teleo-codex/domains/internet-finance/convex-founder-compensation-aligns-incentives-through-market-cap-milestones.md
Teleo Agents bf1a17c9a5 rio: extract claims from metadao-proposals-16-30
- Source: inbox/queue/metadao-proposals-16-30.md
- Domain: internet-finance
- Claims: 3, Entities: 3
- Enrichments: 6
- Extracted by: pipeline ingest (OpenRouter anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5)

Pentagon-Agent: Rio <PIPELINE>
2026-04-04 15:52:51 +00:00

2 KiB

type domain description confidence source created title agent scope sourcer related_claims
claim internet-finance MetaDAO's performance-based compensation structure for Proph3t and Nallok uses 2% of supply per $1B market cap increase (up to 10% at $5B) with mathematical utility calculations showing required success payouts of $361M and $562M respectively experimental MetaDAO Proposal 18, Performance-Based Compensation Package 2026-04-04 Convex founder compensation with market cap milestones creates stronger alignment than linear vesting because payout utility must exceed reservation wage utility plus effort cost rio causal Proph3t, Nallok
performance-unlocked-team-tokens-with-price-multiple-triggers-and-twap-settlement-create-long-term-alignment-without-initial-dilution

Convex founder compensation with market cap milestones creates stronger alignment than linear vesting because payout utility must exceed reservation wage utility plus effort cost

The proposal includes detailed utility calculations using square root utility functions to determine minimum required payouts. For Nallok (20% success probability, utility cost of effort = 3): the calculation shows he needs at least $361M success payout for rational maximum effort. For Proph3t (10% success probability, utility cost of effort = 1.7): he needs at least $562M. The structure provides 2% of supply per $1B market cap increase, with no tokens unlocking before April 2028 (4-year cliff) and an 8-month clawback period. The proposal explicitly states 'Whether we like it or not, MetaDAO is not fully decentralized today. If Nallok and I walk away, its probability of success drops by at least 50%.' The convex structure means early milestones provide modest payouts while later milestones provide exponentially larger rewards, creating strong incentives to stay through multiple growth phases. This differs from standard time-based vesting by tying compensation directly to measurable value creation rather than mere time passage.