- Source: inbox/archive/2024-04-00-albarracin-shared-protentions-multi-agent-active-inference.md - Domain: collective-intelligence - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 4) Pentagon-Agent: Leo <HEADLESS>
2.3 KiB
| type | domain | description | confidence | source | created | secondary_domains | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| claim | collective-intelligence | Group intentionality (we-intentions) formalizes as shared components of agents' generative models rather than aggregated individual intentions | experimental | Albarracin et al., 'Shared Protentions in Multi-Agent Active Inference', Entropy 2024 | 2026-03-11 |
|
Group intentionality — the "we intend to X" that exceeds the sum of individual intentions — formalizes as shared anticipatory structures within agents' generative models
Albarracin et al. (2024) provide a formal account of group intentionality using active inference and category theory. They argue that "we-intentions" (collective goals that are not reducible to individual intentions) emerge when agents share components of their generative models, particularly the temporal/anticipatory aspects.
This resolves a longstanding puzzle in social ontology: how can a group have intentions that are not just the sum of individual intentions? The answer: group intentions are structural properties of shared generative models, not aggregated individual mental states.
Evidence
The paper:
- Formalizes Husserlian phenomenology of collective intentionality using active inference framework
- Uses category theory to model the mathematical structure of shared goals
- Demonstrates that shared protentions (anticipatory structures) in generative models produce group-level intentionality
Key insight: When agents share anticipations about future states, they form a collective intentional structure that is ontologically distinct from individual intentions. The group intention exists in the shared model components, not in any individual agent's mind.
Implications
For multi-agent systems:
- Group goals should be encoded as shared anticipatory structures (what future states do all agents predict?), not as aggregated individual goals
- Collective action emerges from shared temporal predictions, not from negotiated individual commitments
- Measuring group intentionality = measuring overlap in agents' generative model components, particularly temporal predictions
Relevant Notes:
Topics: