extract: 2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy #948
6 changed files with 83 additions and 1 deletions
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@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ This cost differential becomes material at scale: a DAO running 50 proposals ann
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- AMM state requirements described as "almost nothing"
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- State rent recovery requires autocrat program migration (feedback section)
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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MetaDAO proposal provides specific cost data: 'If we average 3-5 proposals per month, then annual costs for market creation is 135-225 SOL, or $11475-$19125 at current prices. AMMs cost almost nothing in state rent.' The proposal also notes that pass/fail market pairs cost 3.75 SOL in state rent which cannot currently be recouped, though feedback during voting pointed out that 'there are ways to recoup openbook state rent costs, though it would require a migration of the current autocrat program.'
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ This connects to [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume
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- Expected pattern: liquidity increases as proposal duration progresses
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- CLOB minimum order size (1 META) acts as spam filter but fragments liquidity further
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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The proposal explicitly identifies lack of liquidity as the primary motivation for switching to AMMs: 'Estimating a fair price for the future value of MetaDao under pass/fail conditions is difficult, and most reasonable estimates will have a wide range. This uncertainty discourages people from risking their funds with limit orders near the midpoint price, and has the effect of reducing liquidity (and trading). This is the main reason for switching to AMMs.'
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ The mechanism depends on futarchy-specific conditions (short duration, governanc
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- May reduce legitimate trading volume
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- LP attraction depends on base trading activity
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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The proposal specifies using 3-5% fees with explicit dual purpose: 'By setting a high fee (3-5%) we can both: encourage LPs, and aggressively discourage wash-trading and manipulation.' This confirms the mechanism operates through fee structure creating opposing incentives for passive versus active participants.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -11,6 +11,12 @@ created: 2026-03-15
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The Autocrat v0.1 upgrade introduces configurable slots per proposal with a default of 3 days, explicitly designed to "allow for quicker feedback loops." This represents a significant reduction from previous implementations and addresses a key friction point in futarchy adoption: the time cost of decision-making. The proposal passed and migrated 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL to the new program, demonstrating community acceptance of faster iteration cycles. The architectural change makes proposal duration a parameter rather than a constant, allowing MetaDAO to tune the speed-quality tradeoff based on empirical results. This matters because governance mechanism adoption depends on matching decision velocity to organizational needs—too slow and participants route around the system, too fast and markets cannot aggregate information effectively.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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The proposal timeline estimates '3 weeks from passing proposal, with an additional week of review and minor changes' for implementation, suggesting the three-day proposal duration is for voting/market settlement, not development cycles. The proposal also mentions loosening time restrictions: 'currently set to 50 slots, which is very restrictive and has led to extra SOL costs to create redundant markets.'
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
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{
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"rejected_claims": [
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{
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"filename": "amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-creating-manipulation-resistance-through-capital-commitment-requirements.md",
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"issues": [
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"missing_attribution_extractor"
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]
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},
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{
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"filename": "amm-futarchy-proposer-liquidity-lockup-requirement-bootstraps-initial-market-depth-and-filters-spam-proposals.md",
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"issues": [
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"missing_attribution_extractor"
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]
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},
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{
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"filename": "amm-futarchy-enables-granular-trading-below-minimum-order-sizes-that-clob-systems-require-for-spam-prevention.md",
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"issues": [
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"missing_attribution_extractor"
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]
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}
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],
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"validation_stats": {
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"total": 3,
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"kept": 0,
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"fixed": 6,
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"rejected": 3,
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"fixes_applied": [
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"amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-creating-manipulation-resistance-through-capital-commitment-requirements.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
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"amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-creating-manipulation-resistance-through-capital-commitment-requirements.md:stripped_wiki_link:liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulat",
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"amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-creating-manipulation-resistance-through-capital-commitment-requirements.md:stripped_wiki_link:liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulat",
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"amm-futarchy-proposer-liquidity-lockup-requirement-bootstraps-initial-market-depth-and-filters-spam-proposals.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
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"amm-futarchy-proposer-liquidity-lockup-requirement-bootstraps-initial-market-depth-and-filters-spam-proposals.md:stripped_wiki_link:amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentive",
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"amm-futarchy-enables-granular-trading-below-minimum-order-sizes-that-clob-systems-require-for-spam-prevention.md:set_created:2026-03-15"
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],
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"rejections": [
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"amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-creating-manipulation-resistance-through-capital-commitment-requirements.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
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"amm-futarchy-proposer-liquidity-lockup-requirement-bootstraps-initial-market-depth-and-filters-spam-proposals.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
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"amm-futarchy-enables-granular-trading-below-minimum-order-sizes-that-clob-systems-require-for-spam-prevention.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
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]
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},
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"model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
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"date": "2026-03-15"
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}
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@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1P
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date: 2024-01-24
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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status: enrichment
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2026-03-15
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enrichments_applied: ["amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-by-99-percent-versus-clob-by-eliminating-orderbook-storage-requirements.md", "futarchy-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-creates-wide-spreads-because-pricing-counterfactual-governance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md", "high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md", "metadao-autocrat-v01-reduces-proposal-duration-to-three-days-enabling-faster-governance-iteration.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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---
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## Proposal Details
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@ -128,3 +132,14 @@ Any important changes or feedback brought up during the proposal vote will be re
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- Autocrat version: 0.1
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- Completed: 2024-01-29
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- Ended: 2024-01-29
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## Key Facts
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- MetaDAO proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG passed on 2024-01-29
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- Proposal budget: 400 META on passing, 800 META on completed migration
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- Implementation team: joebuild (program), 0xNalloK (frontend), TBD (review)
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- CLOB pass/fail market pairs cost 3.75 SOL in state rent
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- Estimated annual CLOB costs: 135-225 SOL ($11,475-$19,125 at time of proposal)
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- Proposed AMM fee range: 3-5%
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- Current CLOB minimum order size: 1 META
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- Proposal creation time restriction: 50 slots between market creation and proposal creation
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