teleo-codex/entities/internet-finance/sanctum-offer-investors-early-unlocks.md
Teleo Agents 1b098a5db1 rio: extract from 2025-08-20-futardio-proposal-should-sanctum-offer-investors-early-unlocks-of-their-cloud.md
- Source: inbox/archive/2025-08-20-futardio-proposal-should-sanctum-offer-investors-early-unlocks-of-their-cloud.md
- Domain: internet-finance
- Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 4)

Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
2026-03-12 08:30:59 +00:00

2.4 KiB

type entity_type name domain status parent_entity platform proposer proposal_url proposal_date resolution_date category summary tracked_by created
entity decision_market Sanctum: Should Sanctum offer investors early unlocks of their CLOUD? internet-finance failed sanctum futardio proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2 https://www.futard.io/proposal/C61vTUyxTq5SWwbrTFEyYeXpGQLKhRRvRrGsu6YUa6CX 2025-08-20 2025-08-23 treasury Proposal to allow investors to unlock vested CLOUD immediately by forfeiting 35% to Team Reserve rio 2026-03-11

Sanctum: Should Sanctum offer investors early unlocks of their CLOUD?

Summary

This proposal would have empowered the Sanctum Team to offer investors immediate unlocks of their vesting CLOUD tokens in exchange for forfeiting 35% of their holdings to the Team Reserve. With 9% of token supply unlocking monthly over 24 months, the mechanism could have increased the Team Reserve by up to 27 million CLOUD while reducing token overhang. The team committed not to redistribute forfeited tokens for at least 24 months.

Market Data

  • Outcome: Failed
  • Proposer: proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2
  • Platform: Futardio (MetaDAO Autocrat v0.3)
  • Proposal Account: C61vTUyxTq5SWwbrTFEyYeXpGQLKhRRvRrGsu6YUa6CX
  • DAO Account: GVmi7ngRAVsUHh8REhKDsB2yNftJTNRt5qMLHDDCizov

Significance

This proposal represents an alternative to standard time-based vesting through a forfeit-for-liquidity mechanism. Rather than allowing investors to hedge their lockups while maintaining locked appearance, it forces a revealed preference: investors wanting liquidity must pay a concrete 35% cost. The mechanism design attempts to make vesting meaningful through economic sacrifice rather than time restrictions. The proposal's failure may indicate either investor satisfaction with existing vesting terms or reluctance to accept the forfeit cost.

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