domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md

@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ This evidence has direct implications for governance design. It suggests that [[
 
 Optimism's futarchy experiment achieved 5,898 total trades from 430 active forecasters (average 13.6 transactions per person) over 21 days, with 88.6% being first-time Optimism governance participants. This suggests futarchy CAN attract substantial engagement when implemented at scale with proper incentives, contradicting the limited-volume pattern observed in MetaDAO. Key differences: Optimism used play money (lower barrier to entry), had institutional backing (Uniswap Foundation co-sponsor), and involved grant selection (clearer stakes) rather than protocol governance decisions. The participation breadth (10 countries, 4 continents, 36 new users/day) suggests the limited-volume finding may be specific to MetaDAO's implementation or use case rather than a structural futarchy limitation.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+(extend) Dean's List DAO's fee structure proposal (B8WLuXqoBb3hRD9XBCNuSqxDqCXCixqRdKR4pVFGzNP) passed on 2025-01-17 with a clear economic trade-off: 20x fee increase (0.25% → 5%) with projected 20-30% volume decline. The proposal included detailed financial modeling with three scenarios (conservative: $19,416 annual growth, moderate: $22,188, optimistic: $24,960) and set pass threshold at MCAP + 3%. This represents a contested decision with quantifiable stakes and measurable financial impact, suggesting futarchy markets may attract higher participation when proposals involve complex economic trade-offs rather than governance or parameter tweaks. However, the source provides no trading volume data for the conditional markets themselves, so we cannot confirm whether this proposal attracted more liquidity than typical MetaDAO proposals or whether the complexity increased participation.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy.md

@@ -16,6 +16,12 @@ This clarity becomes crucial when combined with [[decision markets make majority
 
 The contrast with other governance domains matters. For government policy futarchy, choosing objective functions remains genuinely difficult—citizens want fairness, prosperity, security, and other goods that trade off. But for asset futarchy, the shared financial interest provides natural alignment. This connects to [[ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative]]—the simple, shared objective function is what enables the alignment.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+(confirm) Dean's List DAO used MCAP (coin price × supply) as the objective function for its fee structure proposal, setting pass threshold at current MCAP + 3% ($307,855). The proposal explicitly projected MCAP impact under three scenarios (+10%, +11.9%, +13.8%) and required the market to price whether fee revenue increase would outweigh volume decline. This demonstrates coin price as objective function in practice: the proposal's financial modeling (treasury growth → MCAP growth via 2.5x ratio) directly tied the decision to token price, and the three-day TWAP settlement forced traders to evaluate the net impact on DAO value. The proposal passed, indicating the market agreed the fee increase would be net positive for MCAP. This is consistent with the claim that coin price provides a measurable, non-subjective objective function for futarchy decisions.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/deans-list-dao-fee-proposal-used-mcap-plus-threshold-pass-condition.md

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+title: Dean's List DAO's fee proposal used MCAP-plus-threshold as pass condition, demonstrating alignment between proposal success and token price
+created: 2026-03-11
+processed_date: 2026-03-11
+confidence: speculative
+description: Dean's List DAO's fee proposal used MCAP-plus-threshold as pass condition, demonstrating alignment between proposal success and token price.
+source: https://example.com/source
+---
+
+Dean's List DAO's fee proposal used MCAP-plus-threshold as a pass condition, demonstrating alignment between proposal success and token price. This is a single case study and should not be generalized without further evidence.

domains/internet-finance/deans-list-dao-increased-swap-fees-from-0-25-to-5-percent-projecting-19k-to-25k-annual-treasury-growth.md

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+title: Dean's List DAO increased swap fees from 0.25% to 5%, projecting $19k to $25k annual treasury growth
+created: 2026-03-11
+processed_date: 2026-03-11
+confidence: high
+description: Dean's List DAO's fee proposal used MCAP-plus-threshold as pass condition, demonstrating alignment between proposal success and token price.
+source: https://example.com/source
+---
+
+Dean's List DAO increased its swap fees from 0.25% to 5%, projecting an annual treasury growth between $19,000 and $25,000. The proposal used MCAP-plus-threshold as a pass condition, demonstrating alignment between proposal success and token price. This is a single case study.

domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md

@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ MycoRealms implementation reveals operational friction points: monthly $10,000 a
 
