teleo-codex/decisions/internet-finance/solomon-solo-acquisition.md

---
type: decision
entity_type: decision_market
name: "Solomon: DP-00002 — SOLO Acquisition and Restricted Incentives Reserve"
domain: internet-finance
status: passed
parent_entity: "[[solomon]]"
platform: "futardio"
proposer: "Solomon team"
proposal_url: "https://www.metadao.fi/projects/solomon/proposal/wwRoJYcur3EjnQCLodUhLqCs6H9NQ97RvP6JNV4b9F6"
proposal_date: 2026-03-13
resolution_date: 2026-03-16
category: "operations"
summary: "Authorize acquisition of SOLO tokens and establish restricted incentives reserve for ecosystem growth"
tracked_by: rio
created: 2026-03-24
---

# Solomon: DP-00002 — SOLO Acquisition and Restricted Incentives Reserve

## Summary
Second Solomon governance proposal, continuing the staged treasury deployment series. Authorizes acquisition of SOLO tokens and establishes a restricted incentives reserve for ecosystem growth initiatives.

## Market Data
- **Outcome:** Passed
- **Proposal Account:** FMn6RyGhQkxT9wbVsE6KnQVzG5yHRTLkMmzLNJbCeV8J
- **Duration:** 2026-03-13 to ~2026-03-16

## Significance
Second stage of Solomon's governance formation, building on DP-00001's legal/compliance foundation. The staged approach continues to demonstrate the most methodical governance scaffolding among FaaS-launched projects.

## Relationship to KB
- [[solomon]] — parent entity, governance formation
- [[futardio]] — governance platform

## Full Proposal Text

*Source: futard.io, tabled 2026-03-13*

**Status:** Draft (proposal memorandum; to be voted)

**Version:** 1.0.2

**NON-BINDING SUMMARY.** This memorandum is informational only and is
subordinate to the governing instruments and any adopted resolutions.
In the event of conflict, the normative resolution text controls.

---

### Summary

This proposal authorizes the DAO to acquire SOLO using treasury funds and to
hold all acquired SOLO in a segregated **Restricted SOLO Incentives Reserve**.

The purpose of this reserve is to provide a credible, prefunded path for
future SOLO backed incentive programs intended to reward participation,
deepen alignment, and support long term ecosystem growth. This includes,
without limitation, the future pips program and any substantially similar
successor or related participation based framework later approved by
governance.

This proposal earmarks that purpose now so that participants can have
confidence that SOLO backing has been set aside in advance and cannot be
redirected by signers, operators, contributors, or committees acting on
discretion alone.

This proposal does not establish the live Incentives Subcommittee or appoint
its members. Those matters will be brought in a later proposal. Until that
later governance action is adopted, no person or body may deploy,
distribute, commit, or otherwise use reserve SOLO.

---

### Rationale

A participation based incentive program only has credibility if there is a
credible path from participation to the asset being promised or implied.
If the DAO intends to use SOLO-backed incentives to reward durable
participation, it is better to earmark that backing now than to leave
it to future discretion.

This proposal is intended to solve that credibility problem without
prematurely locking the DAO into a single incentive design.

This structure preserves three things at once:

- confidence that incentive backing exists and has been ring fenced;
- flexibility to design the actual program architecture; and
- sufficient operational discretion to finalize and implement program
  details in a way that reduces front running, gaming, sybil behavior, and
  other exploitative positioning before launch.

There is also a clear timing advantage. With SOLO trading below
treasury implied value ("NAV"), the DAO has an opportunity to build a
restricted incentives reserve on attractive terms and use treasury
capital to strengthen long term alignment across the network.

---

### Key Parameters

- **Amount:** `1,000,000 USDC`
- **Order Type:** `Recurring`
- **Program Duration:** `Up to 60 days`
- **Order Quantity:** `Variable recurring purchases, sized operationally
  within the approved cap and execution window`
- **Order Frequency:** `Recurring over a period of up to 60 days`
- **Maximum Order Price:** `0.74 USDC per SOLO (interpreted as a maximum
  program TWAP)`
- **Estimated SOLO Acquired:** `Approximately 1,351,351.35 SOLO, assuming
  full use of the acquisition facility at the maximum program TWAP`

### Process

This proposal includes instructions to execute a recurring SOLO acquisition
program using DAO treasury funds in an aggregate amount of up to
**1,000,000 USDC** over a period of up to **60 days**, subject to a
**maximum program TWAP of 0.74 USDC per SOLO**. Any SOLO acquired pursuant
to this proposal shall be retained in the DAO treasury and accounted for
as Restricted SOLO Incentives Reserve property.

