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| type | entity_type | name | domain | status | parent_entity | platform | proposer | proposal_url | proposal_date | resolution_date | category | summary | key_metrics | tags | tracked_by | created | last_updated | |||||||||
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| decision | decision_market | MetaDAO: Release a Launchpad? | internet-finance | passed | metadao | metadao | Proph3t, Kollan | https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/BvReLaunchpad111111111111111111111111111111 | 2025-02-26 | 2025-03-01 | strategy | The proposal that actually launched the MetaDAO launchpad. Permissioned at start (team selects projects), with right to go permissionless later. Funders get 1,000 tokens per USDC. If minimum not met, full refund. All USDC to DAO + LP — the 'unruggable ICO' model. |
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rio | 2026-03-11 | 2026-03-24 |
MetaDAO: Release a Launchpad?
Summary & Connections
The proposal that launched MetaDAO's launchpad — the foundation of the "unruggable ICO" model. Permissioned at start (Proph3t and Kollan select projects), with right to go permissionless later. Mechanics: project creators specify minimum USDC, funders get 1,000 tokens per USDC committed, 10% of USDC → AMM liquidity, rest → futarchy DAO. If minimum not reached, burn tokens and reclaim USDC. Contributors raise proposals to pay themselves.
Outcome: Passed (~2025-03-01). Led directly to the Avici, Umbra, Solomon, OmniPair, and subsequent launches.
Connections:
- This is the successor to the twice-rejected memecoin launchpad idea (metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad failed Aug 2024, metadao-create-futardio failed Nov 2024). The market approved the infrastructure version but not the speculative version.
- "If the team walks away on day #1, anyone would be able to raise a proposal to the DAO to liquidate the treasury and return all money to the funders. This is also true on day #30, day #365, and day #1083." — this is the thesis behind futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent
- The "permissioned by us at start" → "transition to permissionless" is what became the MetaDAO (curated) vs futard.io (permissionless) two-tier system
- "Bag bias is real, and in this system it works for you as a founder" — Proph3t's insight on community-from-day-one as a feature, not a compromise
- "Opens up the door to founders from geographies where it's historically been difficult to raise money" — the permissionless capital formation thesis
Full Proposal Text
Type
Business - Project
Author(s)
Proph3t, Kollan
Overview
We are requesting the DAO's permission to release a launchpad for futarchy DAOs. Such a launchpad could solve many of the existing issues with capital formation in crypto.
Mechanics
The launchpad would work in the following way:
- Project creators raise project ideas and specify a minimum amount of USDC they need to execute on the idea
- Funders have 5 days to fund those ideas in exchange for tokens
- Funders would receive 1,000 tokens per USDC committed
- Except in rare cases, the whole initial supply would be issued by this process
- If the launch receives sufficient USDC, 10% of the USDC is paired against an equivalent amount of tokens in a constant-product AMM. Then, all remaining USDC and the ability to mint new tokens are transferred to a futarchy DAO. Contributors can then raise proposals to issue tokens to themselves or to pay themselves on some interval (e.g., monthly)
- If the launch does not receive sufficient USDC, all funders would be able to burn their tokens to claim their original USDC back
Why funders will prefer this to the status quo
Rugging is a rampant problem for on-chain capital raises. In this system, it's much harder for projects to rug because all of the USDC goes either to the DAO or to the liquidity pool. If the team walks away on day #1, anyone would be able to raise a proposal to the DAO to liquidate the treasury and return all money to the funders. This is also true on day #30, day #365, and day #1083.
Why founders will prefer this to the status quo
This system gives you two benefits as a founder:
- Community involvement from day 1
- Ability to raise money that you wouldn't have otherwise been able to raise
As I've written about before, community involvement from day 1 is an unfair advantage for projects. The two biggest crypto projects, Bitcoin and Ethereum, both had it. Bag bias is real, and in this system it works for you as a founder.
This also opens up the door to founders from geographies where it's historically been difficult to raise money.
GTM
We will canvas our network to find early-stage (ideally pre-raise) projects to launch on the platform. We already have a few prospective projects.
At the start, launches would be permissioned by us. We would reserve the right to transition to a permissionless system when and if we deem it beneficial.
Founder discretion
We would also have discretion to change the mechanics of launches (e.g. to adopt an IDO pool approach rather than the above fixed price approach) if we deem it +EV for MetaDAO.
Raw Data
- Proposal account: (from source data)
- DAO account:
CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9 - Proposer:
proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2 - Autocrat version: 0.3
- Completed: ~2025-03-01
Relationship to KB
- metadao — parent entity, launchpad creation
- MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale — this proposal is the origin
- futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent — the liquidation mechanism described here
- metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad — earlier rejected version of this idea
- futarchy-governed permissionless launches require brand separation to manage reputational liability because failed projects on a curated platform damage the platforms credibility — "permissioned at start, permissionless later"