotional awareness and toxicity dimensions. This quantifies the magnitude of difference between community-sourced and developer-specified alignment targets.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -27,6 +27,12 @@ Chakraborty, Qiu, Yuan, Koppel, Manocha, Huang, Bedi, Wang. "MaxMin-RLHF: Alignm
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- GPT-2 experiment: single RLHF achieved positive sentiment but ignored conciseness
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- Tulu2-7B experiment: minority group accuracy dropped from 70.4% to 42% at 10:1 ratio
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2025-11-00-operationalizing-pluralistic-values-llm-alignment]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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Study demonstrates that models trained on different demographic populations show measurable behavioral divergence (3-5 percentage points), providing empirical evidence that single-reward functions trained on one population systematically misalign with others.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -11,15 +11,21 @@ source: "Arrow's impossibility theorem; value pluralism (Isaiah Berlin); LivingI
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Not all disagreement is an information problem. Some disagreements persist because people genuinely weight values differently -- liberty against equality, individual against collective, present against future, growth against sustainability. These are not failures of reasoning or gaps in evidence. They are structural features of a world where multiple legitimate values cannot all be maximized simultaneously.
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[[Universal alignment is mathematically impossible because Arrows impossibility theorem applies to aggregating diverse human preferences into a single coherent objective]]. Arrow proved this formally: no aggregation mechanism can satisfy all fairness criteria simultaneously when preferences genuinely diverge. The implication is not that we should give up on coordination, but that any system claiming to have resolved all disagreement has either suppressed minority positions or defined away the hard cases.
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Universal alignment is mathematically impossible because Arrows impossibility theorem applies to aggregating diverse human preferences into a single coherent objective. Arrow proved this formally: no aggregation mechanism can satisfy all fairness criteria simultaneously when preferences genuinely diverge. The implication is not that we should give up on coordination, but that any system claiming to have resolved all disagreement has either suppressed minority positions or defined away the hard cases.
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This matters for knowledge systems because the temptation is always to converge. Consensus feels like progress. But premature consensus on value-laden questions is more dangerous than sustained tension. A system that forces agreement on whether AI development should prioritize capability or safety, or whether economic growth or ecological preservation takes precedence, has not solved the problem -- it has hidden it. And hidden disagreements surface at the worst possible moments.
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The correct response is to map the disagreement rather than eliminate it. Identify the common ground. Build steelman arguments for each position. Locate the precise crux -- is it empirical (resolvable with evidence) or evaluative (genuinely about different values)? Make the structure of the disagreement visible so that participants can engage with the strongest version of positions they oppose.
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[[Pluralistic alignment must accommodate irreducibly diverse values simultaneously rather than converging on a single aligned state]] -- this is the same principle applied to AI systems. [[RLHF and DPO both fail at preference diversity because they assume a single reward function can capture context-dependent human values]] -- collapsing diverse preferences into a single function is the technical version of premature consensus.
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Pluralistic alignment must accommodate irreducibly diverse values simultaneously rather than converging on a single aligned state -- this is the same principle applied to AI systems. [[RLHF and DPO both fail at preference diversity because they assume a single reward function can capture context-dependent human values]] -- collapsing diverse preferences into a single function is the technical version of premature consensus.
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[[Collective intelligence within a purpose-driven community faces a structural tension because shared worldview correlates errors while shared purpose enables coordination]]. Persistent irreducible disagreement is actually a safeguard here -- it prevents the correlated error problem by maintaining genuine diversity of perspective within a coordinated community. The independence-coherence tradeoff is managed not by eliminating disagreement but by channeling it productively.
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Collective intelligence within a purpose-driven community faces a structural tension because shared worldview correlates errors while shared purpose enables coordination. Persistent irreducible disagreement is actually a safeguard here -- it prevents the correlated error problem by maintaining genuine diversity of perspective within a coordinated community. The independence-coherence tradeoff is managed not by eliminating disagreement but by channeling it productively.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2025-11-00-operationalizing-pluralistic-values-llm-alignment]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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Systematic variation of demographic composition in alignment training produced persistent behavioral differences across Liberal/Conservative, White/Black, and Female/Male populations, suggesting these reflect genuine value differences rather than information asymmetries that could be resolved.
