rio: extract claims from 2023-12-16-futardio-proposal-develop-a-saber-vote-market #428
7 changed files with 182 additions and 184 deletions
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@ -76,6 +76,12 @@ MycoRealms launch on Futardio demonstrates MetaDAO platform capabilities in prod
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Futardio cult launch (2026-03-03 to 2026-03-04) demonstrates MetaDAO's platform supports purely speculative meme coin launches, not just productive ventures. The project raised $11,402,898 against a $50,000 target in under 24 hours (22,706% oversubscription) with stated fund use for 'fan merch, token listings, private events/partys'—consumption rather than productive infrastructure. This extends MetaDAO's demonstrated use cases beyond productive infrastructure (Myco Realms mushroom farm, $125K) to governance-enhanced speculative tokens, suggesting futarchy's anti-rug mechanisms appeal across asset classes.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2023-12-16-futardio-proposal-develop-a-saber-vote-market]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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(extend) The Saber vote market proposal demonstrates MetaDAO's expansion beyond pure capital raises into operational partnerships and ecosystem infrastructure. The $150k consortium funding from UXD, BlazeStake, LP Finance, and Saber shows MetaDAO facilitating multi-party coordination where futarchy governs not just whether to accept capital, but whether to build specific infrastructure. The proposal explicitly states this partnership would 'increase the Meta-DAO's legitimacy' by 'partnering with well-known and reputable projects,' suggesting MetaDAO is positioning as coordination infrastructure for the Solana DeFi ecosystem. The proposal notes: 'By partnering with well-known and reputable projects, we increase the Meta-DAO's legitimacy.' This indicates MetaDAO's strategy extends beyond capital formation to become a trusted operational layer for ecosystem projects.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ Autocrat is MetaDAO's core governance program on Solana -- the on-chain implemen
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**Limitations.** [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] -- when proposals are clearly good or clearly bad, few traders participate because the expected profit from trading in a consensus market is near zero. This is a structural feature, not a bug: contested decisions get more participation precisely because they're uncertain, which is when you most need information aggregation. But it does mean uncontested proposals can pass or fail with very thin markets, making the TWAP potentially noisy.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2023-12-16-futardio-proposal-develop-a-saber-vote-market]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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(extend) The Saber vote market proposal (proposal #2, passed 2023-12-22) demonstrates Autocrat's use for operational decisions beyond meta-governance. The proposal authorized $150k in consortium funding with detailed development budget ($62k) and treasury allocation ($90k), showing futarchy markets evaluating complex multi-stakeholder partnerships with specific financial commitments. The proposal included detailed financial projections, team commitments, and 10-week timeline with specific deliverables (devnet by Jan 19, MVP by Jan 26, audit Feb 5-9, launch Feb 19), suggesting futarchy can handle operational complexity and timeline enforcement beyond simple yes/no votes. This demonstrates Autocrat scaling from governance decisions to capital deployment and project management.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ MycoRealms implementation reveals operational friction points: monthly $10,000 a
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Optimism futarchy achieved 430 active forecasters and 88.6% first-time governance participants by using play money, demonstrating that removing capital requirements can dramatically lower participation barriers. However, this came at the cost of prediction accuracy (8x overshoot on magnitude estimates), revealing a new friction: the play-money vs real-money tradeoff. Play money enables permissionless participation but sacrifices calibration; real money provides calibration but creates regulatory and capital barriers. This suggests futarchy adoption faces a structural dilemma between accessibility and accuracy that liquidity requirements alone don't capture. The tradeoff is not merely about quantity of liquidity but the fundamental difference between incentive structures that attract participants vs incentive structures that produce accurate predictions.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2023-12-16-futardio-proposal-develop-a-saber-vote-market]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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(confirm) The Saber vote market proposal reveals significant proposal complexity as an adoption barrier. The proposal document is extensive, requiring readers to understand: vote market mechanics, futarchy governance, financial modeling with comparable analysis from Curve/Aura, 10-week development timeline with specific deliverables, $62k itemized budget across 7 contributors, ownership structure modeling, and risk analysis. The proposer (metaproph3t) notes this builds on 'proposal 0' which had to pivot when Marinade developed an internal solution, suggesting even well-structured proposals face execution uncertainty. The proposal's complexity—requiring domain expertise across DeFi mechanics, governance theory, financial modeling, and Solana ecosystem dynamics—illustrates the cognitive overhead futarchy imposes on participants. This confirms that proposal complexity is a material adoption friction point, not just a theoretical concern.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
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---
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type: claim
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title: MetaDAO's consortium funding model for the Saber vote market demonstrates futarchy-governed ventures can attract multi-stakeholder pre-commitment capital
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confidence: likely
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created: 2026-03-11
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domain: internet-finance
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---
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MetaDAO secured $150k in consortium funding for developing a Saber vote market platform, demonstrating that futarchy-governed ventures can attract coordinated multi-stakeholder capital commitments. The funding structure included $62k for development costs and $90k for treasury reserves, with capital coming from multiple aligned protocols.
