domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md

@@ -65,6 +65,12 @@ Sanctum's Wonder proposal (2frDGSg1frwBeh3bc6R7XKR2wckyMTt6pGXLGLPgoota, created
 
 Dean's List DAO proposal (DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM) used Autocrat v0.3 with 3-day trading period and 3% TWAP threshold. Proposal completed 2024-06-25 with failed status. This provides concrete implementation data: small DAOs (FDV $123K) can deploy Autocrat with custom TWAP thresholds (3% vs. typical higher thresholds), but low absolute dollar amounts may be insufficient to attract trader participation even when percentage returns are favorable.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Autocrat v0.1 made the three-day window configurable rather than hardcoded, with the proposer stating it was 'most importantly' designed to 'allow for quicker feedback loops.' The proposal passed with 990K META migrated, demonstrating community acceptance of parameterized proposal duration.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md

@@ -35,6 +35,12 @@ This pattern is general. Since [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token pri
 - MetaDAO's current scale ($219M total futarchy marketcap) may be too small to attract sophisticated attacks that the removed mechanisms were designed to prevent
 - Hanson might argue that MetaDAO's version isn't really futarchy at all — just conditional prediction markets used for governance, which is a narrower claim
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+MetaDAO's Autocrat v0.1 simplified by making proposal slots configurable and reducing default duration to 3 days. The proposer explicitly framed this as enabling 'quicker feedback loops,' suggesting the original implementation's fixed duration was a practical barrier to adoption.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/metadao-autocrat-migration-accepted-counterparty-risk-from-unverifiable-builds-prioritizing-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees.md

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: Community approved treasury migration despite inability to verify program builds, revealing governance tradeoffs
+confidence: experimental
+source: MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 proposal risk disclosure, December 2023
+created: 2026-03-15
+---
+
+# MetaDAO Autocrat migration accepted counterparty risk from unverifiable builds prioritizing iteration speed over security guarantees
+
+The proposal explicitly disclosed that the new Autocrat program "was unable to build with solana-verifiable-build" and required "placing trust in me that I didn't introduce a backdoor." Despite this counterparty risk affecting 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL, the proposal passed. The proposer acknowledged this as a temporary compromise, stating "for future versions, I should always be able to use verifiable builds." This reveals a critical governance tradeoff: the MetaDAO community valued faster iteration and improved functionality (configurable proposal slots, 3-day default) over the security guarantee of verifiable builds. The decision suggests early-stage futarchy DAOs prioritize mechanism refinement over security hardening, accepting elevated trust assumptions to compress development cycles. This pattern may not generalize to mature DAOs or larger treasuries, but demonstrates that governance communities will accept temporary centralization when the alternative is slower evolution of the governance mechanism itself.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md
+- futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
+
+Topics:
+- [[_map]]

domains/internet-finance/metadao-autocrat-v01-reduces-proposal-duration-to-three-days-enabling-faster-governance-iteration.md

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: Configurable proposal slots with three-day default compress feedback loops in futarchy governance
+confidence: experimental
+source: MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 proposal, December 2023
+created: 2026-03-15
+---
+
+# MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 reduces proposal duration to three days enabling faster governance iteration
+
+The Autocrat v0.1 upgrade introduces configurable slots per proposal with a default of 3 days, explicitly designed to "allow for quicker feedback loops." This represents a significant reduction from previous implementations and addresses a key friction point in futarchy adoption: the time cost of decision-making. The proposal passed and migrated 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL to the new program, demonstrating community acceptance of faster iteration cycles. The architectural change makes proposal duration a parameter rather than a constant, allowing MetaDAO to tune the speed-quality tradeoff based on empirical results. This matters because governance mechanism adoption depends on matching decision velocity to organizational needs—too slow and participants route around the system, too fast and markets cannot aggregate information effectively.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md
+- futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
+
+Topics:
+- [[_map]]

entities/internet-finance/metadao.md

@@ -60,6 +60,10 @@ The futarchy governance protocol on Solana. Implements decision markets through
 - **2025-01-30** — [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-2]] passed: Theia acquires 370.370 META tokens for $500,000 USDC
 - **2023-11-18** — [[metadao-develop-lst-vote-market]] proposed: first product development proposal requesting 3,000 META to build Votium-style validator bribe platform for MNDE/mSOL holders
 - **2023-11-29** — [[metadao-develop-lst-vote-market]] passed: approved LST Vote Market development with projected $10.5M enterprise value addition
+- **2023-12-03** — Proposed Autocrat v0.1 migration with configurable proposal slots and 3-day default duration
+- **2023-12-13** — Completed Autocrat v0.1 migration, moving 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL to new program despite unverifiable build
+- **2024-01-24** — Proposed AMM program to replace CLOB markets, addressing liquidity fragmentation and state rent costs (Proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG)
+- **2024-01-29** — AMM proposal passed with 400 META on approval and 800 META on completion budget
 ## Key Decisions
 | Date | Proposal | Proposer | Category | Outcome |
 |------|----------|----------|----------|---------|