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---
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@ -29,6 +29,12 @@ Real-world persistence data from 125,474 commercially insured patients shows the
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The Cell Press review characterizes GLP-1s as marking a 'system-level redefinition' of cardiometabolic management with 'ripple effects across healthcare costs, insurance models, food systems, long-term population health.' Obesity costs the US $400B+ annually, providing context for the scale of potential cost impact. The WHO issued conditional recommendations within 2 years of widespread adoption (December 2025), unusually fast for a major therapeutic category.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2025-03-01-medicare-prior-authorization-glp1-near-universal]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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MA plans' near-universal prior authorization creates administrative friction that may worsen the already-poor adherence rates for GLP-1s. PA requirements ensure only T2D-diagnosed patients can access, effectively blocking obesity-only coverage despite FDA approval. This access restriction compounds the chronic-use economics challenge by adding administrative barriers on top of existing adherence problems.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -29,6 +29,12 @@ PACE represents the extreme end of value-based care alignment—100% capitation
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GLP-1 persistence data illustrates why value-based care requires risk alignment: with only 32.3% of non-diabetic obesity patients remaining on GLP-1s at one year (15% at two years), the downstream savings that justify the upfront drug cost never materialize for 85% of patients. Under fee-for-service, the pharmacy benefit pays the cost but doesn't capture the avoided hospitalizations. Under partial risk (upside-only), providers have no incentive to invest in adherence support because they don't bear the cost of discontinuation. Only under full risk (capitation) does the entity paying for the drug also capture the downstream savings—but only if adherence is sustained. This makes GLP-1 economics a test case for whether value-based care can solve the "who pays vs. who benefits" misalignment.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2025-03-01-medicare-prior-authorization-glp1-near-universal]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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Medicare Advantage plans bearing full capitated risk increased GLP-1 prior authorization from <5% to nearly 100% within two years (2023-2025), demonstrating that even full-risk capitation does not automatically align incentives toward prevention when short-term cost pressures dominate. Both BCBS and UnitedHealthcare implemented universal PA despite theoretical alignment under capitation.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -28,6 +28,12 @@ The mechanism addresses the "lack of liquidity" problem identified with CLOBs, w
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Rated experimental because this is a proposed design not yet deployed. The liquidity bootstrapping logic is sound but requires real-world validation.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2025-10-15-futardio-proposal-lets-get-futarded]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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Coal's v0.6 migration sets minimum liquidity requirements of 1500 USDC and 2000 coal for proposals, with OTC buyer lined up to purchase dev fund tokens and seed the futarchy AMM. This shows the liquidity bootstrapping pattern extends beyond initial launch to governance upgrades, where projects must arrange capital to meet minimum depth requirements before migration.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ The new DAO parameters formalize the lesson: 120k USDC monthly spending limit (w
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- Mintable tokens introduce dilution risk that fixed-supply tokens avoid: if mint authority is misused, token holders face value extraction without recourse
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- Since [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]], minting decisions are themselves governable through futarchy — but this only works if the DAO has not already become inoperable from treasury exhaustion
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2025-10-15-futardio-proposal-lets-get-futarded]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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Coal DAO executed a one-time supply increase from 21M to 25M tokens (19% increase) to fund development and liquidity, demonstrating the practical necessity of mint authority for treasury operations. The proposal explicitly structured this as a one-time increase rather than ongoing emissions, suggesting DAOs try to preserve fixed-supply narratives while pragmatically requiring mint capability.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -11,6 +11,12 @@ created: 2026-03-15
