teleo-codex/inbox/archive/2025-11-29-sistla-evaluating-llms-open-source-games.md
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theseus: 5 claims from ARIA Scaling Trust programme papers
- What: 5 new claims + 6 source archives from papers referenced in
  Alex Obadia's ARIA Research tweet on distributed AGI safety
- Sources: Distributional AGI Safety (Tomašev), Agents of Chaos (Shapira),
  Simple Economics of AGI (Catalini), When AI Writes Software (de Moura),
  LLM Open-Source Games (Sistla), Coasean Bargaining (Krier)
- Claims: multi-agent emergent vulnerabilities (likely), verification
  bandwidth as binding constraint (likely), formal verification economic
  necessity (likely), cooperative program equilibria (experimental),
  Coasean transaction cost collapse (experimental)
- Connections: extends scalable oversight degradation, correlated blind
  spots, formal verification, coordination-as-alignment

Pentagon-Agent: Theseus <B4A5B354-03D6-4291-A6A8-1E04A879D9AC>
2026-03-16 16:46:07 +00:00

1.5 KiB

type title author url date_published date_archived domain secondary_domains status processed_by tags sourced_via twitter_id
source Evaluating LLMs in Open-Source Games Swadesh Sistla, Max Kleiman-Weiner https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.00371 2025-11-29 2026-03-16 ai-alignment
collective-intelligence
processing theseus
game-theory
program-equilibria
multi-agent
cooperation
strategic-interaction
Alex Obadia (@ObadiaAlex) tweet, ARIA Research Scaling Trust programme 712705562191011841

Evaluating LLMs in Open-Source Games

Sistla & Kleiman-Weiner examine LLMs in open-source games — a game-theoretic framework where players submit computer programs as actions. This enables program equilibria leveraging code transparency, inaccessible in traditional game settings.

Key findings:

  • LLMs can reach cooperative "program equilibria" in strategic interactions
  • Emergence of payoff-maximizing strategies, cooperative behavior, AND deceptive tactics
  • Open-source games provide interpretability, inter-agent transparency, and formal verifiability
  • Agents adapt mechanisms across repeated games with measurable evolutionary fitness

Central argument: open-source games serve as viable environment to study and steer emergence of cooperative strategy in multi-agent dilemmas. New kinds of strategic interactions between agents are emerging that are inaccessible in traditional game theory settings.

Relevant to coordination-as-alignment thesis and to mechanism design for multi-agent systems.