Adds complete proposal text to all 28 MetaDAO governance records that previously had only hand-built summaries. This was the original batch from PR #1748 that was closed without merge due to rebase conflict. Records updated: - Proposals 1-15: LST vote market, Autocrat migrations (v01/v02), Saber vote market, spot market creation, AMM program, multi-option proposals, OTC trades (Ben Hawkins, Pantera, Colosseum), Dutch auction, burn 99.3% META, FaaS development, benevolent dictators, compensation - Proposals 16-36: Fundraise 2, Q3 roadmap, create Futardio, services agreement, hire Advaith, swap ISC, hire Robin Hanson, token split, release launchpad, OTC Theia, migrate META token, fund futarchy research Source: inbox/archive/internet-finance/ proposal archives from futard.io Pentagon-Agent: Rio <5551F5AF-0C5C-429F-8915-1FE74A00E019>
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| type | entity_type | name | domain | status | parent_entity | platform | proposer | proposal_url | proposal_date | category | summary | key_metrics | pass_volume | tracked_by | created | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| decision | decision_market | MetaDAO: Fund Futarchy Applications Research — Dr. Robin Hanson, George Mason University | internet-finance | active | metadao | metadao | Proph3t and Kollan | https://www.metadao.fi/projects/metadao/proposal/Dt6QxTtaPz87oEK4m95ztP36wZCXA9LGLrJf1sDYAwxi | 2026-03-21 | operations | $80,007 USDC for 6-month academic research at GMU led by Robin Hanson to experimentally test futarchy decision-market governance with 500 participants |
|
$42.16K total volume at time of filing | rio | 2026-03-21 |
MetaDAO: Fund Futarchy Applications Research — Dr. Robin Hanson, George Mason University
Summary
META-036. Proposal to allocate $80,007 USDC from MetaDAO treasury to fund a six-month academic research engagement at George Mason University. Led by Dr. Robin Hanson — the economist who invented futarchy — the project will produce the first rigorous experimental evidence on whether decision-market governance actually produces better decisions than alternatives.
Market Data (as of 2026-03-21)
- Outcome: Active (~2 days remaining)
- Likelihood: 50%
- Total volume: $42.16K
- Pass price: $3.4590 (+0.52% vs spot)
- Spot price: $3.4411
- Fail price: $3.3242 (-3.40% vs spot)
Proposal Details
Authors: Proph3t and Kollan
Period: April–September 2026 (tentative on final grant agreement)
Scope (from GMU Scope of Work, FP6572):
- Core objective: explore feasibility and mechanics of futarchy — specifically how prediction markets aggregate beliefs to inform decision-making
- 500 student participants in structured decision-making scenarios, predictions and behaviors tracked to measure efficiency of market-based governance
- All protocols undergo IRB review
- PI: Dr. Robin Hanson — 0.34 person months academic year + 0.75 person months summer (designs experimental frameworks, analyzes market data)
- Co-PI: Dr. Daniel Houser (experimental economics) — 0.08 person months AY + 0.17 months summer (experiment design, data analysis, communication of results)
- GRA (TBN) — programming, recruiting, IRB, running sessions, data collection/analysis. Full AY + summer. No funds requested for this position — GMU is absorbing this cost.
Budget breakdown (from GMU Budget Justification, FP6572):
| Item | Amount |
|---|---|
| Dr. Robin Hanson — 2 months summer salary | ~$30,000 |
| Dr. Daniel Houser — Co-investigator (0.85% AY + summer) | ~$6,000 |
| Graduate research assistant — full AY + summer | ~$19,007 |
| Participant payments (500 @ $50) | $25,000 |
| Fringe benefits (Faculty 31.4%, FICA 7.4%) | included above |
| F&A overhead (GMU rate: 59.1% MTDC) | waived/absorbed |
| Total | $80,007 |
Note on pricing: GMU's standard F&A rate is 59.1% of modified total direct costs, approved by ONR. At that rate, the overhead alone on ~$55K in direct costs would add ~$32K — meaning the real cost of this research is closer to $112K but GMU is eating the difference. Combined with the unfunded GRA position, the university is effectively subsidizing this engagement. The $80K price tag significantly understates the actual resource commitment.
Disbursement: Two payments — 50% on agreement execution, 50% upon delivery of interim report. Natural checkpoint for the DAO.
Onchain action: Treasury transfer of $80,007 USDC. If GMU cannot accept crypto, MetaDAO servicing entity converts to USD at treasury's expense.
Significance
This is the first attempt to produce peer-reviewed academic evidence on futarchy's core mechanism. Three strategic benefits:
-
Legitimacy. Published experimental results from the mechanism's inventor anchor MetaDAO's governance claims against competitors. No other DAO governance platform has academic validation.
