teleo-codex/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-release-launchpad.md

type	entity_type	name	domain	status	tracked_by	created	last_updated	parent_entity	platform	proposer	proposal_url	proposal_date	resolution_date	category	summary	tags
decision	decision_market	MetaDAO: Release a Launchpad	internet-finance	passed	rio	2026-03-11	2026-03-11	metadao	futardio	Proph3t & Kollan	https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/HREoLZVrY5FHhPgBFXGGc6XAA3hPjZw1UZcahhumFkef	2025-02-26	2025-03-01	strategy	Launch permissioned launchpad for futarchy DAOs — 'unruggable ICOs' where all USDC goes to DAO treasury or liquidity pool	futarchy launchpad unruggable-ico capital-formation futardio

MetaDAO: Release a Launchpad

Summary

Proposal to release a launchpad enabling new projects to raise capital through futarchy-governed DAOs. Mechanics: (1) project creators specify minimum USDC needed; (2) funders commit USDC over 5 days, receiving 1,000 tokens per USDC; (3) if minimum met, 10% of USDC paired with tokens in a constant-product AMM, remaining USDC + mint authority transferred to a futarchy DAO; (4) if minimum not met, funders burn tokens to reclaim USDC. Initially permissioned (Proph3t and Kollan select projects), with discretion to transition to permissionless.

This is the genesis proposal for what became Futardio — MetaDAO's ownership coin launchpad.

Market Data

• Outcome: Passed (2025-03-01)
• Autocrat version: 0.3
• Key participants: Proph3t (co-author), Kollan (co-author)

Significance

This is arguably MetaDAO's most consequential proposal — it created the Futardio launchpad that would generate most of MetaDAO's revenue and ecosystem value. The "unruggable ICO" framing solves the central trust problem of crypto fundraising: if the team walks away, anyone can propose treasury liquidation and return funds to investors. This is the concrete mechanism behind the claim that "futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible."

The progression from metadao-create-futardio (failed, one sentence, November 2024) to this proposal (passed, detailed mechanics, February 2025) demonstrates futarchy's quality filtering: same concept, dramatically different specification, opposite outcomes.

Key design choices: fixed price (1,000 tokens/USDC) rather than auction, 10% to AMM LP, initially permissioned with path to permissionless. The founders explicitly reserved discretion to change mechanics (e.g., adopt IDO pool approach), showing pragmatic flexibility within the futarchy governance framework.

Relationship to KB

• metadao — launchpad creation, major strategic pivot
• futardio — the entity created by this proposal
• metadao-create-futardio — the earlier failed version of this concept
• futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent — the core value proposition
• ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match — launchpad designed around investor protection
• internet-capital-markets-compress-fundraising-timelines — 5-day raise window
• futarchy-governed permissionless launches require brand separation to manage reputational liability because failed projects on a curated platform damage the platforms credibility — initially permissioned to manage this risk

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Relevant Entities:

• metadao — parent organization
• futardio — the launchpad created by this proposal
• proph3t — co-author

Topics:

• internet finance and decision markets

Full Proposal Text

Source: futard.io, tabled 2025-02-26

Type

Business - Project

Author(s)

Proph3t, Kollan

Overview

We are requesting the DAO's permission to release a launchpad for futarchy DAOs. Such a launchpad could solve many of the existing issues with capital formation in crypto.

Mechanics

The launchpad would work in the following way -

1. Project creators raise project ideas and specify a minimum amount of USDC they need to execute on the idea
2. Funders have 5 days to fund those ideas in exchange for tokens
   1. Funders would receive 1,000 tokens per USDC committed
   2. Except in rare cases, the whole initial supply would be issued by this process
3. If the launch receives sufficient USDC, 10% of the USDC is paired against an equivalent amount of tokens in a constant-product AMM. Then, all remaining USDC and the ability to mint new tokens are transferred to a futarchy DAO. Contributors can then raise proposals to issue tokens to themselves or to pay themselves on some interval (e.g., monthly)
4. If the launch does not receive sufficient USDC, all funders would be able to burn their tokens to claim their original USDC back

Why funders will prefer this to the status quo

Rugging is a rampant problem for on-chain capital raises. In this system, it's much harder for projects to rug because all of the USDC goes either to the DAO or to the liquidity pool. If the team walks away on day #1, anyone would be able to raise a proposal to the DAO to liquidate the treasury and return all money to the funders. This is also true on day #30, day #365, and day #1083.

Why founders will prefer this to the status quo

This system gives you two benefits as a founder:

1. Community involvement from day 1
2. Ability to raise money that you wouldn't have otherwise been able to raise

As I've written about before, community involvement from day 1 is an unfair advantage for projects. The two biggest crypto projects, Bitcoin and Ethereum, both had it. Bag bias is real, and in this system it works for you as a founder.

This also opens up the door to founders from geographies where it's historically been difficult to raise money.

GTM

We will canvas our network to find early-stage (ideally pre-raise) projects to launch on the platform. We already have a few prospective projects.

At the start, launches would be permissioned by us. We would reserve the right to transition to a permissionless system when and if we deem it beneficial.

Founder discretion

We would also have discretion to change the mechanics of launches (e.g. to adopt an IDO pool approach rather than the above fixed price approach) if we deem it +EV for MetaDAO