inbox/archive/2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01.md

@@ -6,9 +6,14 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9z
 date: 2023-12-03
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-15
+claims_extracted: ["metadao-autocrat-v01-reduces-proposal-duration-to-three-days-enabling-faster-governance-iteration.md", "metadao-autocrat-migration-accepted-counterparty-risk-from-unverifiable-builds-prioritizing-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees.md"]
+enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md", "futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -63,3 +68,12 @@ For future versions, I should always be able to use verifiable builds.
 - Autocrat version: 0
 - Completed: 2023-12-13
 - Ended: 2023-12-13
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 proposal created 2023-12-03, completed 2023-12-13
+- Proposal migrated 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL from first to second Autocrat program
+- Autocrat v0.1 default proposal duration is 3 days
+- Proposal account: AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi
+- DAO account: 3wDJ5g73ABaDsL1qofF5jJqEJU4RnRQrvzRLkSnFc5di
+- Autocrat v0.1 could not use solana-verifiable-build for undisclosed reasons

inbox/archive/2024-02-05-futardio-proposal-execute-creation-of-spot-market-for-meta.md

@@ -6,9 +6,12 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/HyA2h16uPQBFjezKf77wThNGsEoesUjeQf9rFvfAy4t
 date: 2024-02-05
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-15
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -61,3 +64,12 @@ Obviously, there is no algorithmic guarantee that the multisig members will actu
 - Autocrat version: 0.1
 - Completed: 2024-02-10
 - Ended: 2024-02-10
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- MetaDAO Proposal 5 passed on 2024-02-05 and completed on 2024-02-10
+- The proposal transferred 4,130 META to a 4/6 multisig: 3,100 META for sale participants, 1,000 META for liquidity pool, 30 META for multisig compensation (5 META each)
+- Initial META spot price was set at 35 USDC/META through the liquidity pool pairing
+- Multisig members were Proph3t, Dean, Nallok, Durden, Rar3, and BlockchainFixesThis
+- Participants had a 2-day window (Feb 5-7) to transfer USDC for their allocations
+- The liquidity pool was likely created on Meteora

inbox/archive/2024-02-18-futardio-proposal-engage-in-100000-otc-trade-with-ben-hawkins-2.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/E1FJAp8saDU6Da2ccayjLBfA53qbjKRNYvu7QiMAnjQ
 date: 2024-02-18
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 processed_by: rio
@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ processed_date: 2024-02-18
 enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-governed-DAOs-converge-on-traditional-corporate-governance-scaffolding-for-treasury-operations-because-market-mechanisms-alone-cannot-provide-operational-security-and-legal-compliance.md", "MetaDAOs-Autocrat-program-implements-futarchy-through-conditional-token-markets-where-proposals-create-parallel-pass-and-fail-universes-settled-by-time-weighted-average-price-over-a-three-day-window.md", "futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirements.md", "time-based-token-vesting-is-hedgeable-making-standard-lockups-meaningless-as-alignment-mechanisms-because-investors-can-short-sell-to-neutralize-lockup-exposure-while-appearing-locked.md"]
 extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 extraction_notes: "Failed MetaDAO proposal for $100k OTC trade. Extracted two claims: (1) the vesting mechanism design for managing large token sales, (2) the market rejection despite acknowledged liquidity need. Four enrichments confirm existing claims about futarchy scaffolding, TWAP usage, adoption friction, and vesting limitations. The proposal's failure is particularly interesting as evidence of futarchy rejecting a solution to a stated problem, suggesting the mechanism can distinguish between 'we have a problem' and 'this solution is net positive.'"
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-15
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -157,3 +160,15 @@ Here are some post-money valuations at different prices as well total increase i
 - Multisig: 6 members, 4/6 threshold (Proph3t, Dean, 0xNallok, Durden, Blockchainfixesthis, Rar3)
 - Projected circulating supply increase: 2-7%
 - Projected META value increase: ~15%
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- MetaDAO Proposal 8 created 2024-02-18, failed 2024-02-24
+- Proposal sought $100k USDC for up to 500 META tokens at max(twapPass, $200)
+- META spot price was $695.92 on 2024-02-18 20:20 UTC
+- META circulating supply was 14,530 tokens at proposal time
+- Proposal structure: 20% immediate transfer, 80% linear vest over 12 months via Streamflow
+- Multisig: 6 members (Proph3t, Dean, 0xNallok, Durden, Blockchainfixesthis, Rar3) with 4/6 threshold
+- Projected circulating supply increase: 2-7% depending on final price
+- Projected META value increase: ~15% from liquidity injection
+- Proposal included $2,000 USDC compensation for multisig members