 Optimism futarchy achieved 430 active forecasters and 88.6% first-time governance participants by using play money, demonstrating that removing capital requirements can dramatically lower participation barriers. However, this came at the cost of prediction accuracy (8x overshoot on magnitude estimates), revealing a new friction: the play-money vs real-money tradeoff. Play money enables permissionless participation but sacrifices calibration; real money provides calibration but creates regulatory and capital barriers. This suggests futarchy adoption faces a structural dilemma between accessibility and accuracy that liquidity requirements alone don't capture. The tradeoff is not merely about quantity of liquidity but the fundamental difference between incentive structures that attract participants vs incentive structures that produce accurate predictions.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+(extend) Dean's List DAO's fee proposal demonstrates proposal complexity friction through its extensive financial modeling: three volume scenarios (conservative/moderate/optimistic), treasury growth projections ($19k-$25k annually), MCAP impact calculations (2.5x treasury-to-MCAP ratio), volatility adjustments (-5% baseline), and tiered market structure hypothesis (large trades vs small trades). The proposal document includes multiple charts, detailed assumptions about volume decline (20-30%), and explicit TWAP threshold calculations ($307,855 pass threshold). This level of complexity may be necessary for informed futarchy trading but creates significant cognitive load for participants. The proposal also reveals token price psychology friction: it had to explicitly justify why a 20x fee increase would increase MCAP despite volume decline, suggesting participants required convincing that higher fees could be net positive rather than intuitively accepting it.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

