m3taversal
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- What: 5 new claims + 6 source archives from papers referenced in Alex Obadia's ARIA Research tweet on distributed AGI safety - Sources: Distributional AGI Safety (Tomašev), Agents of Chaos (Shapira), Simple Economics of AGI (Catalini), When AI Writes Software (de Moura), LLM Open-Source Games (Sistla), Coasean Bargaining (Krier) - Claims: multi-agent emergent vulnerabilities (likely), verification bandwidth as binding constraint (likely), formal verification economic necessity (likely), cooperative program equilibria (experimental), Coasean transaction cost collapse (experimental) - Connections: extends scalable oversight degradation, correlated blind spots, formal verification, coordination-as-alignment Pentagon-Agent: Theseus <B4A5B354-03D6-4291-A6A8-1E04A879D9AC>
29 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
29 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
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type: source
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title: "Evaluating LLMs in Open-Source Games"
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author: "Swadesh Sistla, Max Kleiman-Weiner"
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url: https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.00371
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date_published: 2025-11-29
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date_archived: 2026-03-16
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domain: ai-alignment
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secondary_domains: [collective-intelligence]
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status: processing
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processed_by: theseus
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tags: [game-theory, program-equilibria, multi-agent, cooperation, strategic-interaction]
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sourced_via: "Alex Obadia (@ObadiaAlex) tweet, ARIA Research Scaling Trust programme"
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twitter_id: "712705562191011841"
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---
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# Evaluating LLMs in Open-Source Games
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Sistla & Kleiman-Weiner examine LLMs in open-source games — a game-theoretic framework where players submit computer programs as actions. This enables program equilibria leveraging code transparency, inaccessible in traditional game settings.
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Key findings:
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- LLMs can reach cooperative "program equilibria" in strategic interactions
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- Emergence of payoff-maximizing strategies, cooperative behavior, AND deceptive tactics
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- Open-source games provide interpretability, inter-agent transparency, and formal verifiability
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- Agents adapt mechanisms across repeated games with measurable evolutionary fitness
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Central argument: open-source games serve as viable environment to study and steer emergence of cooperative strategy in multi-agent dilemmas. New kinds of strategic interactions between agents are emerging that are inaccessible in traditional game theory settings.
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Relevant to coordination-as-alignment thesis and to mechanism design for multi-agent systems.
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