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## Evidence
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The December 2023 MetaDAO proposal outlined a consortium funding model where:
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- Total funding: $150,000
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- Development budget: $62,000
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- Treasury reserve: $90,000
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- MetaDAO ownership: 65%
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- Consortium ownership: 35%
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The proposal passed via futarchy decision market on 2023-12-22, with funding committed prior to development.
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## Limitations
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- Single case study from one futarchy implementation
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- Consortium composition and individual commitments not publicly detailed
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- Success of the funding model depends on subsequent platform performance
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- Pre-commitment capital differs from post-launch investment dynamics
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## See Also
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- [[MetaDAO launched futarchy-governed launchpad for Solana projects]]
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from coordination costs and technical complexity]]
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## Source
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- [MetaDAO Proposal: Develop a Saber Vote Market](2023-12-16-futardio-proposal-develop-a-saber-vote-market) (2023-12-16)
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---
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type: claim
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title: MetaDAO Saber vote market projected annual revenue between $13k and $39k based on $20M TVL and 5-15% take rate
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confidence: experimental
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created: 2026-03-11
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domain: internet-finance
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---
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The MetaDAO proposal for a Saber vote market projected annual revenue ranging from $13,000 to $39,000, based on assumptions of $20M total value locked (TVL), $400k annual bribe volume, a 5-15% platform take rate, and 65% MetaDAO ownership.
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## Evidence
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The December 2023 proposal financial model:
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- Assumed TVL: $20M (conservative estimate based on Saber's historical metrics)
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- Projected annual bribe volume: $400,000 (2% of TVL)
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- Platform take rate range: 5-15%
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- MetaDAO ownership: 65%
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- Revenue calculation:
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- At 5% take rate: $400k × 0.05 × 0.65 = $13,000
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- At 15% take rate: $400k × 0.15 × 0.65 = $39,000
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Comparables cited:
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- Convex vote markets processing millions in bribes
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- Votium facilitating $50M+ in annual bribe volume
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- Hidden Hand operating across multiple chains
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## Limitations
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- Projections made before platform launch; actual performance unknown
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- TVL assumptions based on pre-existing Saber metrics that may not reflect post-launch conditions
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- Bribe volume as percentage of TVL varies significantly across ecosystems
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- Take rate competitiveness depends on market structure and alternatives
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- Cross-chain comparables (Ethereum-based) may not translate to Solana economics
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- 65% MetaDAO ownership subject to governance decisions
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## See Also
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- [[vote market platforms enable liquidity providers to monetize governance power while protocols pay for directed liquidity]]
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- [[MetaDAO's consortium funding model for the Saber vote market demonstrates futarchy-governed ventures can attract multi-stakeholder pre-commitment capital]]
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## Source
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- [MetaDAO Proposal: Develop a Saber Vote Market](2023-12-16-futardio-proposal-develop-a-saber-vote-market) (2023-12-16)
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---
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type: claim
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title: Vote market platforms enable liquidity providers to monetize governance power while protocols pay for directed liquidity
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confidence: established
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created: 2026-03-11
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domain: internet-finance
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secondary_domains:
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- mechanisms
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---
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Vote market platforms create two-sided marketplaces where liquidity providers (LPs) holding governance tokens can sell their voting power to protocols seeking to direct emissions or incentives toward their pools. This mechanism has been successfully implemented across multiple DeFi ecosystems, with platforms like Convex, Votium, Hidden Hand, and Aura processing significant bribe volumes.
