extract: 2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management #1107
3 changed files with 25 additions and 1 deletions
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@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ Dean's List DAO's fee increase proposal included switching quote token from mSOL
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The HNT-ORE boost proposal frames strategic partnership value through liquidity network effects and brand positioning ('flagship DePIN project', 'competitive unit of account for real world assets'). Markets must price whether Helium association increases ORE's perceived legitimacy and network depth, demonstrating futarchy's ability to evaluate partnership proposals with significant intangible components.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
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Dean's List DAO treasury de-risking proposal passed with market pricing showing 5-20% FDV increase ($500k to $525k-$600k) based on financial stability perception. The proposal explicitly modeled how converting volatile assets to stablecoins would impact market confidence and token valuation, demonstrating futarchy markets can price operational stability as a token price input.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -79,6 +79,12 @@ The Dean's List proposal passed futarchy governance despite requiring complex mu
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LobsterFutarchy's failure ($1,183 of $500,000 target) occurred despite proposing infrastructure for a stated market need (agent financial sandboxing) and reasonable economics ($45k/month burn for 12 months). The 99.8% funding shortfall suggests participation friction or credibility gaps rather than market rejection of the concept itself.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
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Dean's List treasury proposal required TWAP > 3% to pass and projected 5-20% FDV increase, well above the threshold. The proposal passed, suggesting that when economic benefits substantially exceed participation thresholds, friction becomes less determinative of outcomes.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/4gaJ8bi1gpNEx6xSSsepjVBM6GXqTDfLbiUbzXbARHW
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date: 2024-12-02
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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status: enrichment
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2026-03-16
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enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md", "futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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---
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## Proposal Details
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@ -122,3 +126,11 @@ This strategy ensures financial stability while signaling prudence to investors,
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Completed: 2024-12-05
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- Ended: 2024-12-05
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## Key Facts
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- Dean's List DAO treasury valued at $75,000-$87,000 at $350 SOL (excluding DEAN token)
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- Proposal required TWAP > 3% for passage, with conservative FDV baseline of $500,000
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- De-risking projected to increase survival probability from 50% to 90%
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- Market modeled 5% confidence boost scenario ($525k FDV) and 20% confidence boost scenario ($600k FDV)
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- Proposal created 2024-12-02, completed 2024-12-05
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