domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md

@@ -67,6 +67,12 @@ Dean's List DAO fee structure proposal passed despite requiring traders to activ
 
 Dean's List DAO proposal passed with TWAP threshold requiring only 3% MCAP increase ($307,855 vs $298,889 baseline), suggesting the market viewed the fee increase as marginally positive but not strongly so. The conservative 3% threshold indicates either low participation or weak conviction despite clear revenue projections showing 20x fee increase.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
+
+The Dean's List proposal passed with detailed financial modeling showing 5.33% FDV increase exceeding the 3% TWAP requirement, suggesting the economic case was clear enough to overcome participation friction. The proposal included worked examples with specific price impact calculations (24% upward pressure, 15% downward pressure from selling) that reduced information costs for voters.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md

@@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ The model assumes consistent service demand (6 dApp reviews per month) and stabl
 
 The proposal passed MetaDAO governance but represents a single implementation without long-term performance data. The 80% sell-off assumption is stated as "assumption" in the proposal itself, not empirically validated. No mechanism prevents citizens from selling more than 80% if they face liquidity pressure.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
+
+The Dean's List DAO proposal demonstrates buyback mechanics with specific numbers: charging clients 2500 USDC per review, taking 20% DAO tax in USDC, using remaining 80% (2000 USDC) to purchase $DEAN tokens. With 80% of recipients selling immediately, the model still achieves net positive price action because buys exceed sells by 20%. Example shows 560k $DEAN purchased creating upward pressure, with 448k sold (80% of 560k) creating smaller downward pressure, resulting in 'higher low on each cycle.' The proposal projects 5.33% FDV increase from 400 USDC daily purchases against 500 USDC baseline volume.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

inbox/archive/2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model.md

@@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/5c2XSWQ9rVPge2Umoz1yenZcAwRaQS5bC4i4w87B1WU
 date: 2024-07-18
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-16
+enrichments_applied: ["treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md", "futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -146,3 +150,12 @@ This way we create volume (3600 \$USDC volume) and the price action is always po
 - Autocrat version: 0.3
 - Completed: 2024-07-22
 - Ended: 2024-07-22
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- The Dean's List DAO charges clients 2500 USDC per dApp review
+- The Dean's List DAO FDV was $337,074 at proposal time with 100M circulating $DEAN supply
+- The Dean's List DAO daily trading volume was $500 at proposal time
+- The Dean's List DAO current $DEAN price was $0.00337 at proposal time
+- The proposal assumes 6 dApp reviews per month generating 15,000 USDC monthly revenue
+- The proposal estimates 80% of $DEAN recipients immediately sell their tokens