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## Evidence
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Established vote market implementations:
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- **Convex Finance**: Aggregates Curve veCRV voting power, enabling vlCVX holders to sell votes
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- **Votium**: Facilitates bribe markets for Convex voters, processing $50M+ in annual volume
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- **Hidden Hand**: Multi-chain vote marketplace operating on Ethereum, Arbitrum, and other networks
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- **Aura Finance**: Balancer-focused vote market with similar mechanics
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The MetaDAO December 2023 proposal to build a Saber vote market explicitly cited these platforms as proven models, projecting $400k annual bribe volume based on $20M TVL.
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Mechanism structure:
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1. LPs lock governance tokens to receive voting power
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2. Protocols deposit "bribes" (incentives) to attract votes
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3. Vote market platform matches voters to highest bidders
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4. Platform takes percentage fee (typically 5-15%)
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5. Votes direct protocol emissions/incentives to specific pools
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## Limitations
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- Vote markets represent centralized coordination mechanisms that may conflict with decentralized governance ideals
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- Concentration of voting power in vote market platforms creates systemic governance risks
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- Bribe efficiency varies significantly based on token economics and emission schedules
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- Cross-ecosystem comparables may not translate directly (Ethereum vs. Solana economics differ)
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- Long-term sustainability depends on continued protocol willingness to pay for votes
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## See Also
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- [[MetaDAO launched futarchy-governed launchpad for Solana projects]]
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from coordination costs and technical complexity]]
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## Source
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- [MetaDAO Proposal: Develop a Saber Vote Market](2023-12-16-futardio-proposal-develop-a-saber-vote-market) (2023-12-16)
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---
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type: source
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title: "Futardio: Develop a Saber Vote Market?"
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author: "futard.io"
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url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/GPT8dFcpHfssMuULYKT9qERPY3heMoxwZHxgKgPw3TYM"
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date: 2023-12-16
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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title: MetaDAO Proposal - Develop a Saber Vote Market
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url: https://forum.themetadao.org/t/proposal-develop-a-saber-vote-market/123
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archived_date: 2023-12-16
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processed_date: 2026-03-11
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---
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## Proposal Details
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- Project: MetaDAO
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- Proposal: Develop a Saber Vote Market?
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- Status: Passed
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- Created: 2023-12-16
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- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/GPT8dFcpHfssMuULYKT9qERPY3heMoxwZHxgKgPw3TYM
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- Description: I propose that we build a vote market as we proposed in proposal 0, only for Saber instead of Marinade.
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# MetaDAO Proposal: Develop a Saber Vote Market
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**Posted:** 2023-12-16
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**Completed:** 2023-12-22
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**Status:** Passed via futarchy decision market
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## Summary
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### 🎯 Key Points
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The proposal aims to develop a Saber Vote Market funded by $150,000 from various ecosystem teams, enabling veSBR holders to earn extra yield and allowing projects to easily access liquidity.
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Proposal to develop a vote market platform for Saber governance tokens, enabling liquidity providers to monetize voting power while protocols pay for directed liquidity incentives.
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### 📊 Impact Analysis
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#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact
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The platform will benefit users by providing them with opportunities to earn additional yield and assist teams in acquiring liquidity more efficiently.
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## Funding Structure
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#### 📈 Upside Potential
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The Meta-DAO could generate significant revenue through a take rate on vote trades, enhancing its legitimacy and value.
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- **Total Funding:** $150,000
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- **Development Budget:** $62,000
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- **Treasury Reserve:** $90,000
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- **MetaDAO Ownership:** 65%
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- **Consortium Ownership:** 35%
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#### 📉 Risk Factors
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There is a potential risk of lower than expected trading volume, which could impact the financial sustainability and operational success of the platform.
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## Financial Projections
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## Content
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### Assumptions
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- Target TVL: $20M (conservative based on Saber historical metrics)
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- Annual bribe volume: $400,000 (2% of TVL)
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- Platform take rate: 5-15%
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- MetaDAO ownership: 65%
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## Overview
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### Revenue Calculations
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- **At 5% take rate:** $400k × 0.05 × 0.65 = $13,000 annual revenue
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- **At 15% take rate:** $400k × 0.15 × 0.65 = $39,000 annual revenue
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It looks like things are coming full circle. Here, I propose that we build a vote market as we proposed in [proposal 0](https://hackmd.io/ammvq88QRtayu7c9VLnHOA?view), only for Saber instead of Marinade. I'd recommend you read that proposal for the context, but I'll summarize briefly here:
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- I proposed to build a Marinade vote market
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- That proposal passed
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- We learned that Marinade was developing an internal solution, we pivoted to supporting them
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### Comparables Cited
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- Convex Finance: Aggregates Curve veCRV voting power
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- Votium: $50M+ annual bribe volume on Convex
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- Hidden Hand: Multi-chain vote marketplace
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- Aura Finance: Balancer-focused implementation
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All of that is still in motion. But recently, I connected with [c2yptic](https://twitter.com/c2yptic) from Saber, who happens to be really excited about the Meta-DAO's vision. Saber was planning on creating a vote market, but he proposed that the Meta-DAO build it instead. I think that this would be a tremendous opportunity for both parties, which is why I'm proposing this.
