m3taversal
e830fe4c5f
Three-agent knowledge base (Leo, Rio, Clay) with: - 177 claim files across core/ and foundations/ - 38 domain claims in internet-finance/ - 22 domain claims in entertainment/ - Agent soul documents (identity, beliefs, reasoning, skills) - 14 positions across 3 agents - Claim/belief/position schemas - 6 shared skills - Agent-facing CLAUDE.md operating manual Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
31 lines
3.2 KiB
Markdown
31 lines
3.2 KiB
Markdown
# Mechanisms — The Governance Tools
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The tools that make Living Capital and agent governance work. Futarchy, prediction markets, token economics, and mechanism design principles. These are the HOW — the specific mechanisms that implement the architecture.
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## Futarchy
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- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] — why market governance is robust
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- [[futarchy solves trustless joint ownership not just better decision-making]] — the deeper insight
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- [[futarchy enables trustless joint ownership by forcing dissenters to be bought out through pass markets]] — the mechanism
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- [[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage]] — minority protection
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- [[agents create dozens of proposals but only those attracting minimum stake become live futarchic decisions creating a permissionless attention market for capital formation]] — how proposals filter
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] — the liquidity constraint
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — adoption barriers
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- [[redistribution proposals are futarchys hardest unsolved problem because they can increase measured welfare while reducing productive value creation]] — the redistribution problem
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- [[coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy]] — why price works as objective
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## Prediction Markets
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- [[speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds]] — why markets work
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- [[Polymarket vindicated prediction markets over polling in 2024 US election]] — the vindication moment
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- [[called-off bets enable conditional estimates without requiring counterfactual verification]] — mechanism design tool
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## Token Economics & Governance
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- [[token voting DAOs offer no minority protection beyond majority goodwill]] — why voting alone fails
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- [[quadratic voting fails for crypto because Sybil resistance and collusion prevention are unsolvable]] — why not QV
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- [[blind meritocratic voting forces independent thinking by hiding interim results while showing engagement]] — a design principle
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- [[governance mechanism diversity compounds organizational learning because disagreement between mechanisms reveals information no single mechanism can produce]] — why multiple mechanisms
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- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] — mechanism selection
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## Platform
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — the on-chain mechanism
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- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — the platform
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- [[permissionless leverage on metaDAO ecosystem tokens catalyzes trading volume and price discovery that strengthens governance by making futarchy markets more liquid]] — the leverage thesis
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