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53 lines
No EOL
3.3 KiB
Markdown
53 lines
No EOL
3.3 KiB
Markdown
---
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type: entity
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entity_type: company
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name: "Dean's List"
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domain: internet-finance
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handles: ["@deanslistDAO", "@_Dean_Machine"]
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status: active
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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last_updated: 2026-03-11
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category: "Services DAO — user feedback, QA, community management (Solana)"
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stage: stable
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key_metrics:
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token: "DEAN (100M cap, mint authority burned)"
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governance: "Futarchy via MetaDAO Autocrat"
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economic_model: "Client fees in USDC → purchase DEAN tokens"
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competitors: []
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built_on: ["Solana", "MetaDAO Autocrat"]
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tags: ["dao", "services", "futarchy", "metadao-ecosystem", "community"]
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---
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# Dean's List
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## Overview
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Services DAO on Solana providing professional user feedback, QA, marketing, and community management services to other Solana protocols. Originally a sub-DAO of Grape Protocol. Self-describes as a "Network State" of Web3 power users. One of the early DAOs to adopt MetaDAO's futarchy governance outside of MetaDAO itself.
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## Current State
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- **Token**: DEAN. Total supply capped at 100M (30M additional minted, then mint authority burned). Economic model: charge clients in USDC, use collected USDC to purchase DEAN tokens.
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- **Governance**: Uses MetaDAO's futarchy for governance decisions. "Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model" was put through futarchy decision markets.
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- **Scope evolution**: Beyond just feedback services — now involves broader Solana ecosystem coordination, trading community activities, AI agent token exploration.
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## Significance for KB
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Dean's List is interesting not as a standalone company but as an adoption data point. It demonstrates that futarchy governance can be adopted by organizations outside of MetaDAO's direct ecosystem — a services DAO using market-based governance for operational decisions. If more existing DAOs migrate from Snapshot/token voting to futarchy, that validates the governance evolution thesis.
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## Relationship to KB
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- DAO governance degenerates into political capture because proposal processes select for coalition-building skill over operational competence and the resulting bureaucracy creates structural speed disadvantages against focused competitors — Dean's List moved from token voting to futarchy to escape this
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- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] — Dean's List may use futarchy selectively for high-stakes decisions
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---
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Relevant Entities:
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- [[metadao]] — governance platform
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Topics:
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- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
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## Timeline
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- **2024-12-19** — [[deans-list-implement-3-week-vesting]] passed: 3-week linear vesting for DAO payments to reduce sell pressure from 80% immediate liquidation to 33% weekly rate, projected 15%-25% valuation increase
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- **2024-10-10** — [[islanddao-treasury-proposal]] passed: Established treasury reserve funded by 2.5% of USDC payments with risk-scored asset allocation (80/20 safe/risky split) and quarterly performance reviews managed by Kai (@DeFi_Kai)
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- **2024-06-22** — [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] proposed: $15K budget for ThailandDAO event promotion with travel for top 5 governance holders, requiring 3% TWAP increase
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- **2024-06-25** — [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] failed: Despite projecting 16x FDV increase ($123K to $2M+), proposal failed to attract sufficient trading volume during 3-day window |