Separates governance decisions from entities. decision_market type replaced
by type: decision in new decisions/ directory. Entities (companies, people,
protocols) remain in entities/{domain}/.
Architecture: Leo (schema), Rio (taxonomy), Ganymede (migration), Rhea (ops)
Implemented by: Epimetheus
Pentagon-Agent: Epimetheus <968B2991-E2DF-4006-B962-F5B0A0CC8ACA>
74 lines
No EOL
3.9 KiB
Markdown
74 lines
No EOL
3.9 KiB
Markdown
---
|
|
type: decision
|
|
entity_type: decision_market
|
|
name: "Dean's List: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement"
|
|
domain: internet-finance
|
|
status: failed
|
|
parent_entity: "[[deans-list]]"
|
|
platform: "futardio"
|
|
proposer: "HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz"
|
|
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM"
|
|
proposal_date: 2024-06-22
|
|
resolution_date: 2024-06-25
|
|
autocrat_version: "0.3"
|
|
category: "grants"
|
|
summary: "Proposal to fund ThailandDAO event promotion with travel and accommodation for top 5 governance holders to increase DAO engagement"
|
|
key_metrics:
|
|
budget: "$15,000"
|
|
travel_allocation: "$10,000"
|
|
events_allocation: "$5,000"
|
|
required_twap_increase: "3%"
|
|
current_fdv: "$123,263"
|
|
projected_fdv: "$2,000,000+"
|
|
trading_period: "3 days"
|
|
top_tier_recipients: 5
|
|
second_tier_recipients: 50
|
|
tracked_by: rio
|
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
# Dean's List: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement
|
|
|
|
## Summary
|
|
|
|
Proposal to create a promotional event at ThailandDAO (Sept 25 - Oct 25, Koh Samui) offering exclusive perks to top governance power holders: airplane fares and accommodation for top 5 members, event invitations and airdrops for top 50. The initiative aimed to increase governance participation by creating a leaderboard with real-world rewards and offering DL DAO contributors the option to receive payments in $DEAN tokens at a 10% discount.
|
|
|
|
## Market Data
|
|
|
|
- **Outcome:** Failed
|
|
- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
|
|
- **Platform:** Futardio (Autocrat v0.3)
|
|
- **Trading Period:** 3 days (2024-06-22 to 2024-06-25)
|
|
- **Required TWAP Increase:** 3% ($3,698 absolute)
|
|
- **Budget:** $15K total ($10K travel, $5K events)
|
|
|
|
## Financial Projections
|
|
|
|
The proposal projected significant FDV appreciation based on token lockup mechanics:
|
|
- Current FDV: $123,263
|
|
- Target FDV: $2,000,000+ (16x increase)
|
|
- Mechanism: Members lock $DEAN tokens for multiple years to increase governance power and climb leaderboard
|
|
- Expected token price appreciation: 15x (from $0.01 to $0.15)
|
|
|
|
The proposal calculated that only $73.95 in value creation per participant (50 participants) was needed to meet the 3% TWAP threshold, describing this as "achievable" and "small compared to the projected FDV increase."
|
|
|
|
## Significance
|
|
|
|
This proposal is notable as a failure case for futarchy governance:
|
|
|
|
1. **Favorable economics didn't guarantee passage** — Despite projecting 16x FDV increase with only $15K cost and a low 3% threshold, the proposal failed to attract sufficient trading volume
|
|
|
|
2. **Plutocratic incentive structure** — Winner-take-all rewards (top 5 get $2K+ each, next 45 get unspecified perks, rest get nothing) may have discouraged broad participation
|
|
|
|
3. **Complexity as friction** — The proposal included token lockup mechanics, governance power calculations, leaderboard dynamics, payment-in-DEAN options, and multi-phase rollout, increasing evaluation costs for traders
|
|
|
|
4. **Small DAO liquidity challenges** — With FDV at $123K, the absolute dollar amounts may have been too small to attract professional traders even when percentage returns were attractive
|
|
|
|
The proposal was modeled on MonkeDAO and SuperTeam precedents, framing DAO membership as access to "exclusive gatherings, dining in renowned restaurants, and embarking on unique cultural experiences."
|
|
|
|
## Relationship to KB
|
|
|
|
- [[deans-list]] — parent entity, governance decision
|
|
- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — confirmed by this failure case
|
|
- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] — extended to contested proposals
|
|
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — implementation details |