MetaDAO: Approve Fundraise #2

Summary

Proposal to raise $1.5M by selling up to 4,000 META to VCs and angels. Terms: no discount, no lockup, minimum price $375/META (implying $7.81M minimum FDV based on 20,823.5 META in public hands). Funds custodied by Proph3t and Nallok in a multisig, released at $100K/month to minimize DAO attack risk. Burn rate: $1.38M/year covering two founders ($90K each), three engineers ($190K each), audits ($300K), office ($80K), growth person ($150K), and admin ($100K).

Market Data

Outcome: Passed (2024-06-30)
Autocrat version: 0.3
Key participants: Proph3t (proposer), Nallok (multisig co-custodian)

Significance

This was MetaDAO's first VC fundraise approved through futarchy — the market decided whether to dilute existing holders for growth capital. The "no discount, no lockup" terms are unusual for crypto fundraises and reflect futarchy's transparency ethos: investors get the same terms as the market.

The multisig custodianship ($100K/month release) reveals a practical tension: futarchy governs the fundraise decision, but operational security requires trusted custodians. The DAO cannot safely hold and disburse large sums through governance alone — an early signal of the pattern where futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate scaffolding for treasury operations.

The detailed budget breakdown provides one of the few public windows into early MetaDAO operational costs, valuable for benchmarking futarchy-governed organizations.

Relationship to KB

metadao — capital formation event
internet-capital-markets-compress-fundraising-timelines — futarchy-governed fundraise completed in 4 days
futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance — multisig custody alongside futarchy approval
futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control — but this raise has identifiable custodians, complicating the "no beneficial owners" argument

Relevant Entities:

metadao — parent organization
proph3t — proposer and custodian

Topics:

internet finance and decision markets

Full Proposal Text

Source: futard.io, tabled 2024-06-26

Overview

Three weeks ago, MetaDAO launched the futarchy protocol with Drift, Dean's List, and Future. Our goal is to onboard more Solana DAOs. To do that, Nallok and I have a few ideas for growth initiatives, including:

Social: seeing who's trading in the markets
NFTs: allowing NFT communities to leverage decision markets
Special contracts: creating custom financial contracts that make it easier to make grants decisions through decision markets

To accelerate this, our goal is to hire a small team. Between us ($90k/yr each), three engineers ($190k/yr each), audits ($300k), office space ($80k/yr), a growth person ($150k/yr), and other administrative expenses ($100k/yr), we're looking at a $1.38M burn rate.

To fund this, I'm proposing that the DAO raise $1.5M by selling META to a combination of venture capitalists and angels. Specifically, we would sell up to 4,000 META with no discount and no lockup.

Nallok and I would execute this sale on behalf of the DAO. To minimize the risk of a DAO attack, the money raised would be custodied by us in a multisig and released to the DAO treasury at a rate of $100k / month.

The exact terms of the sale would be left to our discretion. This includes details such as who is given allocation, whether to raise more than $1.5M, how escrow is managed, et cetera. However, we would be bound to a minimum price: $375. Given that there'd be 20,823.5 META in the hands of the public (which includes VCs + angels) after this raise, this means we would be unable to sell tokens at less than a $7.81M valuation. Everyone who participates in the raise will get similar terms. We will make public who's participated after it's complete.

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