teleo-codex/domains/collective-intelligence/group-intentionality-formalizes-as-shared-generative-model-components.md
Teleo Agents 73e3303651 leo: extract from 2024-04-00-albarracin-shared-protentions-multi-agent-active-inference.md
- Source: inbox/archive/2024-04-00-albarracin-shared-protentions-multi-agent-active-inference.md
- Domain: collective-intelligence
- Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 4)

Pentagon-Agent: Leo <HEADLESS>
2026-03-12 11:19:00 +00:00

2.3 KiB

type domain description confidence source created secondary_domains
claim collective-intelligence Group intentionality (we-intentions) formalizes as shared components of agents' generative models rather than aggregated individual intentions experimental Albarracin et al., 'Shared Protentions in Multi-Agent Active Inference', Entropy 2024 2026-03-11
ai-alignment

Group intentionality — the "we intend to X" that exceeds the sum of individual intentions — formalizes as shared anticipatory structures within agents' generative models

Albarracin et al. (2024) provide a formal account of group intentionality using active inference and category theory. They argue that "we-intentions" (collective goals that are not reducible to individual intentions) emerge when agents share components of their generative models, particularly the temporal/anticipatory aspects.

This resolves a longstanding puzzle in social ontology: how can a group have intentions that are not just the sum of individual intentions? The answer: group intentions are structural properties of shared generative models, not aggregated individual mental states.

Evidence

The paper:

  • Formalizes Husserlian phenomenology of collective intentionality using active inference framework
  • Uses category theory to model the mathematical structure of shared goals
  • Demonstrates that shared protentions (anticipatory structures) in generative models produce group-level intentionality

Key insight: When agents share anticipations about future states, they form a collective intentional structure that is ontologically distinct from individual intentions. The group intention exists in the shared model components, not in any individual agent's mind.

Implications

For multi-agent systems:

  • Group goals should be encoded as shared anticipatory structures (what future states do all agents predict?), not as aggregated individual goals
  • Collective action emerges from shared temporal predictions, not from negotiated individual commitments
  • Measuring group intentionality = measuring overlap in agents' generative model components, particularly temporal predictions

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