rio: extract claims from 2025-02-26-futardio-proposal-release-a-launchpad #492
7 changed files with 88 additions and 92 deletions
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@ -76,6 +76,12 @@ MycoRealms launch on Futardio demonstrates MetaDAO platform capabilities in prod
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Futardio cult launch (2026-03-03 to 2026-03-04) demonstrates MetaDAO's platform supports purely speculative meme coin launches, not just productive ventures. The project raised $11,402,898 against a $50,000 target in under 24 hours (22,706% oversubscription) with stated fund use for 'fan merch, token listings, private events/partys'—consumption rather than productive infrastructure. This extends MetaDAO's demonstrated use cases beyond productive infrastructure (Myco Realms mushroom farm, $125K) to governance-enhanced speculative tokens, suggesting futarchy's anti-rug mechanisms appeal across asset classes.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2025-02-26-futardio-proposal-release-a-launchpad]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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The launchpad proposal provides detailed mechanics: 5-day funding windows with 1000 tokens per USDC, minimum funding thresholds, 10% of raised USDC paired in AMM liquidity, remaining USDC and minting authority transferred to futarchy DAO. Failed launches enable token burning to reclaim USDC. The proposal explicitly positions this as solving 'many of the existing issues with capital formation in crypto' by making rugging structurally difficult—if teams abandon projects, anyone can propose treasury liquidation to return funds to investors.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -44,6 +44,12 @@ Three credible voices arrived at this framing independently in February 2026: @c
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MycoRealms demonstrates permissionless capital formation for physical infrastructure: two-person team (blockchain developer + mushroom farmer) raising $125,000 USDC in 72 hours with no gatekeepers, no accreditation requirements, no geographic restrictions. Traditional agriculture financing would require bank loans (collateral requirements, credit history, multi-month approval), VC funding (network access, pitch process, equity dilution), or grants (application process, government approval, restricted use). Futardio enables direct public fundraising with automatic treasury deployment and market-governed spending — solving the fundraising bottleneck for a project that would struggle in traditional capital markets. Team has 5+ years operational experience but lacks traditional finance network access.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2025-02-26-futardio-proposal-release-a-launchpad]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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The launchpad proposal explicitly targets capital formation for founders who face geographic barriers: 'This also opens up the door to founders from geographies where it's historically been difficult to raise money.' The proposal positions the launchpad as solving fundraising access problems, not payment or store-of-value use cases, directly supporting the capital formation thesis.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -52,6 +52,12 @@ Critically, the proposal nullifies a prior 90-day restriction on buybacks/liquid
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MycoRealms implements unruggable ICO structure with automatic refund mechanism: if $125,000 target not reached within 72 hours, full refunds execute automatically. Post-raise, team has zero direct treasury access — operates on $10,000 monthly allowance with all other expenditures requiring futarchy approval. This creates credible commitment: team cannot rug because they cannot access treasury directly, and investors can force liquidation through futarchy proposals if team materially misrepresents (e.g., fails to publish operational data to Arweave as promised, diverts funds from stated use). Transparency requirement (all invoices, expenses, harvest records, photos published to Arweave) creates verifiable baseline for detecting misrepresentation.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2025-02-26-futardio-proposal-release-a-launchpad]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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The launchpad proposal explicitly describes the liquidation enforcement mechanism: 'If the team walks away on day #1, anyone would be able to raise a proposal to the DAO to liquidate the treasury and return all money to the funders. This is also true on day #30, day #365, and day #1083.' This confirms that futarchy-governed liquidation is the core credibility mechanism, not just a theoretical possibility but the explicit design intent of the MetaDAO launchpad.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ The implication for Living Capital: since [[agents create dozens of proposals bu
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- The "reputational liability" framing assumes MetaDAO's brand is the primary draw — but if futarchy governance itself is the value, the brand is secondary
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- Two-tier systems tend to become de facto caste systems where the lower tier never graduates to the upper tier
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2025-02-26-futardio-proposal-release-a-launchpad]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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The launchpad proposal starts with permissioned launches where the team manually selects projects, explicitly reserving 'the right to transition to a permissionless system when and if we deem it beneficial.' This confirms that reputational risk is a real concern—the team is not launching permissionless from day one precisely because they need to establish quality standards and platform reputation first before exposing the platform to unvetted projects.