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The Autocrat v0.1 upgrade introduces configurable slots per proposal with a default of 3 days, explicitly designed to "allow for quicker feedback loops." This represents a significant reduction from previous implementations and addresses a key friction point in futarchy adoption: the time cost of decision-making. The proposal passed and migrated 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL to the new program, demonstrating community acceptance of faster iteration cycles. The architectural change makes proposal duration a parameter rather than a constant, allowing MetaDAO to tune the speed-quality tradeoff based on empirical results. This matters because governance mechanism adoption depends on matching decision velocity to organizational needs—too slow and participants route around the system, too fast and markets cannot aggregate information effectively.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2025-10-15-futardio-proposal-lets-get-futarded]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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Coal's v0.6 parameters set proposal length at 3 days with 1-day TWAP delay, confirming this as the standard configuration for Autocrat v0.6 implementations. The combination of 1-day TWAP delay plus 3-day proposal window creates a 4-day total decision cycle.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ The convergence toward lower volatility in recent launches (Ranger, Solomon, Pay
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## Limitations
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The source presents no failure cases despite eight ICOs, which suggests either selection bias in reporting or insufficient time for failures to materialize. The convergence toward lower volatility could indicate efficient pricing or could reflect declining speculative interest—longer observation periods needed to distinguish these hypotheses.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2025-10-14-futardio-launch-avici]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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Avici achieved 17x oversubscription ($34.2M committed vs $2M target), exceeding the previously documented 15x benchmark and demonstrating continued strong market demand for futarchy-governed raises.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ Community-driven animated IP founded by former VFX artists from Sony Pictures, A
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- **2025-06-02** — Announced 39-episode × 7-minute CG-animated series co-production with Mediawan Kids & Family, targeting kids 6-12. Distribution strategy: YouTube premiere followed by traditional TV licensing. Community involvement includes sharing storyboards, scripts, and featuring holders' collectibles in episodes. 450M+ views, 200M+ impressions, 530K+ subscribers at announcement.
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- **2025-10-01** — Announced 39-episode animated series (7 min each) launching YouTube-first with Method Animation (Mediawan) co-production, followed by TV/streaming sales. Gameloft mobile game in co-development. Community has generated nearly 1B social views. Nic Cabana presented creator-led transmedia strategy at VIEW Conference.
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## Relationship to KB
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- Implements [[fanchise management is a stack of increasing fan engagement from content extensions through co-creation and co-ownership]] through specific co-creation mechanisms
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@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ MetaDAO's token launch platform. Implements "unruggable ICOs" — permissionless
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- **2026-03-05** — [[git3-futardio-fundraise]] failed: Git3 raised $28,266 of $100K target (28.3%) before entering refunding status, demonstrating market filtering even with live MVP
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- **2024-06-14** — [[futardio-fund-rug-bounty-program]] passed: Approved $5K USDC funding for RugBounty.xyz platform development to incentivize community recovery from rug pulls
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- **2024-08-28** — MetaDAO proposal to develop futardio as memecoin launchpad with futarchy governance failed. Proposal would have allocated $100k grant over 6 months to development team. Key features: percentage of each new token supply allocated to futarchy DAO, points-to-token conversion within 180 days, revenue distribution to $FUTA holders, immutable deployment on IPFS/Arweave. Proposal rejected by market, suggesting reputational risks outweighed adoption benefits.
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- **2025-11-14** — Solomon launch: $8M raised (12.9x oversubscribed, $102.9M committed) for composable yield-bearing stablecoin
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## Competitive Position
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- **Unique mechanism**: Only launch platform with futarchy-governed accountability and treasury return guarantees
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- **vs pump.fun**: pump.fun is memecoin launch (zero accountability, pure speculation). Futardio is ownership coin launch (futarchy governance, treasury enforcement). Different categories despite both being "launch platforms."
