teleo-codex/inbox/queue/2026-01-17-charnock-external-access-dangerous-capability-evals.md
2026-03-22 00:15:27 +00:00

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---
type: source
title: "Expanding External Access to Frontier AI Models for Dangerous Capability Evaluations"
author: "Jacob Charnock, Alejandro Tlaie, Kyle O'Brien, Stephen Casper, Aidan Homewood"
url: https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.11916
date: 2026-01-17
domain: ai-alignment
secondary_domains: []
format: paper
status: unprocessed
priority: high
tags: [external-evaluation, access-framework, dangerous-capabilities, EU-Code-of-Practice, evaluation-independence, translation-gap, governance-bridge, AL1-AL2-AL3]
---
## Content
This paper proposes a three-tier access framework for external evaluators conducting dangerous capability assessments of frontier AI models. Published January 17, 2026, 20 pages, submitted to cs.CY (Computers and Society).
**Three-tier Access Level (AL) taxonomy:**
- **AL1 (Black-box)**: Minimal model access and information — evaluator interacts via API only, no internal model information
- **AL2 (Grey-box)**: Moderate model access and substantial information — intermediate access to model behavior, some internal information
- **AL3 (White-box)**: Complete model access and comprehensive information — full API access, architecture information, weights, internal reasoning
**Core argument**: Current limited access arrangements (predominantly AL1) may compromise evaluation quality by creating false negatives — evaluations miss dangerous capabilities because evaluators can't probe the model deeply enough. AL3 access reduces false negatives and improves stakeholder trust.
**Security and capacity challenges acknowledged**: The authors propose that access risks can be mitigated through "technical means and safeguards used in other industries" (e.g., privacy-enhancing technologies from Beers & Toner; clean-room evaluation protocols).
**Regulatory framing**: The paper explicitly aims to operationalize the EU GPAI Code of Practice's requirement for "appropriate access" in dangerous capability evaluations — one of the first attempts to provide technical specification for what "appropriate access" means in regulatory practice.
**Authors**: Affiliation details not confirmed from abstract page; the paper's focus on EU regulatory operationalization and involvement of Stephen Casper (AI safety researcher) suggests alignment-safety-governance focus.
## Agent Notes
**Why this matters:** This is the clearest academic bridge-building work between research evaluations and compliance requirements I found this session. The EU Code of Practice says evaluators need "appropriate access" but doesn't define it. This paper proposes a specific technical taxonomy for what appropriate access means at different capability levels. It addresses the translation gap directly.
**What surprised me:** The paper explicitly cites privacy-enhancing technologies (similar to what Beers & Toner proposed in arXiv:2502.05219, archived March 2026) as a way to enable AL3 access without IP compromise. This suggests the research community is converging on PET + white-box access as the technical solution to the independence problem.
**What I expected but didn't find:** I expected more discussion of what labs have agreed to in current voluntary evaluator access arrangements (METR, AISI) — the paper seems to be proposing a framework rather than documenting what already exists. The gap between the proposed AL3 standard and current practice (AL1/AL2) isn't quantified.
**KB connections:**
- Directly extends: 2026-03-21-research-compliance-translation-gap.md (addresses Translation Gap Layer 3)
- Connects to: arXiv:2502.05219 (Beers & Toner, PET scrutiny) — archived previously
- Connects to: Brundage et al. AAL framework (arXiv:2601.11699) — parallel work on evaluation independence
- Connects to: EU Code of Practice "appropriate access" requirement (new angle on Code inadequacy)
**Extraction hints:**
1. New claim candidate: "external evaluators of frontier AI currently have predominantly black-box (AL1) access, which creates systematic false negatives in dangerous capability detection"
2. New claim: "white-box (AL3) access to frontier models is technically feasible via privacy-enhancing technologies without requiring IP disclosure"
3. The paper provides the missing technical specification for what the EU Code of Practice's "appropriate access" requirement should mean in practice — this is a claim about governance operationalization
## Curator Notes
PRIMARY CONNECTION: domains/ai-alignment/third-party-evaluation-infrastructure claims and translation-gap finding
WHY ARCHIVED: First paper to propose specific technical taxonomy for what "appropriate evaluator access" means — bridges research evaluation standards and regulatory compliance language
EXTRACTION HINT: Focus on the claim that AL1 access is currently the norm and creates false negatives; the AL3 PET solution as technically feasible is the constructive KB contribution