3.5 KiB
| type | entity_type | name | domain | status | tracked_by | created | last_updated | parent_entity | platform | proposer | proposal_url | proposal_date | resolution_date | category | summary | tags | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| entity | decision_market | MetaDAO: Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok | internet-finance | passed | rio | 2026-03-11 | 2026-03-11 | metadao | futardio | Proph3t & Nallok | https://www.futard.io/proposal/BgHv9GutbnsXZLZQHqPL8BbGWwtcaRDWx82aeRMNmJbG | 2024-05-27 | 2024-05-31 | hiring | Convex payout: 2% supply per $1B market cap increase (max 10% at $5B), $90K/yr salary each, 4-year vest starting April 2028 |
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MetaDAO: Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok
Summary
The founders proposed a convex performance-based compensation package: 2% of token supply per $1 billion market cap increase, capped at 10% (1,975 META each) at $5B. Fixed salary of $90K/year each. Four-year cliff — no tokens unlock before April 2028 regardless of milestones. DAO can claw back all tokens until December 2024. The $1B market cap benchmark was defined as $42,198 per META (allowing for 20% dilution post-proposal).
The proposal included explicit utility calculations using expected value theory: Nallok requires $361M success payout to rationally stay (20% success probability estimate), Proph3t requires $562M (10% success probability). This drove the 10% allocation at $5B market cap (~$500M payout each).
Market Data
- Outcome: Passed (2024-05-31)
- Autocrat version: 0.3
- Key participants: Proph3t (architect/mechanism designer), Nallok (operations manager)
Significance
This is the first real-world example of futarchy-governed founder compensation. The mechanism design is sophisticated: convex payouts align incentives with exponential growth, the 4-year cliff signals long-term commitment, and the clawback provision creates accountability.
The explicit utility calculation in the proposal is remarkable — founders openly modeled their reservation wages, success probabilities, and effort costs, then derived the compensation that makes maximum effort rational. Proph3t estimated only 10% success probability, making his required payout higher than Nallok's despite both receiving equal allocation. This transparency is the opposite of typical startup compensation negotiations.
The proposal also honestly acknowledges centralization: "If Nallok and I walk away, probability of success drops by at least 50%." Futarchy governed the compensation decision, but the organization remained founder-dependent — the market approved this rather than pretending otherwise.
Relationship to KB
- metadao — founder compensation structure
- performance-unlocked-team-tokens-with-price-multiple-triggers-and-twap-settlement-create-long-term-alignment-without-initial-dilution — direct implementation of this mechanism
- token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance — performance-based rather than fixed allocation
- time-based token vesting is hedgeable making standard lockups meaningless as alignment mechanisms because investors can short-sell to neutralize lockup exposure while appearing locked — this proposal uses milestone vesting instead of time-based, partially addressing the hedging problem
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