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@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
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{
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"rejected_claims": [
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{
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"filename": "medicare-advantage-prior-authorization-escalation-from-5-to-100-percent-demonstrates-capitated-plans-prioritize-short-term-cost-avoidance-over-long-term-prevention.md",
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"issues": [
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"missing_attribution_extractor"
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]
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}
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],
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"validation_stats": {
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"total": 1,
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"kept": 0,
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"fixed": 1,
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"rejected": 1,
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"fixes_applied": [
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"medicare-advantage-prior-authorization-escalation-from-5-to-100-percent-demonstrates-capitated-plans-prioritize-short-term-cost-avoidance-over-long-term-prevention.md:set_created:2026-03-15"
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],
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"rejections": [
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"medicare-advantage-prior-authorization-escalation-from-5-to-100-percent-demonstrates-capitated-plans-prioritize-short-term-cost-avoidance-over-long-term-prevention.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
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]
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},
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"model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
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"date": "2026-03-15"
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}
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@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
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{
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"rejected_claims": [
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{
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"filename": "coal-futarchy-dao-demonstrates-proof-of-work-memecoin-governance-transition-from-autocrat-v03-to-v06.md",
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"issues": [
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"missing_attribution_extractor"
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]
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},
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{
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"filename": "futarchy-development-fund-disbursement-caps-with-escalating-thresholds-create-operational-flexibility-with-manipulation-resistance.md",
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"issues": [
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"missing_attribution_extractor"
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]
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},
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{
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"filename": "meta-holder-airdrops-to-futarchy-governed-projects-create-cross-dao-network-effects-through-stakeholder-overlap.md",
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"issues": [
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"missing_attribution_extractor"
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]
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}
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],
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"validation_stats": {
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"total": 3,
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"kept": 0,
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"fixed": 10,
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"rejected": 3,
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"fixes_applied": [
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"coal-futarchy-dao-demonstrates-proof-of-work-memecoin-governance-transition-from-autocrat-v03-to-v06.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
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"coal-futarchy-dao-demonstrates-proof-of-work-memecoin-governance-transition-from-autocrat-v03-to-v06.md:stripped_wiki_link:metadao-autocrat-v01-reduces-proposal-duration-to-three-days",
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"coal-futarchy-dao-demonstrates-proof-of-work-memecoin-governance-transition-from-autocrat-v03-to-v06.md:stripped_wiki_link:amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentive",
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"coal-futarchy-dao-demonstrates-proof-of-work-memecoin-governance-transition-from-autocrat-v03-to-v06.md:stripped_wiki_link:futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fix",
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"futarchy-development-fund-disbursement-caps-with-escalating-thresholds-create-operational-flexibility-with-manipulation-resistance.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
