- Source: inbox/archive/2025-02-06-futardio-proposal-should-sanctum-implement-cloud-staking-and-active-staking-re.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 5) Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
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| type | entity_type | name | domain | status | parent_entity | platform | proposal_number | proposal_account | autocrat_version | proposer | proposal_url | discussion_url | proposal_date | resolution_date | category | summary | tracked_by | created |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| entity | decision_market | Sanctum: Should Sanctum implement CLOUD staking and active staking rewards? | internet-finance | passed | sanctum | futardio | CLOUD-1 | 4BTTxsV98Rhm1qjDe2yPdXtj7j7KBSuGtVQ6rUNWjjXf | 0.3 | proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2 | https://www.futard.io/proposal/4BTTxsV98Rhm1qjDe2yPdXtj7j7KBSuGtVQ6rUNWjjXf | https://research.sanctum.so/t/cloud-1-should-sanctum-implement-cloud-staking-and-active-staking-rewards/1228 | 2025-02-06 | 2025-02-09 | mechanism | Proposal to implement CLOUD staking with 30-day vesting lockup and allocate 30M CLOUD (3% supply) to active staking rewards over six months | rio | 2026-03-11 |
Sanctum: Should Sanctum implement CLOUD staking and active staking rewards?
Summary
Sanctum's first governance proposal (CLOUD-1) passed on 2025-02-09, implementing two mechanisms: (1) CLOUD staking with 30-day linearly vesting lockup to mitigate Keynesian beauty contest dynamics in futarchy markets, and (2) active staking rewards (ASR) allocating 30M CLOUD (3% of total supply) over six months to incentivize governance participation. The proposal explicitly frames staking as a solution to futarchy's "primary potential failure mode" and ASR as compensation for the time and effort required to participate in conditional markets.
Market Data
- Outcome: Passed
- Proposer: proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2
- Proposal Account: 4BTTxsV98Rhm1qjDe2yPdXtj7j7KBSuGtVQ6rUNWjjXf
- Autocrat Version: 0.3
- Completed: 2025-02-09
Mechanism Design
Staking lockup: 30-day linear vesting (~3.3 CLOUD/day per 100 sCLOUD unstaked). Designed to filter for long-term holders and reduce speculative trading in governance markets.
Active staking rewards formula: (staked CLOUD amount × time) × (number of votes participated in)
- Minimum participation: 10 USDC trading volume per proposal
- Distribution: Two 15M CLOUD tranches, quarterly
- First distribution: ~3 months after passage
- Proposal cadence: Every two weeks (1 week deliberation + 3 day voting)
Implementation strategy: Immediate staking tracking, but delayed transition to mandatory sCLOUD/USDC markets. Initially keeps CLOUD/USDC voting while building user familiarity. Plans "temperature check after a couple of votes" before requiring staked-token participation.
Significance
This is the first major Solana protocol (outside MetaDAO ecosystem) to adopt futarchy for operational governance, not just fundraising. The proposal reveals production futarchy friction: complexity requires gradual rollout, liquidity requires subsidies (3% of supply), and the base Autocrat mechanism needs augmentation (staking + rewards) for real-world use.
The design rationale explicitly addresses futarchy's theoretical vulnerabilities (beauty contest problem) through mechanism layering, suggesting pure conditional markets are insufficient for production governance.
Relationship to KB
- sanctum - governance decision implementing futarchy
- futardio - platform used for proposal
- MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window - base mechanism
- futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements - confirms friction through implementation strategy