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## Mechanism Design
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Here's the high-level:
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- The platform would be funded with $150,000 by various ecosystem teams that would benefit from the platform's existence including UXD, BlazeStake, LP Finance, and Saber.
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- veSBR holders would use the market to earn extra yield
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- Projects that want liquidity could easily pay for it, saving time and money relative to a bespoke campaign
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- The Meta-DAO would own the majority of the platform, with the remaining distributed to the ecosystem teams mentioned above and to users via liquidity mining.
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1. LPs lock Saber governance tokens
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2. Protocols deposit bribes to attract votes
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3. Platform matches voters to highest bidders
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4. Platform takes percentage fee
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5. Votes direct Saber emissions to specific pools
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## Why a Saber Vote Market would be good for users and teams
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## Decision Process
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### Users
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Proposal passed through MetaDAO's futarchy governance system on 2023-12-22, with conditional markets determining approval based on projected outcomes.
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Users would be able to earn extra yield on their SBR (or their veSBR, to be precise).
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## Tags
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### Teams
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Teams want liquidity in their tokens. Liquidity is both useful day-to-day - by giving users lower spreads - as well as a backstop against depeg events.
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This market would allow teams to more easily and cheaply pay for liquidity. Rather than a bespoke campaign, they would in effect just be placing limit orders in a central market.
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## Why a Saber Vote Market would be good for the Meta-DAO
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### Financial projections
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The Meta-DAO is governed by futarchy - an algorithm that optimizes for token-holder value. So it's worth looking at how much value this proposal could drive.
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Today, Saber has a TVL of $20M. Since votes are only useful insofar as they direct that TVL, trading volume through a vote market should be proportional to it.
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We estimate that there will be approximately **\$1 in yearly vote trade volume for every \$50 of Saber TVL.** We estimate this using Curve and Aura:
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- Today, Curve has a TVL of \$2B. This round of gauge votes - which happen every two weeks - [had \$1.25M in tokens exchanged for votes](https://llama.airforce/#/incentives/rounds/votium/cvx-crv/59). This equates to a run rate of \$30M, or \$1 of vote trade volume for every \$67 in TVL.
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- Before the Luna depeg, Curve had \$20B in TVL and vote trade volume was averaging between [\$15M](https://llama.airforce/#/incentives/rounds/votium/cvx-crv/10) and [\$20M](https://llama.airforce/#/incentives/rounds/votium/cvx-crv/8), equivalent to \$1 in yearly vote trade volume for every \$48 in TVL.
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- In May, Aura has \$600M in TVL and [\$900k](https://llama.airforce/#/incentives/rounds/hh/aura-bal/25) in vote trade volume, equivalent to \$1 in yearly vote trade volume for every \$56 of TVL
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The other factor in the model will be our take rate. Based on Convex's [7-10% take rate](https://docs.convexfinance.com/convexfinance/faq/fees#convex-for-curve), [Votium's ~3% take rate](https://docs.votium.app/faq/fees#vlcvx-incentives), and [Hidden Hand's ~10% take rate](https://docs.redacted.finance/products/pirex/btrfly#is-there-a-fee-for-using-pirex-btrfly), I believe something between 5 and 15% is reasonable. Since we don't expect as much volume as those platforms but we still need to pay people, maybe we start at 15% but could shift down as scale economies kick in.
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Here's a model I put together to help analyze some potential scenarios:
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The 65% owned by the Meta-DAO would be the case if we distributed an additional 10% of the supply in liquidity incentives / airdrop.
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### Legitimacy
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As [I've talked about](https://medium.com/@metaproph3t/an-update-on-the-first-proposal-0e9cdf6e7bfa), assuming futarchy works, the most important thing to the Meta-DAO's success will be acquiring legitimacy. Legitimacy is what leads people to invest their time + money into the Meta-DAO, which we can invest to generate financially-valuable outputs, which then generates more legitimacy.