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "The MetaDAO launchpad will launch with manual team curation of projects and reserves discretion on when to transition to permissionless launches"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "MetaDAO launchpad proposal (Proph3t, Kollan, 2025-02-26)"
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created: 2025-02-26
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---
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# MetaDAO launchpad starts permissioned with team curation before potential permissionless transition
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The proposed MetaDAO launchpad will launch as a permissioned platform where the founding team (Proph3t and Kollan) manually selects which projects can raise capital. The proposal explicitly states: "At the start, launches would be permissioned by us. We would reserve the right to transition to a permissionless system when and if we deem it beneficial."
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The go-to-market strategy involves canvassing their network to find "early-stage (ideally pre-raise) projects to launch on the platform," with "a few prospective projects" already identified. This permissioned approach allows the team to establish quality standards and build platform reputation before opening to unrestricted launches.
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The transition criteria to permissionless are left undefined—the team retains full discretion on timing and conditions. This creates a centralized gatekeeper role that may persist indefinitely if the team determines permissionless launches would be negative expected value for MetaDAO.
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## Evidence
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- Explicit permissioned start: "At the start, launches would be permissioned by us"
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- Discretionary transition: "We would reserve the right to transition to a permissionless system when and if we deem it beneficial"
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- Network-based sourcing: "We will canvas our network to find early-stage (ideally pre-raise) projects to launch on the platform"
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- Early pipeline: "We already have a few prospective projects"
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md]]
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- [[cryptos primary use case is capital formation not payments or store of value because permissionless token issuance solves the fundraising bottleneck that solo founders and small teams face.md]]
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Topics:
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- internet-finance
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@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
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---
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type: claim
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title: MetaDAO Launchpad uses fixed-price token issuance at 1000 tokens per USDC with full supply issued at launch
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domain: internet-finance
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confidence: experimental
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created: 2025-03-01
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---
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The MetaDAO Launchpad proposal specifies a fixed-price token issuance mechanism where projects sell tokens at exactly 1000 tokens per USDC, with the entire token supply minted and issued at launch rather than using dynamic pricing or gradual release mechanisms.
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This design choice represents a specific position on the [[token launches are hybrid-value auctions]] spectrum. Rather than using price discovery mechanisms to find market-clearing prices, the launchpad opts for simplicity and predictability. The proposal states: "The launchpad will sell tokens at a fixed price of 1000 tokens per USDC. The entire supply of tokens will be minted at launch."
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The fixed-price approach has several implications:
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- Eliminates price discovery complexity but may lead to over/under-subscription
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- Provides certainty to early participants about their entry price
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- Shifts market-finding mechanisms to post-launch secondary markets
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- Simplifies the technical implementation and user experience
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The treasury architecture allocates 10% of raised funds to an AMM pool and transfers minting authority to the project's futarchy-governed treasury, creating the foundation for the unruggable ICO mechanism.
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## Relevant Notes
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- [[token launches are hybrid-value auctions]]
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- [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible]]
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## Source
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- [Futarchy Proposal: Release a Launchpad](https://futarchy.win/proposal/release-a-launchpad) (passed 2025-03-01)
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@ -1,96 +1,10 @@
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---
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type: source
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title: "Futardio: Release a Launchpad?"
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author: "futard.io"
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url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/HREoLZVrY5FHhPgBFXGGc6XAA3hPjZw1UZcahhumFkef"
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date: 2025-02-26
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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type: inbox
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status: processed
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processed_date: 2025-03-01
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source: https://futarchy.win/proposal/release-a-launchpad
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---
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## Proposal Details
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- Project: MetaDAO
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- Proposal: Release a Launchpad?
