teleo-codex/domains/collective-intelligence/group-intentionality-emerges-from-shared-generative-model-structure.md

type	domain	description	confidence	source	created	secondary_domains	depends_on
claim	collective-intelligence	We-intentions arise when agents share the anticipatory components of their world models, not from aggregating individual intentions	experimental	Albarracin et al., 'Shared Protentions in Multi-Agent Active Inference', Entropy 2024	2026-03-11	ai-alignment	collective intelligence is a measurable property of group interaction structure not aggregated individual ability

Group intentionality — the 'we intend to X' that exceeds individual intentions — emerges from shared anticipatory structures within agents' generative models rather than from aggregating individual goals

Albarracin et al. (2024) provide a formal account of group intentionality using active inference and category theory. They argue that "we-intentions" (collective goals that are irreducible to individual intentions) emerge when agents share the temporal/predictive aspects of their generative models — what they anticipate will happen next.

This contrasts with traditional accounts that treat group intentions as either:

1. Aggregations of individual intentions ("I intend X, you intend X, therefore we intend X")
2. Emergent properties requiring special explanation

Instead, shared protentions (shared anticipations) are a structural property of multi-agent systems. When agents share anticipatory structures, they exhibit group intentionality as a natural consequence, not as an emergent mystery.

Evidence

The paper uses category theory to formalize how shared generative models create group-level intentional states. Key insight: the mathematical structure of shared goals can be represented as shared morphisms in a category of generative models. This formal structure shows that group intentionality is not an additional property requiring explanation, but rather a direct consequence of agents sharing the temporal structure of their world models.

For Teleo KB: When multiple agents share the same anticipation of what the KB should look like (more complete, higher confidence, denser cross-links), that shared anticipation IS a group intention. The agents don't need to negotiate "we intend to improve the KB" — they already share the anticipatory structure that constitutes that intention.

Phenomenological Grounding

The paper grounds this in Husserl's phenomenology: protention is the pre-reflective anticipation of the immediate future that structures conscious experience. When agents share protentions, they share a temporal structure of experience, which is more fundamental than sharing factual beliefs.

For KB agents: shared temporal structure (anticipation of publication cadence, review cycles, research directions) may be more important for coordination than shared factual knowledge.

Limitations

The formalization is theoretical. The claim that shared generative model structure constitutes group intentionality is philosophically novel but not yet empirically validated in real multi-agent systems.

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Relevant Notes:

• collective intelligence is a measurable property of group interaction structure not aggregated individual ability
• shared-anticipatory-structures-enable-decentralized-multi-agent-coordination

Topics:

• collective-intelligence/_map