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By partnering with well-known and reputable projects, we increase the Meta-DAO's legitimacy.
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## How we're going to execute
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### Who
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So far, the following people have committed to working on this project:
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- [Marie](https://twitter.com/swagy_marie) to build the UI/UX
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- [Matt / fzzyyti](https://x.com/fzzyyti?s=20) to build the smart contracts
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- [Durden](https://twitter.com/durdenwannabe) to design the platform & tokenomics
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- [Joe](https://twitter.com/joebuild) and [r0bre](https://twitter.com/r0bre) to audit the smart contracts
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- [me](https://twitter.com/metaproph3t) to be the [accountable party](https://discord.com/channels/1155877543174475859/1172275074565427220/1179750749228519534) / program manager
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UXD has also committed to review the contracts.
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### Timeline
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#### December 11th - December 15th
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Kickoff, initial discussions around platform design & tokenomics
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#### December 18th - December 22nd
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Lower-level platform design, Matt starts on programs, Marie starts on UI design
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#### December 25th - January 5th (2 weeks)
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Holiday break
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#### January 8th - January 12th
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Continued work on programs, start on UI code
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#### January 15th - January 19th
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Continued work on programs & UI
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Deliverables on Friday, January 19th:
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- Basic version of program deployed to devnet. You should be able to create pools and claim vote rewards. Fine if you can't claim $BRB tokens yet. Fine if tests aren't done, or some features aren't added yet.
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- Basic version of UI. It's okay if it's a Potemkin village and doesn't actually interact with the chain, but you should be able to create pools (as a vote buyer) and pick a pool to sell my vote to.
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#### January 22nd - 26th
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Continue work on programs & UI, Matt helps marie integrate devnet program into UI
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Deliverables on Friday, January 26th:
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- MVP of program
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- UI works with the program delivered on January 19th
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#### January 29th - Feburary 2nd
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Audit time! Joe and r0bre audit the program this week
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UI is updated to work for the MVP, where applicable changes are
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#### February 5th - Febuary 9th
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Any updates to the program in accordance with the audit findings
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UI done
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#### February 12th - February 16th
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|
||||
GTM readiness week!
|
||||
|
||||
Proph3t or Durden adds docs, teams make any final decisions, we collectively write copy to announce the platform
|
||||
|
||||
#### February 19th
|
||||
|
||||
Launch day!!! 🎉
|
||||
|
||||
### Budget
|
||||
|
||||
Based on their rates, I'm budgeting the following for each person:
|
||||
- $24,000 to Matt for the smart contracts
|
||||
- $12,000 to Marie for the UI
|
||||
- $7,000 to Durden for the platform design
|
||||
- $7,000 to Proph3t for program management
|
||||
- $5,000 to r0bre to audit the program
|
||||
- $5,000 to joe to audit the program
|
||||
- $1,000 deployment costs
|
||||
- $1,000 miscellaneous
|
||||
|
||||
That's a total of \$62k. As mentioned, the consortium has pledged \$150k to make this happen. The remaining \$90k would be custodied by the Meta-DAO's treasury, partially to fund the management / operation / maintenance of the platform.
|
||||
|
||||
### Terminology
|
||||
|
||||
For those who are more familiar with bribe terminology, which I prefer not to use:
|
||||
- briber = vote buyer
|
||||
- bribee = vote seller
|
||||
- bribe platform = vote market / vote market platform
|
||||
- bribes = vote payments / vote trade volume
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
|
||||
- [Solana DeFi Dashboard](https://dune.com/summit/solana-defi)
|
||||
- [Hidden Hand Volume](https://dune.com/embeds/675784/1253758)
|
||||
- [Curve TVL](https://defillama.com/protocol/curve-finance)
|
||||
- [Llama Airforce](https://llama.airforce/#/incentives/rounds/votium/cvx-crv/59)
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: `GPT8dFcpHfssMuULYKT9qERPY3heMoxwZHxgKgPw3TYM`
|
||||
- Proposal number: 2
|
||||
- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
|
||||
- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.1
|
||||
- Completed: 2023-12-22
|
||||
- Ended: 2023-12-22
|
||||
#metadao #futarchy #vote-markets #saber #defi #governance #consortium-funding
|
||||
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