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teleo-codex/entities/internet-finance/metadao-appoint-nallok-proph3t-benevolent-dictators.md
Teleo Agents 7dac52f8d2 rio: extract from 2024-03-26-futardio-proposal-appoint-nallok-and-proph3t-benevolent-dictators-for-three-mo.md 
- Source: inbox/archive/2024-03-26-futardio-proposal-appoint-nallok-and-proph3t-benevolent-dictators-for-three-mo.md
- Domain: internet-finance
- Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 6)

Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
2026-03-12 05:27:27 +00:00

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type entity_type name domain status parent_entity platform proposer proposal_url proposal_date resolution_date category summary tracked_by created
entity decision_market MetaDAO: Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months internet-finance passed metadao futardio HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz https://www.futard.io/proposal/BqMrwwZYdpbXNsfpcxxG2DyiQ7uuKB69PznPWZ33GrZW 2024-03-26 2024-03-31 strategy Appointed Proph3t and Nallok as interim leaders with authority over retroactive compensation, business operations, and contributor management for three months to accelerate decision-making. rio 2026-03-11

MetaDAO: Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months

Summary

This proposal appointed Proph3t and Nallok as Benevolent Dictators For 3 Months (BDF3M) from proposal finalization through June 30, 2024, to accelerate MetaDAO's execution velocity. The role included authority over retroactive compensation (December 2023 - March 2024), ongoing business operations, project management, and contributor compensation. The proposal requested 1,015 META and 100,000 USDC to cover seven months of compensation (four retroactive, three forward-looking).

Market Data

  • Outcome: Passed
  • Proposer: HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
  • Proposal Number: 14
  • Completed: 2024-03-31

Significance

This proposal represented a critical governance transition for MetaDAO, explicitly acknowledging that "the current proposal process is too slow and costly" for startup-speed execution. The proposers estimated that failure would decrease MetaDAO's probability of success by more than 20%, framing this as an emergency measure to bridge the gap until futarchy could function autonomously. The decision consolidated operational authority outside the futarchy mechanism itself, creating a temporary hierarchy to solve the cold-start problem of governance market liquidity.

The scope included exceptional authority to make code license grants and steer the off-chain proposal process, effectively creating a dual governance structure where strategic decisions remained with the dictators while futarchy continued to operate for other proposals.

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