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One-time atomic migration. All paths preserved (wiki links use stems).
Pentagon-Agent: Epimetheus <968B2991-E2DF-4006-B962-F5B0A0CC8ACA>
53 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
53 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
---
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type: source
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title: "Empirical Evidence: AI Coordination and Governance Mechanisms That Changed Behavior"
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author: "Theseus research agent (multi-source web synthesis)"
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url: null
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date_published: 2026-03-16
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date_archived: 2026-03-16
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domain: ai-alignment
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status: processing
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processed_by: theseus
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tags: [ai-governance, coordination, safety-commitments, regulation, enforcement, voluntary-pledges]
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sourced_via: "Theseus research agent — 45 web searches synthesized from Brookings, Stanford FMTI, EU legislation, OECD, government publications, TechCrunch, TIME, CNN, Fortune, academic papers"
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---
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# Empirical Evidence: AI Coordination and Governance Mechanisms That Changed Behavior
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Core finding: almost no international AI governance mechanism has produced verified behavioral change at frontier AI labs. Only three mechanisms work: (1) binding regulation with enforcement teeth (EU AI Act, China), (2) export controls backed by state power, (3) competitive/reputational pressure through markets.
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## Behavioral Change Tier List
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**Tier 1 — Verified behavioral change:**
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- EU AI Act: Apple paused Apple Intelligence in EU, Meta changed ads, EUR 500M+ fines (DMA). Companies preemptively modifying products.
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- China's AI regulations: mandatory algorithm filing, content labeling, criminal enforcement. First binding generative AI regulation (Aug 2023).
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- US export controls: most impactful mechanism. Tiered country system, deployment caps, Nvidia designing compliance chips. Geopolitically motivated, not safety-motivated.
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**Tier 2 — Institutional infrastructure, uncertain behavioral change:**
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- AI Safety Institutes (UK, US, Japan, Korea, Canada). US-UK joint o1 evaluation. But no blocking authority, US AISI defunded/rebranded.
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- Third-party evaluation (METR, Apollo Research). Fragile, no regulatory mandate.
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**Tier 3 — Partial voluntary compliance:**
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- Watermarking: 38% implementation. Google SynthID, Meta AudioSeal. Anthropic the only major lab without one.
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- Red-teaming: self-reported, limited external verification.
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**Tier 4 — No verified behavioral change:**
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- ALL international declarations (Bletchley, Seoul, Paris, Hiroshima, OECD, UN)
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- Frontier Model Forum
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- White House voluntary commitments
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## Key Evidence Points
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- Stanford FMTI transparency scores DECLINING: -17 points mean (2024→2025). Meta -29, Mistral -37, OpenAI -14.
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- OpenAI explicitly made safety conditional on competitor behavior (Preparedness Framework v2, Apr 2025).
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- OpenAI removed "safely" from mission statement (Nov 2025).
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- OpenAI dissolved Superalignment team (May 2024) and Mission Alignment team (Feb 2026).
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- Google accused by 60 UK lawmakers of violating Seoul commitments (Gemini 2.5 Pro, Apr 2025).
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- 450+ organizations lobbied on AI in 2025 (up from 6 in 2016). $92M in lobbying fees Q1-Q3 2025.
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- SB 1047 (CA AI safety bill) vetoed after heavy industry lobbying.
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- Anthropic's own language: RSP "very hard to meet without industry-wide coordination."
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## Novel Mechanisms
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- Compute governance: export controls work but geopolitically motivated. KYC for compute proposed, not implemented.
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- Insurance/liability: market projected $29.7B by 2033. Creates market incentives aligned with safety.
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- Third-party auditing: METR, Apollo Research. Apollo warns ecosystem unsustainable without regulatory mandate.
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- Futarchy: implemented for DAO governance (MetaDAO, Optimism experiment) but not yet for AI governance.
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