entities/internet-finance/polymarket.md

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 last_updated: 2026-03-11
 founded: 2020-06-01
-founders: ["[[shayne-coplan]]"]
+founders: ["shayne-coplan"]
 category: "Prediction market platform (Polygon/Ethereum L2)"
 stage: growth
 funding: "ICE (Intercontinental Exchange) invested up to $2B"
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ key_metrics:
   monthly_volume_30d: "$8.7B (March 2026)"
   daily_volume_24h: "$390M (March 2026)"
   election_accuracy: "94%+ one month before resolution; 98% on winners"
-competitors: ["[[kalshi]]", "[[augur]]"]
+competitors: ["kalshi", "augur"]
 built_on: ["Polygon"]
 tags: ["prediction-markets", "decision-markets", "information-aggregation"]
 ---
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ Crypto-native prediction market platform on Polygon. Users trade binary outcome
 - **2025-12** — Relaunched for US users (invite-only, restricted markets)
 - **2026-03** — Combined Polymarket+Kalshi weekly record: $5.35B (week of March 2-8, 2026)
 
+- **2026-02-00** — Polymarket's 2024 election success triggers CFTC defensive rulemaking (signaled Feb 2026) and 36-state amicus brief opposition, creating two-front regulatory battle between federal jurisdiction claims and state gaming commission challenges
 ## Competitive Position
 - **#1 by volume** — leads Kalshi on 30-day volume ($8.7B vs $6.8B)
 - **Crypto-native**: USDC on Polygon, non-custodial, permissionless market creation
@@ -58,13 +59,13 @@ Polymarket proved prediction markets work at scale. The 2024 election vindicatio
 ## Relationship to KB
 - [[Polymarket vindicated prediction markets over polling in 2024 US election]] — core vindication claim
 - [[speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds]] — mechanism theory Polymarket demonstrates
-- [[decision markets fail in three systematic categories where legitimacy thin information or herding dynamics make voting or deliberation structurally superior]] — boundary conditions apply to Polymarket too (thin-information markets showed media-tracking behavior during early COVID)
+- decision markets fail in three systematic categories where legitimacy thin information or herding dynamics make voting or deliberation structurally superior — boundary conditions apply to Polymarket too (thin-information markets showed media-tracking behavior during early COVID)
 
 ---
 
 Relevant Entities:
-- [[kalshi]] — primary competitor (regulated)
-- [[metadao]] — same mechanism class, different application (governance vs prediction)
+- kalshi — primary competitor (regulated)
+- metadao — same mechanism class, different application (governance vs prediction)
 
 Topics:
 - [[internet finance and decision markets]]

inbox/archive/2026-02-00-cftc-prediction-market-rulemaking.md

@@ -7,9 +7,14 @@ date: 2026-02-00
 domain: internet-finance
 secondary_domains: []
 format: article
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 priority: high
 tags: [cftc, prediction-markets, rulemaking, regulation, event-contracts, jurisdiction]
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-11
+enrichments_applied: ["Polymarket vindicated prediction markets over polling in 2024 US election.md", "futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "Single source (Sidley Austin legal analysis) provides regulatory context but not empirical evidence of outcomes, justifying experimental confidence. The critical uncertainty—whether CFTC rulemaking will explicitly cover governance prediction markets—remains unresolved in the source. Created new CFTC entity as it's a major regulatory actor not previously in the entity index. Enriched existing Polymarket and futarchy-fundraising claims with regulatory timeline and jurisdictional implications."
 ---
 
 ## Content
@@ -38,7 +43,7 @@ Sidley Austin analysis (February 2026):
 **Why this matters:** CFTC rulemaking is the most promising near-term resolution to the state-federal prediction market crisis. If the CFTC establishes clear rules encompassing governance prediction markets, futarchy can operate under a single federal framework.
 **What surprised me:** The speed — imminent rulemaking signal in Feb 2026, while litigation is still ongoing. The CFTC is trying to establish facts on the ground before courts resolve the jurisdiction question.
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Specific scope of proposed rulemaking — does it cover all event contracts or only specific categories? The distinction matters enormously for futarchy.
-**KB connections:** [[Polymarket vindicated prediction markets over polling in 2024 US election]] — Polymarket's success is what triggered both state pushback and CFTC defense. [[Optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] — regulatory framework determines which mechanisms are legally available.
+**KB connections:** [[Polymarket vindicated prediction markets over polling in 2024 US election]] — Polymarket's success is what triggered both state pushback and CFTC defense. Optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles — regulatory framework determines which mechanisms are legally available.
 **Extraction hints:** Claim about CFTC rulemaking as resolution path for futarchy regulation.
 **Context:** Sidley Austin is a major law firm with strong CFTC practice. Their analysis carries weight.
 
@@ -46,3 +51,9 @@ Sidley Austin analysis (February 2026):
 PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[Polymarket vindicated prediction markets over polling in 2024 US election]]
 WHY ARCHIVED: CFTC rulemaking signal could determine futarchy's regulatory viability. If governance prediction markets are explicitly covered, this resolves the existential regulatory risk.
 EXTRACTION HINT: Focus on CFTC rulemaking as potential resolution of state-federal jurisdiction crisis for futarchy governance markets.
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- CFTC rulemaking process typically takes 12-18 months from proposal to final rule
+- 36 states filed amicus briefs opposing federal preemption of prediction market jurisdiction (as of Feb 2026)
+- Chairman Selig published WSJ op-ed defending exclusive CFTC jurisdiction over prediction markets (Feb 2026)