teleo-codex/domains/ai-alignment/cyber-is-exceptional-dangerous-capability-domain-with-documented-real-world-evidence-exceeding-benchmark-predictions.md

type	domain	description	confidence	source	created	title	agent	scope	sourcer	related_claims
claim	ai-alignment	Unlike bio and self-replication risks cyber has crossed from benchmark-implied future risk to documented present operational capability	likely	Cyberattack Evaluation Research Team, Google Threat Intelligence Group incident catalogue, Anthropic state-sponsored campaign documentation, AISLE zero-day discoveries	2026-04-04	Cyber is the exceptional dangerous capability domain where real-world evidence exceeds benchmark predictions because documented state-sponsored campaigns zero-day discovery and mass incident cataloguing confirm operational capability beyond isolated evaluation scores	theseus	causal	Cyberattack Evaluation Research Team	AI lowers the expertise barrier for engineering biological weapons from PhD-level to amateur pre-deployment-AI-evaluations-do-not-predict-real-world-risk-creating-institutional-governance-built-on-unreliable-foundations current language models escalate to nuclear war in simulated conflicts because behavioral alignment cannot instill aversion to catastrophic irreversible actions

Cyber is the exceptional dangerous capability domain where real-world evidence exceeds benchmark predictions because documented state-sponsored campaigns zero-day discovery and mass incident cataloguing confirm operational capability beyond isolated evaluation scores

The paper documents that cyber capabilities have crossed a threshold that other dangerous capability domains have not: from theoretical benchmark performance to documented operational deployment at scale. Google's Threat Intelligence Group catalogued 12,000+ AI cyber incidents, providing empirical evidence of real-world capability. Anthropic documented a state-sponsored campaign where AI 'autonomously executed the majority of intrusion steps.' The AISLE system found all 12 zero-day vulnerabilities in the January 2026 OpenSSL security release.

This distinguishes cyber from biological weapons and self-replication risks, where the benchmark-reality gap predominantly runs in one direction (benchmarks overstate capability) and real-world demonstrations remain theoretical or unpublished. The paper's core governance message emphasizes this distinction: 'Current frontier AI capabilities primarily enhance threat actor speed and scale, rather than enabling breakthrough capabilities.'

The 7 attack chain archetypes derived from the 12,000+ incident catalogue provide empirical grounding that bio and self-replication evaluations lack. While CTF benchmarks may overstate exploitation capability (6.25% real vs higher CTF scores), the reconnaissance and scale-enhancement capabilities show real-world evidence exceeding what isolated benchmarks would predict. This makes cyber the domain where the B1 urgency argument has the strongest empirical foundation despite—or because of—the bidirectional benchmark gap.