teleo-codex/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposer-incentives-require-delayed-vesting-to-prevent-gaming.md
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-21 10:21:26 +01:00

2.6 KiB

type domain description confidence source created related reweave_edges
claim internet-finance Three-month clawback period filters for proposals that create lasting value versus short-term manipulation experimental Drift Futarchy proposal structure 2026-03-15
drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs
futarchy-incentive-programs-use-multisig-execution-groups-as-discretionary-override
futarchy-retroactive-rewards-bootstrap-participation-through-endowment-effect
drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs
drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs|related|2026-04-18'}
futarchy-incentive-programs-use-multisig-execution-groups-as-discretionary-override|related|2026-04-18
futarchy-retroactive-rewards-bootstrap-participation-through-endowment-effect|related|2026-04-18
Drift: Futarchy Proposal - Welcome the Futarchs|related|2026-04-19

Futarchy proposer incentives require delayed vesting to prevent gaming because immediate rewards enable proposal spam for token extraction rather than quality governance

The Drift proposal structures proposer rewards with a three-month delay between proposal passage and token claim. Passing proposals earn up to 5,000 DRIFT each, but tokens are only claimable after three months. This delay creates a quality filter: proposers must believe their proposals will create sustained value that survives the vesting period. Without this delay, rational actors could spam low-quality proposals to extract rewards, knowing they can exit before negative effects manifest. The proposal also includes an executor group discretion clause - if successful proposals exceed expectations, the group can decide which top N proposals split the allocation. This combines time-based filtering with human judgment to prevent gaming. The 20,000 DRIFT activity pool uses the same three-month delay, with criteria finalized by the execution group to 'filter for non organic activity.'

Additional Evidence (confirm)

Source: 2024-05-30-futardio-proposal-drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs | Added: 2026-03-16

Drift proposal implements 3-month vesting for proposer rewards (up to 5,000 DRIFT per passing proposal) and activity pool rewards (20,000 DRIFT split), explicitly stating rewards are 'claimable after 3 months.' This prevents immediate extraction and forces alignment with longer-term outcomes.


Relevant Notes:

  • futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
  • performance-unlocked-team-tokens-with-price-multiple-triggers-and-twap-settlement-create-long-term-alignment-without-initial-dilution.md

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