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"futarchy-development-fund-disbursement-caps-with-escalating-thresholds-create-operational-flexibility-with-manipulation-resistance.md:stripped_wiki_link:futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate gov",
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"futarchy-development-fund-disbursement-caps-with-escalating-thresholds-create-operational-flexibility-with-manipulation-resistance.md:stripped_wiki_link:futarchy-incentive-programs-use-multisig-execution-groups-as",
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"meta-holder-airdrops-to-futarchy-governed-projects-create-cross-dao-network-effects-through-stakeholder-overlap.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
|
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"meta-holder-airdrops-to-futarchy-governed-projects-create-cross-dao-network-effects-through-stakeholder-overlap.md:stripped_wiki_link:MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects r",
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"meta-holder-airdrops-to-futarchy-governed-projects-create-cross-dao-network-effects-through-stakeholder-overlap.md:stripped_wiki_link:futarchy-governed-meme-coins-attract-speculative-capital-at-"
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],
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"rejections": [
|
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"coal-futarchy-dao-demonstrates-proof-of-work-memecoin-governance-transition-from-autocrat-v03-to-v06.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
|
||||
"futarchy-development-fund-disbursement-caps-with-escalating-thresholds-create-operational-flexibility-with-manipulation-resistance.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
|
||||
"meta-holder-airdrops-to-futarchy-governed-projects-create-cross-dao-network-effects-through-stakeholder-overlap.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
|
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"date": "2026-03-15"
|
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}
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@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
|
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{
|
||||
"rejected_claims": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"filename": "lst-based-privacy-mixers-solve-opportunity-cost-paradox-by-converting-anonymity-waiting-periods-into-yield-generating-staking-positions.md",
|
||||
"issues": [
|
||||
"missing_attribution_extractor"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"validation_stats": {
|
||||
"total": 1,
|
||||
"kept": 0,
|
||||
"fixed": 3,
|
||||
"rejected": 1,
|
||||
"fixes_applied": [
|
||||
"lst-based-privacy-mixers-solve-opportunity-cost-paradox-by-converting-anonymity-waiting-periods-into-yield-generating-staking-positions.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
|
||||
"lst-based-privacy-mixers-solve-opportunity-cost-paradox-by-converting-anonymity-waiting-periods-into-yield-generating-staking-positions.md:stripped_wiki_link:internet-capital-markets-compress-fundraising-from-months-to",
|
||||
"lst-based-privacy-mixers-solve-opportunity-cost-paradox-by-converting-anonymity-waiting-periods-into-yield-generating-staking-positions.md:stripped_wiki_link:MetaDAO-is-the-futarchy-launchpad-on-Solana-where-projects-r"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"rejections": [
|
||||
"lst-based-privacy-mixers-solve-opportunity-cost-paradox-by-converting-anonymity-waiting-periods-into-yield-generating-staking-positions.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
|
||||
"date": "2026-03-15"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
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@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"rejected_claims": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"filename": "demographic-composition-of-alignment-training-data-produces-measurable-behavioral-differences-in-model-outputs.md",
|
||||
"issues": [
|
||||
"missing_attribution_extractor"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"validation_stats": {
|
||||
"total": 1,
|
||||
"kept": 0,
|
||||
"fixed": 1,
|
||||
"rejected": 1,
|
||||
"fixes_applied": [
|
||||
"demographic-composition-of-alignment-training-data-produces-measurable-behavioral-differences-in-model-outputs.md:set_created:2026-03-15"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"rejections": [
|
||||
"demographic-composition-of-alignment-training-data-produces-measurable-behavioral-differences-in-model-outputs.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
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"model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
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"date": "2026-03-15"
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||||
}
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@ -7,9 +7,13 @@ date: 2025-03-01
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domain: health
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secondary_domains: []
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format: article
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status: unprocessed
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status: enrichment
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priority: medium
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tags: [glp-1, prior-authorization, medicare-advantage, formulary, access-barriers]
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processed_by: vida
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processed_date: 2026-03-15
