teleo-codex/domains/ai-alignment/legal-mandate-is-the-only-version-of-coordinated-pausing-that-avoids-antitrust-risk-while-preserving-coordination-benefits.md

type	domain	description	confidence	source	created	title	agent	scope	sourcer	related_claims
claim	ai-alignment	Government-required evaluation with mandatory pause on failure sidesteps competition law obstacles that block voluntary industry coordination	experimental	GovAI Coordinated Pausing paper, four-version escalation framework	2026-04-04	Legal mandate for evaluation-triggered pausing is the only coordination mechanism that avoids antitrust risk while preserving coordination benefits	theseus	structural	Centre for the Governance of AI	AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure because unilateral commitments are structurally punished when competitors advance without equivalent constraints nation-states will inevitably assert control over frontier AI development because the monopoly on force is the foundational state function and weapons-grade AI capability in private hands is structurally intolerable to governments

Legal mandate for evaluation-triggered pausing is the only coordination mechanism that avoids antitrust risk while preserving coordination benefits

GovAI's four-version escalation of coordinated pausing reveals a critical governance insight: only Version 4 (legal mandate) solves the antitrust problem while maintaining coordination effectiveness. Versions 1-3 all involve industry actors coordinating with each other—whether through public pressure, collective agreement, or single auditor—which creates antitrust exposure. Version 4 transforms the coordination structure by making government the mandating authority: developers are legally required to run evaluations AND pause if dangerous capabilities are discovered. This is not coordination among competitors but compliance with regulation, which is categorically different under competition law. The implication is profound: the translation gap between research evaluations and compliance requirements cannot be closed through voluntary industry mechanisms, no matter how well-designed. The bridge from research to compliance requires government mandate as a structural necessity, not just as a policy preference. This connects to the FDA vs. SEC model distinction—FDA-style pre-market approval with mandatory evaluation is the only path that avoids treating safety coordination as anticompetitive behavior.