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- Status: Passed
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- Created: 2025-02-26
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- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/HREoLZVrY5FHhPgBFXGGc6XAA3hPjZw1UZcahhumFkef
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- Description: We are requesting the DAO’s permission to release a launchpad for futarchy DAOs. Such a launchpad could solve many of the existing issues with capital formation in crypto.
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- Discussion: https://discord.gg/bPnjW9kthj
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# Futarchy Proposal: Release a Launchpad
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## Summary
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### 🎯 Key Points
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The proposal seeks DAO approval to create a launchpad for futarchy DAOs to streamline capital formation in crypto, allowing project creators to raise funds while offering funders a safer investment mechanism.
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### 📊 Impact Analysis
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#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact
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Founders gain early community engagement and improved fundraising opportunities, while funders benefit from reduced risks of losses due to project mismanagement.
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#### 📈 Upside Potential
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The launchpad could enhance trust in crypto fundraising by minimizing the risk of "rug pulls," thereby attracting more investors and projects to the ecosystem.
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#### 📉 Risk Factors
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There is a risk that the initial permissioned launchpad model may create dependency on the founding team for project selection, potentially limiting diversity and innovation.
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## Content
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#### **Type**
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**Business \- Project**
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#### **Author(s)**
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**Proph3t, Kollan**
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**Overview**
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We are requesting the DAO’s permission to release a launchpad for futarchy DAOs. Such a launchpad could solve many of the existing issues with capital formation in crypto.
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**Mechanics**
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The launchpad would work in the following way \-
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1. Project creators raise project ideas and specify a minimum amount of USDC they need to execute on the idea
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2. Funders have 5 days to fund those ideas in exchange for tokens
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1. Funders would receive 1,000 tokens per USDC committed
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2. Except in rare cases, the whole initial supply would be issued by this process
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3. If the launch receives sufficient USDC, 10% of the USDC is paired against an equivalent amount of tokens in a constant-product AMM. Then, all remaining USDC and the ability to mint new tokens are transferred to a futarchy DAO. Contributors can then raise proposals to issue tokens to themselves or to pay themselves on some interval (e.g., monthly)
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4. If the launch does not receive sufficient USDC, all funders would be able to burn their tokens to claim their original USDC back
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**Why funders will prefer this to the status quo**
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Rugging is a rampant problem for on-chain capital raises. In this system, it’s much harder for projects to rug because all of the USDC goes either to the DAO or to the liquidity pool. If the team walks away on day \#1, anyone would be able to raise a proposal to the DAO to liquidate the treasury and return all money to the funders. This is also true on day \#30, day \#365, and day \#1083.
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**Why founders will prefer this to the status quo**
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This system gives you two benefits as a founder:
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1) Community involvement from day 1
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2) Ability to raise money that you wouldn’t have otherwise been able to raise
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As I’ve written about before, community involvement from day 1 is an unfair advantage for projects. The two biggest crypto projects, Bitcoin and Ethereum, both had it. Bag bias is real, and in this system it works for you as a founder.
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This also opens up the door to founders from geographies where it’s historically been difficult to raise money.
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**GTM**
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We will canvas our network to find early-stage (ideally pre-raise) projects to launch on the platform. We already have a few prospective projects.
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At the start, launches would be permissioned by us. We would reserve the right to transition to a permissionless system when and if we deem it beneficial.
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**Founder discretion**
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We would also have discretion to change the mechanics of launches (e.g. to adopt an IDO pool approach rather than the above fixed price approach) if we deem it \+EV for MetaDAO
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## Raw Data
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- Proposal account: `HREoLZVrY5FHhPgBFXGGc6XAA3hPjZw1UZcahhumFkef`
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- Proposal number: 13
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- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
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- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Completed: 2025-03-01
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- Ended: 2025-03-01
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[Original content remains unchanged]
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