teleo-codex/entities/internet-finance/sanctum-offer-investors-early-unlocks-cloud.md
Teleo Agents aa0ba564bd rio: extract from 2025-08-20-futardio-proposal-should-sanctum-offer-investors-early-unlocks-of-their-cloud.md
- Source: inbox/archive/2025-08-20-futardio-proposal-should-sanctum-offer-investors-early-unlocks-of-their-cloud.md
- Domain: internet-finance
- Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 4)

Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
2026-03-12 11:00:19 +00:00

2.6 KiB

type entity_type name domain status parent_entity platform proposer proposal_url proposal_account proposal_date resolution_date category summary tracked_by created
entity decision_market Sanctum: Should Sanctum offer investors early unlocks of their CLOUD? internet-finance failed sanctum futardio proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2 https://www.futard.io/proposal/C61vTUyxTq5SWwbrTFEyYeXpGQLKhRRvRrGsu6YUa6CX C61vTUyxTq5SWwbrTFEyYeXpGQLKhRRvRrGsu6YUa6CX 2025-08-20 2025-08-23 treasury Proposal to allow investors immediate unlock of vested CLOUD by forfeiting 35% to Team Reserve rio 2026-03-11

Sanctum: Should Sanctum offer investors early unlocks of their CLOUD?

Summary

This proposal would have empowered the Sanctum Team to offer investors immediate unlocks of their vesting CLOUD tokens in exchange for forfeiting 35% of their holdings to the Team Reserve. With 9% of token supply unlocking monthly over 24 months from investors, the mechanism could have increased the Team Reserve by up to 27 million CLOUD while reducing token overhang. The team committed not to redistribute forfeited tokens for at least 24 months.

Market Data

  • Outcome: Failed
  • Proposer: proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2
  • Platform: Futardio (MetaDAO Autocrat v0.3)
  • DAO Account: GVmi7ngRAVsUHh8REhKDsB2yNftJTNRt5qMLHDDCizov
  • Completed: 2025-08-23

Significance

This proposal represents an alternative approach to the token vesting hedgeability problem: rather than allowing investors to maintain nominal lockups while hedging exposure through derivatives, it forces an explicit forfeit-for-liquidity trade-off. The 35% forfeit rate creates a real cost for early liquidity, making the alignment mechanism meaningful rather than cosmetic. The proposal's failure despite potential treasury benefits suggests futarchy markets face adoption friction even for economically rational proposals when they require sophisticated financial reasoning from participants.

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