2.9 KiB
| type | entity_type | name | domain | status | tracked_by | created | last_updated | parent_entity | platform | proposer | proposal_url | proposal_date | resolution_date | category | summary | tags | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| entity | decision_market | MetaDAO: Approve Fundraise #2 | internet-finance | passed | rio | 2026-03-11 | 2026-03-11 | metadao | futardio | Proph3t | https://www.futard.io/proposal/9BMRY1HBe61MJoKEd9AAW5iNQyws2vGK6vuL49oR3AzX | 2024-06-26 | 2024-06-30 | fundraise | Raise $1.5M by selling up to 4,000 META to VCs and angels at minimum $375/META ($7.81M FDV), no discount, no lockup |
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MetaDAO: Approve Fundraise #2
Summary
Proposal to raise $1.5M by selling up to 4,000 META to VCs and angels. Terms: no discount, no lockup, minimum price $375/META (implying $7.81M minimum FDV based on 20,823.5 META in public hands). Funds custodied by Proph3t and Nallok in a multisig, released at $100K/month to minimize DAO attack risk. Burn rate: $1.38M/year covering two founders ($90K each), three engineers ($190K each), audits ($300K), office ($80K), growth person ($150K), and admin ($100K).
Market Data
- Outcome: Passed (2024-06-30)
- Autocrat version: 0.3
- Key participants: Proph3t (proposer), Nallok (multisig co-custodian)
Significance
This was MetaDAO's first VC fundraise approved through futarchy — the market decided whether to dilute existing holders for growth capital. The "no discount, no lockup" terms are unusual for crypto fundraises and reflect futarchy's transparency ethos: investors get the same terms as the market.
The multisig custodianship ($100K/month release) reveals a practical tension: futarchy governs the fundraise decision, but operational security requires trusted custodians. The DAO cannot safely hold and disburse large sums through governance alone — an early signal of the pattern where futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate scaffolding for treasury operations.
The detailed budget breakdown provides one of the few public windows into early MetaDAO operational costs, valuable for benchmarking futarchy-governed organizations.
Relationship to KB
- metadao — capital formation event
- internet-capital-markets-compress-fundraising-timelines — futarchy-governed fundraise completed in 4 days
- futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance — multisig custody alongside futarchy approval
- futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control — but this raise has identifiable custodians, complicating the "no beneficial owners" argument
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