entities/internet-finance/deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion.md

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "Dean's List: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: failed
+parent_entity: "[[deans-list]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM"
+proposal_date: 2024-06-22
+resolution_date: 2024-06-25
+category: "grants"
+summary: "Proposal to spend $15K on ThailandDAO event perks (travel for top 5, event access for top 50) to boost governance participation and drive token appreciation"
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Dean's List: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement
+
+## Summary
+
+Proposal to allocate $15K from Dean's List DAO treasury to fund promotional event at ThailandDAO (Sept 25 - Oct 25, Koh Samui). Top 5 governance power holders would receive flights and 12-day accommodation, top 50 would receive event invitations and partner airdrops. Proposal projected 16x ROI through token price appreciation driven by governance power competition and token locking. Required only 3% TWAP increase to pass but failed after 3-day trading period.
+
+## Market Data
+
+- **Outcome:** Failed
+- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
+- **Platform:** Futardio (Autocrat v0.3)
+- **Trading Period:** 3 days (2024-06-22 to 2024-06-25)
+- **Required TWAP Increase:** 3% ($3,698 absolute)
+- **Proposal Budget:** $15,000 (12% of DAO FDV)
+- **DAO FDV at Proposal:** $123,263
+- **Projected FDV Target:** $2,000,000+
+
+## Significance
+
+This proposal is significant as a futarchy failure case where favorable stated economics (16x projected ROI, minimal 3% TWAP requirement) did not translate to market approval. The failure suggests either:
+
+1. Markets correctly priced in execution risk and skepticism of self-reported projections
+2. Proposal complexity (multi-layered incentive structure) prevented accurate market pricing
+3. Treasury preservation psychology dominated despite growth opportunity
+4. Insufficient liquidity to form functional prediction markets
+
+The proposal also demonstrates a governance incentive design pattern where IRL community access is allocated through capital competition (governance power leaderboard), creating plutocratic event participation.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+
+- [[deans-list]] — governance decision
+- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — confirms friction thesis
+- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] — failure case evidence
+- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — implementation data

entities/internet-finance/deans-list.md

@@ -33,17 +33,20 @@ Services DAO on Solana providing professional user feedback, QA, marketing, and
 Dean's List is interesting not as a standalone company but as an adoption data point. It demonstrates that futarchy governance can be adopted by organizations outside of MetaDAO's direct ecosystem — a services DAO using market-based governance for operational decisions. If more existing DAOs migrate from Snapshot/token voting to futarchy, that validates the governance evolution thesis.
 
 ## Relationship to KB
-- [[DAO governance degenerates into political capture because proposal processes select for coalition-building skill over operational competence and the resulting bureaucracy creates structural speed disadvantages against focused competitors]] — Dean's List moved from token voting to futarchy to escape this
+- DAO governance degenerates into political capture because proposal processes select for coalition-building skill over operational competence and the resulting bureaucracy creates structural speed disadvantages against focused competitors — Dean's List moved from token voting to futarchy to escape this
 - [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] — Dean's List may use futarchy selectively for high-stakes decisions
 
 ---
 
 Relevant Entities:
-- [[metadao]] — governance platform
+- metadao — governance platform
 
 Topics:
 - [[internet finance and decision markets]]
 
 ## Timeline
 
-- **2024-12-19** — [[deans-list-implement-3-week-vesting]] passed: 3-week linear vesting for DAO payments to reduce sell pressure from 80% immediate liquidation to 33% weekly rate, projected 15%-25% valuation increase
+- **2024-12-19** — deans-list-implement-3-week-vesting passed: 3-week linear vesting for DAO payments to reduce sell pressure from 80% immediate liquidation to 33% weekly rate, projected 15%-25% valuation increase
+
+- **2024-06-22** — [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] proposed: $15K for ThailandDAO event perks targeting $2M FDV increase from $123K baseline
+- **2024-06-25** — [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] failed: 3% TWAP requirement not met despite 16x projected ROI

inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
 date: 2024-06-22
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 processed_by: rio
@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@ processed_date: 2024-06-22
 enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md"]
 extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 claims about futarchy market failure modes and DAO incentive mechanisms. Both claims are experimental/speculative due to single-case evidence. Proposal failed despite seemingly favorable economics, which itself is evidence about futarchy adoption barriers. Enriched 3 existing claims with concrete implementation data and failure case confirmation."
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-11
+enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 claims about futarchy market failure modes and DAO incentive mechanisms. Both claims are experimental/speculative due to single-case evidence. Proposal failed despite seemingly favorable economics, which itself is evidence about futarchy adoption barriers. Enriched 3 existing claims with concrete implementation data and failure case confirmation. Created decision_market entity for the proposal and updated Dean's List timeline."
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -182,3 +187,14 @@ This proposal to create a promotional event at ThailandDAO, incentivizing govern
 - Proposal completed: 2024-06-25
 - Required TWAP increase: 3% ($3,698 absolute)
 - Trading period: 3 days
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- Dean's List DAO FDV: $123,263 (2024-06-22)
+- ThailandDAO event dates: Sept 25 - Oct 25, 2024, Koh Samui Thailand
+- Proposal budget: $15K ($10K travel for top 5, $5K events for top 50)
+- Proposal account: DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
+- DAO account: 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Required TWAP increase: 3% ($3,698 absolute)
+- Trading period: 3 days (2024-06-22 to 2024-06-25)