teleo-codex/decisions/internet-finance/superclaw-liquidation-proposal.md
Teleo Agents b838fecd05 extract: 2026-03-26-tg-source-m3taversal-superclaw-liquidation-proposal-shared-by-m3tavers
Pentagon-Agent: Epimetheus <3D35839A-7722-4740-B93D-51157F7D5E70>
2026-03-26 15:32:31 +00:00

1.7 KiB

Superclaw Liquidation Proposal

Status: Active (as of 2026-03-26) Platform: MetaDAO Proposal ID: FZNt29qdEhvnJWswpoWvvAFV5TBhnpBzUaFced3ZFx1X Category: Liquidation

Overview

Liquidation proposal for $SUPER token on MetaDAO's futarchy platform. This represents one of the first documented uses of MetaDAO's liquidation mechanism, which allows token holders to vote via conditional markets on whether to dissolve the project and return treasury funds to investors.

Mechanism

The proposal uses MetaDAO's Autocrat futarchy implementation:

  • Conditional markets create parallel pass/fail universes
  • Token holders trade in both markets based on expected $SUPER price outcomes
  • Time-weighted average price over settlement window determines outcome
  • If passed, treasury assets are distributed to token holders

Significance

This decision demonstrates the enforcement mechanism that makes "unruggable ICOs" credible - investors have a market-governed path to force liquidation and treasury return if they believe the project is not delivering value. The existence of this option changes the incentive structure for project teams compared to traditional token launches.

Context

User @m3taversal flagged this proposal asking about $SUPER price versus NAV, suggesting the market is evaluating whether current token price justifies continued operations or whether liquidation would return more value to holders.

  • metadao - Platform implementing the futarchy mechanism
  • futarchy-governed-liquidation-is-the-enforcement-mechanism-that-makes-unruggable-ICOs-credible-because-investors-can-force-full-treasury-return-when-teams-materially-misrepresent - Theoretical claim this decision validates