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enrichments_applied: ["value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary because 60 percent of payments touch value metrics but only 14 percent bear full risk.md", "GLP-1 receptor agonists are the largest therapeutic category launch in pharmaceutical history but their chronic use model makes the net cost impact inflationary through 2035.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
|
||||
---
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## Content
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@ -44,3 +48,12 @@ Analysis of GLP-1 coverage and prior authorization requirements under Medicare A
|
|||
PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary because 60 percent of payments touch value metrics but only 14 percent bear full risk]]
|
||||
WHY ARCHIVED: Near-universal PA for GLP-1s under MA demonstrates that capitation alone doesn't align incentives for prevention — MA plans still manage to short-term cost metrics
|
||||
EXTRACTION HINT: Focus on the tension between theoretical capitation incentives (cover prevention → save money) and actual MA behavior (restrict access → minimize short-term spend)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Key Facts
|
||||
- Injectable semaglutide (Ozempic) covered by 98.0% of MA plans in 2025
|
||||
- Tirzepatide (Mounjaro) covered by 96.2% of MA plans in 2025
|
||||
- Oral semaglutide covered by 84.8% of MA plans in 2025
|
||||
- Dulaglutide covered by 87.5% of MA plans in 2025
|
||||
- Only 13 state Medicaid programs covered GLP-1s for obesity as of January 2026
|
||||
- GLP-1s for weight loss/obesity remain excluded under Medicare Part D until BALANCE model demonstration begins July 2026
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/launch/2rYvdtK8ovuSziJuy5gTTPtviY5CfTnW6Pps4pk7ehEq"
|
|||
date: 2025-10-14
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
status: enrichment
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana]
|
||||
event_type: launch
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
processed_date: 2026-03-15
|
||||
enrichments_applied: ["metadao-ico-platform-demonstrates-15x-oversubscription-validating-futarchy-governed-capital-formation.md"]
|
||||
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Launch Details
|
||||
|
|
@ -53,3 +57,11 @@ Token CA: [`BANKJmvhT8tiJRsBSS1n2HryMBPvT5Ze4HU95DUAmeta`](https://jup.ag/tokens
|
|||
- Version: v0.6
|
||||
- Final raise: $3,500,000.00
|
||||
- Closed: 2025-10-18
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Key Facts
|
||||
- Avici DAO raised $34,230,976 committed against $2M target on futardio (Oct 14-18, 2025)
|
||||
- Avici final raise amount was $3,500,000
|
||||
- Avici token mint address: BANKJmvhT8tiJRsBSS1n2HryMBPvT5Ze4HU95DUAmeta
|
||||
- Avici launch address: 2rYvdtK8ovuSziJuy5gTTPtviY5CfTnW6Pps4pk7ehEq
|
||||
- Avici uses futardio platform version v0.6
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/6c1dnggYNpEZvz4fedJ19LAo8Pz2mTTvT6LxySYhpLb
|
|||
date: 2025-10-15
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
status: enrichment
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
processed_date: 2026-03-15
|
||||
enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations.md", "amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md", "metadao-autocrat-v01-reduces-proposal-duration-to-three-days-enabling-faster-governance-iteration.md"]
|
||||
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Proposal Details
|
||||
|
|
@ -97,3 +101,14 @@ Voting
|
|||
- Autocrat version: 0.3
|
||||
- Completed: 2025-10-18
|
||||
- Ended: 2025-10-18
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Key Facts
|
||||
- Coal DAO proposal 3 passed on October 18, 2025
|
||||
- Coal airdropped 420 tokens to each of 2,314 META holders
|
||||
- Coal total supply increased from 21,000,000 to 25,000,000 tokens
|
||||
- Coal development fund received 3,028,120 tokens
|
||||
- Coal v0.6 governance requires 10,000 COAL staked to create proposals
|
||||
- Coal v0.6 pass threshold is 100 basis points
|
||||
- Coal DAO account: 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
|
||||
- Coal proposal account: 6c1dnggYNpEZvz4fedJ19LAo8Pz2mTTvT6LxySYhpLbA
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/launch/4h248CdXdeWtxWnHxEPqa5ruYZaEwXRZPyDFYnndbzpR"
|
|||
date: 2025-10-20
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
status: null-result
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana]
|
||||
event_type: launch
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
|
|
@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ processed_date: 2025-10-20
|
|||
enrichments_applied: ["internet-capital-markets-compress-fundraising-from-months-to-days-because-permissionless-raises-eliminate-gatekeepers-while-futarchy-replaces-due-diligence-bottlenecks-with-real-time-market-pricing.md", "MetaDAO-is-the-futarchy-launchpad-on-Solana-where-projects-raise-capital-through-unruggable-ICOs-governed-by-conditional-markets-creating-the-first-platform-for-ownership-coins-at-scale.md"]
|
||||
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
|
||||
extraction_notes: "Extracted one novel claim about LST-based privacy mixers solving opportunity cost paradox. Enriched two existing claims with fundraising speed and platform scope evidence. Source is primarily a launch announcement with project description - limited technical detail but strong market signal via oversubscription. Confidence capped at experimental due to single-source evidence and lack of post-launch usage data."
