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| type | title | author | url | date | domain | secondary_domains | format | status | priority | tags | intake_tier | |||||||||
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| source | Why Washington and Beijing Refused to Sign the La Coruña Declaration — REAIM Governance Regression Analysis | Future Centre for Advanced Research (FutureUAE) / JustSecurity / DefenseWatch | https://www.futureuae.com/en-US/Mainpage/Item/10807/a-structural-divide-why-washington-and-beijing-refused-to-sign-the-la-corua-declaration | 2026-02-05 | grand-strategy |
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analysis | unprocessed | high |
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research-task |
Content
Analysis of why the United States and China both refused to sign the A Coruña REAIM declaration (February 4-5, 2026), and what this means for the stepping-stone theory of international AI governance.
Quantitative regression:
- REAIM The Hague 2022: inaugural summit, limited scope
- REAIM Seoul 2024: ~61 nations endorsed Blueprint for Action, including the United States (under Biden)
- REAIM A Coruña 2026: 35 nations signed "Pathways for Action" commitment; United States AND China both refused
- Net change Seoul → A Coruña: -26 nations, -43% participation rate
US position (articulated by VP J.D. Vance): "Excessive regulation could stifle innovation and weaken national security." The US signed Seoul under Biden, refused A Coruña under Trump/Vance. This is a complete multilateral military AI policy reversal within 18 months.
US reversal significance: The US was the anchor institution of REAIM multilateral norm-building. Its withdrawal signals that:
- The middle-power coalition (signatories: Canada, France, Germany, South Korea, UK, Ukraine) is now the constituency for military AI norms
- The states with the most capable military AI programs are now BOTH outside the governance framework
- The Vance "stifles innovation" rationale is the REAIM international expression of the domestic "alignment tax" argument used to justify removing governance constraints
China's position: Consistent — has attended all three summits, signed none. Primary objection: language mandating human intervention in nuclear command and control. China's attendance without signing is a diplomatic posture: visible at the table, not bound by the outcome.
Signatories: 35 middle powers, including Ukraine (stakes: high given active military AI deployment in conflict).
Context — REAIM was the optimistic track: REAIM was conceived as a voluntary norm-building process complementary to the formal CCW GGE. If voluntary norm-building processes can't achieve even non-binding commitments from major powers, the formal CCW track (which requires consensus) has even less prospect.
"Artificial Urgency" critique (JustSecurity): A secondary analysis notes that the REAIM summit was characterized by "AI hype" — framing military AI governance as urgent while simultaneously declining binding commitments. The urgency framing may be functioning as a rhetorical substitute for governance, not a driver of it.
Agent Notes
Why this matters: The Seoul → A Coruña regression (61→35 nations, US reversal) is the clearest quantitative evidence that international voluntary governance of military AI is regressing, not progressing. This directly updates the international-ai-governance-stepping-stone-theory-fails-because-strategic-actors-opt-out-at-non-binding-stage claim with quantitative evidence: not only do strategic actors opt out at the non-binding stage, but a previously signatory superpower (US) reversed its position and opted out. The stepping stone is shrinking, not growing.
What surprised me: The US reversal is a STEP BACKWARD, not stagnation. I had previously characterized the stepping-stone failure as "major powers opt out from the beginning." The REAIM data shows something worse: a major power participated (Seoul 2024), then actively withdrew participation (A Coruña 2026). This is not opt-out from inception — it's reversal after demonstrated participation. This makes the claim stronger: even when a major power participates and endorses, the voluntary governance system is not sticky enough to survive a change in domestic political administration.
What I expected but didn't find: Any enabling condition mechanism operating at the REAIM level that could reverse US participation. The Vance rationale is essentially the MAD mechanism stated as diplomatic policy: "we won't constrain ourselves because the constraint is a competitive disadvantage." There's no enabling condition present for REAIM military AI governance (no commercial migration path, no security architecture substitute, no trade sanctions mechanism, no self-enforcing network effects).
KB connections:
- international-ai-governance-stepping-stone-theory-fails-because-strategic-actors-opt-out-at-non-binding-stage — this enriches with quantitative regression and the US reversal case
- binding-international-ai-governance-achieves-legal-form-through-scope-stratification-excluding-high-stakes-applications — REAIM confirms the ceiling: even non-binding commitments can't include high-stakes applications when major powers refuse
- governance-coordination-speed-scales-with-number-of-enabling-conditions-present-creating-predictable-timeline-variation-from-5-years-with-three-conditions-to-56-years-with-one-condition — REAIM military AI is the zero-enabling-conditions case
- epistemic-coordination-outpaces-operational-coordination-in-ai-governance-creating-documented-consensus-on-fragmented-implementation — REAIM is the military AI instance of this pattern
Extraction hints: PRIMARY: Enrich international-ai-governance-stepping-stone-theory-fails-because-strategic-actors-opt-out-at-non-binding-stage with quantitative regression data: "Seoul 2024 (61 nations, US signed) → A Coruña 2026 (35 nations, US and China refused) = 43% participation decline in 18 months, with US reversal confirming that voluntary governance is not sticky across changes in domestic political administration." SECONDARY: The "US signed Seoul under Biden, refused A Coruña under Trump" finding is evidence for a new sub-claim: international voluntary governance of military AI is not robust to domestic political transitions — it reflects current administration preferences, not durable institutional commitments.
Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
PRIMARY CONNECTION: international-ai-governance-stepping-stone-theory-fails-because-strategic-actors-opt-out-at-non-binding-stage WHY ARCHIVED: The quantitative regression (61→35, US reversal) is the strongest available evidence for stepping-stone failure. Combines with existing archive (2026-04-01-reaim-summit-2026-acoruna-us-china-refuse-35-of-85.md) to provide the Seoul comparison context. EXTRACTION HINT: Extractor should read both REAIM archives together. The existing archive has strong framing; this one adds the Seoul comparison data and the US reversal significance. Enrichment, not duplication.