-
Protocol improvement. If experiments reveal design weaknesses in current futarchy mechanics, MetaDAO gets data to fix them before they cause governance failures at scale. $80K to find a flaw is cheap compared to discovering it with $50M+ in treasury.
-
Ecosystem growth. Published findings attract institutional adopters evaluating futarchy governance. Academic credibility is the one thing that money alone cannot buy and competitors cannot replicate.
Cost context: $80K for a 6-month engagement with two professors and a GRA is below typical academic research rates ($200-500K). Hanson's existing advisory relationship (see metadao-hire-robin-hanson) likely reduced the price. The budget is 84% labor (Hanson $30K, Houser $6K, GRA $19K) and 16% participant payments ($25K).
The 50% likelihood is puzzling. This should be an easy pass — the cost is modest relative to MetaDAO's ~$9.5M treasury, the upside is asymmetric (validation or early flaw detection), and the proposers are the co-founders. The even split suggests either thin volume that hasn't found equilibrium, or genuine disagreement about whether academic research is the right priority vs. product development.
Risks
- Primary: experimental results challenge futarchy assumptions — the proposal correctly frames this as a feature ("honest data either way")
- Secondary: IRB or recruitment delays; GRA timeline includes buffer
- The proposal explicitly states "Regardless, MetaDAO benefits from honest/accurate data either way" — intellectual honesty about the outcome
Relationship to KB
- metadao — parent entity, treasury allocation
- metadao-hire-robin-hanson — prior proposal to hire Hanson as advisor (passed Feb 2025)
- futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders — the mechanism being experimentally tested
- speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds — the theoretical claim the research will validate or challenge
- futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject — Hanson bridges theory and implementation; research may identify which simplifications matter
Relevant Entities:
Topics:
Full Proposal Text
Source: metadao.fi, tabled 2026-03-20
Author: Proph3t and Kollan
Category: Operations Direct Action
Proposed period: 6 Months: April – September 2026 (tentative on final grant agreement)
Budget: $80,007 USDC
Summary
This proposal requests $80,007 USDC from the MetaDAO treasury to fund a six-month academic research engagement at George Mason University. Led by Dr. Robin Hanson — the economist who invented futarchy — this project will produce the first rigorous experimental evidence on the information-aggregation efficiency of decision-market governance, directly validating or challenging the theoretical basis on which MetaDAO operates.
A positive market outcome will authorize treasury disbursement and delegate authority to the MetaDAO director to execute a contract with GMU to initiate the engagement.
How and why this benefits MetaDAO and META token holders
-
Legitimacy
- Results will anchor MetaDAO's governance claims — a differentiator vs. competing platforms
-
Protocol improvement
- Experimental data will identify potential design weaknesses in current Futarchy mechanics, enabling targeted upgrades
-
Ecosystem growth
- Published findings will attract and support institutional adopters and projects evaluating the Futarchy Management tool on Solana
Scope of work
The research team will design and run controlled experiments with 500 student participants (500@$50 each, $25,000 total) in structured decision-making scenarios. All protocols will undergo Institutional Review Board (IRB) review. Dr. Daniel Houser (experimental economics) will participate as co-investigator. A graduate research assistant will handle programming, recruitment, data collection, and analysis across the full academic year and summer.
Budget Allocation
| Item | Amount (USDC) |
|---|---|
| Dr. Robin Hanson — 2 months summer salary | ~$30,000 |
| Dr. Daniel Houser — Co-investigator (0.85% AY + summer) | ~$6,000 |
| Graduate research assistant — full AY + summer | ~$19,007 |
| Participant payments (500 @ $50) | $25,000 |
| Total | $80,007 |
Risks and Mitigations
The primary risk is that experimental results challenge some assumptions underlying futarchy — this is a feature, not a bug. Regardless, MetaDAO benefits from honest/accurate data either way.
A secondary risk is IRB or recruitment delays; the GRA timeline includes buffer for both.
We propose funds to be disbursed in two payments (subject to the final grant agreement): 50% on agreement execution, 50% upon delivery of the interim report, giving the DAO a natural checkpoint.
Onchain action
Upon passing the program will authorize a treasury transfer of $80,007 USDC. In the event that George Mason University is unable to accept cryptocurrency payments, the MetaDAO servicing entity is authorized to convert the approved USDC to USD and execute a cash payment to GMU in the full amount of $80,007, with any conversion or transfer fees borne by the MetaDAO treasury. No further governance action required.
Supporting Documentation
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1MBStw8sAwjn7_cdoufQ-ooJjt4_nKY4o?usp=drive_link