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
processed_date: 2026-03-15
|
||||
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
|
||||
extraction_notes: "LLM returned 1 claims, 1 rejected by validator"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Launch Details
|
||||
|
|
@ -77,3 +81,15 @@ Token CA: [`ZKFHiLAfAFMTcDAuCtjNW54VzpERvoe7PBF9mYgmeta`](https://jup.ag/tokens/
|
|||
- Platform: futard.io v0.6
|
||||
- Devnet app: app.zklsol.org
|
||||
- Documentation: docs.zklsol.org
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Key Facts
|
||||
- ZKLSOL funding target: $300,000
|
||||
- ZKLSOL total committed: $14,886,359 (49x oversubscription)
|
||||
- ZKLSOL final raise: $969,420
|
||||
- Launch date: 2025-10-20
|
||||
- Close date: 2025-10-24
|
||||
- Token: ZKFG
|
||||
- Token mint: ZKFHiLAfAFMTcDAuCtjNW54VzpERvoe7PBF9mYgmeta
|
||||
- Platform: futard.io v0.6
|
||||
- Devnet app: app.zklsol.org
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -7,9 +7,13 @@ date: 2025-11-01
|
|||
domain: ai-alignment
|
||||
secondary_domains: []
|
||||
format: paper
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
status: enrichment
|
||||
priority: high
|
||||
tags: [pluralistic-alignment, demographic-composition, empirical, safety-inclusivity, real-human-feedback]
|
||||
processed_by: theseus
|
||||
processed_date: 2026-03-15
|
||||
enrichments_applied: ["community-centred norm elicitation surfaces alignment targets materially different from developer-specified rules.md", "single-reward-rlhf-cannot-align-diverse-preferences-because-alignment-gap-grows-proportional-to-minority-distinctiveness.md", "some disagreements are permanently irreducible because they stem from genuine value differences not information gaps and systems must map rather than eliminate them.md"]
|
||||
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Content
|
||||
|
|
@ -29,7 +33,7 @@ Demonstrates that "whose feedback" matters as much as "how much feedback" for al
|
|||
**Why this matters:** First large-scale empirical study varying DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION of alignment training data. Proves that the composition question (whose preferences?) has measurable, quantitative effects on model behavior.
|
||||
**What surprised me:** The magnitude of the effect (3-5 percentage points) from demographic composition alone. This is not a subtle effect.
|
||||
**What I expected but didn't find:** Couldn't access full paper. Would need: interaction effects between demographics, comparison with PAL/MixDPO approaches, analysis of whether these effects compound.
|
||||
**KB connections:** Directly supports [[community-centred norm elicitation surfaces alignment targets materially different from developer-specified rules]]. Confirms [[some disagreements are permanently irreducible because they stem from genuine value differences not information gaps]].
|
||||
**KB connections:** Directly supports [[community-centred norm elicitation surfaces alignment targets materially different from developer-specified rules]]. Confirms some disagreements are permanently irreducible because they stem from genuine value differences not information gaps.
|
||||
**Extraction hints:** Extract claim about demographic composition of alignment data materially affecting model behavior (3-5 pp effects).
|
||||
**Context:** 1,095 participants is a large N for alignment research. Real human feedback, not synthetic.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -37,3 +41,11 @@ Demonstrates that "whose feedback" matters as much as "how much feedback" for al
|
|||
PRIMARY CONNECTION: community-centred norm elicitation surfaces alignment targets materially different from developer-specified rules
|
||||
WHY ARCHIVED: Empirical evidence that "whose preferences" is a quantitatively important question, not just a fairness concern
|
||||
EXTRACTION HINT: Focus on the magnitude of demographic composition effects and what this means for single-population alignment training
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Key Facts
|
||||
- Study included 27,375 ratings from 1,095 participants
|
||||
- Models fine-tuned on Liberal feedback showed 5.0 percentage point improvement over Conservative baseline
|
||||
- Models fine-tuned on White feedback showed 4.7 percentage point improvement over Black baseline
|
||||
- Models fine-tuned on Female feedback showed 3.4 percentage point improvement over Male baseline
|
||||
- Effects measured across emotional awareness and toxicity dimensions
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue