teleo-codex/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-lst-vote-market.md

type	entity_type	name	domain	status	parent_entity	platform	proposer	proposal_url	proposal_date	resolution_date	category	summary	key_metrics	tags	tracked_by	created
decision	decision_market	MetaDAO: Develop a LST Vote Market?	internet-finance	passed	metadao	metadao	Proph3t	https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/9RisXkQCFLt7NA29vt5aWatcnU8SkyBgS95HxXhwXhW	2023-11-18	2023-11-29	strategy	Proposal 0 — the first-ever futarchy governance decision. Build Votium-style LST bribe platform for Marinade. Requesting 3,000 META.	proposal_number proposal_account autocrat_version budget 0 9RisXkQCFLt7NA29vt5aWatcnU8SkyBgS95HxXhwXhW 0 3,000 META	metadao lst marinade bribe-market first-proposal	rio	2026-03-24

MetaDAO: Develop a LST Vote Market?

Summary & Connections

Proposal 0 — the genesis event for futarchy governance on Solana. The community evaluated a business proposal (build a Votium-style LST bribe platform for Marinade) through conditional token markets and approved it. Budget: 3,000 META. Estimated $10.5M enterprise value addition if executed.

Outcome: Passed (2023-11-29). The LST vote market was later superseded by Marinade's internal solution; MetaDAO pivoted to the Saber vote market (metadao-develop-saber-vote-market).

Connections:

• This established the template for all subsequent MetaDAO proposals — probability-weighted enterprise value projections, team allocation, milestone-based compensation
• The financial projection framework ("if you believe X% chance of success at Y enterprise value...") became the standard for how proposals are evaluated through futarchy
• Proph3t's framing — "the Meta-DAO lacks legitimacy, we need to prove the model works by building profit-turning products" — remains the core strategic thesis through 2026
• Related: metadao-develop-saber-vote-market (Proposal 3, pivoted from Marinade to Saber after learning Marinade was building internally)

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Full Proposal Text

Overview

The Meta-DAO is awakening.

Given that the Meta-DAO is a fundamentally new kind of organization, it lacks legitimacy. To gain legitimacy, we need to first prove that the model works. I believe that the best way to do that is by building profit-turning products under the Meta-DAO umbrella.

Here, we propose the first one: an LST bribe platform. This platform would allow MNDE and mSOL holders to earn extra yield by directing their stake to validators who pay them. A bribe market already exists, but it's fragmented and favors whales. This platform would centralize the market, facilitating open exchange between validators and MNDE / mSOL holders and allowing small holders to earn the same yield as whales.

Executive summary

• The product would exist as a 2-sided marketplace between validators who want more stake and MNDE and mSOL holders who want more yield.
• The platform would likely be structured similar to Votium.
• The platform would monetize by taking 10% of bribes.
• We estimate that this product would generate $1.5M per year for the Meta-DAO, increasing the Meta-DAO's enterprise value by $10.5M, if executed successfully.
• We are requesting 3,000 META and the promise of retroactively-decided performance-based incentives. If executed, this proposal would transfer the first 1,000 META.
• Three contributors have expressed interest in working on this: Proph3t, for the smart contracts; marie, for the UI; and nicovrg, for the BD with Marinade. Proph3t would be the point person and would be responsible for delivering this project to the Meta-DAO.

Problem statement

Validators want more stake. MNDE and mSOL holders want more yield. Since Marinade allows its MNDE and mSOL holders to direct 40% of its stake, this creates an opportunity for mSOL and MNDE to earn higher yield by selling their votes to validators.

Today, this market is fragmented. Trading occurs through one-off locations like Solana Compass' Turbo Stake and in back-room Telegram chats. This makes it hard for people who don't actively follow the Solana ecosystem and small holders to earn the highest yields.

We propose a platform that would centralize this trading. Essentially, this would provide an easy place where validators who want more stake can pay for the votes of MNDE and mSOL holders. In the future, we could expand to other LSTs like bSOL.

Design

There are a number ways you could design a bribe platform. After considering a few options, a Votium-style system appears to be the best one.