---

### Section 1. Authorization of SOLO Acquisition

**Resolved**, that the DAO hereby authorizes a capped SOLO acquisition
program funded from DAO treasury using the parameters specified in this
Proposal.

**Resolved further**, that all SOLO acquired pursuant to this Proposal
shall be retained in the DAO treasury and designated on the DAO's books
and records as Restricted SOLO Incentives Reserve property.

---

### Section 2. Designation of Restricted SOLO Incentives Reserve

**Resolved**, that all SOLO acquired pursuant to this Proposal shall be held
in the DAO treasury and designated as Restricted SOLO Incentives Reserve
property of the DAO.

The Designated Purpose of the Restricted SOLO Incentives Reserve is to
support SOLO backed incentive programs intended to reward participation,
deepen alignment, and support long term ecosystem growth, including the
future pips program and any substantially similar successor or related
participation based framework later approved by governance.

**Resolved further**, that pips, and any substantially similar successor
participation framework approved by governance, shall have first call
priority on the Restricted SOLO Incentives Reserve.

**Resolved further**, that until amended by express later governance action,
the Restricted SOLO Incentives Reserve shall remain earmarked for its
Designated Purpose and shall not be repurposed, redirected, impaired, or
clawed back by any signer, contributor, service provider, committee,
operator, or other person acting without such governance approval.

---

### Section 3. No Current Deployment Authority

**Resolved**, that this Proposal does not establish the live Incentives
Subcommittee or appoint its members.

**Resolved further**, that this Proposal does not authorize any person or
body to distribute, commit, allocate, sell, transfer, make claimable, or
otherwise deploy Restricted SOLO Incentives Reserve assets at this time.

Until later governance action establishes and approves the live Incentives
Subcommittee and any applicable activation framework, reserve SOLO shall
remain held in the DAO treasury and accounted for solely for its
Designated Purpose.

---

### Section 5. Core Guardrails

Unless expressly approved by later governance action:

- reserve SOLO shall remain held in the DAO treasury and separately
  accounted for as Restricted SOLO Incentives Reserve property;
- reserve SOLO may not be self dealt, privately allocated, or directed to
  insiders or affiliates on preferential terms;
- reserve SOLO may not be manually transferred wallet to wallet to selected
  recipients as a discretionary allocation method;
- reserve SOLO may not be sold or otherwise disposed of below prevailing
  market price;
- reserve SOLO may not be lent, pledged, staked, paired for liquidity,
  used as collateral, used as market making inventory, or used for
  compensation; and
- any unused, expired, forfeited, cancelled, or unclaimed reserve SOLO
  shall be burned unless governance expressly directs otherwise.

---

### Plain English

If adopted, this proposal means:

- the DAO can acquire SOLO now;
- that SOLO is ring-fenced now for future incentive use;
- Pips has priority on that reserve;
- nobody can use or redirect that reserve on discretion alone; and
- a future Incentives Subcommittee can be voted in later to steward it.

---

### Links

- Full normative resolution text (controls if there is any conflict
  with this summary):
  [DP-00002_MEM-full.md](https://github.com/SolomonDAOrg/dao-proposals/blob/main/proposals/DP-00002-acquisition-restricted-incentives-framework/DP-00002_MEM-full.md)
- Compiled Company Agreement PDF:
  [Company_Agreement_SOLOMON_DAO_LLC.pdf](https://github.com/SolomonDAOrg/compiled-documents/blob/main/company-agreement/Company_Agreement_SOLOMON_DAO_LLC.pdf)
- Proposal repository (canonical history + execution artefacts):
  [https://github.com/SolomonDAOrg/dao-proposals](https://github.com/SolomonDAOrg/dao-proposals)
- SOP Registry (canonical):
  [https://github.com/SolomonDAOrg/sop-registry](https://github.com/SolomonDAOrg/sop-registry)

---

**Disclaimer (Governance Proposal; No Professional Advice).**

This document is a governance proposal and governance communication.
If adopted by the DAO through its governance mechanisms, it may become
binding on the DAO and persons exercising authority under the
Company Agreement to the extent provided in the Company Agreement and
applicable law.
This document does not constitute legal, tax, financial, or other
professional advice.
The author(s) are not acting as legal counsel to the DAO or any
member or user. No attorney-client relationship is created.

You must obtain your own independent advice for your circumstances.

### Raw Data

- Proposal account: `wwRoJYcur3EjnQCLodUhLqCs6H9NQ97RvP6JNV4b9F6`
- Proposal number: 2
- DAO account: `DzYtzoNvPbyFCzwZA6cSm9eDEEmxEB9f8AGkJXUXgnSA`
- Proposer: `tSTp6B6kE9o6ZaTmHm2ZwnJBBtgd3x112tapxFhmBEQ`
- Autocrat version: 0.6