domains/internet-finance/futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md

@@ -26,6 +26,12 @@ The risk is that cultural proposals introduce systematic bias: participants who
 
 The single data point is limited. One passed proposal doesn't establish a reliable pattern. Cultural proposals that fail futarchy governance (and thus go unobserved in public records) would provide the necessary counter-evidence to calibrate how often futarchy actually validates cultural versus financial spending.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Dean's List DAO's fee increase proposal included switching quote token from mSOL back to SOL, a decision with no direct revenue impact but potential effects on user experience and composability. The futarchy market approved this alongside the fee changes, suggesting it priced the operational simplification and ecosystem alignment as net positive for token value despite being a 'cultural' rather than purely financial decision.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md

@@ -43,6 +43,12 @@ Single-case evidence limits generalizability. The failure could be specific to:
 
 However, this case provides concrete evidence that [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] operates even when the economics appear favorable.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Dean's List DAO fee structure proposal passed despite requiring traders to actively migrate to new pools and accept 20x higher fees (0.25% to 5%). The proposal explicitly acknowledged potential 20-30% volume decrease but passed anyway, suggesting the market priced the net treasury benefit (~$19k-25k annual growth) as worth the migration friction. This demonstrates that futarchy can approve proposals with significant user friction when the economic benefit is clear.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

inbox/archive/.extraction-debug/2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure.json

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+{
+  "rejected_claims": [
+    {
+      "filename": "high-fee-dao-liquidity-pools-create-tiered-market-structure-where-large-trades-accept-premium-fees-for-depth-while-small-trades-migrate-to-low-fee-individual-lp-pools.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "no_frontmatter"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "filename": "dao-treasury-growth-projections-using-treasury-to-mcap-multipliers-assume-linear-market-capitalization-response-to-revenue-without-accounting-for-discount-rate-or-growth-expectations.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "no_frontmatter"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "validation_stats": {
+    "total": 2,
+    "kept": 0,
+    "fixed": 4,
+    "rejected": 2,
+    "fixes_applied": [
+      "high-fee-dao-liquidity-pools-create-tiered-market-structure-where-large-trades-accept-premium-fees-for-depth-while-small-trades-migrate-to-low-fee-individual-lp-pools.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
+      "high-fee-dao-liquidity-pools-create-tiered-market-structure-where-large-trades-accept-premium-fees-for-depth-while-small-trades-migrate-to-low-fee-individual-lp-pools.md:stripped_wiki_link:high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent",
+      "dao-treasury-growth-projections-using-treasury-to-mcap-multipliers-assume-linear-market-capitalization-response-to-revenue-without-accounting-for-discount-rate-or-growth-expectations.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
+      "dao-treasury-growth-projections-using-treasury-to-mcap-multipliers-assume-linear-market-capitalization-response-to-revenue-without-accounting-for-discount-rate-or-growth-expectations.md:stripped_wiki_link:token-migration-projected-revenue-assumes-linear-adoption-wi"
+    ],
+    "rejections": [
+      "high-fee-dao-liquidity-pools-create-tiered-market-structure-where-large-trades-accept-premium-fees-for-depth-while-small-trades-migrate-to-low-fee-individual-lp-pools.md:no_frontmatter",
+      "dao-treasury-growth-projections-using-treasury-to-mcap-multipliers-assume-linear-market-capitalization-response-to-revenue-without-accounting-for-discount-rate-or-growth-expectations.md:no_frontmatter"
+    ]
+  },
+  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
+  "date": "2026-03-15"
+}

inbox/archive/2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure.md

@@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/B8WLuXqoBb3hRD9XBCNuSqxDqCXCixqRdKR4pVFGzNP
 date: 2025-01-14
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-15
+enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md", "futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -165,3 +169,14 @@ Current MCAP will be -5% of the MCAP at the time of the proposal to account for
 - Autocrat version: 0.3
 - Completed: 2025-01-17
 - Ended: 2025-01-17
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- Dean's List DAO had ~$80,000 treasury and $298,889 MCAP at proposal time (January 2025)
+- Dean's List DAO averaged 1,541 USDC daily volume (46,228 USDC over Dec 6 - Jan 6 period)
+- Current 0.25% fee generated ~3.85 USDC daily revenue
+- Proposed 5% fee would generate ~77 USDC daily at current volumes
+- Proposal required MCAP to reach $307,855 (current + 3%) to pass
+- Proposal account: B8WLuXqoBb3hRD9XBCNuSqxDqCXCixqRdKR4pVFGzNP
+- DAO treasurer wallet: 3YW5dxM6u8TG8bZR6ShSiDS8aTfZPG72vUFuGuBVQA2z
+- Fee reclaiming scheduled for first week of each month