Votium

Votium is a bribe platform on Ethereum. Essentially, projects that want liquidity in their token pay veCRV holders to allocate CRV emissions to their token's liquidity pool. If you're a project that wants to pay for votes, you: create a Votium pool, specify which Curve pool you want CRV emissions directed to, and allocate funds. If you're a veCRV-holder, you vote for the specified Curve pool and then claim a pro rata share of the tokens. Alternatively, you can delegate to Votium, who will spread your votes among the various pools.

Our system

In our case, a Votium-style platform would look like the following:

• Once a month, each participating validator creates a pool, specifying a price per vote and depositing SOL to their pool. The amount of SOL deposited in a pool defines the maximum votes bought. For example, if Laine deposits 1,000 SOL to a pool and specifies a price per vote of 0.1 SOL, then this pool can buy up to 10,000 votes
• veMNDE and mSOL holders are given 1 week to join pools, which they do by directing their stake to the respective validator
• After 1 month passes, veMNDE and mSOL holders can claim their SOL bribes from the pools

The main advantage of the Votium approach is that it's non-custodial. There would be no risk of user fund loss. In the event of a hack, the only thing that could be stolen are the bribes deposited to the pools.

Business model

The Meta-DAO would take a small fee from the rewards that are paid to bribees. Currently, we envision this number being 10%, but that is subject to change.

Financial projections

Marinade Finance currently has $532M of SOL locked in it. Of that, 40% or $213M is directed by votes. Validators are likely willing to pay up to the marginal revenue that they can gain by bribing. So, at 8% staking rates and 10% commissions, the estimated market for this is $213M * 0.08 * 0.1, or $1.7M.

At a 10% fee, the revenue available to the Meta-DAO would be $170k. The revenue share with Marinade is yet to be negotiated. At a 10% revshare, the Meta-DAO would earn $150k per year. At a 30% revshare, the Meta-DAO would earn $120k per year.

We take the average of $135k per year and multiply by the typical SaaS valuation multiple of 7.8x to achieve the estimate that this product would add $1.05M to the Meta-DAO's enterprise value if executed successfully.

Of course, there is a chance that is not executed successfully. To estimate how much value this would create for the Meta-DAO, you can calculate:

[(% chance of successful execution / 100) * (estimated addition to the Meta-DAO's enterprise value if successfully executed)] - up-front costs

For example, if you believe that the chance of us successfully executing is 70% and that this would add $10.5M to the Meta-DAO's enterprise value, you can do (0.7 * 10.5M) - dilution cost of 3,000 META. Since each META has a book value of $1 and is probably worth somewhere between $1 and $100, this leaves you with $730k - $700k of value created by the proposal.

As with any financial projections, these results are highly speculative and sensitive to assumptions. Market participants are encouraged to make their own assumptions and to price the proposal accordingly.

Proposal request

We are requesting 3,000 META and retroactively-decided performance-based incentives to fund this project.

This 3,000 META would be split among:

• Proph3t, who would perform the smart contract work
• marie, who would perform the UI/UX work
• nicovrg, who would be the point person to Marinade Finance and submit the grant proposal to the Marinade forums

1,000 META would be paid up-front by the execution of this proposal. 2,000 META would be paid after the proposal is done.

The Meta-DAO is still figuring out how to properly incentivize performance, so we don't want to be too specific with how that would done. Still, it is game-theoretically optimal for the Meta-DAO to compensate us fairly because under-paying us would dissuade future builders from contributing to the Meta-DAO. So we'll put our trust in the game theory.

References

• Solana LST Dune Dashboard
• Marinade Docs — MNDE Directed Stake and mSOL Directed Stake
• Marinade's Validator Dashboard
• MNDE Gauge Profit Calculator
• Marinade SDK
• Solana Compass Turbo Staking
• Marinade Directed Stake program

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Raw Data

• Proposal account: 9RisXkQCFLt7NA29vt5aWatcnU8SkyBgS95HxXhwXhW
• Proposal number: 0
• DAO account: 3wDJ5g73ABaDsL1qofF5jJqEJU4RnRQrvzRLkSnFc5di
• Proposer: HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
• Autocrat version: 0
• Completed: 2023-11-29

Relationship to KB

• metadao — parent entity, first-ever proposal
• metadao-develop-saber-vote-market — pivot after Marinade built internally
• MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window — first deployment of the mechanism