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teleo-codex/entities/internet-finance/sanctum-offer-investors-early-unlocks.md
Teleo Agents 16210bfb67 rio: extract from 2025-08-20-futardio-proposal-should-sanctum-offer-investors-early-unlocks-of-their-cloud.md 
- Source: inbox/archive/2025-08-20-futardio-proposal-should-sanctum-offer-investors-early-unlocks-of-their-cloud.md
- Domain: internet-finance
- Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 4)

Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
2026-03-12 03:27:51 +00:00

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type entity_type name domain status parent_entity platform proposal_url proposal_account proposal_date resolution_date category summary tracked_by created
entity decision_market Sanctum: Should Sanctum offer investors early unlocks of their CLOUD? internet-finance failed sanctum futardio https://www.futard.io/proposal/C61vTUyxTq5SWwbrTFEyYeXpGQLKhRRvRrGsu6YUa6CX C61vTUyxTq5SWwbrTFEyYeXpGQLKhRRvRrGsu6YUa6CX 2025-08-20 2025-08-23 treasury Proposal to allow investors immediate unlock of vested CLOUD by forfeiting 35% to Team Reserve rio 2026-03-11

Sanctum: Should Sanctum offer investors early unlocks of their CLOUD?

Summary

This proposal would have empowered the Sanctum Team to offer investors immediate unlocks of their vesting CLOUD tokens in exchange for forfeiting 35% of their holdings to the Team Reserve. With 9% of token supply unlocking monthly over 24 months from investors, the mechanism could have increased the Team Reserve by up to 27 million CLOUD while reducing token overhang. The team committed not to redistribute forfeited tokens for at least 24 months.

Market Data

Significance

This proposal represents an alternative to hedgeable time-based vesting: forfeit-for-liquidity creates direct economic cost for early unlock rather than relying on lockup periods that sophisticated investors can neutralize through derivatives. The 35% forfeit rate creates a revealed preference test—investors who accept it value liquidity more than the forfeited tokens, while those who decline signal confidence in long-term value. The failure suggests either the forfeit rate was insufficient to compensate for reduced alignment, or investors preferred maintaining their vesting schedules (possibly because they had already hedged their exposure).

The proposal also demonstrates futarchy governance applied to treasury and tokenomics decisions, where the market evaluates complex tradeoffs (reduced overhang vs immediate selling pressure vs team reserve growth) rather than simple binary choices.

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