m3taversal
f63eb8000a
Mechanical space→hyphen conversion in frontmatter references (related_claims, challenges, supports, etc.) to match actual filenames. Fixes 26.9% broken link rate found by wiki-link audit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
37 lines
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2.6 KiB
Markdown
37 lines
No EOL
2.6 KiB
Markdown
---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: Three-month clawback period filters for proposals that create lasting value versus short-term manipulation
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confidence: experimental
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source: Drift Futarchy proposal structure
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created: 2026-03-15
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related:
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- "drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs"
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- futarchy-incentive-programs-use-multisig-execution-groups-as-discretionary-override
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- futarchy-retroactive-rewards-bootstrap-participation-through-endowment-effect
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- "drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs"
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reweave_edges:
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- "drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs|related|2026-04-18'}"
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- futarchy-incentive-programs-use-multisig-execution-groups-as-discretionary-override|related|2026-04-18
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- futarchy-retroactive-rewards-bootstrap-participation-through-endowment-effect|related|2026-04-18
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- "Drift: Futarchy Proposal - Welcome the Futarchs|related|2026-04-19"
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---
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# Futarchy proposer incentives require delayed vesting to prevent gaming because immediate rewards enable proposal spam for token extraction rather than quality governance
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The Drift proposal structures proposer rewards with a three-month delay between proposal passage and token claim. Passing proposals earn up to 5,000 DRIFT each, but tokens are only claimable after three months. This delay creates a quality filter: proposers must believe their proposals will create sustained value that survives the vesting period. Without this delay, rational actors could spam low-quality proposals to extract rewards, knowing they can exit before negative effects manifest. The proposal also includes an executor group discretion clause - if successful proposals exceed expectations, the group can decide which top N proposals split the allocation. This combines time-based filtering with human judgment to prevent gaming. The 20,000 DRIFT activity pool uses the same three-month delay, with criteria finalized by the execution group to 'filter for non organic activity.'
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-05-30-futardio-proposal-drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
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Drift proposal implements 3-month vesting for proposer rewards (up to 5,000 DRIFT per passing proposal) and activity pool rewards (20,000 DRIFT split), explicitly stating rewards are 'claimable after 3 months.' This prevents immediate extraction and forces alignment with longer-term outcomes.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
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- performance-unlocked-team-tokens-with-price-multiple-triggers-and-twap-settlement-create-long-term-alignment-without-initial-dilution.md
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Topics:
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- [[_map]] |