m3taversal
1a31bc0f4d
Changes that missed PR #1750 merge: Dean's List (8 records): - 6 full text backfills + 2 new (Treasury De-Risking, Liquidity Fee Structure) ORE (4 records): - 2 full text backfills + 2 new (USDC-ORE Boost, Sublinear Supply Function) coal (4 records): - 4 full text backfills URL migration (75 files): - All proposal_url fields migrated from dead futard.io to v1.metadao.fi - Pattern: futard.io/proposal/{key} → v1.metadao.fi/{project}/trade/{key} - futard.io returns 404; v1.metadao.fi returns 200 Pentagon-Agent: Rio <5551F5AF-0C5C-429F-8915-1FE74A00E019>
2.8 KiB
| type | entity_type | name | domain | status | tracked_by | created | last_updated | parent_entity | platform | proposer | proposal_url | proposal_date | resolution_date | category | summary | tags | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| decision | decision_market | MetaDAO: Burn 99.3% of META in Treasury | internet-finance | passed | rio | 2026-03-11 | 2026-03-11 | metadao | futardio | doctor.sol & rar3 | https://v1.metadao.fi/MetaDAO/trade/ELwCkHt1U9VBpUFJ7qGoVMatEwLSr1HYj9q9t8JQ1NcU | 2024-03-03 | 2024-03-08 | treasury | Burn ~979,000 of 982,464 treasury-held META tokens to reduce FDV and attract investors |
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MetaDAO: Burn 99.3% of META in Treasury
Summary
Proposal to burn approximately 99.3% of treasury-held META tokens (~979,000 of 982,464) to significantly reduce the Fully Diluted Valuation. Passed on Autocrat v0.1. The high FDV was perceived as discouraging investors and limiting participation in the futarchy experiment. Post-burn treasury: ~4,500 META valued at ~$4M plus ~$2M in META-USDC LP at the time ($880/META). Total META supply after burn: ~20,885.
Market Data
- Outcome: Passed (2024-03-08)
- Autocrat version: 0.1
- Key participants: doctor.sol & rar3 (authors), Proph3t (executor)
Significance
One of the most consequential early MetaDAO governance decisions. The burn fundamentally changed MetaDAO's token economics — eliminating the treasury's ability to pay in META and forcing future operations to use USDC or market-purchase META. This created a natural scarcity signal but also meant the DAO would eventually need mintable tokens (which the proposal explicitly noted as a future possibility). The burn set the stage for the later token split and elastic supply debates.
The proposal also reveals early futarchy dynamics: community members (not founders) proposed a radical tokenomics change, and the market approved it. This is a concrete example of futarchy enabling non-founder governance proposals with material treasury impact.
Relationship to KB
- metadao — governance decision, treasury management
- futarchy enables trustless joint ownership by forcing dissenters to be bought out through pass markets — demonstrates market-governed treasury decisions
- ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests — burn as extreme active management
- futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations — this burn directly created the conditions that made mintable tokens necessary
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