domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md

@@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ Autocrat is MetaDAO's core governance program on Solana -- the on-chain implemen
 
 **Limitations.** [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] -- when proposals are clearly good or clearly bad, few traders participate because the expected profit from trading in a consensus market is near zero. This is a structural feature, not a bug: contested decisions get more participation precisely because they're uncertain, which is when you most need information aggregation. But it does mean uncontested proposals can pass or fail with very thin markets, making the TWAP potentially noisy.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+The Autocrat v0.1 migration proposal (2023-12-03) confirms the three-day settlement window is a deliberate design choice for operational velocity. The proposer made proposal duration configurable and explicitly set the default to 3 days 'to allow for quicker feedback loops,' indicating this was a tuned parameter based on deployment experience rather than an arbitrary technical constant. The proposal migrated 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL to the new program version, confirming this was a significant protocol upgrade.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md

@@ -35,6 +35,12 @@ This pattern is general. Since [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token pri
 - MetaDAO's current scale ($219M total futarchy marketcap) may be too small to attract sophisticated attacks that the removed mechanisms were designed to prevent
 - Hanson might argue that MetaDAO's version isn't really futarchy at all — just conditional prediction markets used for governance, which is a narrower claim
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+The Autocrat v0.1 upgrade demonstrates production futarchy simplification through two mechanisms: (1) Making proposal duration configurable rather than fixed, allowing operators to tune feedback velocity based on market conditions; (2) Accepting counterparty risk from non-verifiable builds due to tooling constraints. The proposer stated: 'Unfortunately, for reasons I can't get into, I was unable to build this new program with solana-verifiable-build.' This shows production futarchy faces operational constraints (verifiable build tooling, deployment security) that theoretical designs don't address. The proposer acknowledged this gap and committed to verifiable builds for future versions, indicating the team recognized this as a temporary simplification rather than a permanent design choice.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/metadao-autocrat-v01-reduced-proposal-duration-to-three-days-enabling-faster-governance-iteration.md

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "MetaDAO's Autocrat v0.1 made proposal duration configurable with 3-day default to accelerate futarchy feedback loops"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 migration proposal, futard.io, 2023-12-03"
+created: 2024-01-15
+---
+
+# MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 made proposal duration configurable with 3-day default to accelerate futarchy feedback loops
+
+The Autocrat v0.1 upgrade introduced configurable proposal slots with a 3-day default duration (measured in Solana slots), down from an unspecified longer period in v0. The proposer explicitly stated the rationale: "to allow for quicker feedback loops."
+
+This represents a deliberate operational tuning of the futarchy mechanism based on deployment experience. The proposal migrated 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL from the v0 treasury to the v0.1 treasury, indicating this was a significant protocol upgrade rather than a minor parameter adjustment.
+
+## Evidence
+
+From the proposal text: "Most importantly, I've made the slots per proposal configurable, and changed its default to 3 days to allow for quicker feedback loops."
+
+The proposal passed and completed on 2023-12-13, ten days after creation on 2023-12-03. Code changes are documented at: https://github.com/metaDAOproject/meta-dao/pull/36/files
+
+## Implementation Constraints
+
+The upgrade was deployed without verifiable builds due to unspecified constraints. The proposer acknowledged this created counterparty risk: "You'd be placing trust in me that I didn't introduce a backdoor, not on the GitHub repo, that allows me to steal the funds." The proposer committed to using verifiable builds for future versions, indicating this was a known limitation of the deployment process rather than a permanent architectural choice.
+
+## Relevance to Futarchy Design
+
+The 3-day window serves as the settlement period for the conditional token markets that implement futarchy. By making this configurable and setting a shorter default, MetaDAO prioritized faster decision velocity over longer deliberation periods, suggesting that production futarchy implementations must balance theoretical design with operational constraints around market liquidity and feedback speed.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md]]
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
+- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]

inbox/archive/2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01.md

@@ -6,9 +6,15 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9z
 date: 2023-12-03
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2024-01-15
+claims_extracted: ["metadao-autocrat-v01-reduced-proposal-duration-to-three-days-enabling-faster-governance-iteration.md"]
+enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md", "futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "Single proposal data point. Main extractable claim is the 3-day duration change as a design choice for faster iteration. Enrichments focus on confirming the 3-day TWAP window, extending the simplification-for-production claim with verifiable build constraints, and challenging the corporate scaffolding claim with evidence of programmatic treasury migration (though with security caveats)."
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -63,3 +69,11 @@ For future versions, I should always be able to use verifiable builds.
 - Autocrat version: 0
 - Completed: 2023-12-13
 - Ended: 2023-12-13
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 proposal created 2023-12-03, passed and completed 2023-12-13
+- Treasury migration: 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, 5.5 SOL from v0 to v0.1 program
+- Proposal account: AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi
+- Code changes: github.com/metaDAOproject/meta-dao/pull/36/files
+- Deployment used non-verifiable build due to unspecified constraints