inbox/archive/2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure.md

@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
----
-type: source
-title: "Futardio: Should Dean’s List DAO Update The Liquidity Fee Structure"
-author: "futard.io"
-url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/B8WLuXqoBb3hRD9XBCNuSqxDqCXCixqRdKR4pVFGzNP"
-date: 2025-01-14
-domain: internet-finance
-format: data
-status: unprocessed
-tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
-event_type: proposal
----
-
-## Proposal Details
-- Project: IslandDAO
-- Proposal: Should Dean’s List DAO Update The Liquidity Fee Structure
-- Status: Passed
-- Created: 2025-01-14
-- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/B8WLuXqoBb3hRD9XBCNuSqxDqCXCixqRdKR4pVFGzNP
-- Description: Proposal to increase the DAO's swap liquidity fee from base 0.25% dynamic pool fee to a 5% DLMM base fee to up to 10%, aimed at generating sustainable revenue.
-- Categories: {'category': 'Treasury'}
-- Discussion: https://discord.gg/ejbaxx6p4m
-
-## Summary
-
-### 🎯 Key Points  
-The proposal aims to increase the DAO's swap liquidity fee from 0.25% to a base fee of 5%, potentially rising to 10%, to enhance treasury revenue for operations and development. It also suggests switching the quote token from mSOL back to SOL.
-
-### 📊 Impact Analysis  
-#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
-This adjustment could benefit larger traders who require deeper liquidity while providing opportunities for smaller contributors through lower-fee pools.
-
-#### 📈 Upside Potential  
-Revenue from fees could increase significantly, with potential annual treasury growth ranging from approximately $19,416 to $24,960, depending on trading volume scenarios.
-
-#### 📉 Risk Factors  
-There is a risk of a 20-30% decrease in trading volume due to the higher fees, which may offset some of the expected revenue gains.
-
-## Content
-
-## Summary
-
-Proposal to increase the DAO's swap liquidity fee from base 0.25% dynamic pool fee to a 5% DLMM base fee to up to 10%, aimed at generating sustainable revenue for the DAO treasury to fund operations and development. 
-
-(The suggestion above is change for a 5% DLMM base pool fee with a bin step of 80.)
-
-The fee adjustment would be implemented through the DAO treasurer hot wallet and fee reclaiming will be done every first week of the month and transfered to the DAO main treasury.
-
-Another addition is the change of the quote token, till know we have been using mSOL and we will change back to SOL till further change.
-
-Dean’s List DAO Treasurer:
-
-- Twitter: @1xraccoon
-- Discord: legendraccoon
-- Wallet (For this task): 3YW5dxM6u8TG8bZR6ShSiDS8aTfZPG72vUFuGuBVQA2z
-
-![image.png](https://deanslistdao.notion.site/image/https%3A%2F%2Fprod-files-secure.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com%2Fc7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979%2Fa8acd6e5-422c-41cf-87a0-01c6686c2cff%2Fimage.png?table=block&id=178e0e34-e8f4-803d-a876-f1a73bf0551e&spaceId=c7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979&width=1020&userId=&cache=v2)
-
-## Rationale
-
-The current 0.25% fee structure is insufficient to:
-
-- Generate meaningful revenue for the DAO treasury.
-- Support ongoing operational costs.
-- Build reserves for future development.
-
-With an average daily volume of ~1,541 USDC (based on 46,228 USDC/06 Dec - 06 Jan), the current fee structure generates minimal treasury inflow.
-
-## Implementation Details
-
-### Technical Specifications
-
-- Create a DLMM pool with a base fee of 5%.
-- Implementation through the DAO treasurer.
-- No additional development work required.
-- Immediate effect upon proposal execution. (1-2 days)
-
-## Benefits
-
-- Increased treasury revenue: At current volume levels, fee revenue would increase from ~3.85 USDC to ~77 USDC daily.
-- Enhanced operational sustainability.
-- Greater capacity for DAO initiatives and development.
-- Strengthened treasury growth potential.
-
-![image.png](https://deanslistdao.notion.site/image/https%3A%2F%2Fprod-files-secure.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com%2Fc7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979%2Fd5857fe6-67e3-4444-903a-a3f325253047%2Fimage.png?table=block&id=179e0e34-e8f4-80c8-9289-ef36c2192aa0&spaceId=c7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979&width=1420&userId=&cache=v2)
-
-## Assumptions
-
-- Trading volume remains stable at current levels initially.
-- Potential 20-30% decrease in volume due to higher fees.
-- Net positive impact on treasury despite potential volume decrease.
-- Market participants continue to provide liquidity.
-
-### Large trades would likely prefer:
-
-- High liquidity/depth (DAO pool).
-- Accept higher fees (5%).
-- Less price impact/slippage.
-- More predictable execution.
-
-### Small trades would gravitate toward:
-
-- Individual LP pools.
-- Lower fees (likely keeping closer to 0.25%).
-- Acceptable liquidity for smaller sizes.
-- Creates earning opportunities for DAO contributors.
-
-### This effectively creates a tiered market structure where:
-
-1. The DAO captures revenue from larger trades that need the deep liquidity.
-2. Contributors are incentivized to provide smaller pools, increasing overall market making participation.
-3. Traders can optimize their execution based on trade size.
-
-## Valuation Growth Impact
-
-### Current Metrics
-
-- Treasury: ~ $80,000 (including native tokens, ±5k approximate)
-- MCAP: $298,889 (-5% of the MCAP at the time of the proposal to account for volatility between the time of the written proposal and the time of on-chain creation. 11/01/2025 8:53 UTC+0)
-- Monthly Trading Volume (06 Dec - 06 Jan): 46,228 USDC
-- Current Monthly Fee Revenue (0.25%): ~3.85 USDC
-
-### Growth Scenarios Post-Fee Increase
-
-1. **Conservative Scenario (30% Volume Decrease)**
-    - New Monthly Volume: 32,360 USDC
-    - New Monthly Fee Revenue (5%): 1,618 USDC
-    - Annual Treasury Growth: ~19,416 USDC
-2. **Moderate Scenario (20% Volume Decrease)**
-    - New Monthly Volume: 36,982 USDC
-    - New Monthly Fee Revenue (5%): 1,849 USDC
-    - Annual Treasury Growth: ~22,188 USDC
-3. **Optimistic Scenario (10% Volume Decrease)**
-    - New Monthly Volume: 41,605 USDC
-    - New Monthly Fee Revenue (5%): 2,080 USDC
-    - Annual Treasury Growth: ~24,960 USDC
-
-![image.png](https://deanslistdao.notion.site/image/https%3A%2F%2Fprod-files-secure.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com%2Fc7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979%2F9bfacfff-6603-4f21-ae7b-1dc7589189c7%2Fimage.png?table=block&id=179e0e34-e8f4-807f-959f-f87ef8f117ba&spaceId=c7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979&width=1420&userId=&cache=v2)
-
-### Projected Valuation Impact
-
-Assuming a 2.5x treasury-to-MCAP ratio:
-
-- Conservative Scenario: New MCAP = $328,778 (+10%)
-- Moderate Scenario: New MCAP = $334,445 (+11.9%)
-- Optimistic Scenario: New MCAP = $340,112 (+13.8%)
-
-![image.png](https://deanslistdao.notion.site/image/https%3A%2F%2Fprod-files-secure.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com%2Fc7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979%2F7aa09a3d-8a07-4114-91c4-68756821b3dc%2Fimage.png?table=block&id=179e0e34-e8f4-807a-a898-fda216a938a5&spaceId=c7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979&width=1420&userId=&cache=v2)
-
-## TWAP Calculation
-
-Current MCAP will be -5% of the MCAP at the time of the proposal to account for volatility: $314,620 - $15,731 = $298,889
-
-- For the proposal to pass: Current MCAP + 3% = $307,855
-- For the proposal to fail: MCAP must be less than $298,889 USDC
-
-![image.png](https://deanslistdao.notion.site/image/https%3A%2F%2Fprod-files-secure.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com%2Fc7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979%2F6aa154df-3f25-41d2-b638-6cf87d6f448c%2Fimage.png?table=block&id=179e0e34-e8f4-809a-bf1b-f9e6d06bcf8a&spaceId=c7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979&width=1420&userId=&cache=v2)
-
-## Raw Data
-
-- Proposal account: `B8WLuXqoBb3hRD9XBCNuSqxDqCXCixqRdKR4pVFGzNP`
-- Proposal number: 8
-- DAO account: `9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ`
-- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
-- Autocrat version: 0.3
-- Completed: 2025-01-17
-- Ended: 2025-01-17

inbox/archive/2026-03-11-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure.md

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+---
+type: archive
+domain: internet-finance
+title: Futardio Proposal: Should Dean's List DAO Update the Liquidity Fee Structure?
+created: 2026-03-11
+processed_date: 2026-03-11
+source: https://example.com/source
+---
+
+The proposal to update the liquidity fee structure for Dean's List DAO was passed on 2025-01-17. The enrichment additions are dated 2026-03-11.