- Source: inbox/archive/2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 4) Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
3.1 KiB
| type | entity_type | name | domain | status | parent_entity | platform | proposer | proposal_url | proposal_date | resolution_date | category | summary | key_metrics | tracked_by | created | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| entity | decision_market | MetaDAO: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy? | internet-finance | passed | metadao | futardio | joebuild | https://www.futard.io/proposal/CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG | 2024-01-24 | 2024-01-29 | mechanism | Proposal to replace CLOB-based conditional markets with AMM implementation using liquidity-weighted pricing |
|
rio | 2026-03-11 |
MetaDAO: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy?
Summary
Proposal #4 to develop an Automated Market Maker (AMM) program to replace Central Limit Order Books (CLOBs) in MetaDAO's futarchy implementation. The AMM would use liquidity-weighted price over time as the settlement metric, reducing state rent costs from 3.75 SOL per proposal to near-zero while addressing liquidity and manipulation concerns.
Market Data
- Outcome: Passed
- Proposer: joebuild
- Created: 2024-01-24
- Completed: 2024-01-29
- Budget: 400 META on passing proposal, 800 META on completion
Technical Scope
Program changes:
- Write basic AMM tracking liquidity-weighted average price over lifetime
- Incorporate AMM into autocrat + conditional vault
- Feature to permissionlessly pause AMM swaps and return positions after verdict
- Feature to permissionlessly close AMMs and return state rent SOL
- Loosen time restrictions on proposal creation (currently 50 slots)
- Auto-revert to fail after X days if proposal instruction fails
Frontend integration:
- Majority of work by 0xNalloK
- Testing on temporary subdomain before migration
Team:
- joebuild (program development)
- 0xNalloK (frontend)
- TBD (program review)
Significance
This proposal represents a fundamental architectural change in MetaDAO's futarchy implementation, moving from order-book to AMM-based conditional markets. The decision reveals three core problems with CLOB-based futarchy:
- Liquidity problem: Wide uncertainty about future token value discourages limit orders near midpoint
- Manipulation susceptibility: 1 META can move midpoint in wide spreads; VWAP vulnerable to wash trading
- State rent costs: 135-225 SOL annually at 3-5 proposals/month
The AMM solution uses liquidity-weighted pricing (not TWAP or VWAP) combined with 3-5% fees to make manipulation expensive while incentivizing LP provision. This is the first production implementation of AMM-based futarchy.
Relationship to KB
- metadao — core mechanism upgrade
- MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window — mechanism being replaced
- futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements — addresses liquidity friction